area handbook series 

Philippines 

country study 



Philippines 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Ronald E. Dolan 
Research Completed 
June 1991 



On the cover: The presence of the Church of the Holy Child 
in the center of metropolitan Manila symbolizes the constancy 
of the Roman Catholic Church in a changing Philippines. 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Philippines : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Ronald E. Dolan. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-72) 

"Supersedes the 1983 edition of Philippines: a country study, 
edited by Frederica M. Bunge" — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed June 1991." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 317-359) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0748-8 

1. Philippines. L Dolan, Ronald E., 1939- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA 
pam ; 550-72. 

DS655.P598 1993 92-39812 
959.9— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-72 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supersedes the 1983 edition of Philippines: A Coun- 
try Study, edited by Frederica M. Bunge. The authors wish to ac- 
knowledge their use and adaptation of information from that book 
in the preparation of this edition. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Andrea M. Savada and Sandra W. Meditz made many helpful sug- 
gestions during their review of the book. Robert L. Worden also 
reviewed parts of the book and made numerous suggestions and 
points of clarification. Timothy Merrill reviewed the maps and geo- 
graphical and telecommunications references in the book; David 
P. Cabitto prepared the artwork of the cover illustration and coor- 
dinated production of all maps and figures; Marilyn L. Majeska 
managed editing and production of the book; Andrea T. Merrill 
provided valuable assistance with tables and figures; Alberta J. King 
provided research and word processing assistance on parts of the 
book; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson performed final 
word processing for the completed manuscript. 

The editor owes a special debt of gratitude to the late Professor 
Charles W. Lindsey, who despite serious illness continued to pro- 
vide valuable advice and assistance in the editing of his chapter 
on the Philippine economy. Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, 
who oversees the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program for 
the Department of the Army, and James Nach of the Department 
of State, who reviewed the text and also offered suggestions and 
points of clarification. In addition, the editor wishes to thank vari- 
ous members of the staff of the Embassy of the Philippines, Wash- 
ington, especially Colonel Roberto P. Santiago and MacArthur 
Corsino. None of these individuals is in any way responsible for 
the final version of the book, however. 

Others who contributed to the publication of this book were Har- 
riett R. Blood and the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, who as- 
sisted in the preparation of maps and charts; Deanna D'Errico, 
who edited the individual chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who 
performed the final prepublication review; Joan C. Cook, who pre- 
pared the index; and Linda Peterson and Malinda B. Neale of the 
Library of Congress Composing Unit, who prepared camera-ready 
copy under the direction of Peggy Pixley. Finally, the authors are 
especially grateful to individuals and organizations who donated 
photographs. They are acknowledged in the illustration captions. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Donald M. Seekins 

EARLY HISTORY 4 

THE EARLY SPANISH PERIOD, 1521-1762 5 

THE DECLINE OF SPANISH RULE, 1762-1898 , 8 

Trade with Europe and America 9 

Chinese and Chinese Mestizos 11 

The Friarocracy 12 

The Development of a National Consciousness 15 

Jose Rizal and the Propaganda Movement 17 

The Katipunan 20 

The 1896 Uprising and Rizal' s Execution 20 

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND PHILIPPINE 

RESISTANCE 22 

Outbreak of War, 1898 22 

The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris ... 24 

War of Resistance 26 

THE FIRST PHASE OF UNITED STATES RULE, 

1898-1935 27 

A Collaborative Philippine Leadership 29 

The Jones Act 32 

Economic and Social Developments 34 

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE JAPANESE 

OCCUPATION 38 

Commonwealth Politics, 1935-41 38 

World War II, 1941-45 39 

INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 

GOVERNMENT, 1945-72 41 

Economic Relations with the United States 

after Independence 43 



vii 



Security Agreements 44 

The Huk Rebellion 45 

The Magsaysay, Garcia, and Macapagal 

Administrations, 1953-65 47 

Marcos and the Road to Martial Law, 

1965-72 49 

Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law 52 

From Aquino's Assassination to People's 

Power 56 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 65 

Chester L. Hunt 

PHYSICAL SETTING 68 

THE CLIMATE 69 

POPULATION 70 

Population Growth 70 

Migration 70 

Population Control 74 

ETHNICITY, REGIONALISM, AND LANGUAGE 75 

Historical Development of Ethnic 

Identities 75 

Language Diversity and Uniformity 77 

The Lowland Christian Population 80 

Muslim Filipinos 81 

Upland Tribal Groups 84 

The Chinese 86 

SOCIAL VALUES AND ORGANIZATION 88 

RURAL SOCIAL PATTERNS 91 

URBAN SOCIAL PATTERNS 94 

THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THE FILIPINA 96 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 98 

Historical Background 99 

Roman Catholicism 100 

Indigenous Christian Churches 102 

Protestantism 103 

Islam 105 

Ecumenical Developments 106 

Church and State 107 

EDUCATION 108 

Historical Background 109 

Education in the Modern Period 109 

HEALTH AND LIVING STANDARDS 112 



vm 



Chapter 3. The Economy 117 

Charles W. Lindsey 

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT 120 

Economic Development until 1970 120 

Martial Law and Its Aftermath, 1972-86 122 

The Aquino Government 124 

ECONOMIC PLANNING AND POLICY 128 

Development Planning 128 

Fiscal Policy 130 

Monetary Policy 132 

Privatization 135 

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 135 

Agricultural Geography 135 

Agricultural Production and Government 

Policy 136 

Rice and the Green Revolution 139 

Coconut Industry 140 

Sugar 143 

Land Tenancy and Land Reform 147 

Livestock 151 

Forestry 151 

Fishing 153 

INDUSTRY 154 

Manufacturing 154 

Mining 155 

Energy 157 

THE SERVICE SECTOR 158 

Finance 158 

Transportation 161 

Telecommunications and Postal Services 165 

Tourism 165 

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS 166 

Labor Force and Employment 166 

Labor Relations 168 

ECONOMIC WELFARE 171 

Extent of Poverty 171 

Causes of Poverty 172 

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 173 

International Trade 173 

Foreign Investment 177 

External Debt 179 



ix 



Development Assistance 184 

Political Economy of United States Military Bases ... 185 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 189 

Ross Marlay 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 193 

Constitutional Framework 193 

National Government 198 

Local Government 206 

POLITICS 212 

The Inheritance from Marcos 212 

The Rise of Corazon Aquino 214 

Political Parties 218 

Voting and Elections 222 

The Return of Old-Style Politics in the 

Countryside 224 

Church-State Relations 226 

Civil-Military Relations 227 

The Media 229 

Unsolved Political Problems 230 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 232 

Filipino Nationalism 232 

Relations with the United States 233 

Relations with Asian Neighbors 235 

Relations with the Soviet Union 238 

Relations with the Middle East 239 

Chapter 5. National Security 241 

Allen G. Miller 

THE ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL LIFE 245 

Historical Background 245 

External Defense 248 

Political Role 249 

The Counterinsurgency Campaign 252 

Recruitment and Personnel 256 

Defense Spending and Industry 258 

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES 260 

Organization and Training 261 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 272 

Salary and Benefits 272 

Foreign Military Relations 273 

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCIES 277 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 279 

The Communist Insurgency 280 



x 



The Moro Insurgency 290 

Crime 293 

Law Enforcement 295 

Penal Law 297 

Criminal Procedure 298 

The Correctional System 299 

Appendix. Tables 303 

Bibliography 317 

Glossary 361 

Index 365 

List of Figures 

1 Philippines in Its Asian Setting, 1991 xxii 

2 Topography and Drainage 72 

3 Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991 78 

4 Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1988 114 

5 Major Agricultural Activity, 1991 142 

6 Major Industrial Activity, 1988 156 

7 Transportation System, 1991 164 

8 Structure of the National Government, 1991 200 

9 Regions and Provinces, 1990 210 

10 Organization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

(AFP), 1989 264 

11 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1989 274 

12 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989 275 

13 Areas of Insurgent Organization and Activity, 1989 286 



xi 



Preface 



This edition is a revision of the 1983 Philippines: A Country Study. 
The new edition recounts events in the Philippines since the ouster 
of President Ferdinand Marcos, the restoration of democracy, and 
the installation of President Corazon Aquino in February 1986, 

Like its predecessor, this study is an effort to present an objec- 
tive and concise account of the major social, economic, political, 
and national security concerns of the Philippines in the 1990s, us- 
ing a historical framework. Sources of information include schol- 
arly books, official reports from government and international 
organizations, and foreign and domestic newspapers and periodi- 
cals. Brief commentary on some of the more useful and readily 
accessible sources appears at the end of each chapter. Full refer- 
ences to these and other sources used by the authors are listed in 
the Bibliography. 

The authors have limited the use of foreign and technical terms, 
which are defined when they first appear. Readers are also referred 
to the Glossary in the back of the book. The authors have used 
the place-names established by the United States Board on Geo- 
graphic Names. Pilipino personal and place-names and terminol- 
ogy include the tilde. Names and terminology from the Spanish 
colonial period include accented vowels in addition to the tilde. 
Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table 
is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements 
(see table 1, Appendix). 

The body of the text reflects information available as of June 
1991. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been up- 
dated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile 
includes updated information as available. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of the Philippines 
Short Form: Philippines 
Term for Citizens: Filipinos 
Capital: Manila 

Date of Independence: Attained full independence from United 
States July 4, 1946. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



xv 



Geography 

Location and Size: Archipelago off coast of Southeast Asia, total 
300,000 square kilometers, land area 296,170 square kilometers. 

Topography: Archipelago of 7,100 islands: Luzon, Mindanao, 
Palawan, and numerous smaller islands, all prone to earthquakes. 
Largely mountainous terrain, creating narrow coastal plains and 
interior valleys and plains. Major plains include those of Central 
Luzon, northeastern Cagayan Valley, and Agusan Basin in far 
south. Numerous dormant and active volcanos, notably Mount 
Pinatubo in Central Luzon. Highest point Mount Apo (2,954 
meters). 

Climate: Tropical marine; northeast monsoon (December to Febru- 
ary), southwest monsoon (May to October). Mean annual sea-level 
temperatures rarely fall below 27 °C. Frequent typhoons. 

Society 

Population: 66,117,284 in July 1990; average population density 
220 persons per square kilometer; annual growth rate 2.2 percent; 
birth rate 29 per 1,000 (in 1991); death rate 7 per 1,000 (in 1991). 

Ethnic Groups: 91.5 percent Christian Malay, almost 5 percent 
Muslim Malay, close to 1 percent Chinese, and 3 percent other, 
mainly upland tribal groups. 

Language: Pilipino (based on Tagalog) and English (official lan- 
guages). Eleven languages and eighty-seven dialects indigenous to 
archipelago. 

Religion: In 1989 approximately 82 percent Roman Catholic, ap- 
proximately 9 percent associated with Iglesia ni Kristo and vari- 
ous Protestant denominations, 5 percent Muslim, remainder 
Buddhist, Taoist, or other religions. 

Education: In 1989 six years of compulsory, free elementary edu- 
cation provided to approximately 15 million students, more than 
96 percent of age-group. Approximately 290,000 teachers in 34,000 
elementary schools. Beginning at age 13, approximately 4 million 
students, more than 55 percent of age-group, enrolled in 5,500 
secondary schools with approximately 80,000 teachers; 1.6 million 
enrolled in 1,675 institutions of higher education with 56,380 in- 
structors. Supervised by Department of Education, Culture, and 
Sports. Literacy rate nearly 90 percent in 1990. 



xvi 



Health: In 1990 life expectancy 69 years for women, 63 years for 
men; infant mortality rate in 1989 was 51.6 deaths per 1,000 births. 
Main health hazards: pulmonary, cardiovascular, and gastro- 
intestinal disorders. Health care system in 1989 adequate in ur- 
ban areas, minimal in rural areas; 33,000 health professionals, 
including 9,500 physicians, and 1,700 hospitals with 85,000 beds 
concentrated in urban areas. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Economy struggling under heavy foreign debt. 
Approximately 50 percent of population below poverty line; un- 
employment 10.3 percent in mid- 1991, underemployment estimated 
at nearly twice that rate. Large overseas work force. Rapid eco- 
nomic growth of 1970s slowed considerably in 1980s. Prospects for 
1990s uncertain. 

Gross National Product (GNP): US$41.5 billion (1990); per capita 
GNP US$668 (1990). 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Approximately US$43 billion 
(1990). 

Resources: Ample manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, gold, sil- 
ver, and low-grade iron ores and coal. In late 1980s, petroleum 
and natural gas production provided less than half of energy needs. 
Excellent potential for hydroelectric and geothermal energy. 

Industry: 33 percent of GNP and approximately 15 percent of work 
force in 1990. Major industries: textiles, food processing, chemi- 
cals, pharmaceuticals, wood products, and electronics equipment 
assembly. 

Services: 44 percent of GNP and approximately 40 percent of work 
force in 1990. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: 23 percent of GNP and slight- 
ly more than 45 percent of work force in 1990. Intense cultivation 
of diminishing arable land, already in short supply. Major crops: 
rice, corn, coconuts, sugarcane, pineapples, and bananas. Rapid- 
ly declining timber resources. In 1990, 2 million ton fish catch 
provided more than half of domestic protein consumption. 

Foreign Trade: Heavy importation of capital goods and high 
petroleum prices along with weak export growth resulted in large 
trade deficit increase. 



xvii 



Exports: Approximately US$8.1 billion in 1989. Major products: 
clothing, electronic components, nickel, coconut products, sugar, 
pineapples, bananas. Major partners: United States, European 
Community, Japan. 

Imports: Approximately US$12.1 billion in 1989. Major products: 
fuels, lubricants, motor vehicles, consumer goods. Major partners: 
United States, Japan, Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, European Community. 

Balance of Payments: Current account deficit US$1.4 billion in 
1989. 

Exchange Rate: P24.96 = US$1 (January 1992). 
Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Maritime: Extensive interisland transportation; 314 private and 
622 public seaports, including major ports at Manila, Cebu, Iloi- 
lo, Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, and Davao. 

Railroads: In 1990 one main line from Manila 266 kilometers north 
to San Fernando and La Union, 474 kilometers south to Legaspi 
City; 15 kilometers of Light Rail Transit system in Metro Manila. 

Roads: In 1988 some 157,000 kilometers of various type roads; 
26,000 kilometers designated national (arterial) roads. Somewhat 
less than 50 percent of national roads all-weather surfaces. 

Airports: Total of 301 airports, 237 usable; international facili- 
ties at Manila (Ninoy Aquino) and near Cebu City (Mactan). 
Philippine Airlines serves domestic and international routes. 

Telecommunications: In 1989, 380 radio stations and 42 televi- 
sion stations. In 1990, 872,900 telephones, mainly concentrated 
in Metro Manila; 4 million radio receivers, 6 million television 
receivers. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Presidential form of government based on 1987 con- 
stitution with president and vice president elected separately by 
popular vote. Bicameral legislature (Congress: Senate — upper 
house; House of Representatives — lower house). President limit- 
ed to one six-year term. Senators elected nationwide and limited 



xvni 



to two consecutive six-year terms, representatives elected from 200 
districts and limited to three consecutive three-year terms. 

Politics: Numerous political parties. In 1992 main parties included 
PDP-LABAN, Lakas-NUCD, Nacionalista Party, and Liberal 
Party. 

Administrative Divisions: 73 provinces and 61 chartered cities. 

Judiciary: Civil law system heavily influenced by Spanish and 
Anglo-American law. Independent judiciary headed by Supreme 
Court, with anticorruption Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, 
Intermediate Appellate Court, regional trial courts, and metropoli- 
tan and municipal courts. 

Media: Freedom of expression constitutional right; about thirty 
daily newspapers in 1991. 

Foreign Affairs: Diplomatic relations with virtually all countries 
of world. Member of international organizations, including As- 
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, and United Nations and its affiliated agencies. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP), with total ac- 
tive duty strength of 106,500 in late 1991 : army 68,000, navy 23,000 
(including 8,500 marines and 2,000 coast guard), and air force 
15,500. Reserves totalled 128,000: army 100,000, navy 12,000, 
and air force 16,000. 

Military Units: Six area unified commands, six naval districts, 
and thirteen air force squadrons. 

Equipment: Army: light tanks, armored infantry fighting vehi- 
cles, armored personnel carriers, towed howitzers, mortars, and 
recoilless rifles. Navy: frigates, patrol and coastal combatants, am- 
phibious ships and craft, auxiliaries, and rotary and fixed- wing air- 
craft. Air Force: fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, 
helicopters, and training aircraft. 

Military Budget: Approximately US$968.4 million in FY 1991. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (1951). 

Insurgency: In 1992 New People's Army (NPA), military arm of 
Communist Party of the Philippines-Marxist Leninist a formidable 



xix 



threat, especially in Luzon; Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
potential threat in the south. 

Police: Philippine Constabulary combined with Integrated National 
Police on January 1, 1991, to form Philippine National Police un- 
der newly created Department of Interior and Local Government. 



xx 




Figure 1. Philippines in Its Asian Setting, 1991 



xxn 



Introduction 



IN EARLY SPRING 1992, as President Corazon C. Aquino ap- 
proached the end of her term, there was no doubt that her adminis- 
tration had restored a functioning democratic system to the 
Philippines. Aquino herself had decided not to seek another term 
as president even though the one-term presidency limitation im- 
posed by the constitution did not apply to her. There was, however, 
no dearth of aspirants for the position. Eight candidates, includ- 
ing former First Lady Imelda Marcos, who had returned to the 
Philippines in the fall of 1991 to face embezzlement charges, were 
considered serious contenders. 

In 1992, although its citizens had many reasons to hope for a 
brighter future, the Philippines was a nation beset with numerous 
economic and political problems. These problems have been com- 
pounded by a series of natural disasters: in the wake of a massive 
earthquake in northern Luzon in July 1990 and a devastating 
typhoon in the central Visayas in November 1990, the Mount 
Pinatubo volcano in Central Luzon erupted for the first time in 
600 years in early June 1991 . The eruption covered the surround- 
ing countryside with molten ash and caused serious damage to the 
infrastructure of the region, including United States military fa- 
cilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The econo- 
my, which had slowed to a 3-percent gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) growth in 1990, fell by 0.6 percent in the 
first six months of 1991 and by slightly more than that in the third 
quarter. Inflation peaked at 19.3 percent in August 1991, declined 
to 15.8 percent by November, but remained far above the 
9.5-percent International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) tar- 
get for the year. Investment, up 19.7 percent from January to Sep- 
tember 1991, was nearly offset by the inflation rate, resulting in 
only a marginal increase. Unemployment was 10.3 percent in July 
1991, nearly two percentage points higher than the previous year, 
and most economists estimated underemployment to be at least 
twice that rate. 

In the early 1990s, the Philippines was rather densely populat- 
ed (220 persons per square kilometer), and the annual population 
growth rate was 2.5 percent. Approximately 57 percent of the popu- 
lation was under twenty years of age. Education was very highly 
regarded, as it had been throughout most of the twentieth centu- 
ry. The literacy rate of the total population approached 90 per- 
cent, and compulsory, free education reached nearly all elementary 



xxm 



school-age children, even in the remotest areas. Health care was 
adequate in urban areas, less so in the countryside. 

Corazon Aquino had been swept into the presidency by the 
February 1986 "People's Power" uprising amid high expectations 
that she would be able to right all of the wrongs in the Philippine 
body politic. It soon became evident, however, that her goals were 
essentially limited to restoring democratic institutions. She renounced 
the dictatorial powers that she had inherited from President Fer- 
dinand E. Marcos and returned the Philippines to the rule of law, 
replacing the Marcos constitution with a democratic, progressive 
document that won overwhelming popular approval in a nation- 
wide plebiscite, and scheduling national legislative and local elec- 
tions. The new constitution, ratified in 1987, gives the Philippines 
a presidential system of government similar to that of the United 
States. The constitution provides the checks and balances of a three- 
branch government. It provides for the presidency; a two-house 
Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives; and an 
independent judiciary capped by the Supreme Court. The consti- 
tution also provides for regular elections and contains a bill of rights 
guaranteeing the same political freedoms found in the United States 
Constitution. Fueled by a constitutionally guaranteed free and open 
press, the freewheeling political life that had existed before the mar- 
tial law period (1972-81) soon resumed. But most of the political 
problems, including widespread corruption, human rights abuses, 
and inequitable distribution of wealth and power, remained. 

Many of the most intractable problems in the Philippines can 
be traced to the country's colonial past. One major source of ten- 
sion and instability stems from the great disparity in wealth and 
power between the affluent upper social stratum and the mass of 
low-income, often impoverished, Filipinos. In 1988 the wealthiest 
10 percent of the population received nearly 36 percent of the in- 
come, whereas the poorest 30 percent of the population received 
less than 15 percent of the income. 

The roots of the disparity between the affluent and the im- 
poverished lie in the structure established under Spanish rule, lasting 
from the first settlement under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi in 1565 
to the beginning of United States rule in 1898. Friars of various 
Roman Catholic orders, acting as surrogates of the Spanish govern- 
ment, had integrated the scattered peoples of the barangays (see Glos- 
sary) into administrative entities and firmly implanted Roman 
Catholicism among them as the dominant faith — except in the 
southern Muslim-dominated portion of the archipelago. Over the 
centuries, these orders acquired huge landed estates and became 



xxiv 



wealthy, sometimes corrupt, and very powerful. Eventually, their 
estates were acquired by principales (literally, principal ones; a term 
for the indigenous local elite) and Chinese mestizos (see Glossary) 
eager to take advantage of expanding opportunities in agriculture 
and commerce. The children of these new entrepreneurs and land- 
lords were provided education opportunities not available to the 
general populace and formed the nucleus of an emerging, largely 
provincially based, sociocultural elite — the ilustrados (see Glos- 
sary) — who dominated almost all aspects of national life in later 
generations. 

The peasants revolted from time to time against their growing 
impoverishment on the landed estates. They were aided by some 
reform-minded ilustrados, who made persistent demands for better 
treatment of the colony and its eventual assimilation with Spain. 
In the late nineteenth century, inflamed by various developments, 
including the martyrdom of three Filipino priests, a number of 
young ilustrados took up the nationalist banner in their writings, 
published chiefly in Europe. During the struggle for independence 
against Spain (1896-98), ilustrados and peasants made common cause 
against the colonial power, but not before a period of ilustrado vacil- 
lation, reflective of doubts about the outcome of a confrontation 
that had begun as a mass movement among workers and peasants 
around Manila. Once committed to the struggle, however, the il- 
ustrados took over, becoming the articulators and leaders of the fight 
for independence— first against Spain, then against the United 
States. 

Philippine peasant guerrilla forces contributed to the defeat of 
the Spanish. When the Filipinos were denied independence by the 
United States, they focused their revolutionary activity on United 
States forces, holding out in the hills for several years. The ilustra- 
do leadership chose to accommodate to the seemingly futile situa- 
tion. Once again, ilustrados found themselves in an intermediary 
position as arbiters between the colonial power and the rest of the 
population. Ilustrados responded eagerly to United States tutelage 
in democratic values and process in preparation for eventual Philip- 
pine self-rule, and, in return for their allegiance, United States 
authorities began to yield control to the ilustrados. Although a mas- 
sive United States-sponsored popular education program exposed 
millions of Filipinos to the basic workings of democratic govern- 
ment, political leadership at the regional and national levels be- 
came almost entirely the province of families of the sociocultural 
elite. Even into the 1990s, most Philippine political leaders belonged 
to this group. 



xxv 



Members of the peasantry, for their part, continued to stage peri- 
odic uprisings in protest against their difficult situation. As the twen- 
tieth century progressed, their standard of living worsened as a result 
of population growth, usury, the spread of absentee landlordism, 
and the weakening of the traditional patron-client bonds of recipro- 
cal obligation. 

Whereas the economic legacy of colonialism, including the rela- 
tive impoverishment of a very large segment of the population, left 
seeds of dissension in its wake, not all of the enduring features of 
colonial rule were destabilizing forces. Improvements in education 
and health had done much to enhance the quality of life. More 
important in the context of stabilizing influences was the profound 
impact of Roman Catholicism. The great majority of the Filipino 
people became Catholic, and the prelates of the church profound- 
ly influenced the society. 

Beginning with independence in 1946, the church was a source 
of stability to the infant nation. Throughout the period of constitu- 
tional government up to the declaration of martial law in 1972, 
however, the church remained outside of politics; its largely con- 
servative clergy was occupied almost exclusively with religious 
matters. 

Democracy functioned fairly well in the Philippines until 1972. 
National elections were held regularly under the framework of the 
1935 constitution, which established checks and balances among 
the principal branches of government. Elections provided freewheel- 
ing, sometimes violent, exchanges between two loosely structured 
political parties, with one succeeding the other at the apex of pow- 
er in a remarkably consistent cycle of alternation. Ferdinand Mar- 
cos, first elected to the presidency in 1965, was reelected by a large 
margin in 1969, the first president since independence to be elect- 
ed to a second term. 

Discontent rooted in economic disparity and religious differences 
grew in the late 1960s. The New People's Army (NPA), a guerril- 
la force formed in 1968 in Tarlac Province, north of Manila, by 
the newly established Communist Party of the Philippines-Marxist 
Leninist, soon spread to other parts of Luzon and throughout the 
archipelago. In the south, demands for Muslim autonomy and vio- 
lence, often between indigenous Muslims and government- 
sponsored Christian immigrants who had begun to move down from 
the north, were on the rise. In 1969 the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) was organized as a guerrilla force for the Muslim 
cause. The volatile political situation came to a head when grenade 
explosions in the Plaza Miranda in Manila during an opposition 
Liberal Party rally on August 21 , 1971 , killed 9 people and wounded 



xxvi 



100. Marcos blamed the leftists and suspended habeas corpus. Thir- 
teen months later, on September 21, 1972, Marcos used a provi- 
sion of the 1935 constitution to declare martial law after an attempt 
was reportedly made to assassinate Minister of National Defense 
Juan Ponce Enrile. In 1986, after Marcos 's downfall, Enrile ad- 
mitted that his unoccupied car had been riddled by machine-gun 
bullets fired by his own people. 

Under the provisions of martial law, Marcos shut down Con- 
gress and most newspapers, jailed his major political opponents, 
assumed dictatorial powers, and ruled by presidential decree. Dur- 
ing the early years of martial law, the economy improved, benefiting 
from increased business confidence and Marcos 's appointment of 
talented technocrats to economic planning posts. But over the next 
few years, major segments of the economy gradually were brought 
under the control of the Marcos crony (see Glossary) group. Mo- 
nopolies controlled by Marcos cronies were subsidized heavily, seri- 
ously depleting the national treasury. The previously apolitical, 
professional armed forces were used by Marcos to enforce martial 
law and ensure his political survival. Even after Marcos rescinded 
martial law in January 1981 , he continued to rule with virtual dic- 
tatorial powers. Thus, it came as no surprise that Marcos won an 
overwhelming victory in the June 1981 presidential election, an 
election that was boycotted by most opposition forces. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the economic and political 
situation deteriorated, opposition to the Marcos government grew. 
The Catholic Church, the country's strongest and most indepen- 
dent nongovernmental institution, became increasingly critical of 
the government. Priests, nuns, and the church hierarchy, moti- 
vated by their commitment to human rights and social justice, be- 
came involved in redressing the sufferings of the common people 
through the political process. The business community became in- 
creasingly apprehensive during this period, as inflation and un- 
employment soared and the GNP stagnated and declined. Young 
military officers, desirous of a return to pre-martial law profession- 
alism, allied with Minister of National Defense Enrile to oppose 
close Marcos associates in the military. 

One of Marcos's first acts under martial law was to jail Senator 
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, his main opponent and most likely suc- 
cessor. But even in his imprisonment, Aquino maintained a large 
following, and when he was allowed to go to the United States for 
medical treatment in 1980, he became a more formidable leader 
of the opposition in exile. By 1983 the deteriorating economic and 
political situation and Marcos's worsening health convinced Aquino 
that in order to prevent civil war he must return to the Philippines 



xxvn 



to build a responsible united opposition and persuade Marcos to 
relinquish power. 

Despite the obvious danger to his personal safety, Aquino 
returned. He was shot in the head and killed on August 21 , 1983, 
as he was escorted off an airplane at Manila International Airport 
by soldiers of the Aviation Security Command. As a martyr, 
Aquino became the focus of popular indignation against the cor- 
rupt Marcos regime, a more formidable opponent in death than 
in life. The opposition initially consisted primarily of the Catho- 
lic hierarchy, the business elite, and a faction of the armed forces. 
It grew into the People's Power movement with millions of rural, 
working class, middle class, and professional supporters, when 
Aquino's widow, Corazon "Cory" Aquino, returned to the Philip- 
pines to take over, first symbolically and then substantively, as lead- 
er of the opposition. 

In November 1985, Marcos, still convinced that he had control 
of the political situation, announced a presidential election for 
February 7, 1986, one year before the expiration of his presiden- 
tial term. Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila, arranged 
a political alliance of convenience that ran the immensely popular 
Cory Aquino as candidate for president and politically astute Sal- 
vador "Doy" Laurel as vice president. The Aquino-Laurel ticket 
gained the support of the Catholic Church and a substantial part 
of the electorate and, despite widespread fraud by Marcos support- 
ers, garnered a majority of votes in the election. Nevertheless, the 
Marcos-dominated National Assembly declared Marcos the win- 
ner on February 15. 

Opposition at home and abroad was immediate and vociferous. 
On February 22, Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile 
and the commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Fidel V. Ra- 
mos, issued a joint statement demanding Marcos 's resignation and 
set up a rebel headquarters inside Camp Aguinaldo and the ad- 
joining Camp Crame in Metro Manila (see Glossary). When Mar- 
cos called out troops loyal to him to put down the rebellion, Cardinal 
Sin broadcast an appeal over the church-run Radio Veritas call- 
ing on the people to render nonviolent support to the rebels. 
Hundreds of thousands of unarmed priests, nuns, and ordinary 
citizens faced down the tanks and machine guns of the government 
troops. Violent confrontation was prevented and many government 
troops turned back or defected. By the evening of February 25, 
Marcos and his family were enroute to exile in Hawaii, and Corazon 
Aquino had assumed power. 

The Aquino government had been in office only five months 
when it was challenged by the first of six coup attempts led by 



xxviii 



dissatisfied armed forces factions. The first attempt, a relatively 
minor affair, was quickly put down, but later attempts in August 
1987 and December 1989, led by the same reformist officers that 
had helped bring Aquino to power, came very close to toppling 
her government. In the 1989 attempt, elite rebel units seized a major 
air base in Cebu, held parts of army and air force headquarters 
and the international airport, and were preparing to move on armed 
forces headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo when they were turned 
back. The threat of another coup attempt hung over the capital 
in 1990, but as Aquino's term drew to a close in 1991 and 1992, 
the threat had considerably diminished. Most disaffected military 
officers seemed content to seek change through the political process, 
and many officers involved in earlier coup attempts had been per- 
suaded to give themselves up, confident of lenient treatment. 

In 1992 the threat from domestic insurgents was somewhat 
reduced. Although the MNLF and other Moro insurgent groups 
were a major threat in the southern Philippines in the early 1970s, 
since that time, internal divisions, reduced external support, pres- 
sure by the armed forces, and government accommodations — 
including the creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Min- 
danao in 1990 — had greatly reduced that threat. The communist 
NPA peaked in 1987, when there were 26,000 guerrillas active in 
the field. In 1992, with approximately 20,000 full-time guerrilla 
troops, the NPA remained a formidable threat to the government. 
Arrest of a number of top insurgent cadres and major internal 
purges, however, had greatly reduced its power. 

Despite Filipinos' serious concern for maintaining national iden- 
tity and avoiding any appearance of foreign subjugation, in 1992 
congruent interests and a long history of friendly relations made 
it seem likely that the United States would remain the Philippines' 
closest ally — even after the long, difficult, and ultimately unsuc- 
cessful negotiations to extend the Military Bases Agreement. The 
original Military Bases Agreement of 1947, amended in 1959 and 
again in 1979, was scheduled to expire in 1991 unless an exten- 
sion was negotiated. Negotiations for continued United States use 
of the two major bases in the Philippines — Clark Air Base in Pam- 
panga Province and Subic Bay Naval Base in Zambales Province — 
had begun in 1990. The tenor of the negotiations changed signifi- 
cantly, however, in 1991, when the end of the Cold War made 
the bases less important and the eruption of the Mount Pinatubo 
volcano rendered Clark Air Base unusable. By the end of August 
1991, United States and Philippine negotiators had agreed to ex- 
tend the United States lease of Subic Bay Naval Base for another 
ten years in return for US$360 million in direct compensation for 



xxix 



the first year and US$203 million for the remaining nine years of 
the lease. But in September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected 
the agreement. As a result, the United States was expected to va- 
cate Subic Bay Naval Base, its only remaining base in the Philip- 
pines, by the end of 1992. 

In early spring 1992, everyone's attention was turned to the up- 
coming national elections. Who would be the first president elect- 
ed since the restoration of democracy? What would be the 
composition of the new Congress? Would the new president and 
the new Congress strike out in bold new directions or would it be 
more business as usual? The future of the Philippines depended 
on the answers to these questions. 

March 23, 1992 

Fidel Ramos succeeded Corazon Aquino as president of the 
Philippines on June 30, 1992, after winning a 23.6 percent plural- 
ity in the May 11, 1992, general election. Ramos, secretary of na- 
tional defense in the Aquino administration and handpicked by 
Aquino to succeed her, narrowly defeated Secretary of Agrarian 
Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago, who received 19.8 percent of 
the vote, and former Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuangco, who 
received 18.1 percent. 

The election proved that Corazon Aquino had succeeded in the 
primary goal of her presidency, restoring democracy to the Philip- 
pines. Nearly 85 percent of eligible voters turned out to elect 17,205 
officials, including the president, the vice president, 24 members 
of the Senate, 200 members of the House of Representatives, 73 
governors, and 1,602 mayors. The election was relatively peace- 
ful; there was no threat of a military coup before, during, or after 
the election and only 52 election-related deaths were reported, com- 
pared to 150 in the 1986 presidential election. Despite claims of 
election fraud from losing candidates, the Commission on Elec- 
tions apparently exercised effective control and relatively few vot- 
ing irregularities were substantiated. Ramos won the election on 
his appeal for stability and a continuation of Aquino policies, and 
Santiago received strong support for her anticorruption candidacy. 
Cojuangco's substantial support, however, suggested that a large 
share of the electorate favored a return to the economic policies 
and the traditional patronage system of the Marcos era. 

Shortly after his inauguration, Ramos sought a reconciliation 
with his former rivals from the presidential election, Imelda Marcos 



xxx 



and Eduardo Cojuangco. In the House of Representatives, Ra- 
mos gained the position of speaker of the House for Jose de Vene- 
cia, his close political ally and secretary of the Lakas ng 
Edsa-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD). Ra- 
mos received support from the fifty-one members of the House elect- 
ed under the banner of the Lakas-NUCD alliance, which he had 
formed when he failed to get the nomination of the Laban 
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party. In part because of his con- 
ciliatory approach, Ramos was also able to marshal support from 
a substantial share of LDP members, from members of Eduardo 
Cojuangco's Nationalist People's Party, and from members of the 
Liberal Party. He was less successful in the Senate, where LDP 
chairman Neptali Gonzales was elected president. Ramos seemed 
likely to face a major challenge getting his program to stimulate 
economic growth and restore order to the Philippines through a 
divided and potentially hostile Congress. 

The Philippine economy showed some improvement in early 
1992, spurred by increases in agricultural production and in con- 
sumer and government spending. Budget deficits were well within 
IMF guidelines — P3.2 billion in the first two months. At the end 
of April, the treasury posted a P5.5 billion surplus as a result of 
higher than programmed revenue receipts, mainly from the sale 
of Philippine Airlines. The increased revenue permitted the early 
repeal of the 5 percent import surcharge, stimulating both import 
spending and export growth. The money supply grew more rapidly 
than desired, but was kept under control. Treasury bill rates fell 
to 17.3 percent in March 1992 from 23 percent in November 1991, 
and inflation was down to 9.4 percent for the first quarter of 1992, 
from 18.7 percent in 1991. 

One of the greatest threats to the Philippine economy in 1992 
was the power shortage. The fall in the water level in Lake Lanao 
caused a 50 percent reduction in the power supply to Mindanao 
in December 1991, and the resumption of full power was not ex- 
pected until almost the end of 1992. The power shortage in Luzon 
continued to be chronic. Power cuts of four to five hours per day 
have been common; in May they reached six hours on some days 
in Manila, the country's industrial hub. To help to meet this chronic 
shortage, the government reactivated the contract with Westing- 
house Corporation to restart construction on a 620 megawatt 
nuclear power plant on the Bataan Peninsula that had been aban- 
doned in 1986. This plant, however, will not be on line until 1995. 

The conversion to civilian use of the military bases vacated by 
the United States poses another major economic challenge. The 
United States forces departed from the huge Subic Bay Naval Base 



xxxi 



on September 30, 1992, and the United States was expected to leave 
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, its last base in the Philippines, in 
November 1992. The Philippine Congress ratified a base conver- 
sion bill in February 1992 that created five special economic zones 
at the vacated United States bases under the Base Conversion De- 
velopment Authority. The authority, which will exist for five years, 
will sell the land connected with the bases within six months and 
use half the proceeds to convert the bases to civilian use. One plan 
envisions converting the former Subic Bay Naval Base into a tourist 
center, industrial zone, container port, and commercial shipyard. 
But this plan will be hampered by the United States removal of 
major equipment, including three dry docks, from the base. 

In late 1992, a new Philippine president and a new Congress, 
the first elected under the 1987 constitution, faced major econom- 
ic and political challenges. An anxious Philippine citizenry waited 
to see how well its leader and elected representatives would cooperate 
in an attempt to meet these challenges. 

October 21, 1992 Ronald E. Dolan 



XXXll 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Architecture of this church from the Spanish colonial period reflects 

the Hispanic legacy. Philippine influences, however, can be seen in the palm 

tree motif at the top of the facade and in other details. 



ON AUGUST 21, 1983, Benigno Aquino, leader of the Philip- 
pines democratic opposition, was assassinated as he left the air- 
plane that had brought him back home after a three-year exile in 
the United States. The explanation of the killing by the govern- 
ment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, placing responsibility on 
a lone communist gunman, who himself was shot by government 
troops, aroused skepticism and was rejected by a government- 
appointed commission. It was evident to a majority of Filipinos 
that Aquino had been killed by the armed forces and that ultimate 
responsibility lay, if not with Ferdinand Marcos, with his power- 
ful wife Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her close ally, General Fa- 
bian Ver. The killing exposed the Marcoses to massive popular 
indignation that was even stronger than the indignation aroused 
by the communist and Muslim insurgencies in the countryside, 
economic distress, corruption of political institutions, and the in- 
competence and brutality of the military. Aquino's widow, Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino, became a powerful symbol of democratic resur- 
gence. Following a February 7, 1986, presidential election hope- 
lessly compromised by regime-perpetuated abuses, she was brought 
to power by a popular movement that encompassed practically every 
major social group. Her struggle against Marcos was more than 
a political campaign and assumed the proportions of a moral cru- 
sade that was backed by the Roman Catholic Church. 

Ferdinand Marcos had been elected president in 1965 and won 
a second term in 1969. But, in September 1972, largely in order 
to perpetuate his regime, he felt constrained to impose martial law. 
Long-established democratic institutions were shut down or coopted 
by the Marcos dictatorship. While the economies of neighboring 
states, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, flourished, or 
at least adequately weathered uncertainties during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Philippine economy stagnated. The Aquino 
assassination caused any remaining confidence in business to eva- 
porate. For ordinary Filipinos, this situation meant high inflation, 
unemployment, and a decline in an already low standard of living. 

The Marcos era from 1965 to 1986 and the ensuing democratic 
resurgence under Corazon Aquino revealed both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the nation's democratic institutions. A Spanish colony 
since the sixteenth century, the Philippines became a United States 
possession after the 1898 Spanish- American War, despite the op- 
position of local patriots who wanted to establish an independent 



3 



Architecture of this church from the Spanish colonial period reflects 

the Hispanic legacy. Philippine influences, however, can be seen in the palm 

tree motif at the top of the facade and in other details. 



ON AUGUST 21, 1983, Benigno Aquino, leader of the Philip- 
pines democratic opposition, was assassinated as he left the air- 
plane that had brought him back home after a three-year exile in 
the United States. The explanation of the killing by the govern- 
ment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, placing responsibility on 
a lone communist gunman, who himself was shot by government 
troops, aroused skepticism and was rejected by a government- 
appointed commission. It was evident to a majority of Filipinos 
that Aquino had been killed by the armed forces and that ultimate 
responsibility lay, if not with Ferdinand Marcos, with his power- 
ful wife Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her close ally, General Fa- 
bian Ver. The killing exposed the Marcoses to massive popular 
indignation that was even stronger than the indignation aroused 
by the communist and Muslim insurgencies in the countryside, 
economic distress, corruption of political institutions, and the in- 
competence and brutality of the military. Aquino's widow, Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino, became a powerful symbol of democratic resur- 
gence. Following a February 7, 1986, presidential election hope- 
lessly compromised by regime-perpetuated abuses, she was brought 
to power by a popular movement that encompassed practically every 
major social group. Her struggle against Marcos was more than 
a political campaign and assumed the proportions of a moral cru- 
sade that was backed by the Roman Catholic Church. 

Ferdinand Marcos had been elected president in 1 965 and won 
a second term in 1969. But, in September 1972, largely in order 
to perpetuate his regime, he felt constrained to impose martial law. 
Long-established democratic institutions were shut down or coopted 
by the Marcos dictatorship. While the economies of neighboring 
states, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, flourished, or 
at least adequately weathered uncertainties during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Philippine economy stagnated. The Aquino 
assassination caused any remaining confidence in business to eva- 
porate. For ordinary Filipinos, this situation meant high inflation, 
unemployment, and a decline in an already low standard of living. 

The Marcos era from 1965 to 1986 and the ensuing democratic 
resurgence under Corazon Aquino revealed both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the nation's democratic institutions. A Spanish colony 
since the sixteenth century, the Philippines became a United States 
possession after the 1898 Spanish- American War, despite the op- 
position of local patriots who wanted to establish an independent 



3 



Philippines: A Country Study 



republic and fought a bitter guerrilla war against the new coloniz- 
ers. Representative institutions were established in the first decade 
of United States rule in order to prepare the people for eventual 
independence. Particularly when compared with other Western 
colonies in Asia, the Philippines made rapid progress. On Novem- 
ber 15, 1935, the self-governing Commonwealth of the Philippines 
was established. Despite a harsh Japanese occupation during World 
War II, which inflicted tremendous suffering on the population, 
the Philippines became independent on schedule, on July 4, 1946. 

The independent Philippines had firmly established democratic 
institutions: a two-party system, an independent judiciary, a free 
press, and regularly scheduled national and local elections. Although 
there were electoral abuses, the candidates and the citizenry abid- 
ed by the results. Social values, however, emphasized the impor- 
tance of personal relations over the rule of law, and since early 
American colonial days the political system and economy had been 
dominated by a small landholding elite that opposed meaningful 
social change, including land reform. The rural and urban poor 
lacked political power, and many joined communist insurgencies. 
By the early 1980s, this nation, richly endowed with natural 
resources, had extreme poverty in some regions, such as the sugar- 
growing island of Negros, and gaps between rich and poor that 
were wider than in most of the other developing countries of 
Southeast Asia and East Asia (see fig. 1). 

When Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he 
promised to eliminate poverty and injustice and create a 4 'New 
Society." Instead, he destroyed democratic institutions that would 
have acted as a brake on abuses of power by him, his wife, and 
their close associates. Ultimately these abuses contributed to his 
ouster. Corazon Aquino assumed power on February 25, 1986, 
amidst an atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm. But the obstacles 
she faced — communist insurgency, years of economic mismanage- 
ment, and an indigenous ethic that persistently emphasized group 
loyalties and patron-client relationships over the national welfare — 
were formidable. 

Early History 

Negrito, proto-Malay, and Malay peoples were the principal peo- 
ples of the Philippine archipelago. The Negritos are believed to 
have migrated by land bridges some 30,000 years ago, during the 
last glacial period. Later migrations were by water and took place 
over several thousand years in repeated movements before and af- 
ter the start of the Christian era. 



4 



Historical Setting 



The social and political organization of the population in the wide- 
ly scattered islands evolved into a generally common pattern. Only 
the permanent-field rice farmers of northern Luzon had any con- 
cept of territoriality. The basic unit of settlement was the barangay 
(see Glossary), originally a kinship group headed by a datu (chief). 
Within the barangay, the broad social divisions consisted of nobles, 
including the datu; freemen; and a group described before the Span- 
ish period as dependents. Dependents included several categories 
with differing status: landless agricultural workers; those who had 
lost freeman status because of indebtedness or punishment for crime; 
and slaves, most of whom appear to have been war captives. 

Islam was brought to the Philippines by traders and proselytiz- 
ers from the Indonesian islands. By 1500 Islam was established in 
the Sulu Archipelago and spread from there to Mindanao; it had 
reached the Manila area by 1565. Muslim immigrants introduced 
a political concept of territorial states ruled by rajas or sultans who 
exercised suzerainty over the datu. Neither the political state con- 
cept of the Muslim rulers nor the limited territorial concept of the 
sedentary rice farmers of Luzon, however, spread beyond the areas 
where they originated. When the Spanish arrived in the sixteenth 
century, the majority of the estimated 500,000 people in the is- 
lands still lived in barangay settlements. 

The Early Spanish Period, 1521-1762 

The first recorded sighting of the Philippines by Europeans was 
on March 16, 1521, during Ferdinand Magellan's circumnaviga- 
tion of the globe. Magellan landed on Cebu, claimed the land for 
Charles I of Spain, and was killed one month later by a local chief. 
The Spanish crown sent several expeditions to the archipelago dur- 
ing the next decades. Permanent Spanish settlement was finally 
established in 1565 when Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the first royal 
governor, arrived in Cebu from New Spain (Mexico). Six years 
later, after defeating a local Muslim ruler, he established his capi- 
tal at Manila, a location that offered the excellent harbor of Manila 
Bay, a large population, and proximity to the ample food supplies 
of the central Luzon rice lands. Manila remained the center of Span- 
ish civil, military, religious, and commercial activity in the islands. 
The islands were given their present name in honor of Philip II 
of Spain, who reigned from 1556 to 1598. 

Spain had three objectives in its policy toward the Philippines, 
its only colony in Asia: to acquire a share in the spice trade, to de- 
velop contacts with China and Japan in order to further Christian 
missionary efforts there, and to convert the Filipinos to Chris- 
tianity. Only the third objective was eventually realized, and this 



5 



Philippines: A Country Study 

not completely because of the active resistance of both the Mus- 
lims in the south and the Igorot, the upland tribal peoples in the 
north. Philip II explicitly ordered that pacification of the Philip- 
pines be bloodless, to avoid a repetition of Spain's sanguinary con- 
quests in the Americas. Occupation of the islands was accomplished 
with relatively little bloodshed, partly because most of the popula- 
tion (except the Muslims) offered little armed resistance initially. 

Church and state were inseparably linked in carrying out Span- 
ish policy. The state assumed administrative responsibility — funding 
expenditures and selecting personnel — for the new ecclesiastical es- 
tablishments. Responsibility for conversion of the indigenous popu- 
lation to Christianity was assigned to several religious orders: the 
Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians, known collectively 
as the friars — and to the Jesuits. At the lower levels of colonial ad- 
ministration, the Spanish built on traditional village organization 
by co-opting the traditional local leaders, thereby ruling indirectly. 

This system of indirect rule helped create in rural areas a Filipi- 
no upper class, referred to as the principalia or the principals (prin- 
cipal ones). This group had local wealth; high status and prestige; 
and certain privileges, such as exemption from taxes, lesser roles 
in the parish church, and appointment to local offices. The prin- 
cipalia was larger and more influential than the preconquest nobil- 
ity, and it created and perpetuated an oligarchic system of local 
control. Among the most significant and enduring changes that 
occurred under Spanish rule was that the Filipino idea of communal 
use and ownership of land was replaced with the concept of pri- 
vate, individual ownership and the conferring of titles on mem- 
bers of the principalia. 

Religion played a significant role in Spain's relations with and 
attitudes toward the indigenous population. The Spaniards consid- 
ered conversion through baptism to be a symbol of allegiance to 
their authority. Although they were interested in gaining a profit 
from the colony, the Spanish also recognized a responsibility to 
protect the property and personal rights of these new Christians. 

The church's work of converting Filipinos was facilitated by the 
absence of other organized religions, except for Islam, which 
predominated in the south. The missionaries had their greatest suc- 
cess among women and children, although the pageantry of the 
church had a wide appeal, reinforced by the incorporation of Filipi- 
no social customs into religious observances, for example, in the 
fiestas celebrating the patron saint of a local community (see Reli- 
gious Life, ch. 2). The eventual outcome was a new cultural com- 
munity of the main Malay lowland population, from which the 



6 



Multilevel rice terraces on Luzon were established centuries ago 

by Ifugao tribal peoples. 
Courtesy Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, Washington 
Ferdinand Magellan 's commemorative cross in a church on Cebu 
marks his arrival in the Philippines in 1521. 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 



7 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Muslims (known by the Spanish as Moros, or Moors) and the up- 
land tribal peoples of Luzon remained detached and alienated. 

The Spanish found neither spices nor exploitable precious met- 
als in the Philippines. The ecology of the islands was little changed 
by Spanish importations and technical innovations, with the ex- 
ception of corn cultivation and some extension of irrigation in order 
to increase rice supplies for the growing urban population. The 
colony was not profitable, and a long war with the Dutch in the 
seventeenth century and intermittent conflict with the Moros nearly 
bankrupted the colonial treasury. Annual deficits were made up 
by a subsidy from Mexico. 

Colonial income derived mainly from entrepot trade: the "Ma- 
nila galleons" sailing from Acapulco on the west coast of Mexico 
brought shipments of silver bullion and minted coin that were ex- 
changed for return cargoes of Chinese goods, mainly silk textiles. 
There was no direct trade with Spain. Failure to exploit indigenous 
natural resources and investment of virtually all official, private, 
and church capital in the galleon trade were mutually reinforcing 
tendencies. Loss or capture of the galleons or Chinese junks en 
route to Manila represented a financial disaster for the colony. 

The thriving entrepot trade quickly attracted growing numbers 
of Chinese to Manila. The Chinese, in addition to managing trade 
transactions, were the source of some necessary provisions and ser- 
vices for the capital. The Spanish regarded them with a mixture 
of distrust and acknowledgment of their indispensable role. Dur- 
ing the first decades of Spanish rule, the Chinese in Manila be- 
came more numerous than the Spanish, who tried to control them 
with residence restrictions, periodic deportations, and actual or threat- 
ened violence that sometimes degenerated into riots and massacres 
of Chinese during the period between 1603 and 1762. 

The Decline of Spanish Rule, 1762-1898 

In 1762 Spain became involved in the Seven Years' War 
(1756-63) on the side of France against Britain; in October 1762, 
forces of the British East India Company captured Manila after 
fierce fighting. Spanish resistance continued under Lieutenant 
Governor Simon de Anda, based at Bacolor in Pampanga Province, 
and Manila was returned to the Spanish in May 1764 in confor- 
mity with the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the war. The 
British occupation nonetheless marked, in a very significant sense, 
the beginning of the end of the old order. 

Spanish prestige suffered irreparable damage because of the defeat 
at British hands. A number of rebellions broke out, of which the 
most notable was that of Diego Silang in the Ilocos area of northern 



8 



Historical Setting 



Luzon. In December 1762, Silang expelled the Spanish from the 
coastal city of Vigan and set up an independent government. He 
established friendly relations with the British and was able to repulse 
Spanish attacks on Vigan, but he was assassinated in May 1763. 
The Spanish, tied down by fighting with the British and the reb- 
els, were unable to control the raids of the Moros of the south on 
the Christian communities of the Visayan Islands and Luzon. Thou- 
sands of Christian Filipinos were captured as slaves, and Moro raids 
continued to be a serious problem through the remainder of the 
century. The Chinese community, resentful of Spanish discrimi- 
nation, for the most part enthusiastically supported the British, 
providing them with laborers and armed men who fought de Anda 
in Pampanga. 

After Spanish rule was restored, Jose Basco y Vargas, one of 
the ablest of Spanish administrators, was governor from 1778 to 
1787, and he implemented a series of reforms designed to promote 
the economic development of the islands and make them indepen- 
dent of the subsidy from New Spain. In 1781 he established the 
Economic Society of Friends of the Country, which, throughout 
its checkered history extending over the next century, encouraged 
the growth of new crops for export — for example, indigo, tea, silk, 
opium poppies, and abaca (hemp) — and the development of local 
industry. A government tobacco monopoly was established in 1782. 
The monopoly brought in large profits for the government and 
made the Philippines a leader in world tobacco production. 

The venerable galleon trade between the Philippines and Mexi- 
co continued as a government monopoly until 1815, when the last 
official galleon from Acapulco docked at Manila. The Royal Com- 
pany of the Philippines, chartered by the Spanish king in 1785, 
promoted direct trade from that year on between the islands and 
Spain. All Philippine goods were given tariff-free status, and the 
company, together with Basco 's Economic Society, encouraged the 
growth of a cash-crop economy by investing a portion of its early 
profits in the cultivation of sugar, indigo, peppers, and mulberry 
trees for silk, as well as in textile factories. 

Trade with Europe and America 

As long as the Spanish empire on the eastern rim of the Pacific 
remained intact and the galleons sailed to and from Acapulco, there 
was littie incentive on the part of colonial authorities to promote the 
development of the Philippines, despite the initiatives of Jose Basco 
y Vargas during his career as governor in Manila. After his depar- 
ture, the Economic Society was allowed to fall on hard times, and 
the Royal Company showed decreasing profits. The independence 



9 



Philippines: A Country Study 



of Spain's Latin American colonies, particularly Mexico in 1821, 
forced a fundamental reorientation of policy. Cut off from the Mex- 
ican subsidies and protected Latin American markets, the islands 
had to pay for themselves. As a result, in the late eighteenth cen- 
tury commercial isolation became less feasible. 

Growing numbers of foreign merchants in Manila spurred the 
integration of the Philippines into an international commercial sys- 
tem linking industrialized Europe and North America with sources 
of raw materials and markets in the Americas and Asia. In princi- 
ple, non-Spanish Europeans were not allowed to reside in Manila 
or elsewhere in the islands, but in fact British, American, French, 
and other foreign merchants circumvented this prohibition by fly- 
ing the flags of Asian states or conniving with local officials. In 
1834 the crown abolished the Royal Company of the Philippines 
and formally recognized free trade, opening the port of Manila to 
unrestricted foreign commerce. 

By 1856 there were thirteen foreign trading firms in Manila, of 
which seven were British and two American; between 1855 and 
1873 the Spanish opened new ports to foreign trade, including Ilo- 
ilo on Panay, Zamboanga in the western portion of Mindanao, 
Cebu on Cebu, and Legaspi in the Bicol area of southern Luzon. 
The growing prominence of steam over sail navigation and the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 contributed to spectacular in- 
creases in the volume of trade. In 1851 exports and imports to- 
taled some US$8.2 million; ten years later, they had risen to 
US$18.9 million and by 1870 were US$53.3 million. Exports alone 
grew by US$20 million between 1861 and 1870. British and Unit- 
ed States merchants dominated Philippine commerce, the former 
in an especially favored position because of their bases in Singa- 
pore, Hong Kong, and the island of Borneo. 

By the late nineteenth century, three crops — tobacco, abaca, and 
sugar — dominated Philippine exports. The government monopoly 
on tobacco had been abolished in 1880, but Philippine cigars main- 
tained their high reputation, popular throughout Victorian parlors 
in Britain, the European continent, and North America. Because 
of the growth of worldwide shipping, Philippine abaca, which was 
considered the best material for ropes and cordage, grew in im- 
portance and after 1850 alternated with sugar as the islands' most 
important export. Americans dominated the abaca trade; raw 
material was made into rope, first at plants in New England and 
then in the Philippines. Principal regions for the growing of abaca 
were the Bicol areas of southeastern Luzon and the eastern por- 
tions of the Visayan Islands. 



10 



Historical Setting 



Sugarcane had been produced and refined using crude methods 
at least as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. The 
opening of the port of Iloilo on Panay in 1855 and the encourage- 
ment of the British vice consul in that town, Nicholas Loney 
(described by a modern writer as "a one-man whirlwind of en- 
trepreneurial and technical innovation"), led to the development 
of the previously unsettled island of Negros as the center of the 
Philippine sugar industry, exporting its product to Britain and Aus- 
tralia. Loney arranged liberal credit terms for local landlords to 
invest in the new crop, encouraged the migration of labor from 
the neighboring and overpopulated island of Panay, and introduced 
stream-driven sugar refineries that replaced the traditional method 
of producing low-grade sugar in loaves. The population of Negros 
tripled. Local "sugar barons" — the owners of the sugar planta- 
tions — became a potent political and economic force by the end 
of the nineteenth century. 

Chinese and Chinese Mestizos 

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, deep-seated 
Spanish suspicion of the Chinese gave way to recognition of their 
potentially constructive role in economic development. Chinese ex- 
pulsion orders issued in 1755 and 1766 were repealed in 1788. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese remained concentrated in towns around 
Manila, particularly Binondo and Santa Cruz. In 1839 the govern- 
ment issued a decree granting them freedom of occupation and 
residence. 

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, immigration into the 
archipelago, largely from the maritime province of Fujian on the 
southeastern coast of China, increased, and a growing proportion 
of Chinese settled in outlying areas. In 1849 more than 90 percent 
of the approximately 6,000 Chinese lived in or around Manila, 
whereas in 1886 this proportion decreased to 77 percent of the 
66,000 Chinese in the Philippines at that time, declining still fur- 
ther in the 1890s. The Chinese presence in the hinterland went 
hand in hand with the transformation of the insular economy. Span- 
ish policy encouraged immigrants to become agricultural laborers. 
Some became gardeners, supplying vegetables to the towns, but 
most shunned the fields and set themselves up as small retailers 
and moneylenders. The Chinese soon gained a central position in 
the cash-crop economy on the provincial and local levels. 

Of equal, if not greater, significance for subsequent political, 
cultural, and economic developments were the Chinese mestizos 
(see Glossary). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, they 
composed about 5 percent of the total population of around 2.5 



11 



Philippines: A Country Study 

million and were concentrated in the most developed provinces of 
Central Luzon and in Manila and its environs. A much smaller 
number lived in the more important towns of the Visayan Islands, 
such as Cebu and Iloilo, and on Mindanao. Converts to Catholi- 
cism and speakers of Filipino languages or Spanish rather than 
Chinese dialects, the mestizos enjoyed a legal status as subjects of 
Spain that was denied the Chinese. In the words of historian Ed- 
gar Vickberg, they were considered, unlike the mixed-Chinese of 
other Southeast Asian countries, not "a special kind of local 
Chinese" but ''a special kind of Filipino." 

The eighteenth-century expulsion edicts had given the Chinese 
mestizos the opportunity to enter retailing and the skilled craft oc- 
cupations formerly dominated by the Chinese. The removal of le- 
gal restrictions on Chinese economic activity and the competition 
of new Chinese immigrants, however, drove a large number of mes- 
tizos out of the commercial sector in mid-nineteenth century. As 
a result, many Chinese mestizos invested in land, particularly in 
Central Luzon. The estates of the religious orders were concen- 
trated in this region, and mestizos became inquilinos (lessees) of these 
lands, subletting them to cultivators; a portion of the rent was given 
by the inquilinos to the friary estate. Like the Chinese, the mestizos 
were moneylenders and acquired land when debtors defaulted. 

By the late nineteenth century, prominent mestizo families, 
despite the inroads of the Chinese, were noted for their wealth and 
formed the major component of a Filipino elite. As the export econ- 
omy grew and foreign contact increased, the mestizos and other 
members of this Filipino elite, known collectively as ilustrados (see 
Glossary), obtained higher education (in some cases abroad), en- 
tered professions such as law or medicine, and were particularly 
receptive to the liberal and democratic ideas that were beginning 
to reach the Philippines despite the efforts of the generally 
reactionary — and friar-dominated — Spanish establishment. 

The Friarocracy 

The power of religious orders remained one of the great con- 
stants, over the centuries, of Spanish colonial rule. Even in the late 
nineteenth century, the friars of the Augustinian, Dominican, and 
Franciscan orders conducted many of the executive and control 
functions of government on the local level. They were responsible 
for education and health measures, kept the census and tax records, 
reported on the character and behavior of individual villagers, su- 
pervised the selection of local police and town officers, and were 
responsible for maintaining public morals and reporting incidences 
of sedition to the authorities. Contrary to the principles of the 



12 



Historical Setting 



church, they allegedly used information gained in confession to pin- 
point troublemakers. Given the minuscule number of Spanish living 
outside the capital even in the nineteenth century, the friars were 
regarded as indispensable instruments of Spanish rule that con- 
temporary critics labeled a "friarocracy" (Jrialocracia). 

Controversies over visitation and secularization were persistent 
themes in Philippine church history. Visitation involved the authori- 
ty of the bishops of the church hierarchy to inspect and discipline 
the religious orders, a principle laid down in church law and prac- 
ticed in most of the Catholic world. The friars were successful in 
resisting the efforts of the archbishop of Manila to impose visita- 
tion; consequently, they operated without formal supervision 
except that of their own provincials or regional superiors. Secular- 
ization meant the replacement of the friars, who came exclusively 
from Spain, with Filipino priests ordained by the local bishop. This 
movement, again, was successfully resisted, as friars through the 
centuries kept up the argument, often couched in crude racial terms, 
that Filipino priests were too poorly qualified to take on parish 
duties. Although church policy dictated that religious orders relin- 
quish parishes of countries converted to Christianity to indigenous 
diocesan priests, in 1870 only 181 out of 792 parishes in the is- 
lands had Filipino priests. The national and racial dimensions of 
secularization meant that the issue became linked with broader de- 
mands for political reform. 

The economic position of the orders was secured by their exten- 
sive landholdings, which generally had been donated to them for 
the support of their churches, schools, and other establishments. 
Given the general lack of interest on the part of Spanish colonials — 
clustered in Manila and dependent on the galleon trade — in de- 
veloping agriculture, the religious orders had become by the eigh- 
teenth century the largest landholders in the islands, with their es- 
tates concentrated in the Central Luzon region. Land rents — paid 
often by Chinese mestizo inquilinos, who planted cash crops for 
export — provided them with the sort of income that enabled many 
friars to live like princes in palatial establishments. 

Central to the friars' dominant position was their monopoly of 
education at all levels and thus their control over cultural and intel- 
lectual life. In 1863 the Spanish government decreed that a system 
of free public primary education be established in the islands, which 
could have been interpreted as a threat to this monopoly. By 1867 
there were 593 primary schools enrolling 138,990 students; by 1877 
the numbers had grown to 1,608 schools and 177,113 students; 
and in 1898 there were 2,150 schools and over 200,000 students 
out of a total population of approximately 6 million. The friars, 



13 



Philippines: A Country Study 

however, were given the responsibility of supervising the system 
both on the local and the national levels. The Jesuits were given 
control of the teacher-training colleges. Except for the Jesuits, the 
religious orders were strongly opposed to the teaching of modern 
foreign languages, including Spanish, and scientific and technical 
subjects to the indios (literally, Indians; the Spanish term for Filipi- 
nos). In 1898 the University of Santo Tomas taught essentially the 
same courses that it did in 1611, when it was founded by the 
Dominicans, twenty-one years before Galileo was brought before 
the Inquisition for publishing the idea that the earth revolved around 
the sun. 

The friarocracy seems to have had more than its share of per- 
sonal irregularities, and the priestly vow of chastity often was hon- 
ored in the breach. In the eyes of educated Filipino priests and 
laymen, however, most inexcusable was the friars' open attitude 
of contempt toward the people. By the late nineteenth century, their 
attitude was one of blatant racism. In the words of one friar, 
responding to the challenge of the ilustrados, "the only liberty the 
Indians want is the liberty of savages. Leave them to their cock- 
fighting and their indolence, and they will thank you more than 
if you load them down with old and new rights." 

Apolinario de la Cruz, a Tagalog (see Glossary) who led the 
1839-41 Cofradia de San Jose revolt, embodied the religious aspi- 
rations and disappointments of the Filipinos. A pious individual 
who sought to enter a religious order, he made repeated applica- 
tions that were turned down by the racially conscious friars, and 
he was left with no alternative but to become a humble lay brother 
performing menial tasks at a charitable institution in Manila. While 
serving in that capacity, he started the cofradia (confraternity or 
brotherhood), a society to promote Roman Catholic devotion 
among Filipinos. From 1839 to 1840, Brother Apolinario sent 
representatives to his native Tayabas, south of Laguna de Bay, 
to recruit members, and the movement rapidly spread as cells were 
established throughout the southern Tagalog area. Originally, the 
cofradia was apparently neither anti- Spanish nor nativist in religious 
orientation, although native elements were prevalent among its 
provincial followers. Yet its emphasis on secrecy, the strong bond 
of loyalty its members felt for Brother Apolinario, and, above all, 
the fact that it barred Spanish and mestizos from membership 
aroused the suspicions of the authorities. The cofradia was banned 
by the authorities in 1840. 

In the autumn of 1841 Brother Apolinario left Manila and 
gathered his followers, then numbering several thousands armed 
with rifles and bolos (heavy, single-bladed knives), at bases in the 



14 



Interior view of St. Augustine's Church, Manila, 
dating from the late sixteenth century 
Courtesy Robert L. W or den 

villages around the town of Tayabas; as a spiritual leader, he 
preached that God would deliver the Tagalog people from slav- 
ery. Although the rebel force, aided by Negrito hill tribesmen, was 
able to defeat a detachment led by the provincial governor in late 
October, a much larger Spanish force composed of soldiers from 
Pampanga Province — the elite of the Philippine military establish- 
ment and traditional enemies of the Tagalogs — took the cofradia 
camp at Alitao after a great slaughter on November 1, 1841. 

The insurrection effectively ended with the betrayal and cap- 
ture of Brother Apolinario. He was executed on November 5, 1841 . 
Survivors of the movement became remontados (those who go back 
into the mountains), leaving their villages to live on the slopes of 
the volcanic Mount San Cristobal and Mount Banahao, within sight 
of Alitao. These mountains, where no friar ventured, became folk 
religious centers, places of pilgrimage for lowland peasants, and 
the birthplace of religious communities known as colorums (see 
Glossary). 

The Development of a National Consciousness 

Religious movements such as the cofradia and colorums expressed 
an inchoate desire of their members to be rid of the Spanish and 



15 



Philippines: A Country Study 

discover a promised land that would reflect memories of a world 
that existed before the coming of the colonists. Nationalism in the 
modern sense developed in an urban context, in Manila and the 
major towns and, perhaps more significantly, in Spain and other 
parts of Europe where Filipino students and exiles were exposed 
to modern intellectual currents. Folk religion, for all its power, did 
not form the basis of the national ideology. Yet the millenarian 
tradition of rural revolt would merge with the Europeanized na- 
tionalism of the ilustrados to spur a truly national resistance, first 
against Spain in 1896 and then against the Americans in 1899. 

Following the Spanish revolution of September 1868, in which 
the unpopular Queen Isabella II was deposed, the new government 
appointed General Carlos Maria de la Torre governor of the Philip- 
pines. An outspoken liberal, de la Torre extended to Filipinos the 
promise of reform. In a break with established practice, he frater- 
nized with Filipinos, invited them to the governor's palace, and 
rode with them in official processions. Filipinos in turn welcomed 
de la Torre warmly, held a "liberty parade" to celebrate the adop- 
tion of the liberal 1869 Spanish constitution, and established a re- 
form committee to lay the foundations of a new order. Prominent 
among de la Torre's supporters in Manila were professional and 
business leaders of the ilustrado community and, perhaps more sig- 
nificantly, Filipino secular priests. These included the learned Father 
Jose Burgos, a Spanish mestizo, who had published a pamphlet, 
Manifesto to the Noble Spanish Nation, criticizing those racially 
prejudiced Spanish who barred Filipinos from the priesthood and 
government service. For a brief time, the tide seemed to be turn- 
ing against the friars. In December 1870, the archbishop of Manila, 
Gregorio Meliton Martinez, wrote to the Spanish regent advocat- 
ing secularization and warning that discrimination against Filipino 
priests would encourage anti-Spanish sentiments. 

According to historian Austin Coates, "1869 and 1870 stand dis- 
tinct and apart from the whole of the rest of the period as a time 
when for a brief moment a real breath of the nineteenth century 
penetrated the Islands, which till then had been living largely in 
the seventeenth century." De la Torre abolished censorship of 
newspapers and legalized the holding of public demonstrations, free 
speech, and assembly — rights guaranteed in the 1869 Spanish con- 
stitution. Students at the University of Santo Tomas formed an 
association, the Liberal Young Students (Juventud Escolar Liber- 
al), and in October 1869 held demonstrations protesting the abuses 
of the university's Dominican friar administrators and teachers. 

The liberal period came to an abrupt end in 1871. Friars and 
other conservative Spaniards in Manila managed to engineer the 



16 



Historical Setting 



replacement of de la Torre by a more conservative figure, Rafael 
de Izquierdo, who, following his installation as governor in April 
1871, reimposed the severities of the old regime. He is alleged to 
have boasted that he came to the islands "with a crucifix in one 
hand and a sword in the other. " Liberal laws were rescinded, and 
the enthusiastic Filipino supporters of de la Torre came under po- 
litical suspicion. 

The heaviest blow came after a mutiny on January 20, 1872, 
when about 200 Filipino dockworkers and soldiers in Cavite 
Province revolted and killed their Spanish officers, apparently in 
the mistaken belief that a general uprising was in progress among 
Filipino regiments in Manila. Grievances connected with the 
government's revocation of old privileges — particularly exemption 
from tribute service — inspired the revolt, which was put down by 
January 22. The authorities, however, began weaving a tale of con- 
spiracy between the mutineers and prominent members of the Filipi- 
no community, particularly diocesan priests. The governor asserted 
that a secret junta, with connections to liberal parties in Spain, 
existed in Manila and was ready to overthrow Spanish rule. 

A military court sentenced to death the three Filipino priests most 
closely associated with liberal reformism — Jose Burgos, Mariano 
Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora — and exiled a number of prominent 
ilustrados to Guam and the Marianas (then Spanish possessions), 
from which they escaped to carry on the struggle from Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Europe. Archbishop Martinez requested that the 
governor commute the priests' death sentences and refused the 
governor's order that they be defrocked. Martinez's efforts were 
in vain, however, and on February 17, 1872, they were publicly 
executed with the brutal garrote on the Luneta (the broad park 
facing Manila Bay). The archbishop ordered that Manila church 
bells toll a requiem for the victims, a requiem that turned out to 
be for Spanish rule in the islands as well. Although a policy of ac- 
commodation would have won the loyalty of peasant and ilustrado 
alike, intransigence — particularly on the question of the seculari- 
zation of the clergy — led increasing numbers of Filipinos to ques- 
tion the need for a continuing association with Spain. 

Jose Rizal and the Propaganda Movement 

Between 1872 and 1892, a national consciousness was growing 
among the Filipino emigres who had settled in Europe. In the freer 
atmosphere of Europe, these emigres — liberals exiled in 1872 and 
students attending European universities — formed the Propagan- 
da Movement. Organized for literary and cultural purposes more 
than for political ends, the Propagandists, who included upper-class 



17 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Filipinos from all the lowland Christian areas, strove to "awaken 
the sleeping intellect of the Spaniard to the needs of our country" 
and to create a closer, more equal association of the islands and 
the motherland. Among their specific goals were representation of 
the Philippines in the Cortes, or Spanish parliament; seculariza- 
tion of the clergy; legalization of Spanish and Filipino equality; 
creation of a public school system independent of the friars; aboli- 
tion of the polo (labor service) and vandala (forced sale of local 
products to the government); guarantee of basic freedoms of speech 
and association; and equal opportunity for Filipinos and Spanish 
to enter government service. 

The most outstanding Propagandist was Jose Rizal, a physician, 
scholar, scientist, and writer. Born in 1861 into a prosperous 
Chinese mestizo family in Laguna Province, he displayed great 
intelligence at an early age. After several years of medical study 
at the University of Santo Tomas, he went to Spain in 1882 to fin- 
ish his studies at the University of Madrid. During the decade that 
followed, Rizal' s career spanned two worlds: Among small com- 
munities of Filipino students in Madrid and other European cities, 
he became a leader and eloquent spokesman, and in the wider world 
of European science and scholarship — particularly in Germany — he 
formed close relationships with prominent natural and social scien- 
tists. The new discipline of anthropology was of special interest to 
him; he was committed to refuting the friars' stereotypes of Filipino 
racial inferiority with scientific arguments. His greatest impact on 
the development of a Filipino national consciousness, however, was 
his publication of two novels — Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not) 
in 1886 and El Filibusterismo (The Reign of Greed) in 1891. Rizal 
drew on his personal experiences and depicted the conditions of 
Spanish rule in the islands, particularly the abuses of the friars. 
Although the friars had Rizal' s books banned, they were smug- 
gled into the Philippines and rapidly gained a wide readership. 

Other important Propagandists included Graciano Lopez Jae- 
na, a noted orator and pamphleteer who had left the islands for 
Spain in 1880 after the publication of his satirical short novel, Fray 
Botod (Brother Fatso), an unflattering portrait of a provincial friar. 
In 1889 he established a biweekly newspaper in Barcelona, La 
Solidaridad (Solidarity), which became the principal organ of the 
Propaganda Movement, having audiences both in Spain and in the 
islands. Its contributors included Rizal; Dr. Ferdinand Blumen- 
tritt, an Austrian geographer and ethnologist whom Rizal had met 
in Germany; and Marcelo del Pilar, a reform-minded lawyer. Del 
Pilar was active in the antifriar movement in the islands until 



18 



Ruins of Fort Santiago, with Rizal Museum in background 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 

obliged to flee to Spain in 1888, where he became editor of La Soli- 
daridad and assumed leadership of the Filipino community in Spain. 

In 1887 Rizal returned briefly to the islands, but because of the 
furor surrounding the appearance of Noli Me Tangere the previous 
year, he was advised by the governor to leave. He returned to Eu- 
rope by way of Japan and North America to complete his second 
novel and an edition of Antonio de Morga's seventeenth-century 
work, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinos (History of the Philippine Islands). 
The latter project stemmed from an ethnological interest in the cul- 
tural connections between the peoples of the pre-Spanish Philip- 
pines and those of the larger Malay region (including modern 
Malaysia and Indonesia) and the closely related political objective 
of encouraging national pride. De Morga provided positive infor- 
mation about the islands' early inhabitants and reliable accounts 
of pre-Christian religion and social customs. 

After a stay in Europe and Hong Kong, Rizal returned to the 
Philippines in June 1892, partly because the Dominicans had evicted 
his father and sisters from the land they leased from the friars' es- 
tate at Calamba, in Laguna Province. He also was convinced that 
the struggle for reform could no longer be conducted effectively 
from overseas. In July he established the Liga Filipina (Philippine 
League), designed to be a truly national, nonviolent organization. 



19 



Philippines: A Country Study 

It was dissolved, however, following his arrest and exile to the re- 
mote town of Dapitan in northwestern Mindanao. 

The Propaganda Movement languished after Rizal's arrest and 
the collapse of the Liga Filipina. La Solidaridad went out of busi- 
ness in November 1895, and in 1896 both del Pilar and Lopez Jaena 
died in Barcelona, worn down by poverty and disappointment. An 
attempt was made to reestablish the Liga Filipina, but the nation- 
al movement had become split between ilustrado advocates of re- 
form and peaceful evolution (the compromisarios, or compromisers) 
and a plebeian constituency that wanted revolution and national 
independence. Because the Spanish refused to allow genuine re- 
form, the initiative quickly passed from the former group to the 
latter. 

The Katipunan 

After Rizal's arrest and exile, Andres Bonifacio, a self-educated 
man of humble origins, founded a secret society, the Katipunan, 
in Manila. This organization, modeled in part on Masonic lodges, 
was committed to winning independence from Spain. Rizal, Lo- 
pez Jaena, del Pilar, and other leaders of the Propaganda Move- 
ment had been Masons, and Masonry was regarded by the Catholic 
Church as heretical. The Katipunan, like the Masonic lodges, had 
secret passwords and ceremonies, and its members were organized 
into ranks or degrees, each having different colored hoods, special 
passwords, and secret formulas. New members went through a 
rigorous initiation, which concluded with thepacto de sangre, or blood 
compact. 

The Katipunan spread gradually from the Tondo district of 
Manila, where Bonifacio had founded it, to the provinces, and by 
August 1896 — on the eve of the revolt against Spain — it had some 
30,000 members, both men and women. Most of them were mem- 
bers of the lower- and lower-middle-income strata, including peas- 
ants. The nationalist movement had effectively moved from the 
closed circle of prosperous ilustrados to a truly popular base of support. 

The 1896 Uprising and Rizal's Execution 

During the early years of the Katipunan, Rizal remained in ex- 
ile at Dapitan. He had promised the Spanish governor that he would 
not attempt an escape, which, in that remote part of the country, 
would have been relatively easy. Such a course of action, however, 
would have both compromised the moderate reform policy that he 
still advocated and confirmed the suspicions of the reactionary Span- 
ish. Whether he came to support Philippine independence during 
his period of exile is difficult to determine. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Rizal retained, to the very end, a faith in the decency of Span- 
ish "men of honor," which made it difficult for him to accept the 
revolutionary course of the Katipunan. Revolution had broken out 
in Cuba in February 1895, and Rizal applied to the governor to 
be sent to that yellow fever-infested island as an army doctor, be- 
lieving that it was the only way he could keep his word to the gover- 
nor and yet get out of his exile. His request was granted, and he 
was preparing to leave for Cuba when the Katipunan revolt broke 
out in August 1896. An informer had tipped off a Spanish friar 
about the society's existence, and Bonifacio, his hand forced, 
proclaimed the revolution, attacking Spanish military installations 
on August 29, 1896. Rizal was allowed to leave Manila on a Spanish 
steamship. The governor, however, apparently forced by reaction- 
ary elements, ordered Rizal 's arrest en route, and he was sent back 
to Manila to be tried by a military court as an accomplice of the 
insurrection. 

The rebels were poorly led and had few successes against colonial 
troops. Only in Cavite Province did they make any headway. Com- 
manded by Emilio Aguinaldo, the twenty-seven-year-old mayor 
of the town of Cavite who had been a member of the Katipunan 
since 1895, the rebels defeated Civil Guard and regular colonial 
troops between August and November 1896 and made the province 
the center of the revolution. 

Under a new governor, who apparently had been sponsored as 
a hard-line candidate by the religious orders, Rizal was brought 
before a military court on fabricated charges of involvement with 
the Katipunan. The events of 1872 repeated themselves. A brief 
trial was held on December 26 and — with little chance to defend 
himself — Rizal was found guilty and sentenced to death. On De- 
cember 30, 1896, he was brought out to the Luneta and executed 
by a firing squad. 

Rizal 's death filled the rebels with new determination, but the 
Katipunan was becoming divided between supporters of Bonifa- 
cio, who revealed himself to be an increasingly ineffective leader, 
and its rising star, Aguinaldo. At a convention held at Tejeros, 
the Katipunan 's headquarters in March 1897, delegates elected 
Aguinaldo president and demoted Bonifacio to the post of direc- 
tor of the interior. Bonifacio withdrew with his supporters and 
formed his own government. After fighting broke out between 
Bonifacio's and Aguinaldo 's troops, Bonifacio was arrested, tried, 
and on May 10, 1897, executed by order of Aguinaldo. 

As 1897 wore on, Aguinaldo himself suffered reverses at the hands 
of Spanish troops, being forced from Cavite in June and retreating 
to Biak-na-Bato in Bulacan Province. The futility of the struggle 



21 



Philippines: A Country Study 

was becoming apparent, however, on both sides. Although Span- 
ish troops were able to defeat insurgents on the batdefleld, they 
could not suppress guerrilla activity. In August armistice negotia- 
tions were opened between Aguinaldo and a new Spanish gover- 
nor. By mid-December, an agreement was reached in which the 
governor would pay Aguinaldo the equivalent of US$800,000, and 
the rebel leader and his government would go into exile. Aguinaldo 
established himself in Hong Kong, and the Spanish bought them- 
selves time. Within the year, however, their more than three cen- 
turies of rule in the islands would come to an abrupt and unexpected 
end. 

Spanish-American War and Philippine Resistance 
Outbreak of War, 1898 

Spain's rule in the Philippines came to an end as a result of Unit- 
ed States involvement with Spain's other major colony, Cuba. 
American business interests were anxious for a resolution — with 
or without Spain — of the insurrection that had broken out in Cuba 
in February 1895. Moreover, public opinion in the United States 
had been aroused by newspaper accounts of the brutalities of Span- 
ish rule. When the United States declared war on Spain on April 
25, 1898, acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt ordered 
Commodore George Dewey, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, 
to sail to the Philippines and destroy the Spanish fleet anchored 
in Manila Bay. The Spanish navy, which had seen its apogee in 
the support of a global empire in the sixteenth century, suffered 
an inglorious defeat on May 1, 1898, as Spain's antiquated fleet, 
including ships with wooden hulls, was sunk by the guns of Dewey's 
flagship, the Olympia, and other United States warships. More than 
380 Spanish sailors died, but there was only one American fatality. 

As Spain and the United States had moved toward war over Cuba 
in the last months of 1897, negotiations of a highly tentative na- 
ture began between United States officials and Aguinaldo in both 
Hong Kong and Singapore. When war was declared, Aguinaldo, 
a partner, if not an ally, of the United States, was urged by Dewey 
to return to the islands as quickly as possible. Arriving in Manila 
on May 19, Aguinaldo reassumed command of rebel forces. In- 
surrectionists overwhelmed demoralized Spanish garrisons around 
the capital and established links with other movements through- 
out the islands. 

In the eyes of the Filipinos, their relationship with the United 
States was that of two nations joined in a common struggle against 
Spain. As allies, the Filipinos provided American forces with 



22 



Historical Setting 



valuable intelligence (e.g. , that the Spanish had no mines or torpe- 
does with which to sink warships entering Manila Bay), and 
Aguinaldo's 12,000 troops kept a slightly larger Spanish force bot- 
tled up inside Manila until American troop reinforcements could 
arrive from San Francisco in late June. Aguinaldo was unhappy, 
however, that the United States would not commit to paper a state- 
ment of support for Philippine independence. 

By late May, the United States Department of the Navy had 
ordered Dewey, newly promoted to Admiral, to distance himself 
from Aguinaldo lest he make untoward commitments to the Philip- 
pine forces. The war with Spain still was going on, and the future 
of the Philippines remained uncertain. The immediate objective 
was to capture Manila, and it was thought best to do that without 
the assistance of the insurgents. By late July, there were some 12,000 
United States troops in the area, and relations between them and 
rebel forces deteriorated rapidly. 

By the summer of 1898, Manila had become the focus not only 
of the Spanish- American conflict and the growing suspicions be- 
tween the Americans and Filipino rebels but also of a rivalry that 
encompassed the European powers. Following Dewey's victory, 
Manila Bay was filled with the warships of Britain, Germany, 
France, and Japan. The German fleet of eight ships, ostensibly 
in Philippine waters to protect German interests (a single import 
firm), acted provocatively — cutting in front of United States ships, 
refusing to salute the United States flag (according to naval courte- 
sy), taking soundings of the harbor, and landing supplies for the 
besieged Spanish. Germany, hungry for the ultimate status sym- 
bol, a colonial empire, was eager to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities the conflict in the islands might afford. Dewey called 
the bluff of the German admiral, threatening a fight if his aggres- 
sive activities continued, and the Germans backed down. 

The Spanish cause was doomed, but Fermin Jaudenes, Spain's 
last governor in the islands, had to devise a way to salvage the honor 
of his country. Negotiations were carried out through British and 
Belgian diplomatic intermediaries. A secret agreement was made 
between the governor and United States military commanders in 
early August 1898 concerning the capture of Manila. In their as- 
sault, American forces would neither bombard the city nor allow 
the insurgents to take part (the Spanish feared that the Filipinos 
were plotting to massacre them all). The Spanish, in turn, would 
put up only a show of resistance and, on a prearranged signal, would 
surrender. In this way, the governor would be spared the ignomi- 
ny of giving up without a fight, and both sides would be spared 
casualties. The mock batde was staged on August 13. The attackers 



23 



Philippines: A Country Study 

rushed in, and by afternoon the United States flag was flying over 
Intramuros, the ancient walled city that had been the seat of Spanish 
power for over 300 years. 

The agreement between Jaudenes and Dewey marked a curi- 
ous reversal of roles. At the beginning of the war, Americans and 
Filipinos had been allies against Spain in all but name; now Span- 
ish and Americans were in a partnership that excluded the insur- 
gents. Fighting between American and Filipino troops almost broke 
out as the former moved in to dislodge the latter from strategic 
positions around Manila on the eve of the attack. Aguinaldo was 
told bluntly by the Americans that his army could not participate 
and would be fired upon if it crossed into the city. The insurgents 
were infuriated at being denied triumphant entry into their own 
capital, but Aguinaldo bided his time. Relations continued to de- 
teriorate, however, as it became clear to Filipinos that the Ameri- 
cans were in the islands to stay. 

The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris 

After returning to the islands, Aguinaldo wasted little time in 
setting up an independent government. On June 12, 1898, a decla- 
ration of independence, modeled on the American one, was 
proclaimed at his headquarters in Cavite. It was at this time that 
Apolinario Mabini, a lawyer and political thinker, came to promi- 
nence as Aguinaldo' s principal adviser. Born into a poor indio fam- 
ily but educated at the University of Santo Tomas, he advocated 
"simultaneous external and internal revolution," a philosophy that 
unsettled the more conservative landowners and ilustrados, who in- 
itially supported Aguinaldo. For Mabini, true independence for 
the Philippines would mean not simply liberation from Spain (or 
from any other colonial power) but also educating the people for 
self-government and abandoning the paternalistic, colonial men- 
tality that the Spanish had cultivated over the centuries. Mabini' s 
The True Decalogue, published in July 1898 in the form of ten com- 
mandments, used this medium, somewhat paradoxically, to pro- 
mote critical thinking and a reform of customs and attitudes. His 
Constitutional Program for the Philippine Republic, published at the same 
time, elaborated his ideas on political institutions. 

On September 15, 1898, a revolutionary congress was convened 
at Malolos, a market town located thirty- two kilometers north of 
Manila, for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for the new 
republic. A document was approved by the congress on Novem- 
ber 29, 1898. Modeled on the constitutions of France, Belgium, 
and Latin American countries, it was promulgated at Malolos on 



24 



Historical Setting 



January 21, 1899, and two days later Aguinaldo was inaugurated 
as president. 

American observers traveling in Luzon commented that the areas 
controlled by the republic seemed peaceful and well governed. The 
Malolos congress had set up schools, a military academy, and the 
Literary University of the Philippines. Government finances were 
organized, and new currency was issued. The army and navy were 
established on a regular basis, having regional commands. The ac- 
complishments of the Filipino government, however, counted for 
little in the eyes of the great powers as the transfer of the islands 
from Spanish to United States rule was arranged in the closing 
months of 1898. 

In late September, treaty negotiations were initiated between 
Spanish and American representatives in Paris. The Treaty of Paris 
was signed on December 10, 1898. Among its conditions was the 
cession of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United 
States (Cuba was granted its independence); in return, the Unit- 
ed States would pay Spain the sum of US$20 million. The nature 
of this payment is rather difficult to define; it was paid neither to 
purchase Spanish territories nor as a war indemnity. In the words 
of historian Leon Wolff , "It was . . . a gift. Spain accepted it. Quite 
irrelevantly she handed us the Philippines. No question of honor 
or conquest was involved. The Filipino people had nothing to say 
about it, although their rebellion was thrown in (so to speak) free 
of charge." The Treaty of Paris aroused anger among Filipinos. 
Reacting to the US$20 million sum paid to Spain, La Independencia 
(Independence), a newspaper published in Manila by a revolution- 
ary, General Antonio Luna, stated that "people are not to be bought 
and sold like horses and houses. If the aim has been to abolish the 
traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there 
still maintained the sale of countries with inhabitants?" Tension 
and ill feelings were growing between the American troops in Ma- 
nila and the insurgents surrounding the capital. In addition to 
Manila, Iloilo, the main port on the island of Panay, also was a 
pressure point. The Revolutionary Government of the Visayas was 
proclaimed there on November 17, 1898, and an American force 
stood poised to capture the city. Upon the announcement of the 
treaty, the radicals, Mabini and Luna, prepared for war, and provi- 
sional articles were added to the constitution giving President 
Aguinaldo dictatorial powers in times of emergency. President Wil- 
liam McKinley issued a proclamation on December 21, 1898, 
declaring United States policy to be one of "benevolent assimila- 
tion" in which "the mild sway of justice and right" would be sub- 
stituted for "arbitrary rule." When this proclamation was published 



25 



Philippines: A Country Study 



in the islands on January 4, 1899, references to "American 
sovereignty" having been prudently deleted, Aguinaldo issued his 
own proclamation that condemned "violent and aggressive seizure" 
by the United States and threatened war. 

War of Resistance 

Hostilities broke out on the night of February 4, 1899, after two 
American privates on patrol killed three Filipino soldiers in a suburb 
of Manila. Thus began a war that would last for more than two 
years. Some 126,000 American soldiers would be committed to the 
conflict; 4,234 American and 16,000 Filipino soldiers, part of a 
nationwide guerrilla movement of indeterminate numbers, died. 

The Filipino troops, armed with old rifles and bolos and carry- 
ing anting-anting (magical charms), were no match for American 
troops in open combat, but they were formidable opponents in guer- 
rilla warfare. For General Ewell S. Otis, commander of the Unit- 
ed States forces, who had been appointed military governor of the 
Philippines, the conflict began auspiciously with the expulsion of 
the rebels from Manila and its suburbs by late February and the 
capture of Malolos, the revolutionary capital, on March 31, 1899. 
Aguinaldo and his government escaped, however, establishing a 
new capital at San Isidro in Nueva Ecija Province. The Filipino 
cause suffered a number of reverses. The attempts of Mabini and 
his successor as president of Aguinaldo 's cabinet, Pedro Paterno, 
to negotiate an armistice in May 1899 ended in failure because 
Otis insisted on unconditional surrender. 

Still more serious was the murder of Luna, Aguinaldo 's most 
capable military commander, in June. Hot-tempered and cruel, 
Luna collected a large number of enemies among his associates, 
and, according to rumor, his death was ordered by Aguinaldo. With 
his best commander dead and his troops suffering continued defeats 
as American forces pushed into northern Luzon, Aguinaldo dis- 
solved the regular army in November 1899 and ordered the estab- 
lishment of decentralized guerrilla commands in each of several 
military zones. More than ever, American soldiers knew the mis- 
eries of fighting an enemy that was able to move at will within the 
civilian population in the villages. The general population, caught 
between Americans and rebels, suffered horribly. 

According to historian Gregorio Zaide, as many as 200,000 
civilians died, largely because of famine and disease, by the end 
of the war. Atrocities were committed on both sides. Although 
Aguinaldo' s government did not have effective authority over the 
whole archipelago and resistance was strongest and best organized 
in the Tagalog area of Central Luzon, the notion entertained by 



26 



Historical Setting 



many Americans that independence was supported only by the 
"Tagalog tribe" was refuted by the fact that there was sustained 
fighting in the Visayan Islands and in Mindanao. Although the 
ports of Iloilo on Panay and Cebu on Cebu were captured in Febru- 
ary 1899, and Tagbilaran, capital of Bohol, in March, guerrilla 
resistance continued in the mountainous interiors of these islands. 
Only on the sugar-growing island of Negros did the local authori- 
ties peacefully accept United States rule. On Mindanao the Unit- 
ed States Army faced the determined opposition of Christian 
Filipinos loyal to the republic. 

Aguinaldo was captured at Palanan on March 23, 1901, by a 
force of Philippine Scouts loyal to the United States and was brought 
back to Manila. Convinced of the futility of further resistance, he 
swore allegiance to the United States and issued a proclamation 
calling on his compatriots to lay down their arms. Yet insurgent 
resistance continued in various parts of the Philippines until 1903. 

The Moros on Mindanao and on the Sulu Archipelago, suspi- 
cious of both Christian Filipino insurrectionists and Americans, 
remained for the most part neutral. In August 1899, an agreement 
had been signed between General John C. Bates, representing the 
United States government, and the sultan of Sulu, Jamal-ul Kir- 
am II, pledging a policy of noninterference on the part of the United 
States. In 1903, however, a Moro province was established by the 
American authorities, and a more forward policy was implement- 
ed: slavery was outlawed, schools that taught a non-Muslim cur- 
riculum were established, and local governments that challenged 
the authority of traditional community leaders were organized. A 
new legal system replaced the sharia, or Islamic law. United States 
rule, even more than that of the Spanish, was seen as a challenge 
to Islam. Armed resistance grew, and the Moro province remained 
under United States military rule until 1914, by which time the 
major Muslim groups had been subjugated (see Islam, ch. 2). 

The First Phase of United States Rule, 1898-1935 

On January 20, 1899, President McKinley appointed the First 
Philippine Commission (the Schurman Commission), a five-person 
group headed by Dr. Jacob Schurman, president of Cornell Univer- 
sity, and including Admiral Dewey and General Otis, to inves- 
tigate conditions in the islands and make recommendations. In the 
report that they issued to the president the following year, the com- 
missioners acknowledged Filipino aspirations for independence; they 
declared, however, that the Philippines was not ready for it. Specific 
recommendations included the establishment of civilian govern- 
ment as rapidly as possible (the American chief executive in the 



27 



Philippines: A Country Study 

islands at that time was the military governor), including estab- 
lishment of a bicameral legislature, autonomous governments on 
the provincial and municipal levels, and a system of free public 
elementary schools. 

The Second Philippine Commission (the Taft Commission), ap- 
pointed by McKinley on March 16, 1900, and headed by William 
Howard Taft, was granted legislative as well as limited executive 
powers. Between September 1900 and August 1902, it issued 499 
laws. A judicial system was established, including a Supreme Court, 
and a legal code was drawn up to replace antiquated Spanish or- 
dinances. A civil service was organized. The 1901 municipal code 
provided for popularly elected presidents, vice presidents, and coun- 
cilors to serve on municipal boards. The municipal board mem- 
bers were responsible for collecting taxes, maintaining municipal 
properties, and undertaking necessary construction projects; they 
also elected provincial governors. In July 1901, the Philippine Con- 
stabulary was organized as an archipelago-wide police force to con- 
trol brigandage and deal with the remnants of the insurgent 
movement. After military rule was terminated on July 4, 1901, 
the Philippine Constabulary gradually took over from United States 
army units the responsibility for suppressing guerrilla and bandit 
activities. 

From the very beginning, United States presidents and their 
representatives in the islands defined their colonial mission as 
tutelage: preparing the Philippines for eventual independence. Ex- 
cept for a small group of ' 'retentionists, ' ' the issue was not whether 
the Philippines would be granted self-rule, but when and under 
what conditions. Thus political development in the islands was rapid 
and particularly impressive in light of the complete lack of represen- 
tative institutions under the Spanish. The Philippine Organic Act 
of July 1902 stipulated that, with the achievement of peace, a legis- 
lature would be established composed of a lower house, the Philip- 
pine Assembly, which would be popularly elected, and an upper 
house consisting of the Philippine Commission, which was to be 
appointed by the president of the United States. The two houses 
would share legislative powers, although the upper house alone 
would pass laws relating to the Moros and other non-Christian peo- 
ples. The act also provided for extending the United States Bill 
of Rights to Filipinos and sending two Filipino resident commis- 
sioners to Washington to attend sessions of the United States Con- 
gress. In July 1907, the first elections for the assembly were held, 
and it opened its first session on October 16, 1907. Political par- 
ties were organized, and, although open advocacy of independence 



28 



Historical Setting 



had been banned during the insurgency years, criticism of govern- 
ment policies in the local newspapers was tolerated. 

Taft, the Philippines' first civilian governor, outlined a compre- 
hensive development plan that he described as "the Philippines 
for the Filipinos . . . that every measure, whether in the form of 
a law or an executive order, before its adoption, should be weighed 
in the light of this question: Does it make for the welfare of the 
Filipino people, or does it not?" Its main features included not 
only broadening representative institutions but also expanding a 
system of free public elementary education and designing economic 
policies to promote the islands' development. Filipinos widely in- 
terpreted Taft's pronouncements as a promise of independence. 

The 1902 Philippine Organic Act disestablished the Catholic 
Church as the state religion. The United States government, in 
an effort to resolve the status of the friars, negotiated with the Vati- 
can. The church agreed to sell the friars' estates and promised 
gradual substitution of Filipino and other non-Spanish priests for 
the friars. It refused, however, to withdraw the religious orders 
from the islands immediately, partly to avoid offending Spain. In 
1904 the administration bought for US$7.2 million the major part 
of the friars' holdings, amounting to some 166,000 hectares, of 
which one-half was in the vicinity of Manila. The land was even- 
tually resold to Filipinos, some of them tenants but the majority 
of them estate owners. 

A Collaborative Philippine Leadership 

The most important step in establishing a new political system 
was the successful cooptation of the Filipino elite — called the "policy 
of attraction." Wealthy and conservative ilustrados, the self-described 
"oligarchy of intelligence," had been from the outset reluctant 
revolutionaries, suspicious of the Katipunan and willing to negotiate 
with either Spain or the United States. Trinidad H. Pardo de 
Tavera, a descendant of Spanish nobility, and Benito Legarda, a 
rich landowner and capitalist, had quit Aguinaldo's government 
in 1898 as a result of disagreements with Mabini. Subsequently, 
they worked closely with the Schurman and Taft commissions, ad- 
vocating acceptance of United States rule. 

In December 1900, de Tavera and Legarda established the Fed- 
eralista Party, advocating statehood for the islands. In the follow- 
ing year, they were appointed the first Filipino members of the 
Philippine Commission of the legislature. In such an advantageous 
position, they were able to bring influence to bear to achieve the 
appointment of Federalistas to provincial governorships, the 
Supreme Court, and top positions in the civil service. Although 



29 



Philippines: A Country Study 

the party boasted a membership of 200,000 by May 1901, its 
proposal to make the islands a state of the United States had limit- 
ed appeal, both in the islands and in the United States, and the 
party was widely regarded as being opportunistic. In 1905 the party 
revised its program over the objections of its leaders, calling for 
"ultimate independence" and changing its name to the National 
Progressive Party (Partido Nacional Progresista). 

The Nacionalista Party, established in 1907, dominated the 
Philippine political process until after World War II. It was led 
by a new generation of politicians, who were not ilustrados and were 
by no means radical. One of the leaders, Manuel Quezon, came 
from a family of moderate wealth. An officer in Aguinaldo's army, 
he studied law, passed his bar examination in 1903, and entered 
provincial politics, becoming governor of Tayabas in 1906 before 
being elected to the Philippine Assembly the following year. His 
success at an early age was attributable to consummate political 
skills and the support of influential Americans. His Nacionalista 
Party associate and sometime rival was Sergio Osmena, the college- 
educated son of a shopkeeper, who had worked as a journalist. The 
former journalist's thoroughness and command of detail made him 
a perfect complement to Quezon. Like Quezon, Osmena had served 
as a provincial governor (in his home province of Cebu) before 
being elected in 1907 to the assembly and, at age twenty-nine, select- 
ed as its first speaker. 

Although the Nacionalista Party's platform at its founding called 
for "immediate independence," American observers believed that 
Osmena and Quezon used this appeal only to get votes. In fact, 
their policy toward the Americans was highly accommodating. In 
1907 an understanding was reached with an American official that 
the two leaders would block any attempt by the Philippine Assem- 
bly to demand independence. Osmena and Quezon, who were the 
dominant political figures in the islands up to World War II, were 
genuinely committed to independence. The failure of Aguinaldo's 
revolutionary movement, however, had taught them the prag- 
matism of adopting a conciliatory policy. 

The appearance of the Nacionalista Party in 1907 marked the 
emergence of the party system, although the party was without an 
effective rival from 1916 for most of the period until the emergence 
of the Liberal Party in 1946. Much of the system's success (or, 
rather, the success of the Nacionalistas) depended on the linkage 
of modern political institutions with traditional social structures 
and practices. Most significantly, it involved the integration of local- 
level elite groups into the new political system. Philippine parties 
have been described by political scientist Carl Lande as organized 



30 



Traditional horse-drawn calesa cart 
Courtesy Robert L. W or den 



"upward" rather than "downward." That is, national followings 
were put together by party leaders who worked in conjunction with 
local elite groups — in many cases the descendants of the principalia 
of Spanish times — who controlled constituencies tied to them in 
patron-client relationships. The issue of independence, and the con- 
ditions and timing under which it would be granted, generated con- 
siderable passion in the national political arena. According to 
Lande, however, the decisive factors in terms of popular support 
were more often local and particularistic issues rather than national 
or ideological concerns. Filipino political associations depended on 
intricate networks of personalistic ties, directed upward to Manila 
and the national legislature. 

The linchpins of the system created under United States tutelage 
were the village- and province-level notables — often labeled boss- 
es or caciques by colonial administrators — who garnered support 
by exchanging specific favors for votes. Reciprocal relations be- 
tween inferior and superior (most often tenants or sharecroppers 
with large landholders) usually involved the concept of utang na loob 
(repayment of debts) or kinship ties, and they formed the basis of 
support for village-level factions led by the notables (see Social 
Values and Organization, ch. 2). These factions decided politi- 
cal party allegiance. The extension of voting rights to all literate 



31 



Philippines: A Country Study 



males in 1916, the growth of literacy, and the granting of wom- 
en's suffrage in 1938 increased the electorate considerably. The 
elite, however, was largely successful in monopolizing the support 
of the newly enfranchised, and a genuinely populist alternative to 
the status quo was never really established. 

The policy of attraction ensured the success of what colonial ad- 
ministrators called the political education of the Filipinos. It was, 
however, also the cause of its greatest failure. Osmefia and Quezon, 
as the acknowledged representatives, were not genuinely interest- 
ed in social reform, and serious problems involving land owner- 
ship, tenancy, and the highly unequal distribution of wealth were 
largely ignored. The growing power of the Nacionalista Party, par- 
ticularly in the period after 1916 when it gained almost complete 
control of a bicameral Filipino legislature, barred the effective in- 
clusion of nonelite interests in the political system. Not only revo- 
lution but also moderate reforms of the social and economic systems 
were precluded. Discussions of policy alternatives became less salient 
to the political process than the dynamics of personalism and the 
ethic of give and take. 

The Jones Act 

The term of Governor General Francis Burton Harrison (1913-21) 
was one of particularly harmonious collaboration between Ameri- 
cans and Filipinos. Harrison's attitudes (he is described as having 
regarded himself as a "constitutional monarch" presiding over a 
"government of Filipinos") reflected the relatively liberal stance of 
Woodrow Wilson's Democratic Party administration. In 1913 Wilson 
had appointed five Filipinos to the Philippine Commission of the 
legislature, giving it a Filipino majority for the first time. Harrison 
undertook rapid "Filipinization" of the civil service, much to the 
anger and distress of Americans in the islands, including superan- 
nuated officials. In 1913 there had been 2,623 American and 6,363 
Filipino officials; in 1921 there were 13,240 Filipino and 614 Ameri- 
can administrators. Critics accused Harrison of transforming a 
"colonial government of Americans aided by Filipinos" into a 
"government of Filipinos aided by Americans" and of being the 
"plaything and catspaw of the leaders of the Nacionalista Party." 

A major step was taken in the direction of independence in 1916, 
when the United States Congress passed a second organic law, com- 
monly referred to as the Jones Act, which replaced the 1902 law. 
Its preamble stated the intent to grant Philippine independence as 
soon as a stable government was established. The Philippine Senate 
replaced the Philippine Commission as the upper house of the legisla- 
ture. Unlike the commission, all but two of the Senate's twenty-four 



32 



Historical Setting 



members (and all but nine of the ninety representatives in the lower 
house, now renamed the House of Representatives) were popu- 
larly elected. The two senators and nine representatives were ap- 
pointed by the governor general to represent the non-Christian 
peoples. The legislature's actions were subject to the veto of the 
governor general, and it could not pass laws affecting the rights 
of United States citizens. The Jones Act brought the legislative 
branch under Filipino control. The executive still was firmly un- 
der the control of an appointed governor general, and most Supreme 
Court justices, who were appointed by the United States president, 
still were Americans in 1916. 

Elections were held for the two houses in 1916, and the Na- 
cionalista Party made an almost clean sweep. All but one elected 
seat in the Senate and eighty-three out of ninety elected seats in 
the House were won by their candidates, leaving the National 
Progressive Party (the former Federalista Party) a powerless opposi- 
tion. Quezon was chosen president of the Senate, and Osmefia con- 
tinued as speaker of the House. 

The Jones Act remained the basic legislation for the adminis- 
tration of the Philippines until the United States Congress passed 
new legislation in 1934, which became effective in 1935, establish- 
ing the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Provisions of the Jones 
Act were differendy interpreted, however, by the governors general. 
Harrison rarely challenged the legislature by his use of the veto 
power. His successor, General Leonard Wood (1921-27), was con- 
vinced that United States withdrawal from the islands would be 
as disastrous for the Filipinos as it would be for the interests of 
the United States in the western Pacific. He aroused the intense 
opposition of the Nacionalistas by his use of the veto power 126 
times in his six years in office. The Nacionalista Party created a 
political deadlock when ranking Filipino officials resigned in 1923 
leaving their positions vacant until Wood's term ended with his 
death in 1927. His successors, however, reversed Wood's policies 
and reestablished effective working relations with Filipino poli- 
ticians. 

Although the Jones Act did not transfer responsibility for the 
Moro regions (reorganized in 1914 under the Department of Min- 
danao and Sulu) from the American governor to the Filipino- 
controlled legislature, Muslims perceived the rapid Filipinization 
of the civil service and United States commitment to eventual in- 
dependence as serious threats. In the view of the Moros, an in- 
dependent Philippines would be dominated by Christians, their 
traditional enemies. United States policy from 1903 had been to 



33 



Philippines: A Country Study 

break down the historical autonomy of the Muslim territories. Im- 
migration of Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayan Islands 
to the relatively unsettled regions of Mindanao was encouraged, 
and the new arrivals began supplanting the Moros in their own 
homeland. Large areas of the island were opened to economic ex- 
ploitation. In addition, there was no legal recognition of Muslim 
customs and institutions. In March 1935, Muslim datu petitioned 
United States president Franklin D. Roosevelt; the petition read 
in part: "The American people should not release us until we are 
educated and become powerful because we are like a calf who, once 
abandoned by its mother, would be devoured by a merciless lion. ' ' 
Any suggestion of special status for or continued United States rule 
over the Moro regions, however, was vehementiy opposed by Chris- 
tian Filipino leaders, who, when the Commonwealth of the Philip- 
pines was established, gained virtually complete control over 
government institutions. 

Economic and Social Developments 

The Taft Commission, appointed in 1900, viewed economic de- 
velopment, along with education and the establishment of represen- 
tative institutions, as one of the three pillars of the United States 
program of tutelage. Its members had ambitious plans to build rail- 
roads and highways, improve harbor facilities, open greater mar- 
kets for Philippine goods through the lowering or elimination of 
tariffs, and stimulate foreign investment in mining, forestry, and 
cash-crop cultivation. In 1901 some 93 percent of the islands' to- 
tal land area was public land, and it was hoped that a portion of 
this area could be sold to American investors. Those plans were 
frustrated, however, by powerful agricultural interests in the United 
States Congress who feared competition from Philippine sugar, 
coconut oil, tobacco, and other exports. Although Taft argued for 
more liberal terms, the United States Congress, in the 1902 Land 
Act, set a limit of 16 hectares of Philippine public land to be sold 
or leased to American individuals and 1 ,024 hectares to American 
corporations. This act and tight financial markets in the United 
States discouraged the development of large-scale, foreign-owned 
plantations such as were being established in British Malaya, the 
Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina. 

The Taft Commission argued that tariff relief was essential if 
the islands were to be developed. In August 1909, Congress passed 
the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act, which provided for free entry to the 
United States of all Philippine products except rice, sugar, and 
tobacco. Rice imports were subjected to regular tariffs, and quo- 
tas were established for sugar and tobacco. In 1913 the Underwood 



34 



Historical Setting 



Tariff Act removed all restrictions. The principal result of these 
acts was to make the islands increasingly dependent on American 
markets; between 1914 and 1920, the portion of Philippine exports 
going to the United States rose from 50 to 70 percent. By 1939 
it had reached 85 percent, and 65 percent of imports came from 
the United States. 

In 1931 there were between 80,000 and 100,000 Chinese in the 
islands active in the local economy; many of them had arrived af- 
ter United States rule had been established. Some 16,000 Japanese 
were concentrated largely in the Mindanao province of Davao (the 
incorporated city of Davao was labeled the "Little Tokyo of the 
South" by local boosters) and were predominant in the abaca in- 
dustry. Yet the immigration of foreign laborers never reached a 
volume sufficient to threaten indigenous control of the economy 
or the traditional social structure as it did in British Malaya and 
Burma. 

The Tenancy Problem 

The limited nature of United States intervention in the econo- 
my and the Nacionalista Party's elite dominance of the Philippine 
political system ensured that the status quo in landlord and tenant 
relationships would be maintained, even if certain of its tradition- 
al aspects changed. A government attempt to establish homesteads 
modeled on those of the American West in 1903 did little to alter 
landholding arrangements. Although different regions of the ar- 
chipelago had their own specific arrangements and different propor- 
tions of tenants and small proprietors, the kasama (sharecropper) 
system was the most prevalent, particularly in the rice- growing areas 
of Central Luzon and the Visayan Islands. 

Under this arrangement, the landowners supplied the seed and 
cash necessary to tide cultivators over during the planting season, 
and the cultivators provided tools and work animals and were 
responsible for one-half the expense of crop production. Usually, 
owner and sharecropper each took one-half of the harvest, although 
only after the former had deducted a portion for expenses. Terms 
might be more liberal in frontier areas where owners needed to 
attract cultivators to clear the land. Sometimes land tenancy ar- 
rangements were three tiered: an original owner would lease land 
to an inquilino, who would then sublet it to kasamas. In the words 
of historian David R. Sturtevant: "Thrice removed from their 
proprietario, affected taos [peasants] received ever-diminishing shares 
from the picked-over remains of harvests." 

Cultivators customarily were deep in debt, for they were depen- 
dent on advances made by the landowner, or inquilino, and had to 



35 



Philippines: A Country Study 



pay steep interest rates. Principal and interest accumulated rapidly, 
becoming an impossible burden. It was estimated in 1924 that the 
members of the average tenant family would have to labor unin- 
terruptedly for 163 years to pay off debts and acquire title to the 
land they worked. The kasama system created a class of peons or 
serfs; children inherited the debts of their fathers, and over the 
generations families were tied in bondage to their estates. Con- 
tracts usually were unwritten, and landowners could change con- 
ditions to their own advantage. 

Two factors led to a worsening of the cultivators' position. One 
was the rapid increase in the national population (from 7.6 mil- 
lion in 1905 to 16 million in 1939) brought about through improve- 
ments in public health, which put added pressure on the land, 
lowered the standard of living, and created a labor surplus. Closely 
tied to the population increase was the erosion of traditional patron- 
client ties. The landlord-tenant relationship was becoming more 
impersonal. The landlord's interest in the tenants' welfare was wan- 
ing. Landlords ceased providing important services and used profits 
from the sale of cash crops to support their urban life-styles or to 
invest in other kinds of enterprises. Cultivators accused landown- 
ers of demanding services from tenants without pay and giving noth- 
ing in return, shamelessly forgetting the principle of utang na loob. 

As the area under cultivation increased from 1 . 3 million hect- 
ares in 1903 to 4 million hectares in 1935 — stimulated by United 
States demand for cash crops and by the growing population — 
tenancy also increased. In 1918 there were roughly 2 million farms, 
of which 1.5 million were operated by their owners; by 1939 these 
figures had declined to 1.6 million and 800,000, respectively, as 
individual proprietors became tenants or migrant laborers. Dis- 
parities in the distribution of wealth grew. By 1939 the wealthiest 
10 percent of the population received 40 percent of the islands' in- 
come. The elite and the cultivators were separated culturally and 
geographically, as well as economically. As new urban centers rose, 
often with an Americanized culture, the elite left the countryside 
to become absentee landlords, leaving estate management in the 
hands of frequently abusive overseers. The Philippine Constabu- 
lary played a central role in suppressing antilandlord resistance. 

Resistance Movements 

The tradition of rural revolt, often with messianic overtones, con- 
tinued under United States rule. Colorum sects, derived from the 
old Cofradfa de San Jose, had spread throughout the Christian 
regions of the archipelago and by the early 1920s competed with 
the Roman Catholic establishment and the missionaries of Gregorio 



36 



Historical Setting 



Aglipay's Independent Philippine Church (Iglesia Filipina Indepen- 
diente). A colorum-\ed revolt broke out in northeastern Mindanao 
early in 1924, sparked by a sect leader's predictions of an immi- 
nent judgment day. In 1925 Florencio Entrencherado, a shopkeeper 
on the island of Panay, proclaimed himself Florencio I, Emperor 
of the Philippines, somewhat paradoxically running for the office 
of provincial governor of Iloilo that same year on a platform of 
tax reduction, measures against Chinese and Japanese merchants, 
and immediate independence. Although he lost the election, the 
campaign made him a prominent figure in the western Visayan 
Islands and won him the sympathies of the poor living in the sugar 
provinces of Panay and Negros. Claiming semidivine attributes 
(that he could control the elements and that his charisma had been 
granted him by the Holy Spirit and the spirits of Father Burgos 
and Rizal), Florencio had a following of some 10,000 peasants on 
Negros and Panay by late 1926. In May 1927, his supporters, heed- 
ing his call that "the hour will come when the poor will be ordered 
to kill all the rich," launched an abortive insurrection. 

Tensions were highest in Central Luzon, where tenancy was most 
widespread and population pressures were the greatest. The 1931 
Tayug insurrection north of Manila was connected with a colorum 
sect and had religious overtones, but traditionally messianic move- 
ments gradually gave way to secular, and at times revolutionary, 
ones. One of the first of these movements was the Association of 
the Worthy Kabola (Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag), a secret 
society that by 1925 had some 12,000 followers, largely in Nueva 
Ecija Province. Its leader, Pedro Kabola, called for liberation 
of the Philippines and promised the aid of the Japanese. The 
Tangulang (Kapatiran Tangulang Malayang Mamamayang — 
Association for an Offensive for Our Future Freedom) movement 
founded in 1931 was both urban and rural based and had as many 
as 40,000 followers. 

The most important movement, however, was that of the Sak- 
dalistas. Founded in 1933 by Benigno Ramos, a former Nacionalista 
Party member and associate of Quezon who broke with him over 
the issue of collaboration, the Sakdal Party {sakdal means to ac- 
cuse) ran candidates in the 1934 election on a platform of com- 
plete independence by the end of 1935, redistribution of land, and 
an end to caciquism. Sakdalistas were elected to a number of seats 
in the legislature and to provincial posts, and by early 1935 the 
party may have had as many as 200,000 members. Because of poor 
harvests and frustrations with the government's lack of response 
to peasant demands, Sakdalistas took up arms and seized govern- 
ment buildings in a number of locations on May 2-3, 1935. The 



37 



Philippines: A Country Study 

insurrection, suppressed by the Philippine Constabulary, resulted in 
approximately 100 dead and Benigno Ramos fled into exile to Japan. 

Through the 1930s, tenant movements in Central Luzon became 
more active, articulate, and better organized. In 1938 the Socialist 
Party joined in a united front with the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas — PKP), which was 
prominent in supporting the demands of tenants for better con- 
tracts and working conditions. As the depression wore on and prices 
for cash crops collapsed, tenant strikes and violent confrontations 
with landlords, their overseers, and the Philippine Constabulary 
escalated. 

In response to deteriorating conditions, commonwealth presi- 
dent Quezon launched the "Social Justice" program, which in- 
cluded regulation of rents but achieved only meager results. There 
were insufficient funds to carry out the program, and implemen- 
tation was sabotaged on the local level by landlords and municipal 
officials. In 1939 and 1940, thousands of cultivators were evicted 
by landlords because they insisted on enforcement of the 1933 Rice 
Share Tenancy Act, which guaranteed larger shares for tenants. 

The Commonwealth and the Japanese Occupation 

Commonwealth Politics, 1935-41 

The constellation of political forces in the United States that as- 
sisted in the resolution of the independence question formed an 
odd community of interests with the Filipino nationalists. Principal 
among these were the agricultural interests. American sugar beet, 
tobacco, and dairy farmers feared the competition of low-tariff 
insular products, and the hardships suffered in a deepening depres- 
sion in the early 1930s led them to seek protection through a sever- 
ance of the colonial relationship. In this they had the support of 
Cuban sugar interests, who feared the loss of markets to Philippine 
sugarcane. United States labor unions, particularly on the West 
Coast, wanted to exclude Filipino labor. A number of American 
observers saw the Philippines as a potential flash point with an ex- 
pansive Japan and argued for a withdrawal across the Pacific to 
Hawaii. 

In the climate generated by these considerations, Osmena and 
Manuel Roxas, a rising star in the Nacionalista Party and Osmena' s 
successor as speaker of the House, successfully campaigned for pas- 
sage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Independence Bill, which Con- 
gress approved over President Herbert Hoover's veto in January 
1933. Quezon opposed the legislation, however, on the grounds 



38 



Historical Setting 



that clauses relating to trade and excluding Filipino immigrants 
were too stringent and that the guarantees of United States bases 
on Philippine soil and powers granted a United States high com- 
missioner compromised independence. After the bill was defeated 
in the Philippine legislature, Quezon himself went to Washington 
and negotiated the passage of a revised independence act, the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act, in March 1934. 

The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for a ten-year transition 
period to independence, during which the Commonwealth of the 
Philippines would be established. The commonwealth would have 
its own constitution and would be self-governing, although foreign 
policy would be the responsibility of the United States. Laws passed 
by the legislature affecting immigration, foreign trade, and the cur- 
rency system had to be approved by the United States president. 

If the Tydings-McDuffie Act marked a new stage in Filipino- 
American partnership, it remained a highly unequal one. Although 
only fifty Filipino immigrants were allowed into the United States 
annually under the arrangement, American entry and residence 
in the islands were unrestricted. Trade provisions of the act allowed 
for five years' free entry of Philippine goods during the transition 
period and five years of gradually steepening tariff duties there- 
after, reaching 100 percent in 1946, whereas United States goods 
could enter the islands unrestricted and duty free during the full 
ten years. Quezon had managed to obtain more favorable terms 
on bases; the United States would retain only a naval reservation 
and fueling stations. The United States would, moreover, negoti- 
ate with foreign governments for the neutralization of the islands. 

The country's first constitution was framed by a constitutional 
convention that assembled in July 1934. Overwhelmingly approved 
by plebiscite in May 1935, this document established the political 
institutions for the intended ten-year commonwealth period that 
began that year and after July 1946 became the constitution of the 
independent Republic of the Philippines. The first commonwealth 
election to the new Congress was held in September 1935. Quezon 
and Osmena, reconciled after their disagreements over the indepen- 
dence act, ran on a Coalition Party ticket and were elected presi- 
dent and vice president, respectively. 

World War II, 1941-45 

Japan launched a surprise attack on the Philippines on Decem- 
ber 8, 1941, just ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Ini- 
tial aerial bombardment was followed by landings of ground troops 
both north and south of Manila. The defending Philippine and 
United States troops were under the command of General Douglas 



39 



Philippines: A Country Study 

MacArthur, who had been recalled to active duty in the United 
States Army earlier in the year and was designated commander 
of the United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
aircraft of his command were destroyed; the naval forces were or- 
dered to leave; and because of the circumstances in the Pacific 
region, reinforcement and resupply of his ground forces were im- 
possible. Under the pressure of superior numbers, the defending 
forces withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula and to the island of Cor- 
regidor at the entrance to Manila Bay. Manila, declared an open 
city to prevent its destruction, was occupied by the Japanese on 
January 2, 1942. 

The Philippine defense continued until the final surrender of 
United States-Philippine forces on the Bataan Peninsula in April 
1942 and on Corregidor in May. Most of the 80,000 prisoners of 
war captured by the Japanese at Bataan were forced to undertake 
the infamous "Death March" to a prison camp 105 kilometers to 
the north. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 men, weakened 
by disease and malnutrition and treated harshly by their captors, 
died before reaching their destination. Quezon and Osmefia had 
accompanied the troops to Corregidor and later left for the United 
States, where they set up a government in exile. MacArthur was 
ordered to Australia, where he started to plan for a return to the 
Philippines. 

The Japanese military authorities immediately began organiz- 
ing a new government structure in the Philippines. Although the 
Japanese had promised independence for the islands after occupa- 
tion, they initially organized a Council of State through which they 
directed civil affairs until October 1943, when they declared the 
Philippines an independent republic. Most of the Philippine elite, 
with a few notable exceptions, served under the Japanese. Philip- 
pine collaboration in Japanese- sponsored political institutions — 
which later became a major domestic political issue — was moti- 
vated by several considerations. Among them was the effort to pro- 
tect the people from the harshness of Japanese rule (an effort that 
Quezon himself had advocated), protection of family and personal 
interests, and a belief that Philippine nationalism would be advanced 
by solidarity with fellow Asians. Many Filipinos, however, collabo- 
rated to pass information to the Allies. The Japanese-sponsored 
republic headed by President Jose P. Laurel proved to be un- 
popular. 

Japanese occupation of the Philippines was opposed by increas- 
ingly effective underground and guerrilla activity that ultimately 
reached large-scale proportions. Postwar investigations showed that 
about 260,000 people were in guerrilla organizations and that 



40 



Historical Setting 



members of the anti-Japanese underground were even more numer- 
ous. Their effectiveness was such that by the end of the war, Japan 
controlled only twelve of the forty-eight provinces. The major ele- 
ment of resistance in the Central Luzon area was furnished by the 
Huks (see Glossary), Hukbalahap, or the People's Anti-Japanese 
Army organized in early 1942 under the leadership of Luis Taruc, 
a communist party member since 1939. The Huks armed some 
30,000 people and extended their control over much of Luzon. 
Other guerrilla units were loyal to the United States Armed Forces 
Far East. 

MacArthur's Allied forces landed on the island of Leyte on Oc- 
tober 20, 1944, accompanied by Osmefia, who had succeeded to 
the commonwealth presidency upon the death of Quezon on Au- 
gust 1, 1944. Landings then followed on the island of Mindoro and 
around the Lingayen Gulf on the west side of Luzon, and the push 
toward Manila was initiated. Fighting was fierce, particularly in 
the mountains of northern Luzon, where Japanese troops had 
retreated, and in Manila, where they put up a last-ditch resistance. 
Guerrilla forces rose up everywhere for the final offensive. Fight- 
ing continued until Japan's formal surrender on September 2, 1945. 
The Philippines had suffered great loss of life and tremendous phys- 
ical destruction by the time the war was over (see The Armed Forces 
in National Life, ch. 5). An estimated 1 million Filipinos had been 
killed, a large proportion during the final months of the war, and 
Manila was extensively damaged. 

Independence and Constitutional Government, 1945-72 

Demoralized by the war and suffering rampant inflation and 
shortages of food and other goods, the Philippine people prepared 
for the transition to independence, which was scheduled for July 
4, 1946. A number of issues remained unresolved, principally those 
concerned with trade and security arrangements between the is- 
lands and the United States. Yet in the months following Japan's 
surrender, collaboration became a virulent issue that split the coun- 
try and poisoned political life. Most of the commonwealth legisla- 
ture and leaders, such as Laurel, Claro Recto, and Roxas, had 
served in the Japanese-sponsored government. While the war was 
still going on, Allied leaders had stated that such "quislings" and 
their counterparts on the provincial and local levels would be se- 
verely punished. Harold Ickes, who as United States secretary of 
the interior had civil authority over the islands, suggested that all 
officials above the rank of schoolteacher who had cooperated with 
the Japanese be purged and denied the right to vote in the first 



41 



Philippines: A Country Study 

postwar elections. Osmena countered that each case should be tried 
on its own merits. 

Resolution of the problem posed serious moral questions that 
struck at the heart of the political system. Collaborators argued 
that they had gone along with the occupiers in order to shield the 
people from the harshest aspects of Japanese rule. Before leaving 
Corregidor in March 1942, Quezon had told Laurel and Jose Var- 
gas, mayor of Manila, that they should stay behind to deal with 
the Japanese but refuse to take an oath of allegiance. Although presi- 
dent of a * 'puppet" republic, Laurel had faced down the Japanese 
several times and made it clear that his loyalty was first to the Philip- 
pines and second to the Japanese-sponsored Greater East Asia 
Coprosperity Sphere. 

Critics accused the collaborators of opportunism and of enrich- 
ing themselves while the people starved. Anticollaborationist feel- 
ing, moreover, was fueled by the people's resentment of the elite. 
On both the local and the national levels, it had been primarily 
the landlords, important officials, and the political establishment 
that had supported the Japanese, largely because the latter, with 
their own troops and those of a reestablished Philippine Constabu- 
lary, preserved their property and forcibly maintained the rural 
status quo. Tenants felt the harshest aspects of Japanese rule. Guer- 
rillas, particularly those associated with the Huks, came from the 
ranks of the cultivators, who organized to defend themselves against 
the Philippine Constabulary and Japanese depredations. 

The issue of collaboration centered on Roxas, prewar Nacionalis- 
ta speaker of the House of Representatives, who had served as 
minister without portfolio and was responsible for rice procurement 
and economic policy in the wartime Laurel government. A close 
prewar associate of Mac Arthur, he maintained contact with Allied 
intelligence during the war and in 1944 had unsuccessfully attempt- 
ed to escape to Allied territory, which exonerated him in the gener- 
al's eyes. MacArthur supported Roxas in his ambitions for the 
presidency when he announced himself as a candidate of the newly 
formed Liberal Party (the liberal wing of the Nacionalista Party) 
in January 1946. MacArthur' s favoritism aroused much criticism, 
particularly because other collaborationist leaders were held in jail, 
awaiting trial. A presidential campaign of great vindictiveness en- 
sued, in which Roxas 's wartime role was a central issue. Roxas 
outspent and outspoke his Nacionalista opponent, the aging and ail- 
ing Osmena. In the April 23, 1946, election, Roxas won 54 percent 
of the vote, and the Liberal Party won a majority in the legislature. 

On July 4, 1946, Roxas became the first president of the indepen- 
dent Republic of the Philippines. In 1948 he declared an amnesty 



42 



Historical Setting 



for arrested collaborators — only one of whom had been indicted — 
except for those who had committed violent crimes. The resilien- 
cy of the prewar elite, although remarkable, nevertheless had left 
a bitter residue in the minds of the people. In the first years of the 
republic, the issue of collaboration became closely entwined with 
old agrarian grievances and produced violent results. 

Economic Relations with the United States after Independence 

If the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 
November 1935 marked the high point of Philippine-United States 
relations, the actual achievement of independence was in many ways 
a disillusioning anticlimax. Economic relations remained the most 
salient issue. The Philippine economy remained highly dependent 
on United States markets — more dependent, according to United 
States high commissioner Paul McNutt, than any single state was 
dependent on the rest of the country. Thus a severance of special 
relations at independence was unthinkable, and large landowners, 
particularly those with hectarage in sugar, campaigned for an ex- 
tension to free trade. The Philippine Trade Act, passed by the Unit- 
ed States Congress in 1946 and commonly known as the Bell Act, 
stipulated that free trade be continued until 1954; thereafter, tariffs 
would be increased 5 percent annually until full amounts were 
reached in 1974. Quotas were established for Philippine products 
both for free trade and tariff periods. At the same time, there would 
be no restrictions on the entry of United States products to the 
Philippines, nor would there be Philippine import duties. The 
Philippine peso (for value of the peso — see Glossary) was tied at 
a fixed rate to the United States dollar. 

The most controversial provision of the Bell Act was the "pari- 
ty" clause that granted United States citizens equal economic rights 
with Filipinos, for example, in the exploitation of natural resources. 
If parity privileges of individuals or corporations were infringed 
upon, the president of the United States had the authority to re- 
voke any aspect of the trade agreement. Payment of war damages 
amounting to US$620 million, as stipulated in the Philippine Re- 
habilitation Act of 1946, was made contingent on Philippine ac- 
ceptance of the parity clause. 

The Bell Act was approved by the Philippine legislature on July 
2, two days before independence. The parity clause, however, re- 
quired an amendment relating to the 1935 constitution's thirteenth 
article, which reserved the exploitation of natural resources for 
Filipinos. This amendment could be obtained only with the ap- 
proval of three-quarters of the members of the House and Senate 
and a plebiscite. The denial of seats in the House to six members 



43 



Philippines: A Country Study 



of the leftist Democratic Alliance and three Nacionalistas on grounds 
of fraud and violent campaign tactics during the April 1946 elec- 
tion enabled Roxas to gain legislative approval on September 18. 
The definition of three-quarters became an issue because three- 
quarters of the sitting members, not the full House and Senate, 
had approved the amendment, but the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the administration's interpretation. 

In March 1947, a plebiscite on the amendment was held; only 
40 percent of the electorate participated, but the majority of those 
approved the amendment. The Bell Act, particularly the parity 
clause, was seen by critics as an inexcusable surrender of national 
sovereignty. The pressure of the sugar barons, particularly those 
of Roxas 's home region of the western Visayan Islands and other 
landowner interests, however, was irresistible. In 1955 a revised 
United States-Philippine Trade Agreement (the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement) was negotiated. This treaty abolished the United States 
authority to control the exchange rate of the peso, made parity 
privileges reciprocal, extended the sugar quota, and extended the 
time period for the reduction of other quotas and for the progres- 
sive application of tariffs on Philippine goods exported to the United 
States. 

Security Agreements 

The Philippines became an integral part of emerging United 
States security arrangements in the western Pacific upon approval 
of the Military Bases Agreement in March 1947. The United States 
retained control of twenty-three military installations, including 
Clark Air Base and the extensive naval facilities at Subic Bay, for 
a lease period of ninety-nine years. United States rather than Philip- 
pine authorities retained full jurisdiction over the territories covered 
by the military installations, including over collecting taxes and 
trying offenders, including Filipinos, in cases involving United 
States service personnel. Base rights remained a controversial is- 
sue in relations between the two countries into the 1990s (see For- 
eign Affairs, ch. 4). 

The Military Assistance Agreement also was signed in March 
1947. This treaty established a Joint United States Military Advi- 
sory Group to advise and train the Philippine armed forces and 
authorized the transfer of aid and materiel — worth some US$169 
million by 1957. Between 1950 and the early 1980s, the United 
States funded the military education of nearly 17,000 Filipino mili- 
tary personnel, mostly at military schools and training facilities in 
the United States. Much United States aid was used to support 
and reorganize the Philippine Constabulary in late 1947 in the face 



44 



Historical Setting 



of growing internal unrest. A contingent of Philippine troops was 
sent to Korea in 1950. In August 1951 , the two nations signed the 
Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines 
and the United States of America. 

The Huk Rebellion 

At the end of World War II, most rural areas, particularly in 
Central Luzon, were tinderboxes on the point of conflagration. The 
Japanese occupation had only postponed the farmers' push for better 
conditions. Tensions grew as landlords who had fled to urban areas 
during the fighting returned to the villages in late 1945, demand- 
ed back rent, and employed military police and their own armed 
contingents to enforce these demands. Food and other goods were 
in short supply. The war had sharpened animosities between the 
elite, who in large numbers had supported the Japanese, and those 
tenants who had been part of the guerrilla resistance. Having had 
weapons and combat experience and having lost friends and rela- 
tives to the Japanese and the wartime Philippine Constabulary, 
guerrilla veterans and those close to them were not as willing to 
be intimidated by landlords as they had been before 1942. 

MacArthur had jailed Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, both Huk 
leaders, in 1945 and ordered United States forces to disarm and 
disband Huk guerrillas. Many guerrillas, however, concealed their 
weapons or fled into the mountains. The Huks were closely iden- 
tified with the emerging Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Mag- 
bubukid (PKM — National Peasant Union), which was strongest 
in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac 
and had as many as 500,000 members. As part of the left-wing 
Democratic Alliance, which also included urban left-wing groups 
and labor unions, the PKM supported Osmena and the Nacionalis- 
tas against Roxas in the 1946 election campaign. They did so not 
only because Roxas had been a collaborator but also because Os- 
mena had promised a new law giving tenants 60 percent of the har- 
vest, rather than the 50 percent or less that had been customary. 

Six Democratic Alliance candidates won congressional seats. In- 
cluded among these winners was Taruc, who had been released 
from jail along with other leaders. The Democratic Alliance can- 
didates were, however, excluded from the legislature on charges 
of using terrorist methods during the campaign; the exclusion pro- 
voked great unrest in the districts that had elected them. Continued 
landlord- and police-instigated violence against peasant activities, 
including the murder of PKM leader Juan Feleo in August 1946, 
provoked the Huk veterans to dig up their weapons and incite a 
rebellion in the Central Luzon provinces. The name of the Huk 



45 



Philippines: A Country Study 

movement was changed from the People's Anti-Japanese Army to 
the People's Liberation Army (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan). 

Roxas's policy toward the Huks alternated between gestures of 
negotiation and harsh suppression. His administration established 
an Agrarian Commission and passed a law giving tenants 70 per- 
cent of the harvest; the law, however, was extremely difficult to 
enforce in the countryside. The Huks in turn demanded reinstate- 
ment of the Democratic Alliance members of Congress; disband- 
ment of the military police, which in the 1945-48 period had been 
the equivalent of the old Philippine Constabulary; and a general 
amnesty. They also refused to give up their arms. In March 1948, 
Roxas declared the Huks an illegal and subversive organization 
and stepped up counterinsurgency activities. 

Following Roxas's death from a heart attack in April 1948, his 
successor, Elpidio Quirino, opened negotiations with Huk leader 
Taruc, but nothing was accomplished. That same year the com- 
munist PKP decided to support the rebellion, overcoming its reluc- 
tance to rely on peasant movements. Although it lacked a peasant 
following, the PKP declared that it would lead the Huks on all levels 
and in 1950 described them as the ' ' military arm" of the revolu- 
tionary movement to overthrow the government. From the Huk 
movement's inception, the government considered it to have been 
communist instigated, an extension onto the Luzon Plain of the 
international revolutionary strategy of the Cominform (see Glos- 
sary) in Moscow. Yet the rebellion's main impetus was peasant 
grievances, not Leninist designs. The principal factors were con- 
tinuous tenant-landlord conflicts, in which the government actively 
took the part of the latter, dislocations caused by the war, and 
perhaps an insurrectionist tradition going back several centuries. 
According to historian Benedict Kerkvliet, ' 'The PKP did not in- 
spire or control the peasant movement .... What appears closer 
to the truth is that the PKP, as an organization, moved back and 
forth between alliance and nonalliance with the peasant movement 
in Central Luzon. " Most farmers had litde interest in or knowledge 
of socialism. Most wanted better conditions, not redistribution of 
land or collectivization. The landlord- tenant relationship itself was 
not challenged, just its more exploitive and impersonal character 
in the contemporary period. 

Huk fortunes reached their peak between 1949 and 1951. Vio- 
lence associated with the November 1949 presidential election, in 
which Quirino was reelected on the Liberal Party ticket, led many 
farmers to support the Huks. After that date there were between 
11,000 and 15,000 armed Huks. Although the core of the rebel- 
lion remained in Central Luzon, Huk regional committees also were 



46 



Historical Setting 



established in the provinces of Southern Tagalog, in northern Lu- 
zon, in the Visayan Islands, and in Mindanao. Antigovernment 
activities spread to areas outside the movement's heartland. 

Beginning in 1951 , however, the momentum began to slow. This 
was in part the result of poor training and the atrocities perpetrat- 
ed by individual Huks. Their mistreatment of Negrito peoples made 
it almost impossible for them to use the mountain areas where these 
tribespeople lived, and the assassination of Aurora Quezon, Presi- 
dent Quezon's widow, and of her family by Huks outraged the 
nation. Many Huks degenerated into murderers and bank robbers. 
Moreover, in the words of one guerrilla veteran, the movement 
was suffering from 4 'battle fatigue." Lacking a hinterland, such 
as that which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Viet- 
nam) provided for Viet Cong guerrillas or the liberated areas es- 
tablished by the Chinese Communists before 1949, the Huks were 
constantly on the run. Also the Huks were mainly active in Cen- 
tral Luzon, which permitted the government to concentrate its 
forces. Other decisive factors were the better quality of United 
States-trained Philippine armed forces and the more conciliatory 
policy adopted by the Quirino government toward the peasants. 

The Magsaysay, Garcia, and Macapagal Administrations, 1953-65 

Ramon Magsaysay, a member of Congress from Zambales 
Province and veteran of a non-Huk guerrilla unit during the war, 
became secretary of defense in 1950. He initiated a campaign to 
defeat the insurgents militarily and at the same time win popular 
support for the government. With United States aid and advisers, 
he was able to improve the quality of the armed forces, whose cam- 
paign against the Huks had been largely ineffective and heavy- 
handed. In 1950 the constabulary was made part of the armed forces 
(it had previously been under the secretary of the interior) with 
its own separate command. All armed forces units were placed un- 
der strict discipline, and their behavior in the villages was visibly 
more restrained. Peasants felt grateful to Magsaysay for ending 
the forced evacuations and harsh pacification tactics that some 
claimed had been worse than those of the Japanese occupation. 

Nominated as Nacionalista Party presidential candidate in April 
1953, Magsaysay won almost two-thirds of the vote over his op- 
ponent, Quirino, in November. Often compared to United States 
president Andrew Jackson, Magsaysay styled himself as a man of 
the people. He invited thousands of peasants and laborers to tour 
the Malacafiang Palace — the presidential residence in Manila — 
and encouraged farmers to send him telegrams, free of charge, with 
their complaints. In the countryside a number of small-scale but 



47 



Philippines: A Country Study 

highly visible projects had been started, including the building of 
bridges, roads, irrigation canals, and artesian "liberty wells"; the 
establishment of special courts for landlord-tenant disputes; agricul- 
tural extension services; and credit for farmers. The Economic De- 
velopment Corps project settled some 950 families on land that the 
government had purchased on Mindanao. In the ensuing years, 
this program, in various forms, promoted the settlement of poor 
people from the Christian north in traditionally Muslim areas. 
Although the settlement program relieved population pressures in 
the north, it also exacerbated centuries-old Muslim-Christian hostil- 
ities. The capture and killing of Huk leaders, the dissolution of Huk 
regional committees, and finally the surrender of Taruc in May 
1954 marked the waning of the Huk threat. 

Magsaysay's vice president, Carlos P. Garcia, succeeded to the 
presidency after Magsaysay's death in an airplane crash in March 
1957 and was shortly thereafter elected to the office. Garcia em- 
phasized the nationalist themes of "Filipino First" and attainment 
of "respectable independence." Further discussions with the United 
States on the question of the military bases took place in 1959. Early 
agreement was reached on United States relinquishment of large 
land areas initially reserved for bases but no longer required for 
their operation. As a result, the United States turned over to Philip- 
pine administration the town of Olongapo on Subic Bay, north of 
Manila, which previously had been under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Navy. 

The 1957 election had resulted, for the first time, in a vice presi- 
dent of a party different from that of the president. The new vice 
president, Diosdado Macapagal, ran as the candidate of the Liberal 
Party, which followers of Magsaysay had joined after unsuccess- 
ful efforts to form an effective third party. By the time of the 1961 
presidential election, the revived Liberal Party had built enough 
of a following to win the presidency for Macapagal. In this elec- 
tion, the returns from each polling place were reported by observ- 
ers (who had been placed there by newspapers) as soon as the votes 
were counted. This system, known as Operation Quick Count, was 
designed to prevent fraud. 

The issue of jurisdiction over United States service personnel 
in the Philippines, which had not been fully settled after the 1959 
discussions, continued to be a problem in relations between the 
two countries. A series of incidents in the 1960-65 period, chiefly 
associated with Clark Air Base, aroused considerable anti- American 
feelings and demonstrations. Negotiations took place and resulted 
in an August 1965 agreement to adopt provisions similar to the sta- 
tus of forces agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 



48 



Historical Setting 



regarding criminal jurisdiction. In the next four years, agreements 
were reached on several other matters relating to the bases, includ- 
ing a 1966 amendment to the 1947 agreement, which moved the 
expiration date of the fixed term for United States use of the mili- 
tary facilities up to 1991. 

Philippine foreign policy under Macapagal sought closer rela- 
tions with neighboring Asian peoples. In July 1963, he convened 
a summit meeting in Manila consisting of the Philippines, Indone- 
sia, and Malaya. An organization called MAPHILINDO was pro- 
posed; much heralded in the local press as a realization of Rizal's 
dream of bringing together the Malay peoples, MAPHILINDO 
was described as a regional association that would approach issues 
of common concern in the spirit of consensus. MAPHILINDO was 
quickly shelved, however, in the face of the continuing confronta- 
tion between Indonesia and newly established Malaysia and the 
Philippines' own claim to Sabah, the territory in northeastern Bor- 
neo that had become a Malaysian state in 1963. 

Marcos and the Road to Martial Law, 1965-72 

In the presidential election of 1965, the Nacionalista candidate, 
Ferdinand E. Marcos (1917-90), triumphed over Macapagal. Mar- 
cos dominated the political scene for the next two decades, first 
as an elected president in 1965 and 1969, and then as a virtual 
dictator after his 1972 proclamation of martial law. He was born 
in llocos Norte Province at the northwestern tip of Luzon, a tradi- 
tionally poor and clannish region. He was a brilliant law student, 
who successfully argued before the Philippine Supreme Court in 
the late 1930s for a reversal of a murder conviction against him 
(he had been convicted of shooting a political rival of his father) . 
During World War II, Marcos served in the Battle of Bataan and 
then claimed to have led a guerrilla unit, the Maharlikas. Like many 
other aspects of his life, Marcos' s war record and the large num- 
ber of United States and Philippine military medals that he claimed 
(at one time including the Congressional Medal of Honor), came 
under embarrassing scrutiny during the last years of his presiden- 
cy. His stories of wartime gallantry, which were inflated by the 
media into a personality cult during his years in power, enthralled 
not only Filipino voters but also American presidents and mem- 
bers of Congress. 

In 1949 Marcos gained a seat in the Philippine House of 
Representatives; he became a senator in 1959. His 1954 marriage 
to former beauty queen Imelda Romualdez provided him with a 



49 



Philippines: A Country Study 



photogenic partner and skilled campaigner. She also had family 
connections with the powerful Romualdez political dynasty of Leyte 
in the Visayas. 

During his first term as president, Marcos initiated ambitious 
public works projects — roads, bridges, schools, health centers, ir- 
rigation facilities, and urban beautification projects — that improved 
the quality of life and also provided generous pork barrel benefits 
for his friends. Massive spending on public works was, politically, 
a cost-free policy not only because the pork barrel won him loyal 
allies but also because both local elites and ordinary people viewed 
a new civic center or bridge as a benefit. By contrast, a land re- 
form program — part of Marcos 's platform as it had been that of 
Macapagal and his predecessors — would alienate the politically all- 
powerful landowner elite and thus was never forcefully im- 
plemented. 

Marcos lobbied rigorously for economic and military aid from 
the United States but resisted pressure from President Lyndon John- 
son to become significantly involved in the Second Indochina War. 
Marcos 's contribution to the war was limited to a 2,000-member 
Philippine Civic Action Group sent to the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam) between 1966 and 1969. The Philippines became 
one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967. Disputes with fel- 
low ASEAN member Malaysia over Sabah in northeast Borneo, 
however, continued, and it was discovered, after an army mutiny 
and murder of Muslim troops in 1968 (the "Corregidor Incident"), 
that the Philippine army was training a special unit to infiltrate 
Sabah (see Relations with Asian Neighbors, ch. 4). 

Although Marcos was elected to a second term as president in 
1969 — the first president of the independent Philippines to gain 
a second term — the atmosphere of optimism that characterized his 
first years in power was largely dissipated. Economic growth slowed. 
Ordinary Filipinos, especially in urban areas, noted a deteriorat- 
ing quality of life reflected in spiraling crime rates and random vio- 
lence. Communist insurgency, particularly the activity of the Huks, 
had degenerated into gangsterism during the late 1950s, but the 
Communist Party of the Philippines-Marxist Leninist, usually 
referred to as the CPP, was "reestablished" in 1968 along Maoist 
lines in Tarlac Province north of Manila, leaving only a small rem- 
nant of the original PKF. The CPP's military arm, the New Peo- 
ple's Army (NPA), soon spread from Tarlac to other parts of the 
archipelago. On Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago, violence 
between Muslims and Christians, the latter often recent gov- 
ernment-sponsored immigrants from the north, was on the rise. 



50 



Historical Setting 



In 1969 the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was or- 
ganized on Malaysian soil. The MNLF conducted an insurrection 
supported by Malaysia and certain Islamic states in the Middle 
East, including Libya. 

The carefully crafted "Camelot" atmosphere of Marcos's first 
inauguration, in which he cast himself in the role of John F. Kenne- 
dy with Imelda as his Jackie, gave way in 1970 to general dissatis- 
faction with what had been one of the most dishonest elections in 
Philippine history and fears that Marcos might engineer change 
in the 1935 constitution to maintain himself in power. On Janu- 
ary 30, 1970, the "Battle of Mendiola," named after a street in 
front of the Malacanang Palace, the presidential mansion, pitted 
student demonstrators, who tried to storm the palace, against riot 
police and resulted in many injuries. 

Random bombings, officially attributed to communists but prob- 
ably set by government agent provocateurs, occurred in Manila 
and other large cities. Most of these only destroyed property, but 
grenade explosions in the Plaza Miranda in Manila during an op- 
position Liberal Party rally on August 21, 1971, killed 9 people 
and wounded 100 (8 of the wounded were Liberal Party candidates 
for the Senate). Although it has never been conclusively shown who 
was responsible for the bombing, Marcos blamed leftists and sus- 
pended habeas corpus — a prelude to martial law. But evidence sub- 
sequently pointed, again, to government involvement. 

Government and opposition political leaders agreed that the coun- 
try's constitution, American-authored during the colonial period, 
should be replaced by a new document to serve as the basis for 
thorough- going reform of the political system. In 1967 a bill was 
passed providing for a constitutional convention, and three years later, 
delegates to the convention were elected. It first met in June 1971 . 

The 1935 constitution limited the president to two terms. Op- 
position delegates, fearing that a proposed parliamentary system 
would allow Marcos to maintain himself in power indefinitely, 
prevailed on the convention to adopt a provision in September 1971 
banning Marcos and members of his family from holding the po- 
sition of head of state or government under whatever arrangement 
was finally established. But Marcos succeeded, through the use of 
bribes and intimidation, in having the ban nullified the following 
summer. Even if Marcos had been able to contest a third presiden- 
tial term in 1973, however, both the 1971 mid-term elections and 
subsequent public opinion polls indicated that he or a designated 
successor — Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile or the 
increasingly ambitious Imelda Marcos — would likely be defeated 
by his arch-rival, Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino. 



51 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law 

On September 21, 1972, Marcos issued Proclamation 1081, 
declaring martial law over the entire country. Under the president's 
command, the military arrested opposition figures, including Benig- 
no Aquino, journalists, student and labor activists, and criminal 
elements. A total of about 30,000 detainees were kept at military 
compounds run by the army and the Philippine Constabulary. 
Weapons were confiscated, and "private armies" connected with 
prominent politicians and other figures were broken up. Newspapers 
were shut down, and the mass media were brought under tight 
control. With the stroke of a pen, Marcos closed the Philippine 
Congress and assumed its legislative responsibilities. During the 
1972-81 martial law period, Marcos, invested with dictatorial pow- 
ers, issued hundreds of presidential decrees, many of which were 
never published. 

Like much else connected with Marcos, the declaration of mar- 
tial law had a theatrical, smoke-and-mirrors quality. The incident 
that precipitated Proclamation 1081 was an attempt, allegedly by 
communists, to assassinate Minister of National Defense Enrile. 
As Enrile himself admitted after Marcos' s downfall in 1986, his 
unoccupied car had been riddled by machine-gun bullets fired by 
his own men on the night that Proclamation 1081 was signed. 

Most Filipinos — or at least those well positioned within the eco- 
nomic and social elites — initially supported the imposition of martial 
law. The rising tide of violence and lawlessness was apparent to 
everyone. Although still modest in comparison with the Huk in- 
surgency of the early 1950s, the New People's Army was expand- 
ing, and the Muslim secessionist movement continued in the south 
with foreign support. Well-worn themes of communist conspiracy — 
Marcos claimed that a network of "front organizations" was oper- 
ating "among our peasants, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, 
students, and mass media personnel" — found a ready audience in 
the United States, which did not protest the demise of Philippine 
democracy. 

The New Society 

Marcos claimed that martial law was the prelude to creating a 
"New Society" based on new social and political values. He ar- 
gued that certain aspects of personal behavior, attributed to a coloni- 
al mentality, were obstacles to effective modernization. These 
included the primacy of personal connections, as reflected in the 
ethic of utang na loob, and the importance of maintaining in- group 



52 



Historical Setting 



harmony and coherence, even at the cost to the national commu- 
nity. A new spirit of self-sacrifice for the national welfare was neces- 
sary if the country were to equal the accomplishments of its Asian 
neighbors, such as Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea). Despite Marcos' s often perceptive criticisms of the old so- 
ciety, Marcos, his wife, and a small circle of close associates, the 
crony (see Glossary) group, now felt free to practice corruption on 
an awe-inspiring scale. 

Political, economic, and social policies were designed to neu- 
tralize Marcos 's rivals within the elite. The old political system, 
with its parties, rough-and-tumble election campaigns, and a press 
so uninhibited in its vituperative and libelous nature that it was 
called "the freest in the world," had been boss-ridden and domi- 
nated by the elite since early American colonial days, if not be- 
fore. The elite, however, composed of local political dynasties, had 
never been a homogeneous group. Its feuds and tensions, fueled 
as often by assaults on amor proprio (self-esteem) as by disagreement 
on ideology or issues, made for a pluralistic system. 

Marcos 's self-proclaimed "revolution from the top" deprived 
significant portions of the old elite of power and patronage. For 
example, the powerful Lopez family, who had fallen out of Mar- 
cos's favor (Fernando Lopez had served as Marcos 's first vice presi- 
dent), was stripped of most of its political and economic assets. 
Although always influential, during the martial law years, Imelda 
Marcos built her own power base, with her husband's support. 
Concurrently the governor of Metro Manila (see Glossary) and 
minister of human setdements (a post created for her), she exer- 
cised significant powers. 

Crony Capitalism 

During the first years of martial law, the economy benefited from 
increased stability, and business confidence was bolstered by Mar- 
cos's appointment of talented technocrats to economic planning 
posts. Despite the 1973 oil price rise shock, the growth of the gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary) was respectable, and the 
oil-pushed inflation rate, reaching 40 percent in 1974, was trimmed 
back to 10 percent the following year. Between 1973 and the early 
1980s, dependence on imported oil was reduced by domestic finds 
and successful energy substitution measures, including one of the 
world's most ambitious geothermal energy programs. Claiming that 
"if land reform fails, there is no New Society," Marcos launched 
highly publicized new initiatives that resulted in the formal trans- 
fer of land to some 184,000 farming families by late 1975. The law 
was filled with loopholes, however, and had little impact on local 



53 



Philippines: A Country Study 

landowning elites or landless peasants, who remained desperately 
poor. 

The largest, most productive, and technically most advanced 
manufacturing enterprises were gradually brought under the con- 
trol of Marcos 's cronies. For example, the huge business conglomer- 
ate owned by the Lopez family, which included major newspapers, 
a broadcast network, and the country's largest electric power com- 
pany, was broken up and distributed to Marcos loyalists includ- 
ing Imelda Marcos's brother, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and 
another loyal crony, Roberto Benedicto. Huge monopolies and 
semimonopolies were established in manufacturing, construction, 
and financial services. When these giants proved unprofitable, the 
government subsidized them with allocations amounting to 
hundreds of millions of pesos. Philippine Airlines, the nation's in- 
ternational and domestic air carrier, was nationalized and turned 
into what one author has called a "virtual private commuter line" 
for Imelda Marcos and her friends on shopping excursions to New 
York and Europe (see Transportation, ch. 3). 

Probably the most negative impact of crony capitalism, however, 
was felt in the traditional cash-crop sector, which employed mil- 
lions of ordinary Filipinos in the rural areas. (The coconut indus- 
try alone brought income to an estimated 15 million to 18 million 
people.) Under Benedicto and Eduardo Cojuangco, distribution 
and marketing monopolies for sugar and coconuts were established. 
Farmers on the local level were obliged to sell only to the monopo- 
lies and received less than world prices for their crops; they also 
were the first to suffer when world commodity prices dropped. Mil- 
lions of dollars in profits from these monopolies were diverted over- 
seas into Swiss bank accounts, real estate deals, and purchases of 
art, jewelry, and antiques. On the island of Negros in the Visayas, 
the region developed by Nicholas Loney for the sugar industry in 
the nineteenth century, sugar barons continued to live lives of lux- 
ury, but the farming community suffered from degrees of malnutri- 
tion rare in other parts of Southeast Asia. 

Ferdinand Marcos was responsible for making the previously 
nonpolitical, professional Armed Forces of the Philippines, which 
since American colonial times had been modeled on the United 
States military, a major actor in the political process. This subver- 
sion occurred in two ways. First, Marcos appointed officers from 
the Ilocos region, his home province, to its highest ranks. Region- 
al background and loyalty to Marcos rather than talent or a dis- 
tinguished service record were the major factors in promotion. 
Fabian Ver, for example, had been a childhood friend of Marcos 
and later his chauffeur. He rose to become chief of staff of the armed 



54 



Historical Setting 



forces and head of the internal security network. Secondly, both 
officers and the rank and file became beneficiaries of generous bud- 
get allocations. Officers and enlisted personnel received generous 
salary increases. Armed forces personnel increased from about 
58,000 in 1971 to 142,000 in 1983. Top-ranking military officers, 
including Ver, played an important policy-making role. On the 
local level, commanders had opportunities to exploit the economy 
and establish personal patronage networks, as Marcos and the mili- 
tary establishment evolved a symbiotic relationship under martial 
law. 

A military whose commanders, with some exceptions, were re- 
warded for loyalty rather than competence proved both brutal and 
ineffective in dealing with the rapidly growing communist insur- 
gency and Muslim separatist movement. Treatment of civilians 
in rural areas was often harsh, causing rural people, as a measure 
of self-protection rather than ideological commitment, to cooper- 
ate with the insurgents. The communist insurgency, after some 
reverses in the 1970s, grew quickly in the early 1980s, particularly 
in some of the poorest regions of the country. The Muslim separatist 
movement reached a violent peak in the mid-1970s and then 
declined greatly because of divisions in the leadership of the move- 
ment and reduced external support brought about by the diplo- 
matic activity of the Marcos government. 

Relations with the United States remained most important for 
the Philippines in the 1970s, although the special relationship be- 
tween the former and its ex-colony was greatly modified as trade, 
investment, and defense ties were redefined (see Relations with the 
United States, ch. 4). The Laurel- Langley Agreement defining 
preferential United States tariffs for Philippine exports and parity 
privileges for United States investors expired on July 4, 1974, and 
trade relations were governed thereafter by the international General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . During the martial law 
period, foreign investment terms were substantially liberalized, 
despite official rhetoric about foreign "exploitation" of the econo- 
my. A policy promoting "nontraditional" exports such as textiles, 
footwear, electronic components, and fresh and processed foods 
was initiated with some success. Japan increasingly challenged the 
United States as a major foreign participant in the Philippine 
economy. 

The status of United States military bases was redefined when 
a major amendment to the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 was 
signed on January 6, 1979, reaffirming Philippine sovereignty over 
the bases and reducing their total area. At the same time, the United 
States administration promised to make its "best effort" to obtain 



55 



Philippines: A Country Study 

congressional appropriations for military and economic aid amount- 
ing to US$400 million between 1979 to 1983. The amendment 
called for future reviews of the bases agreement every fifth year. 
Although the administration of President Jimmy Carter empha- 
sized promoting human rights worldwide, only limited pressure 
was exerted on Marcos to improve the behavior of the military in 
rural areas and to end the death- squad murder of opponents. (Pres- 
sure from the United States, however, did play a role in gaining 
the release of Benigno Aquino in May 1980, and he was allowed 
to go to the United States for medical treatment after spending 
almost eight years in prison, including long stretches of time in 
solitary confinement.) 

On January 17, 1981, Marcos issued Proclamation 2045, for- 
mally ending martial law. Some controls were loosened, but the 
ensuing New Republic proved to be a superficially liberalized ver- 
sion of the crony-dominated New Society. Predictably, Marcos won 
an overwhelming victory in the June 1981 presidential election, 
boycotted by the main opposition groups, in which his opponents 
were nonentities. 

From Aquino's Assassination to People's Power 

Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino was, like his life-long rival Ferdinand 
Marcos, a consummate politician, Philippine- style. Born in 1932, 
he interrupted his college studies to pursue a journalistic career, 
first in wartime Korea and then in Vietnam, Malaya, and other 
parts of Southeast Asia. Like Marcos, a skilled manager of his own 
public image, he bolstered his popularity by claiming credit for 
negotiating the May 1954 surrender of Huk leader Luis Taruc. 
The Aquino family was to Tarlac Province in Central Luzon what 
the Marcos family was to Ilocos Norte and the Romualdez family 
was to Leyte: a political dynasty. Aquino became the governor of 
Tarlac Province in 1963, and a member of the Senate in 1967. His 
marriage to Corazon Cojuangco, a member of one of the coun- 
try's richest and most prominent Chinese mestizo families, was, 
like Marcos 's marriage to Imelda Romualdez, a great help to his 
political career. If martial law had not been declared in Septem- 
ber 1972, Aquino would probably have defeated Marcos or a hand- 
picked successor in the upcoming presidential election. Instead, 
he was one of the first to be jailed when martial law was imposed. 

Aquino's years in jail — physical hardship, the fear of imminent 
death at the hands of his jailers, and the opportunity to read and 
meditate — seemed to have transformed the fast-talking political 
operator into a deeper and more committed leader of the democra- 
tic opposition. Although he was found guilty of subversion and 



56 



Historical Setting 



sentenced to death by a military court in November 1977, Aqui- 
no, still in prison, led the LABAN (Lakas Ng Bayan — Strength 
of the Nation) party in its campaign to win seats in the 1978 legis- 
lative election and even debated Marcos 's associate, Enrile, on 
television. The vote was for seats in the legislature called the Na- 
tional Assembly, initiated in 1978, which was, particularly in its 
first three years, essentially a rubber-stamp body designed to pass 
Marcos 's policies into law with the appearance of correct legal form. 
(The LABAN was unsuccessful, but it gained 40 percent of the 
vote in Metro Manila.) 

Allowed to go to the United States for medical treatment in 1980, 
Benigno Aquino, accompanied by his wife, became a major lead- 
er of the opposition in exile. In 1983 Aquino was fully aware of 
the dangers of returning to the Philippines. Imelda Marcos had 
pointedly advised him that his return would be risky, claiming that 
communists or even some of Marcos's allies would try to kill him. 
The deterioration of the economic and political situation and Mar- 
cos's own worsening health, however, persuaded Aquino that the 
only way his country could be spared civil war was either by per- 
suading the president to relinquish power voluntarily or by build- 
ing a responsible, united opposition. In his view, the worst possible 
outcome was a post-Marcos regime led by Imelda and backed by 
the military under Ver. 

Aquino was shot in the head and killed as he was escorted off 
an airplane at Manila International Airport by soldiers of the Avi- 
ation Security Command on August 21, 1983. The government's 
claim that he was the victim of a lone communist gunman, Rolan- 
do Galman (who was convenientiy killed by Aviation Security Com- 
mand troops after the alleged act), was unconvincing. A commission 
appointed by Marcos and headed by jurist Corazon Agrava con- 
cluded in their findings announced in late October 1984, that the 
assassination was the result of a military conspiracy. Marcos's credi- 
bility, both domestically and overseas, was mortally wounded when 
the Sandiganbayan, a high court charged with prosecuting govern- 
ment officials for crimes, ignored the Agrava findings, upheld the 
government's story, and acquitted Ver and twenty-four other mili- 
tary officers and one civilian in December 1985. 

Although ultimate responsibility for the act still had not been 
clearly determined in the early 1990s, on September 28, 1990, a 
special court convicted General Luther Custodio and fifteen other 
officers and enlisted members of the Aviation Security Command 
of murdering Aquino and Galman. Most observers believed, 
however, that Imelda Marcos and Fabian Ver wanted Aquino assas- 
sinated. Imelda' s remarks, both before and after the assassination, 



57 



Philippines: A Country Study 

and the fact that Ver had become her close confidant, cast suspi- 
cion on them. 

For the Marcoses, Aquino became a more formidable opponent 
dead than alive. His funeral drew millions of mourners in the larg- 
est demonstration in Philippine history. Aquino became a martyr 
who focused popular indignation against a corrupt regime. The 
inevitable outcome — Marcos 's overthrow — could be delayed but 
not prevented. 

The People's Power (see Glossary) movement, which bore fruit 
in the ouster of Marcos on February 25, 1986, was broad-based 
but primarily, although not exclusively, urban-based; indeed the 
movement was commonly known in Manila as the EDSA Revo- 
lution (see Glossary). People's Power encompassed members of the 
Roman Catholic hierarchy, the business elite, and a faction of the 
armed forces. Its millions of rural, working-class, middle-class, and 
professional supporters were united not by ideology or class in- 
terests, but by their esteem for Aquino's widow, Corazon, and their 
disgust with the Marcos regime. After her husband's assassination, 
Corazon Aquino assumed first a symbolic and then a substantive 
role as leader of the opposition. A devout Catholic and a shy and 
self-styled "simple housewife," Mrs. Aquino inspired trust and 
devotion. Some, including top American policy makers, regarded 
her as inexperienced and naive. Yet in the events leading up to 
Marcos' s ouster she displayed unexpected shrewdness and deter- 
mination. 

The Old Political Opposition 

Martial law had emasculated and marginalized the opposition, 
led by a number of traditional politicians who attempted, with limit- 
ed success, to promote a credible, noncommunist alternative to 
Marcos. The most important of these was Salvador H. "Doy" 
Laurel. Laurel organized a coalition of ten political groups, the 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), to con- 
test the 1982 National Assembly elections. Although he included 
Benigno Aquino as one of UNIDO's twenty "vice presidents," 
Laurel and Aquino were bitter rivals. 

The Catholic Church 

During the martial law and post-martial law periods, the Catholic 
Church was the country's strongest and most independent non- 
governmental institution. It traditionally had been conservative and 
aligned with the elites. Parish priests and nuns, however, witnessed 
the sufferings of the common people and often became involved 
in political, and even communist, activities. One of the best-known 



58 



Historical Setting 



politicized clergy was Father Conrado Balweg, who led a New Peo- 
ple's Army guerrilla unit in the tribal minority regions of north- 
ern Luzon. Although Pope John Paul II had admonished the clergy 
worldwide not to engage in active political struggle, the pope's com- 
mitment to human rights and social justice encouraged the Philip- 
pine hierarchy to criticize the Marcos regime's abuses in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Church-state relations deteriorated as the 
state-controlled media accused the church of being infiltrated by 
communists. Following Aquino's assassination, Cardinal Jaime Sin, 
archbishop of Manila and a leader of the Catholic Bishops Con- 
ference of the Philippines, gradually shifted the hierarchy's stance 
from one of "critical collaboration" to one of open opposition. 

A prominent Catholic layman, Jose Concepcion, played a ma- 
jor role in reviving the National Movement for Free Elections 
(NAMFREL) with church support in 1983 in order to monitor the 
1984 National Assembly elections. Both in the 1984 balloting and 
the February 7, 1986, presidential election, NAMFREL played 
a major role in preventing, or at least reporting, regime-instigated 
irregularities. The backbone of its organization was formed by par- 
ish priests and nuns in virtually every part of the country. 

The Business Elite 

The Aquino assassination shattered business confidence at a time 
when the economy was suffering from years of mismanagement 
under the cronies and unfavorable international conditions. Busi- 
ness leaders, especially those excluded from regime-nurtured mo- 
nopolies, feared that a continuation of the status quo would cause 
a collapse of the economy. Their apprehensions were shared by 
foreign creditors and international agencies such as the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). Inflation and unem- 
ployment were soaring. The country's GNP became stagnant by 
1983, and then it contracted — by - 6.8 percent in 1984 and - 3.8 
percent in 1985, according to the IMF. There was a steep decline 
both in domestic and foreign investment. Outward capital flows 
reached as high as US$2 million a day in the panic that followed 
Aquino's death. The Makati area of Manila, with its banks, broker- 
age houses, luxury hotels, and upper-class homes, became a center 
of vocal resistance to the Marcos regime. 

The Left 

Left-wing groups, affiliated directly or indirectly with the Com- 
munist Party of the Philippines, played a prominent role in anti- 
regime demonstrations after August 1983. While the New People's 
Army was spreading in rural areas, the communists, through the 



59 



Philippines: A Country Study 

National Democratic Front, gained influence, if not control, over 
some labor unions, student groups, and other urban-based organi- 
zations. Leftists demanding radical political change established the 
New Nationalist Alliance (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan — 
BAYAN), in the early 1980s, but their political influence suffered 
considerably from their decision to boycott the presidential elec- 
tion of February 1986. 

The Armed Forces 

Corruption and demoralization of the armed forces led to the 
emergence, in the early 1980s, of a faction of young officers, mosdy 
graduates of the elite Philippine Military Academy, known as the 
Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM — see Political Role, 
ch. 5). RAM supported a restoration of pre-martial law "profes- 
sionalism" and was closely allied with Minister of National Defense 
Enrile, long a Marcos loyalist yet increasingly unhappy with Ver's 
ascendancy over the armed forces. 

United States Reactions 

Given its past colonial association and continued security and 
economic interests in the Philippines, the United States never was 
a disinterested party in Philippine politics. On June 1, 1983, the 
United States and the Philippines signed a five-year memorandum 
of agreement on United States bases, which committed the Unit- 
ed States administration to make "best efforts" to secure US$900 
million in economic and military aid for the Philippines between 
1984 and 1988. The agreement reflected both United States secu- 
rity concerns at a time of increased Soviet-Western tension in the 
Pacific and its continued faith in the Marcos regime. 

The assassination of Aquino shocked United States diplomats 
in Manila, but conservative policy makers in the administration 
of President Ronald Reagan remained, until almost the very end, 
supportive of the Marcoses, because no viable alternative seemed 
available. In hindsight, United States support for the moderate Peo- 
ple's Power movement under Corazon Aquino, backed by church 
and business groups, would seem to be self-evident common sense. 
Yet in the tense days and weeks leading up to Marcos 's ouster, 
many policy makers feared that she was not tough or canny enough 
to survive a military coup d'etat or a communist takeover. 

The Snap Election and Marcos 's Ouster 

Indicative of the importance of United States support for his re- 
gime, Marcos announced his decision to hold a "snap" presiden- 
tial election on an American television talk show, "This Week with 



60 



Historical Setting 



David Brinkley," in November 1985. He promised skeptical Ameri- 
cans access for observer teams, setting February 7, 1986, a year 
before his six-year presidential term ran out, as the date for the 
election. He believed his early reelection would solidify United 
States support, silence his critics in the Philippines and the United 
States, and perhaps banish the ghost of Benigno Aquino. Marcos' s 
smoothly running, well- financed political machine and the divid- 
ed nature of the opposition promised success, but his decision proved 
to be a monumental blunder. 

Cardinal Sin, an astute negotiator described by one diplomat 
as ' 'one of the best politicians in the Philippines," arranged a po- 
litical alliance of convenience between Corazon Aquino and Sal- 
vador Laurel, who had announced his own candidacy but agreed 
to run as Aquino's vice-presidential candidate. Aquino had im- 
mense popular support and Laurel brought his superior organiza- 
tional skills to the campaign. Their agreement to run together was 
arranged just in time for the deadline for submission of candida- 
cies in early December. The church hierarchy gave its moral sup- 
port to the opposition ticket. Cardinal Sin, realizing that poor people 
would not refuse money offered for votes and that the ethic of utang 
na loob would oblige them to vote for the briber, admonished the 
voters that an immoral contract was not binding and that they 
should vote according to their consciences. 

On the day of the election, NAMFREL guarded ballot boxes 
and tried to get a rapid tally of the results in order to prevent ir- 
regularities. A team of United States observers, which included 
a joint congressional delegation, issued a mild criticism of elector- 
al abuses, but individual members expressed shock and indigna- 
tion: Senator Richard Lugar claimed that between 10 and 40 
percent of the voters had been disenfranchised by the removal of 
their names from registration rolls. The results tabulated by the 
government's Commission on Elections (COMELEC) showed 
Marcos leading, whereas NAMFREL figures showed a majority 
for the Aquino-Laurel ticket. On February 9, computer operators 
at COMELEC observed discrepancies between their figures and 
those officially announced and walked out in protest, at some risk 
to their lives. The church condemned the election as fraudulent, 
but on February 15, the Marcos-dominated National Assembly 
proclaimed him the official winner. Despite the election fraud, the 
Reagan administration's support for Marcos remained strong, as 
did its uncertainty concerning Corazon Aquino. Yet a consensus 
was developing among policy makers in the White House, Depart- 
ment of State, Pentagon, and Congress to advise the withdrawal 
of support from Marcos. 



61 



Philippines: A Country Study 

On February 22, Enrile and General Fidel Ramos, commander 
of the Philippine Constabulary, issued a joint statement demand- 
ing Marcos 's resignation. They established their rebel headquar- 
ters inside Camp Aguinaldo and the adjoining Camp Crame in 
Metro Manila, which was guarded by several hundred troops. Mar- 
cos ordered loyal units to suppress the uprising, but Cardinal Sin, 
broadcasting over the Catholic-run Radio Veritas (which became 
the voice of the revolution), appealed to the people to bring food 
and supplies for the rebels and to use nonviolence to block pro- 
Marcos troop movements. 

Hundreds of thousands responded. In the tense days that fol- 
lowed, priests, nuns, ordinary citizens, and children linked arms 
with the rebels and faced down, without violence, the tanks and 
machine guns of government troops. Many of the government 
troops defected, including the crews of seven helicopter gunships, 
which seemed poised to attack the massive crowd on February 24 
but landed in Camp Crame to announce their support for Peo- 
ple's Power. Violent confrontations were prevented. The Philip- 
pine troops did not want to wage war on their own people. 

Although Marcos held an inauguration ceremony at Malacafiang 
Palace on February 25, it was boycotted by foreign ambassadors 
(with the exception, in an apparently unwitting gaffe, of a new 
Soviet ambassador). It was, for the Marcoses, the last, pathetic 
hurrah. Advised by a United States senator, Paul Laxalt, who had 
close ties to Reagan, to "cut and cut cleanly," Marcos realized 
that he had lost United States support for any kind of arrangement 
that could keep him in power. By that evening, the Marcoses had 
quit the palace that had been their residence for two decades and 
were on their way to exile in the United States. Manila's popula- 
tion surged into Malacafiang to view the evidence of the Marcos 's 
extravagant life-style (including Imelda's much-publicized hundreds 
of pairs of expensive, unworn shoes). An almost bloodless revolu- 
tion brought Corazon Aquino into office as the seventh president 
of the Republic of the Philippines (see The Rise of Corazon Aqui- 
no, ch. 4). 

* * * 

David Joel Steinberg's The Philippines provides a good general 
introduction to the country and pays considerable attention to 
historical background. For good discussions of the Spanish period, 
see John L. Phelan's The Hispanicization of the Philippines and Robert 
Reed's Colonial Manila. Austin Coate's Rizal provides a well-written 
account of one of the most extraordinary lives of modern times. 



62 



Historical Setting 



On the American annexation of the islands, Stuart C. Miller's 
Benevolent Assimilation is a valuable work. Peter W. Stanley's Reap- 
praising an Empire is a good study of the American colonial period, 
and Theodore Friend's The Blue Eyed Enemy discusses the Japanese 
occupation in comparison with neighboring Indonesia. One of the 
best accounts of the insurgency is Benedict J. Kerkvliet's The Huk 
Rebellion. 

Crisis in the Philippines, a collection of essays edited by John Bres- 
nan, provides an excellent scholarly discussion of the Marcos years 
and the events that brought Corazon Aquino to the presidency. 
Waltzing with a Dictator, by Raymond Bonner, discusses Marcos' s 
relations with the United States, martial law, and the collapse of 
the Marcos regime. People Power, edited by Monina Allarey Mer- 
cado, describes the tense and exuberant atmosphere surrounding 
the mass movement that toppled Marcos. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



63 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Locally available materials are effectively used for housing in outlying 
areas. 



THE PHILIPPINES CONTINUED to be primarily a rural so- 
ciety in 1990, despite increasing signs of urbanization. The family 
remained the prime unit of social awareness, and ritual kin rela- 
tions and associations of a patron-client nature still were the basis 
for social groupings beyond the nuclear family, rather than horizon- 
tal ties forged among members of economically based social class- 
es. Because of a common religious tradition and the spread of 
Pilipino as a widely used, if not thoroughly accepted, national lan- 
guage, Filipinos were a relatively homogeneous population, with 
the important exceptions of the Muslim minority on Mindanao 
and in Sulu and southern Palawan provinces, and the upland tribal 
minorities sprinkled throughout the islands. In general, Filipinos 
shared a common set of values emphasizing social acceptance as 
a primary virtue and a common world view in which education 
served as the principal avenue for upward social mobility. Cleavages 
in the society were based primarily on religious differences (in the 
case of Muslims versus Christians), socio-cultural differences (in 
the case of upland tribes versus lowland coastal Filipinos), and 
urban-rural differences, rather than ethnic or racial considerations. 

Improvements in the national transportation system and in mass 
communications in most parts of the archipelago in the 1970s and 
1980s tended to reduce ethnolinguistic and regional divisions among 
lowland Filipinos, who made up more than 90 percent of the popu- 
lation. Some resistance to this cultural homogeneity remained, 
however, and continued regional identification was manifested in 
loyalty to regional languages and in opposition to the imposition 
of a national language based largely on Tagalog, the language of 
the Manila area. 

Large numbers of rural migrants continued to flow into the huge 
metropolitan areas, especially Metro Manila (see Glossary). Filipi- 
nos also migrated in substantial numbers to the United States and 
other countries. Many of these migrants, especially those to the 
Middle East, migrated only to fmd temporary employment and 
retained their Philippine domiciles. 

There was a significant shift in the composition of the elite as 
a result of political and economic policies following the end of the 
administration of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986. Some 
of the elite families displaced by the Marcos regime regained wealth 
and influence, but many of the families enjoying power, privilege, 
and prestige in the early 1990s were not the same as those enjoying 



67 



Philippines: A Country Study 



similar status a decade earlier. The abolition of monopolistic mar- 
keting boards, along with some progress in privatization, elimi- 
nated the economic base of some of Marcos's powerful associates. 

As a result of economic policies that permitted fruit and logging 
companies to expand their landholdings, previously farmed by tribal 
people, and to push farther and farther into the mountains to ex- 
ploit timber resources, upland tribal people have been threatened 
and dislocated, and the country's rich rain forests have suffered. 
Despite government efforts to instill respect for cultural diversity, 
it remained to be seen whether minorities and the ecosystem they 
shared would survive the onslaught of powerful economic forces 
that include the migration of thousands of lowland Filipinos to the 
frontier areas on Mindanao, as well as the intrusion of corporate 
extractive industries. Even if these influences were held in check, 
the attraction of lowland society might wean the tribal people from 
their customary way of life. 

Population growth did not seem to be a major concern of the 
government, although it would seem that the continued high rate 
of population growth aggravated the state of the Philippine economy 
and health care. At the beginning of the Aquino administration, 
Roman Catholic clergy withdrew cooperation from the Population 
Control Commission (Popcorn) and sought its elimination. The 
commission was retained, however, and government efforts to re- 
duce population growth continued but hardly on a scale likely to 
produce major results. 

Physical Setting 

The Philippine archipelago lies in Southeast Asia in a position 
that has led to its becoming a cultural crossroads, a place where 
Malays, Chinese, Spaniards, Americans, and others have inter- 
acted to forge that unique cultural and racial blend known to the 
world as Filipino. The archipelago numbers some 7,100 islands, 
and the nation claims an exclusive economic zone (EEZ — see Glos- 
sary) of 200 nautical miles from its shores. The Philippines occupies 
an area that stretches for 1,850 kilometers from about the fifth to 
the twentieth parallels north latitude. The total land area is almost 
300,000 square kilometers. Only approximately 1,000 of its islands 
are populated, and fewer than one-half of these are larger than 2.5 
square kilometers. Eleven islands make up 94 percent of the Philip- 
pine landmass, and two of these — Luzon and Mindanao — measure 
105,000 and 95,000 square kilometers, respectively. They, together 
with the cluster of the Visayan Islands that separate them, represent 
the three principal regions of the archipelago that are identified 
by the three stars on the Philippine flag. Topographically, the 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



Philippines is broken up by the sea, which gives it one of the long- 
est coastlines of any nation in the world (see fig. 2). Most Filipi- 
nos live on or near the coast, where they can easily supplement 
their diet from approximately 2,000 species of fish. 

Off the coast of eastern Mindanao is the Philippine Trough, 
which descends to a depth of 10,430 meters. The Philippines is 
part of a western Pacific arc system that is characterized by active 
volcanoes. Among the most notable peaks are Mount Mayon near 
Legaspi, Taal Volcano south of Manila, and Mount Apo on Min- 
danao. All of the Philippines islands are prone to earthquakes. The 
northern Luzon highlands, or Cordillera Central, rise to between 
2,500 and 2,750 meters, and, together with the Sierra Madre in 
the northeastern portion of Luzon and the mountains of Minda- 
nao, boast rain forests that provide refuge for numerous upland 
tribal groups. The rain forests also offer prime habitat for more 
than 500 species of birds, including the Philippine eagle (or monkey- 
eating eagle), some 800 species of orchids, and some 8,500 species 
of flowering plants. 

The country's most extensive river systems are the Pulangi (Rio 
Grande), which flows into the Mindanao River; the Agusan, in 
Mindanao, which flows north into the Mindanao Sea; the Cagayan 
in northern Luzon; and the Pampanga, which flows south from 
Central Luzon into Manila Bay. Laguna de Bay, southeast of Ma- 
nila Bay, is the largest freshwater lake in the Philippines. Several 
rivers have been harnessed for hydroelectric power. 

The Climate 

The Philippines has a tropical marine climate dominated by a 
rainy season and a dry season. The summer monsoon brings heavy 
rains to most of the archipelago from May to October, whereas 
the winter monsoon brings cooler and drier air from December 
to February. Manila and most of the lowland areas are hot and 
dusty from March to May. Even at this time, however, tempera- 
tures rarely rise above 37°C. Mean annual sea-level temperatures 
rarely fall below 27 °C. Annual rainfall measures as much as 5,000 
millimeters in the mountainous east coast section of the country, 
but less than 1,000 millimeters in some of the sheltered valleys. 

Monsoon rains, although hard and drenching, are not normal- 
ly associated with high winds and waves. But the Philippines does 
sit astride the typhoon belt, and it suffers an annual onslaught of 
dangerous storms from July through October. These are especial- 
ly hazardous for northern and eastern Luzon and the Bicol and 
Eastern Visayas regions, but Manila gets devastated periodically 
as well. 



69 



Philippines: A Country Study 

In the last decade, the Philippines has suffered severely from 
natural disasters. In 1990 alone, Central Luzon was hit by both 
a drought, which sharply curtailed hydroelectric power, and by a 
typhoon that flooded practically all of Manila's streets. Still more 
damaging was an earthquake that devastated a wide area in Lu- 
zon, including Baguio and other northern areas. The city of Cebu 
and nearby areas were struck by a typhoon that killed more than 
a hundred people, sank vessels, destroyed part of the sugar crop, 
and cut off water and electricity for several days. 

Building construction is undertaken with natural disasters in 
mind. Most rural housing has consisted of nipa huts that are easily 
damaged but are inexpensive and easy to replace. Most urban build- 
ings are steel and concrete structures designed (not always success- 
fully) to resist both typhoons and earthquakes. Damage is still 
significant, however, and many people are displaced each year by 
typhoons, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. In 1987 alone 
the Department of Social Welfare and Development helped 2.4 mil- 
lion victims of natural disasters. 

Population 

Population Growth 

The Philippine population in the early 1990s continued to grow 
at a rapid, although somewhat reduced rate from that which had 
prevailed in the preceding decades. In 1990 the Philippine popu- 
lation was more than 66 million, up from 48 million in 1980. This 
figure represents an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent, down from 
2.6 percent in 1980 and from more than 3 percent in the 1960s. 
Even at the lower growth rate, the Philippine population will in- 
crease to more than 84 million by the year 2000 and will double 
every twenty-eight years into the next century. Moreover, in 1990 
the population was still a youthful one, with 57 percent under the 
age of twenty. The birth rate in early 1991 was 29 per 1,000, and 
the death rate was 7 per 1,000. The infant mortality rate was 48 
deaths per 1,000 live births. Population density increased from 160 
per square kilometer in 1980 to 220 in 1990. The rapid popula- 
tion growth and the size of the younger population have required 
the Philippines to double the number of houses, schools, and health 
facilities every twenty-nine years just to maintain a constant level. 

Migration 

Two significant migration trends affected population figures in the 
1970s and the 1980s. One was the trend of migration from village 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



to city, which put extra stress on urban areas. As of the early 1980s, 
thirty cities had 100,000 or more residents, up from twenty-one 
cities in 1970. Metro Manila's population was 5,924,563, up from 
4,970,006 in 1975, marking an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent. 
This figure was far above the national average of 2.5 percent. 
Within Metro Manila, the city of Manila itself was growing more 
slowly, at a rate of only 1 .9 percent per annum, but two other cities 
within this complex, Quezon City and Caloocan, were booming 
at rates of 4 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively. 

A National Housing Authority report revealed that, in the early 
1980s, one out of four Metro Manila residents was a squatter. This 
figure represented a 150 percent increase in a decade in the num- 
ber of people living in shanty town communities, evidence of con- 
tinuing, virtually uncontrolled, rural-urban migration. The city 
of Manila had more than 500,000 inhabitants and Quezon City 
had 371,000 inhabitants in such neighborhoods. Moreover, rural- 
urban migrants, responding to better employment opportunities 
in peripheral metropolitan cities such as Navotas, had boosted the 
percentage of squatters in the total population of those cities. 

A second major migration pattern consisted of resettlement from 
the more densely to the less densely populated regions. As a result 
of a population-land ratio that declined from about one cultivated 
hectare per agricultural worker in the 1950s to about 0.5 hectare 
by the early 1980s, thousands of Filipinos had migrated to the 
agricultural frontier on Mindanao. According to the 1980 census, 
six of the twelve fastest growing provinces were in the western, 
northern, and southern Mindanao regions, and a seventh was the 
frontier province of Palawan. Sulu, South Cotabato, Misamis 
Oriental, Surigao del Norte, Agusan del Norte, and Agusan del 
Sur provinces all had annual population growth rates of 4 percent 
or more, a remarkable statistic given the uncertain law-and-order 
situation on Mindanao. Among the fastest- growing cities in the 
late 1970s were General Santos (10 percent annual growth rate), 
Iligan (6.9), Cagayan de Oro (6.7), Cotabato (5.7), Zamboanga 
(5.4), Butuan (5.4), and Dipolog (5.1) — all on Mindanao. 

By the early 1980s, the Mindanao frontier had ceased to offer 
a safety valve for land-hungry settlers. Hitherto peaceful provinces 
had become dangerous tinderboxes in which mounting numbers 
of Philippine army troops and New People's Army insurgents car- 
ried on a sporadic shooting war with each other and with bandits, 
"lost commands," millenarian religious groups, upland tribes, log- 
gers, and Muslims (see The Counterinsurgency Campaign, ch. 5). 
Population pressures also created an added obstacle to land reform. 
For years, the poor and their supporters had demanded that land 



73 



Philippines: A Country Study 



tenure be restructured so that the large holdings of landlords could 
be eliminated and peasants could become farm owners. In the past, 
land reform had been opposed by landlords. In the 1990s there 
simply was not enough land to enable a majority of the rural inhabi- 
tants to become landowners. In the 1980s and 1990s, international 
migration offered better economic opportunities to a number of Fili- 
pinos without, however, reaching the point where it relieved popula- 
tion pressure. Since the liberalization of United States immigration 
laws in 1965, the number of people in the United States having 
Filipino ancestry had grown to 1,406,770, according to the 1990 
United States census. In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990, 
the United States Embassy in Manila issued 45,189 immigrant and 
85,128 temporary visas, the largest number up to that time. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, more than half a million temporary 
migrants went abroad to work but maintained a Philippine resi- 
dence. This number included contract workers in the Middle East 
and domestic servants in Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as 
nurses and physicians who went to the United States for training 
and work experience. A fair proportion of the latter group managed 
to become permanent residents. The remittances sent back to the 
Philippines by migrants have been a substantial source of foreign 
exchange. 

Population Control 

Popcorn was the government agency with primary responsibility 
for controlling population growth. In 1985 Popcorn set a target for 
reducing the growth rate to 1 percent by 2000. To reach that goal 
in the 1990s, Popcorn recommended that families have a maximum 
of two children, that they space the birth of children at three-year 
intervals, and that women delay marriage to age twenty-three and 
men to age twenty-five. 

During the Marcos regime (1965-86), there was a rather un- 
easy accommodation between the Catholic hierarchy and the 
government population control program. Bishops served on Pop- 
corn, and clinics included the rhythm method as a birth-control 
method about which they could give information. A few Catholic 
priests, notably Frank Lynch, even called for energetic support of 
population limitation. 

The fall of Marcos coincided with a general rise of skepticism 
about the relation between population growth and economic de- 
velopment. It became common to state that exploitation, rather 
than population pressure, was the cause of poverty. The bishops 
withdrew from the Popcorn board, opposed an effort to reduce the 



74 



Pasig River at Manila after a typhoon 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

number of children counted as dependents for tax purposes, secured 
the removal of the population-planning clause from the draft of the 
constitution, and attempted to end government population programs. 
Attacks on the government population program were defeated, and 
efforts to popularize family planning, along with the provision of 
contraceptive materials, continued. In the early 1990s, however, the 
program generally lacked the firm government support needed to 
make it effective. 

Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Language 

Historical Development of Ethnic Identities 

Philippine society was relatively homogeneous in 1990, espe- 
cially considering its distribution over some 1,000 inhabited islands. 
Muslims and upland tribal peoples were obvious exceptions, but 
approximately 90 percent of the society remained united by a 
common cultural and religious background. Among the lowland 
Christian Filipinos, language was the main point of internal dif- 
ferentiation, but the majority interacted and intermarried regu- 
larly across linguistic lines. Because of political centralization, 
urbanization, and extensive internal migration, linguistic barriers 
were eroding, and government emphasis on Pilipino and English 



75 



Philippines: A Country Study 

(at the expense of local dialects) also reduced these divisions. 
Nevertheless, national integration remained incomplete. 

Through centuries of intermarriage, Filipinos had become a 
unique blend of Malay, Chinese, Spanish, Negrito, and Ameri- 
can. Among the earliest inhabitants were Negritos, followed by 
Malays, who deserve most of the credit for developing lowland 
Philippine agricultural life as it is known in the modern period 
(see Early History, ch. 1). As the Malays spread throughout the 
archipelago, two things happened. First, they absorbed, through 
intermarriage, most of the Negrito population, although a minority 
of Negritos remained distinct by retreating to the mountains. Sec- 
ond, they dispersed into separate groups, some of which became 
relatively isolated in pockets on Mindanao, northern Luzon, and 
some of the other large islands. Comparative linguistic analysis sug- 
gests that most groups may once have spoken a form of "proto- 
Manobo, ' ' but that each group developed a distinct vernacular that 
can be traced to its contact over the centuries with certain groups 
and its isolation from others (see fig. 3). 

With the advent of Islam in the southern Philippines during the 
fifteenth century, separate sultanates developed on Mindanao and 
in the Sulu Archipelago. By the middle of the sixteenth century, 
Islamic influence had spread as far north as Manila Bay. 

Spain colonized the Philippines in the sixteenth century and suc- 
ceeded in providing the necessary environment for the develop- 
ment of a Philippine national identity; however, Spain never 
completely vitiated Muslim autonomy on Mindanao and in the Sulu 
Archipelago, where the separate Muslim sultanates of Sulu, 
Maguindanao, and Maranao remained impervious to Christian 
conversion. Likewise, the Spanish never succeeded in converting 
upland tribal groups, particularly on Luzon and Mindanao. The 
Spanish influence was strongest among lowland groups and ema- 
nated from Manila. Even among these lowland peoples, however, 
linguistic differences continued to outweigh unifying factors until 
a nationalist movement emerged to question Spanish rule in the 
nineteenth century. 

Philippine national identity emerged as a blend of diverse eth- 
nic and linguistic groups, when lowland Christians, called indios 
by the Spaniards, began referring to themselves as "Filipinos," 
excluding Muslims, upland tribal groups, and ethnic Chinese who 
had not been assimilated by intermarriage and did not fit the 
category. In the very process of defining a national identity, the 
majority was also drawing attention to a basic societal cleavage 
among the groups (see The Development of a National Conscious- 
ness, ch. 1). In revolting against Spanish rule and, later, fighting 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



United States troops, the indigenous people became increasingly 
conscious of a national unity transcending local and regional iden- 
tities. A public school system that brought at least elementary-level 
education to all but the most remote barrios and sitios (small clusters 
of homes) during the early twentieth century also served to dilute 
religious, ethnic, and linguistic or regional differences, as did im- 
provements in transportation and communication systems and the 
spread of English as a lingua franca (see The First Phase of Ameri- 
can Rule, 1898-1935, ch. 1). 

Language Diversity and Uniformity 

Some eleven languages and eighty-seven dialects were spoken 
in the Philippines in the late 1980s. Eight of these — Tagalog, Cebu- 
ano, Ilocano, Hiligaynon, Bicolano, Waray-Waray, Pampangan, 
and Pangasinan — were native tongues for about 90 percent of the 
population. All eight belong to the Malay-Polynesian language 
family and are related to Indonesian and Malay, but no two are 
mutually comprehensible. Each has a number of dialects and all 
have impressive literary traditions, especially Tagalog, Cebuano, 
and Ilocano. Some of the languages have closer affinity than others. 
It is easier for Ilocanos and Pangasinans to learn each other's 
language than to learn any of the other six. Likewise, speakers of 
major Visayan Island languages — Cebuano, Ilongo, and Waray- 
Waray — find it easier to communicate with each other than with 
Tagalogs, Ilocanos, or others. 

Language divisions were nowhere more apparent than in the con- 
tinuing public debate over national language. The government in 
1974 initiated a policy of gradually phasing out English in schools, 
business, and government, and replacing it with Pilipino, based 
on the Tagalog language of central and southern Luzon. Pilipino 
had spread throughout the nation, the mass media, and the school 
system. In 1990 President Corazon Aquino ordered that all govern- 
ment offices use Pilipino as a medium of communication, and 200 
college executives asked that Pilipino be the main medium of col- 
lege instruction rather than English. Government and educational 
leaders hoped that Pilipino would be in general use throughout the 
archipelago by the end of the century. By that time, it might have 
enough grass-roots support in non-Tagalog- speaking regions to be- 
come a national language. In the early 1990s, however, Filipinos had 
not accepted a national language at the expense of their regional lan- 
guages. Nor was there complete agreement that regional languages 
should be subordinated to a national language based on Tagalog. 

The role of English was also debated. Some argued that English 
was essential to economic progress because it opened the Philippines 



77 



Philippines: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Principal Ethno linguistic Groups, 1991 



"8 



The Society and Its Environment 



Classification of 
Cultural-Linguistic Groups 



MAJOR GROUPS INCLUDED ON MAP: 

llocano llongo 

Pangasinan Waray-Waray 

Pampangan Cebuano 

Tagalog Boholano 
Bicolano 



MUSLIM GROUPS: 



A Maguindanao 

B Maranao 

C Tausug 

D Samal 

E Bajau 



F Yakan 

G llanon 

H Sangir 

I Melabugnan 

J Jama Mapun 



UPLAND TRIBAL GROUPS - LUZON: 



1 Ifugao 

2 Bontoc 

3 Kankanay 

4 Ibaloi 

5 Kalinga 



6 Tinguian 

7 Isneg 

8 Gaddang 

9 llongot 

10 Negrito 



UPLAND TRIBAL GROUPS - MINDORO AND MINDANAO: 



11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 



Mangyan 

Manobo 

Bukidnon 

Bagobo 

Mandaya 

Ata 

Mansaka 



18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 



Subanun 

Mamanua 

Bila-an 

Tiruray 

T-Boli 

Tasaday 



79 



Philippines: A Country Study 



to communication with the rest of the world, facilitated foreign com- 
merce, and made Filipinos desirable employees for international 
firms both in the Philippines and abroad. Despite census reports 
that nearly 65 percent of the populace claimed some understand- 
ing of English, as of the early 1990s competence in English ap- 
peared to have deteriorated. Groups also debated whether 
"Filipinization" and the resulting shifting of the language toward 
"Taglish" (a mixture of Tagalog and English) had made the lan- 
guage less useful as a medium of international communication. 
Major newspapers in the early 1990s, however, were in English, 
English language movies were popular, and English was often used 
in advertisements. 

Successful Filipinos were likely to continue to be competent in 
Pilipino and English. Speakers of another regional language would 
most likely continue to use that language at home, Pilipino in or- 
dinary conversation in the cities, and English for commerce, govern- 
ment, and international relations. Both Pilipino, gaining use in 
the media, and English continued in the 1990s to be the languages 
of education. 

The Lowland Christian Population 

Although lowland Christians maintained stylistic differences in 
dress until the twentieth century and had always taken pride in 
their unique culinary specialties, they continued to be a remark- 
ably homogeneous core population of the Philippines. In 1990 
lowland Christians, also known as Christian Malays, made up 91.5 
percent of the population and were divided into several regional 
groups. Because of their regional base in Metro Manila and adja- 
cent provinces to the north, east, and south, Tagalogs tended to 
be more visible than other groups. Cebuanos, whose language was 
the principal one in the Visayan Island area, inhabited Cebu, Bo- 
hol, Siquijor, Negros Oriental, Leyte, and Southern Leyte prov- 
inces, and parts of Mindanao. Ilocanos had a reputation for being 
ready migrants, leaving their rocky northern Luzon homeland not 
just for more fertile parts of the archipelago but for the United States 
as well. The home region of the Ilongos (speakers of Hiligaynon) 
included most of Panay, Negros Occidental Province, and the 
southern end of Mindoro. Their migration in large numbers to 
the Cotabato and Lanao areas of Mindanao led to intense fric- 
tion between them and the local Muslim inhabitants and the out- 
break of fighting between the two groups in the 1970s. The 
homeland of the Bicolanos, or "Bicolandia," was the southeastern 
portion of Luzon together with the islands of Catanduanes, Bu- 
rias, and Ticao, and adjacent parts of Masbate. The Waray-Warays 



80 



Child playing on flooded Central Luzon road 
Courtesy Patricia V. Dolan 

lived mostly in eastern Leyte and Samar in the Eastern Visayas. 
The Pampangan homeland was the Central Luzon Plain and espe- 
cially Pampanga Province. Speakers of Pangasinan were especially 
numerous in the Lingayen Gulf region of Luzon, but they also had 
spread to the Central Luzon Plain where they were interspersed 
with Tagalogs, Ilocanos, and Pampangans. 

As migrants to the city, these lowland Christians clustered 
together in neighborhoods made up primarily of people from their 
own regions. Multilingualism generally characterized these neigh- 
borhoods; the language of the local area was used, as a rule, for 
communicating with those native to the area, and English or Pilipino 
was used as a supplement. Migrants to cities and to agricultural 
frontiers were remarkably ready and willing to learn the language 
of their new location while retaining use of their mother tongue 
within the home. 

Muslim Filipinos 

Muslims, about 5 percent of the total population, were the most 
significant minority in the Philippines. Although undifferentiated 
racially from other Filipinos, in the 1990s they remained outside 
the mainstream of national life, set apart by their religion and way 



81 



Philippines: A Country Study 



of life. In the 1970s, in reaction to consolidation of central govern- 
ment power under martial law, which began in 1972, the Muslim 
Filipino, or Moro (see Glossary), population increasingly identi- 
fied with the worldwide Islamic community, particularly in Malay- 
sia, Indonesia, Libya, and Middle Eastern countries. Longstanding 
economic grievances stemming from years of governmental neglect 
and from resentment of popular prejudice against them contributed 
to the roots of Muslim insurgency (see The Moros, ch. 5). 

Moros were confined almost entirely to the southern part of the 
country — southern and western Mindanao, southern Palawan, and 
the Sulu Archipelago. Ten subgroups could be identified on the 
basis of language. Three of these groups made up the great majority 
of Moros. They were the Maguindanaos of North Cotabato, Sul- 
tan Kudarat, and Maguindanao provinces; the Maranaos of the 
two Lanao provinces; and the Tausugs, principally from Jolo Island. 
Smaller groups were the Samals and Bajaus, principally of the Sulu 
Archipelago; the Yakans of Zamboanga del Sur Province; the Ila- 
nons and Sangirs of Southern Mindanao Region; the Melabug- 
nans of southern Palawan; and the Jama Mapuns of the tiny 
Cagayan Islands. 

Muslim Filipinos traditionally had not been a closely knit or even 
allied group. They were fiercely proud of their separate identities, 
and conflict between them had been endemic for centuries. In ad- 
dition to being divided by different languages and political struc- 
tures, the separate groups also differed in their degree of Islamic 
orthodoxy. For example, the Tausugs, the first group to adopt Is- 
lam, criticized the more recently Islamicized Yakan and Bajau peo- 
ples for being less zealous in observing Islamic tenets and practices. 
Internal differences among Moros in the 1980s, however, were out- 
weighed by commonalities of historical experience vis-a-vis non- 
Muslims and by shared cultural, social, and legal traditions. 

The traditional structure of Moro society focused on a sultan 
who was both a secular and a religious leader and whose authority 
was sanctioned by the Quran. The datu were communal leaders 
who measured power not by their holdings in landed wealth but 
by the numbers of their followers. In return for tribute and labor, 
the datu provided aid in emergencies and advocacy in disputes with 
followers of another chief. Thus, through his agama (court — actually 
an informal dispute-settling session), a datu became basic to the 
smooth function of Moro society. He was a powerful authority 
figure who might have as many as four wives and who might en- 
slave other Muslims in raids on their villages or in debt bondage. 
He might also demand revenge (maratabat) for the death of a fol- 
lower or upon injury to his pride or honor. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



The datu continued to play a central role in Moro society in the 
1980s. In many parts of Muslim Mindanao, they still administered 
the sharia (sacred Islamic law) through the agama. They could no 
longer expand their circle of followers by raiding other villages, 
but they achieved the same end by accumulating wealth and then 
using it to provide aid, employment, and protection for less for- 
tunate neighbors. Datu support was essential for government pro- 
grams in a Muslim barangay (see Glossary). Although a datu in 
modern times rarely had more than one wife, polygamy was per- 
mitted so long as his wealth was sufficient to provide for more than 
one. Moro society was still basically hierarchical and familial, at 
least in rural areas. 

The national government policies instituted immediately after 
independence in 1946 abolished the Bureau for Non-Christian 
Tribes used by the United States to deal with minorities and en- 
couraged migration of Filipinos from densely settled areas such as 
Central Luzon to the "open" frontier of Mindanao. By the 1950s, 
hundreds of thousands of Bongos, Ilocanos, Tagalogs, and others 
were settling in North Cotabato and South Cotabato and Lanao 
del Norte and Lanao del Sur provinces, where their influx inflamed 
Moro hostility. The crux of the problem lay in land disputes. Chris- 
tian migrants to the Cotabatos, for example, complained that they 
bought land from one Muslim only to have his relatives refuse to 
recognize the sale and demand more money. Muslims claimed that 
Christians would title land through government agencies unknown 
to Muslim residents, for whom land titling was a new institution. 
Distrust and resentment spread to the public school system, regard- 
ed by most Muslims as an agency for the propagation of Christian 
teachings. By 1970, a terrorist organization of Christians called 
the Ilagas (Rats) began operating in the Cotabatos, and Muslim 
armed bands, called Blackshirts, appeared in response. The same 
thing happened in the Lanaos, where the Muslim Barracudas be- 
gan fighting the Ilagas. Philippine army troops sent in to restore 
peace and order were accused by Muslims of siding with the Chris- 
tians. When martial law was declared in 1972, Muslim Mindanao 
was in turmoil (see Marcos and the Road to Martial Law, 1965-72, 
ch. 1). 

The Philippine government discovered shortly after independence 
that there was a need for some kind of specialized agency to deal 
with the Muslim minority and so set up the Commission for Na- 
tional Integration in 1957, which was later replaced by the Office 
of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities. Filipino nationalists 
envisioned a united country in which Christians and Muslims would 



83 



Philippines: A Country Study 

be offered economic advantages and the Muslims would be assimi- 
lated into the dominant culture. They would simply be Filipinos 
who had their own mode of worship and who refused to eat pork. 
This vision, less than ideal to many Christians, was generally re- 
jected by Muslims who feared that it was a euphemistic equiva- 
lent of assimilation. Concessions were made to Muslim religion 
and customs. Muslims were exempted from Philippine laws pro- 
hibiting polygamy and divorce, and in 1977 the government at- 
tempted to codify Muslim law on personal relationships and to 
harmonize Muslim customary law with Philippine law. A signifi- 
cant break from past practice was the 1990 establishment of the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which gave Muslims 
in the region control over some aspects of government, but not 
over national security and foreign affairs (see Local Government, 
ch. 4). 

There were social factors in the early 1990s that militated against 
the cultural autonomy sought by Muslim leaders. Industrial de- 
velopment and increased migration outside the region brought new 
educational demands and new roles for women. These changes in 
turn led to greater assimilation and, in some cases, even intermar- 
riage. Nevertheless, Muslims and Christians generally remained 
distinct societies often at odds with one another. 

Upland Tribal Groups 

Another minority, the more than 100 upland tribal groups, in 
1990 constituted approximately 3 percent of the population. As 
lowland Filipinos, both Muslim and Christian, grew in numbers 
and expanded into the interiors of Luzon, Mindoro, Mindanao, 
and other islands, they isolated upland tribal communities in pock- 
ets. Over the centuries, these isolated tribes developed their own 
special identities. The folk art of these groups was, in a sense, the 
last remnant of an indigenous tradition that flourished everywhere 
before Islamic and Spanish contact. 

Technically, the upland tribal groups were a blend in ethnic origin 
like other Filipinos, although they did not, as a rule, have as much 
contact with the outside world. They displayed great variety in so- 
cial organization, cultural expression, and artistic skills that showed 
a high degree of creativity, usually employed to embellish utilitar- 
ian objects, such as bowls, baskets, clothing, weapons, and even 
spoons. Technologically, these groups ranged from the highly 
sophisticated Bontocs and Ifugaos, who engineered the extraordi- 
nary rice terraces, to more primitive groups. They also covered 
a wide spectrum in terms of their integration and acculturation with 
lowland Christian Filipinos. Some, like the Bukidnons of Mindanao, 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



had intermarried with lowlanders for almost a century, whereas 
others, like the Kalingas on Luzon, remained more isolated from 
lowland influences. 

There were ten principal cultural groups living in the Cordillera 
Central of Luzon in 1990. The name Igorot, the Tagalog word 
for mountaineer, was often used with reference to all groups. At 
one time it was employed by lowland Filipinos in a pejorative sense, 
but in recent years it came to be used with pride by youths in the 
mountains as a positive expression of their separate ethnic identi- 
ty vis-a-vis lowlanders. Of the ten groups, the Ifugaos of Ifugao,, 
Province, the Bontocs of Mountain and Kalinga-Apayao provinces, 
and the Kankanays and Ibalois of Benguet Province were all wet- 
rice farmers who worked the elaborate rice terraces they had con- 
structed over the centuries. The Kankanays and Ibalois were the 
most influenced by Spanish and American colonialism and lowland 
Filipino culture because of the extensive gold mines in Benguet, 
the proximity of Baguio, good roads and schools, and a consumer 
industry in search of folk art. Other mountain peoples of Luzon 
were the Kalingas of Kalinga-Apayao Province and the Tingui- 
ans of Abra Province, who employed both wet-rice and dry-rice 
growing techniques. The Isnegs of northern Kalinga-Apayao 
Province, the Gaddangs of the border between Kalinga-Apayao 
and Isabela provinces, and the Uongots of Nueva Vizcaya Province 
all practiced shifting cultivation. Negritos completed the picture 
for Luzon. Although Negritos had formerly dominated the high- 
lands, by the early 1980s they were reduced to small groups living 
in widely scattered locations, primarily along the eastern ranges 
of the mountains. 

South of Luzon, upland tribal groups were concentrated on Min- 
danao, although there was an important population of mountain 
peoples with the generic name Mangyan living on Mindoro. Among 
the most important groups on Mindanao were the Manobos (a 
general name for many tribal groups in southern Bukidnon and 
Agusan del Sur provinces); the Bukidnons of Bukidnon Province; 
the Bagobos, Mandayas, Atas, and Mansakas, who inhabited 
mountains bordering the Davao Gulf; the Subanuns of upland areas 
in the Zamboanga provinces; the Mamanuas of the Agusan-Surigao 
border region; and the Bila-ans, Tirurays, and T-Bolis of the area 
of the Cotabato provinces. Tribal groups on Luzon were widely 
known for their carved wooden figures, baskets, and weaving; Min- 
danao tribes were renowned for their elaborate embroidery, ap- 
plique, and bead work. 

The Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities suc- 
ceeded in establishing a number of protected reservations for tribal 



85 



Philippines: A Country Study 



groups. Residents were expected to speak their tribal language, 
dress in their traditional tribal clothing, live in houses constructed 
of natural materials using traditional architectural designs, and 
celebrate their traditional ceremonies of propitiation of spirits be- 
lieved to be inhabiting their environment. They also were en- 
couraged to reestablish their traditional authority structure, in 
which, as in Moro society, tribal datu were the key figures. These 
men, chosen on the basis of their bravery and their ability to settle 
disputes, were usually, but not always, the sons of former datu. Often 
they were also the ones who remembered the ancient oral epics 
of their people. The datu sang these epics to reawaken in tribal youth 
an appreciation for the unique and semisacred history of the tribal 
group. 

Contact between primitive and modern groups usually resulted 
in weakening or destroying tribal culture without assimilating the 
tribal groups into modern society. It seemed doubtful that the shift 
of government policy from assimilation to cultural pluralism could 
reverse the process. James Eder, an anthropologist who has studied 
several Filipino tribes, maintains that even the protection of tribal 
land rights tends to lead to the abandonment of traditional culture 
because land security makes it easier for tribal members to adopt 
the economic practices of the larger society and facilitates mar- 
riage with outsiders. Government bureaus could not preserve tribes 
as social museum exhibits, but with the aid of various private or- 
ganizations, they hoped to be able to help the tribes adapt to modern 
society without completely losing their ethnic identity. 

The Chinese 

In 1990 the approximately 600,000 ethnic Chinese made up less 
than 1 percent of the population. Because Manila is close to Tai- 
wan and the mainland of China, the Philippines has for centuries 
attracted both Chinese traders and semipermanent residents. The 
Chinese have been viewed as a source of cheap labor and of capi- 
tal and business enterprise. Government policy toward the Chinese 
has been inconsistent. Spanish, American, and Filipino regimes 
alternately welcomed and restricted the entry and activities of the 
Chinese (see Chinese and Chinese Mestizos, ch. 1). Most early 
Chinese migrants were male, resulting in a sex ratio, at one time, 
as high as 113 to 1 . In the 1990s, however, the ratio was more nearly 
equal, reflecting a population based more on natural increase than 
on immigration. 

There has been a good deal of intermarriage between the Chinese 
and lowland Christians, although the exact amount is impossible 



86 




Chinese Buddhist cemetery on the outskirts of Manila 
Courtesy Patricia V. Dolan 

to determine. Although many prominent Filipinos, including Jose 
Rizal, President Corazon Aquino, and Cardinal Jaime Sin have 
mixed Chinese ancestry, intermarriage has not necessarily led to 
ethnic understanding. Mestizos (see Glossary), over a period of 
years, tended to deprecate their Chinese ancestry and to identify 
as Filipino. The Chinese tended to regard their culture as superior 
and sought to maintain it by establishing a separate school system 
in which about half the curriculum consisted of Chinese literature, 
history, and language. 

Intermarriage and changing governmental policies made it 
difficult to define who was Chinese. The popular usage of 
"Chinese" included Chinese aliens, both legal and illegal, as well 
as those of Chinese ancestry who had become citizens. "Ethnic 
Chinese" was another term often used but hard to define. Mesti- 
zos could be considered either Chinese or Filipino, depending on 
the group with which they associated to the greatest extent. 

Research indicates that Chinese were one of the least accepted 
ethnic groups. The common Filipino perception of the Chinese was 
of rich businessmen backed by Chinese cartels who stamped out 
competition from other groups. There was, however, a sizable 
Chinese working class in the Philippines, and there was a sharp 
gap between rich and poor Chinese. 



87 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Social Values and Organization 

The great majority of the Philippine population is bound together 
by common values and a common religion. Philippine society is 
characterized by many positive traits. Among these are strong re- 
ligious faith, respect for authority, and high regard for amor proprio 
(self-esteem) and smooth interpersonal relationships. Philippine 
respect for authority is based on the special honor paid to elder 
members of the family and, by extension, to anyone in a position 
of power. This characteristic is generally conducive to the smooth 
running of society, although, when taken to extreme, it can de- 
velop into an authoritarianism that discourages independent judg- 
ment and individual responsibility and initiative. Filipinos are 
sensitive to attacks on their own self-esteem and cultivate a sensi- 
tivity to the self-esteem of others as well. Anything that might hurt 
another's self-esteem is to be avoided or else one risks terminating 
the relationship. One who is insensitive to others is said to lack 
a sense of shame and embarrassment, the principal sanction against 
improper behavior. This great concern for self-esteem helps to main- 
tain harmony in society and within one's particular circle, but it also 
can give rise to clannishness and a willingness to sacrifice personal 
integrity to remain in the good graces of the group. Strong per- 
sonal faith enables Filipinos to face great difficulties and unpredict- 
able risks in the assurance that "God will take care of things." 
But, if allowed to deteriorate into fatalism, even this admirable 
characteristic can hinder initiative and stand in the way of progress. 

Social organization generally follows a single pattern, although 
variations do occur, reflecting the influence of local traditions. 
Among lowland Christian Filipinos, social organization continues 
to be marked primarily by personal alliance systems, that is, group- 
ings composed of kin (real and ritual), grantors and recipients of 
favors, friends, and partners in commercial exchanges. 

Philippine personal alliance systems are anchored by kinship, 
beginning with the nuclear family. A Filipino's loyalty goes first 
to the immediate family; identity is deeply embedded in the web 
of kinship. It is normative that one owes support, loyalty, and trust 
to one's close kin and, because kinship is structured bilaterally with 
affinal as well as consanguineal relatives, one's kin can include quite 
a large number of people. Still, beyond the nuclear family, Filipi- 
nos do not assume the same degree of support, loyalty, and trust 
that they assume for immediate family members for whom loyalty 
is nothing less than a social imperative. With respect to kin be- 
yond this nuclear family, closeness in relationship depends very 
much on physical proximity. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



Bonds of ritual kinship, sealed on any of three ceremonial 
occasions — baptism, confirmation, and marriage — intensify and 
extend personal alliances. This mutual kinship system, known as 
compadrazgo, meaning godparenthood or sponsorship, dates back 
at least to the introduction of Christianity and perhaps earlier. It 
is a primary method of extending the group from which one can 
expect help in the way of favors, such as jobs, loans, or just simple 
gifts on special occasions. But in asking a friend to become god- 
parent to a child, a Filipino is also asking that person to become 
a closer friend. Thus it is common to ask acquaintances who are 
of higher economic or social status than oneself to be sponsors. Such 
ritual kinship cannot be depended on in moments of crisis to the 
same extent as real kinship, but it still functions for small and regular 
acts of support such as gift giving. 

A dyadic bond — between two individuals — may be formed based 
on the concept of utang na bob. Although it is expected that the debtor 
will attempt repayment, it is widely recognized that the debt (as 
in one's obligation to a parent) can never be fully repaid and the 
obligation can last for generations. Saving another's life, provid- 
ing employment, or making it possible for another to become edu- 
cated are "gifts" that incur utang na loob. Moreover, such gifts 
initiate a long-term reciprocal interdependency in which the grant- 
or of the favor can expect help from the debtor whenever the need 
arises and the debtor can, in turn, ask other favors. Such recipro- 
cal personal alliances have had obvious implications for the socie- 
ty in general and the political system in particular. In 1990 educated 
Filipinos were less likely to feel obligated to extend help (thereby 
not initiating an utang na loob relationship) than were rural dwellers 
among whom traditional values remained strong. Some observers 
believed that as Philippine society became more modernized and 
urban in orientation, utang na loob would become less important 
in the political and social systems. 

In the commercial context, suki relationships (market-exchange 
partnerships) may develop between two people who agree to be- 
come regular customer and supplier. In the marketplace, Filipi- 
nos will regularly buy from certain specific suppliers who will give 
them, in return, reduced prices, good quality, and, often, credit. 
Suki relationships often apply in other contexts as well. For exam- 
ple, regular patrons of restaurants and small neighborhood retail 
shops and tailoring shops often receive special treatment in return 
for their patronage. Suki does more than help develop economic 
exchange relationships. Because trust is such a vital aspect, it cre- 
ates a platform for personal relationships that can blossom into 
genuine friendship between individuals. 



89 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Patron-client bonds also are very much a part of prescribed pat- 
terns of appropriate behavior. These may be formed between tenant 
farmers and their landlords or between any patron who provides 
resources and influence in return for the client's personal services 
and general support. The reciprocal arrangement typically involves 
the patron giving a means of earning a living or of help, protec- 
tion, and influence and the client giving labor and personal favors, 
ranging from household tasks to political support. These relation- 
ships often evolve into ritual kinship ties, as the tenant or worker 
may ask the landlord to be a child's godparent. Similarly, when 
favors are extended, they tend to bind patron and client together 
in a network of mutual obligation or a long-term interdependency. 

Filipinos also extend the circle of social alliances with friendship. 
Friendship often is placed on a par with kinship as the most cen- 
tral of Filipino relationships. Certainly ties among those within one's 
group of friends are an important factor in the development of per- 
sonal alliance systems. Here, as in other categories, a willingness 
to help one another provides the prime rationale for the relationship. 

These categories — real kinship, ritual kinship, utang na loob rela- 
tionships, ^^'relationships, patron-client bonds, and friendship — 
are not exclusive. They are interrelated components of the Fil- 
ipino's personal alliance system. Thus two individuals may be 
cousins, become friends, and then cement their friendship through 
godparenthood. Each of their social networks will typically include 
kin (near and far, affinal and consanguineal), ritual kin, one or 
two patron-client relationships, one or more other close friends (and 
a larger number of social friends), and a dozen or more market- 
exchange partners. Utang na loob may infuse any or all of these rela- 
tionships. One's network of social allies may include some eighty 
or more people, integrated and interwoven into a personal alliance 
system. 

In 1990 personal alliance systems extended far beyond the local 
arena, becoming pyramidal structures going all the way to Ma- 
nila, where members of the national political elite represented the 
tops of numerous personal alliance pyramids. The Philippine elite 
was composed of weathly landlords, financiers, businesspeople, high 
military officers, and national political figures. Made up of a few 
families often descended from the ilustrados (see Glossary), or en- 
lightened ones, of the Spanish colonial period, the elite controlled 
a high percentage of the nations' s wealth. The lavish life-styles of 
this group usually included owning at least two homes (one in Ma- 
nila and one in the province where the family originated), patroniz- 
ing expensive shops and restaurants, belonging to exclusive clubs, 
and having a retinue of servants. Many counted among their 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



social acquaintances a number of rich and influential foreigners, 
especially Americans, Spaniards, and other Europeans. Their chil- 
dren attended exclusive private schools in Manila and were often 
sent abroad, usually to the United States, for higher education. 
In addition, by 1990 a new elite of businesspeople, many from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, had developed. 

In the cities, there existed a considerable middle-class group con- 
sisting of small entrepreneurs, civil servants, teachers, merchants, 
small property owners, and clerks whose employment was relatively 
secure. In many middle-class families, both spouses worked. They 
tended to place great value on higher education, and most had a 
college degree. They also shared a sense of common identity der- 
ived from similar educational experiences, facility in using English, 
common participation in service clubs such as the Rotary, and simi- 
lar economic standing. 

Different income groups lived in different neighborhoods in the 
cities and lacked the personal contact essential to the patron-client 
relationship. Probably the major social division was between those 
who had a regular source of income and those who made up the 
informal sector of the economy. The latter subsisted by salvaging 
material from garbage dumps, begging, occasional paid labor, and 
peddling. Although their income was sometimes as high as those 
in regular jobs, they lacked the protection of labor legislation and 
had no claim to any type of social insurance (see Employment and 
Labor Relations; Economic Welfare, ch. 3). 

Rural Social Patterns 

In 1990, nearly six out of every ten Filipinos lived in villages, 
or barangays. Each barangay consisted of a number of sitios (neigh- 
borhoods), clusters of households that were the basic building blocks 
of society above the family. Each sitio comprised 15 to 30 house- 
holds, and most barangays numbered from 150 to 200 households. 
As a rule, barangays also contained an elementary school, one or 
two small retail stores, and a small Roman Catholic chapel. They 
were combined administratively into municipalities. 

In the larger center, one could find a much more substantial 
church and rectory for the resident priest, other non-Roman Catho- 
lic churches, a number of retail stores and the weekly marketplace, 
a full six-year elementary school and probably a high school, a rice 
and corn mill, a pit for cockfights, and the homes of most landown- 
ers and middle-class teachers and professionals living in the munic- 
ipality. This urban concentration was not only the administrative 
center but also the social, economic, educational, and recreational 
locus. This was particularly so where the center was itself a full-scale 



91 



Philippines: A Country Study 

town, complete with restaurants, cinemas, banks, specialty stores, 
gas stations, repair shops, bowling alleys, a rural health clinic, and 
perhaps a hospital and hotel or two. Television sets were found 
in most homes in such towns, whereas some barangays in remote 
areas did not even have electricity. 

In the rural Philippines, traditional values remained the rule. 
The family was central to a Filipino's identity, and many sitios were 
composed mainly of kin. Kin ties formed the basis for most friend- 
ships and supranuclear family relationships. Filipinos continued 
to feel a strong obligation to help their neighbors — whether in grant- 
ing a small loan or providing jobs for neighborhood children, or 
expecting to be included in neighborhood work projects, such as 
rebuilding or reroofing a house and clearing new land. The recipient 
of the help was expected to provide tools and food. Membership 
in the cooperative work group sometimes continued even after a 
member left the neighborhood. Likewise, the recipient's siblings 
joined the group even if they lived outside the sitio. In this way, 
familial and residential ties were intermixed. 

Before World War II, when landlords and tenants normally lived 
in close proximity, patron-client relationships, often infused with 
mutual affection, frequently grew out of close residential contact. 
In the early 1990s, patron-client reciprocal ties continued to charac- 
terize relations between tenants and those landlords who remained 
in barangays. Beginning with World War II, however, landlords left 
the countryside and moved into the larger towns and cities or even 
to one of the huge metropolitan centers. By the mid-1980s, most 
large landowners had moved to the larger cities, although, as a rule, 
they also maintained a residence in their provincial center. Land- 
owners who remained in the municipality itself were usually school 
teachers, lawyers, and small entrepreneurs who were neither long- 
standing large landowners (hacenderos) nor owners of more than a 
few hectares of farmland. 

In the urban areas, the landowners had the advantages of bet- 
ter education facilities and more convenient access to banking and 
business opportunities. This elite exodus from the barangays, how- 
ever, brought erosion of landlord-tenant and patron-client ties. The 
exodus of the wealthiest families also caused patronage of local pro- 
grams and charities to suffer. 

The strength of dyadic patterns in Philippine life probably caused 
farmers to continue to seek new patron-client relationships within 
their barangays, or municipalities. Their personal alliance systems 
continued to stress the vertical dimension more than the horizon- 
tal. Likewise, they sought noninstitutional means for settling dis- 
putes, rarely going to court except as a last resort. Just as the local 



92 



Typical rural Philippine nipa house, constructed of locally 
available bamboo and nipa-leaf thatching 
Courtesy Patricia V. Dolan 

landlord used to be the arbiter of serious disputes, so the barangay 
head could be called on to perform this function. 

The traditional rural village was an isolated settlement, influenced 
by a set of values that discouraged change. It relied, to a great ex- 
tent, on subsistence farming. By the 1980s, land reform and lease- 
holding arrangements had somewhat limited the role of the landlords 
so that farmers could turn to government credit agencies and mer- 
chants as sources of credit. Even the categories of landlord and 
tenant changed because one who owned land might also rent ad- 
ditional land and thus become both a landlord and a tenant. 

In many barangays, the once peaceful atmosphere of the commu- 
nity was gone, and community cohesion was further complicated 
by the effects of the New People's Army (NPA) insurgency (see 
The Communist Insurgency, ch. 5). If residents aided the NPA, 
they faced punishment from government troops. Government 
troops could not be everywhere at all times, however, and when 
they left, those who aided the government faced vengeance from 
the NPA. One approach that the government took was to organize 
the villagers into armed vigilante groups. Such groups, however, 
have often been accused of extortion, intimidation, and even tor- 
ture (see Civil-Military Relations, ch. 4). 



93 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Economic organization of Philippine farmers has been largely 
ineffective. This fact has worked to the disadvantage of all of the 
farmers, especially the landless farm workers who were neither own- 
ers nor tenants. These landless farmers remained in abject poverty 
with little opportunity to better their lot or benefit from land re- 
form or welfare programs. 

Even in the 1990s, the pace of life was slower in rural than in 
urban areas. Increased communication and education had brought 
rural and urban culture closer to a common outlook, however, and 
the trend toward scientific agriculture and a market economy had 
brought major changes in the agricultural base (see Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishery, ch. 3). Scientific farming on a commercial- 
ized basis, land reform programs, and increased access to educa- 
tion and to mass media were all bringing change. In spite of 
migration to cities, the rural areas continued to grow in popula- 
tion, from about 33 million in 1980 to nearly 38 million in 1985. 
Rural living conditions also improved significantly, so that by the 
early 1990s most houses, except in the most remote areas, were 
built of strong material and equipped with electricity and indoor 
plumbing. 

Urban Social Patterns 

The Philippines, like most other Southeast Asian nations, has 
one dominant city that is in a category all by itself as a "primate 
city." In the mid-1980s, Metro Manila produced roughly half of 
the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) of the Philippines 
and contained two- thirds of the nation's vehicles. Its plethora of 
wholesale and retail business establishments, insurance companies, 
advertising companies, and banks of every description made the 
region the unchallenged hub of business and finance. 

Because of its fine colleges and universities, including the Univer- 
sity of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La 
Salle University, some of the best in Southeast Asia, the Manila 
area was a magnet for the best minds of the nation. In addition 
to being the political and judicial capital, Manila was the enter- 
tainment and arts capital, with all the glamour of first-class inter- 
national hotels and restaurants. Because Manila dominated the 
communications and media industry, Filipinos everywhere were 
constantly made aware of economic, cultural, and political events 
in Manila. Large numbers of rural Filipinos moved to Manila in 
search of economic and other opportunities. More than one-half 
of the residents of Metro Manila were born elsewhere. 

In the early 1990s, Manila, especially the Makati section, had 
a modern superstructure of hotels and banks, supermarkets, malls, 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



art galleries, and museums. Beneath this structure, however, was 
a substructure of traditional small neighborhoods and a wide spec- 
trum of life-styles ranging from traditional to modern, from those 
of the inordinately wealthy to those of the abjectly poor. Metro 
Manila offered greater economic extremes than other urban areas: 
poverty was visible in thousands of squatters' flimsy shacks and 
wealth was evident in the elegant, guarded suburbs with expen- 
sive homes and private clubs. But in Manila, unlike urban centers 
in other countries, these economic divisions were not paralleled 
by racial or linguistic residential patterns. Manila and other Philip- 
pine cities were truly melting pots, in which wealth was the only 
determinant for residence. 

Whether in poor squatter and slum communities or in middle- 
class sections of cities, values associated primarily with rural baran- 
gays continued to be important in determining expectations, if not 
always actions. Even when it was clearly impossible to create a warm 
and personal community in a city neighborhood, Filipinos neverthe- 
less felt that traditional patterns of behavior conducive to such a 
community should be followed. Hospitality, interdependence, 
patron-client bonds, and real kinship all continued to be of impor- 
tance for urban Filipinos. 

Still another indication that traditional Philippine values re- 
mained functional for city dwellers was that average household size 
in the 1980s was greater in urban than in rural areas. Observers 
speculated that, as Filipinos moved to the city, they had fewer chil- 
dren but more extended family members and nonrelatives in their 
households. This situation might have been caused by factors such 
as the availability of more work opportunities in the city, the ten- 
dency of urban Filipinos to marry later so that there were more 
singles, the housing industry's inability to keep pace with urbani- 
zation, and the high urban unemployment rates that caused fami- 
lies to supplement their incomes by taking in boarders. Whatever 
the reason, it seemed clear that kinship and possibly other personal 
alliance system ties were no weaker for most urban Filipinos than 
for their rural kin. 

Urban squatters have been a perennial problem or, perhaps, a 
sign of a problem. Large numbers of people living in makeshift 
housing, often without water or sewage, indicated that cities had 
grown in population faster than in the facilities required. In fact, 
the growth in population even exceeded the demand for labor so 
that many squatters found their living by salvaging material from 
garbage dumps, peddling, and performing irregular day work. 

Most squatters were long-time residents, who found in the ab- 
sence of rent a way of coping with economic problems. The efforts 



95 



Philippines: A Country Study 

of the government in the late 1980s to beautify and modernize the 
Manila area led inevitably to conflict with the squatters, who had 
settled on most of the land that might be utilized in such projects. 
The forced eviction of squatters and the destruction of their shacks 
were frequent occurrences. 

Two types of organizations have intervened in support of squat- 
ters: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and syndicates. The 
NGOs had a variety of programs, each one representing only a 
small minority of the actual squatters, but they sustained pressure 
on the government and demanded land titles and an end to forced 
evictions as well as help in housing construction. The syndicates 
were extra-legal entities that provided an informal type of govern- 
ment in the late 1980s, levying fees of as much as 3 billion pesos 
(for value of peso — see Glossary) a year, or about US$120 mil- 
lion. The syndicates allocated land for lots, built roads and side- 
walks of sorts, maintained order, and occasionally even provided 
water and light. In other words, they acted like private developers, 
although their only claim to the land was forcible seizure. Both 
the authoritarian Marcos government and the democratic Aquino 
government found it hard to handle the squatter problem. All pro- 
posed solutions contained difficulties, and probably only a major 
economic recovery in both rural and urban areas would provide 
a setting in which a degree of success would be possible. 

The growth of other urban centers in the late 1980s and early 
1990s could signal a slowdown in the expansion of Metro Manila. 
This situation has been caused, at least in part, by the policies of 
both the Marcos and the Aquino administrations. The Marcos ad- 
ministration encouraged industrial decentralization and prohibit- 
ed the erection of new factories within fifty kilometers of Manila. 
In an effort to relieve unemployment, the Aquino administration 
spent billions of pesos on rural infrastructure, which helped to ex- 
pand business in the nearby cities. Cities such as Iligan, Cagayan 
de Oro, and General Santos on Mindanao, and especially Cebu 
on Cebu Island experienced economic growth in the 1980s far ex- 
ceeding that of Manila. 

The Role and Status of the Filipina 

Women have always enjoyed greater equality in Philippine so- 
ciety than was common in other parts of Southeast Asia. Since 
pre-Spanish times, Filipinos have traced kinship bilaterally. A wom- 
an's rights to legal equality and to inherit family property have 
not been questioned. Education and literacy levels in 1990 were 
higher for women than for men. President Aquino often is given 
as an example of what women can accomplish in Philippine society. 



96 



Manila apartment 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 



The appearance of women in important positions, however, is not 
new or even unusual in the Philippines. Filipino women, usually 
called Filipinas, have been senators, cabinet officers, Supreme Court 
justices, administrators, and heads of major business enterprises. 
Furthermore, in the early 1990s women were found in more than 
a proportionate share of many professions although they predomi- 
nated in domestic service (91 percent), professional and technical 
positions (59.4 percent), and sales (57.9 percent). Women also were 
often preferred in assembly- type factory work. The availability of 
the types of employment in which women predominated probably 
explains why about two-thirds of the rural to urban migrants were 
female. Although domestic service is a low-prestige occupation, the 
other types of employment compare favorably with opportunities 
open to the average man. 

This favorable occupational distribution does not mean that wom- 
en were without economic problems. Although women were eligi- 
ble for high positions, these were more often obtained by men. In 
1990 women represented 64 percent of graduate students but held 
only 159 of 982 career top executive positions in the civil service. 
In the private sector, only about 15 percent of top-level positions 
were held by women. 



97 



Philippines: A Country Study 



According to many observers, because men relegated household 
tasks to women, employed women carried a double burden. This 
burden was moderated somewhat by the availability of relatives 
and servants who functioned as helpers and child caretakers, but 
the use of servants and relatives has sometimes been denounced 
as the equivalent of exploiting some women to free others. 

Since the Spanish colonial period, the woman has been the family 
treasurer, which, at least to some degree, gave her the power of 
the purse. Nevertheless, the Spanish also established a tradition 
of subordinating women, which is manifested in women's gener- 
ally submissive attitudes and in a double standard of sexual con- 
duct. The woman's role as family treasurer, along with a woman's 
maintenance of a generally submissive demeanor, has changed little, 
but the double standard of sexual morality is being challenged. Male 
dominance also has been challenged, to some extent, in the 1987 
constitution. The constitution contains an equal rights clause — 
although it lacks specific provisions that might make that clause 
effective. 

As of the early 1990s, divorce was prohibited in the Philippines. 
Under some circumstances, legal separation was permitted, but 
no legal remarriage was possible. The family code of 1988 was some- 
what more liberal. Reflective of Roman Catholic Church law, the 
code allowed annulment for psychological incapacity to be a mari- 
tal partner, as well as for repeated physical violence against a mate 
or pressure to change religious or political affiliation. Divorce 
obtained abroad by an alien mate was recognized. Although the 
restrictive divorce laws might be viewed as an infringement on wom- 
en's liberty to get out of a bad marriage, indications were that many 
Filipinas viewed them as a protection against abandonment and 
loss of support by wayward husbands. 

Religious Life 

Religion holds a central place in the life of most Filipinos, in- 
cluding Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, Protestants, and animists. 
It is central not as an abstract belief system, but rather as a host 
of experiences, rituals, ceremonies, and adjurations that provide 
continuity in life, cohesion in the community, and moral purpose 
for existence. Religious associations are part of the system of kin- 
ship ties, patron-client bonds, and other linkages outside the nuclear 
family. 

Christianity and Islam have been superimposed on ancient tra- 
ditions and acculturated. The unique religious blends that have 
resulted, when combined with the strong personal faith of Filipi- 
nos, have given rise to numerous and diverse revivalist movements. 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



Generally characterized by millenarian goals, antimodern bias, 
supernaturalism, and authoritarianism in the person of a charis- 
matic messiah figure, these movements have attracted thousands 
of Filipinos, especially in areas like Mindanao, which have been 
subjected to extreme pressure of change over a short period of time. 
Many have been swept up in these movements, out of a renewed 
sense of fraternity and community. Like the highly visible exam- 
ples of flagellation and reenacted crucifixion in the Philippines, these 
movements may seem to have little in common with organized 
Christianity or Islam. But in the intensely personalistic Philippine 
religious context, they have not been aberrations so much as ex- 
treme examples of how religion retains its central role in society. 

The religious composition of the Philippines remained 
predominantly Catholic in the late 1980s. In 1989 approximately 
82 percent of the population was Roman Catholic; Muslims ac- 
counted for only 5 percent. The remaining population was mostly 
affiliated with other Christian churches, although there were also 
a small number of Buddhists, Taoists, and tribal animists. Chris- 
tians were to be found throughout the archipelago. Muslims re- 
mained largely in the south and were less integrated than other 
religious minorities into the mainstream of Philippine culture. 
Although most Chinese were members of Christian churches, a 
minority of Chinese worshipped in Taoist or in Buddhist temples, 
the most spectacular of which was an elaborate Taoist temple on 
the outskirts of Cebu. 

Historical Background 

Spanish colonialism had, from its formal inception in 1565 with 
the arrival of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, as its principal raison d'etre 
the conversion of the inhabitants to Christianity. When Legazpi 
embarked on his conversion efforts, most Filipinos were still prac- 
ticing a form of polytheism, although some as far north as Manila 
had converted to Islam. For the majority, religion still consisted 
of sacrifices and incantations to spirits believed to be inhabiting 
field and sky, home and garden, and other dwelling places both 
human and natural. Malevolent spirits could bring harm in the 
form of illness or accident, whereas benevolent spirits, such as those 
of one's ancestors, could bring prosperity in the form of good 
weather and bountiful crops. Shamans were called upon to com- 
municate with these spirits on behalf of village and family, and 
propitiation ceremonies were a common part of village life and ritu- 
al. Such beliefs continued to influence the religious practices of many 
upland tribal groups in the modern period. 



99 



Philippines: A Country Study 

The religious system that conquistadors and priests imported in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was superimposed on this 
polytheistic base. Filipinos who converted to Catholicism did not 
shed their earlier beliefs but superimposed the new on the old. Saints 
took primacy over spirits, the Mass over propitiation ceremonies, 
and priests over shamans. This mixing of different religious be- 
liefs and practices marked Philippine Catholicism from the start. 

From its inception, Catholicism was deeply influenced by the 
prejudices, strategies, and policies of the Catholic religious or- 
ders. The orders of the Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans, 
and others — known collectively as friars— and the Jesuits turned 
out to be just about the only Caucasians willing to dedicate their 
lives to converting and ministering to Spain's subject population 
in the Philippines. They divided the archipelago into distinct ter- 
ritories, learned the vernaculars appropriate to each region, and 
put down roots in the rural Philippines, where they quickly be- 
came founts of wisdom for uneducated and unsophisticated local 
inhabitants (see The Friarocracy, ch. 1). Because most secular 
colonial officials had no intention of living so far from home any 
longer than it took to turn a handsome profit, friars took on the 
roles of the crown's representatives and interpreters of government 
policies in the countryside. 

The close relationship between church and state proved to be 
a liability when the Philippines was swept by nationalistic revolt 
in the late nineteenth century, and Filipino priests seized churches 
and proclaimed the Independent Philippine Church (Iglesia Fili- 
pina Independiente). After the American occupation, Protestant 
missionaries came and established churches and helped to spread 
American culture. 

Roman Catholicism 

The Catholic Church made a remarkable comeback in the Philip- 
pines in the twentieth century, primarily because the Vatican agreed 
to divest itself of massive church estates and to encourage Filipi- 
nos to join in the clergy. This resurgence was so successful that 
Protestant mission efforts, led by large numbers of American mis- 
sionaries during the period of American colonial rule, made little 
headway. In the early 1990s, the clergy were predominantly Filipi- 
no, all of the diocesan hierarchy were Filipino, and the church was 
supported by an extensive network of parochial schools. 

Catholicism, as practiced in the Philippines in the 1990s, blended 
official doctrine with folk observance. In an intensely personal way, 
God the Father was worshiped as a father figure and Jesus as the 
loving son who died for the sins of each individual, and the Virgin 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



was venerated as a compassionate mother. In the words of scholar 
David J. Steinberg, "This framework established a cosmic com- 
padrazgo, and an utang na bob to Christ, for his sacrifice transcend- 
ed any possible repayment .... To the devout Filipino, Christ 
died to save him; there could be no limit to an individual's thanks- 
giving. " As in other Catholic countries, Filipinos attended official 
church services (men usually not as regularly as women) such as 
Masses, novenas, baptisms, weddings, and funerals. They sup- 
plemented these official services with a number of folk-religious 
ceremonies basic to the community's social and religious calendar 
and involving just about everyone in the community. 

Perhaps the single event most conducive to community solidar- 
ity each year is the fiesta. Celebrated on the special day of the pa- 
tron saint of a town, or barangay, the fiesta is a time for general 
feasting. Houses are opened to guests, and food is served in abun- 
dance. The fiesta always includes a Mass, but its purpose is un- 
abashedly social. The biggest events include a parade, dance, 
basketball tournament, cockfights, and other contests, and perhaps 
a carnival, in addition to much visiting and feasting. 

Christmas is celebrated in a manner that blends Catholic reli- 
gious practices with Chinese, Philippine, and American customs. 
For nine days, people attend misas de gallo (early morning Christ- 
mas Mass). They hang elaborate lanterns (originally patterned af- 
ter the Chinese lanterns) and other decorations in their homes and 
join with friends in caroling. On Christmas Eve, everyone attends 
midnight Mass, the climax of the misas de gallo and the year's high 
point of church attendance. After the service, it is traditional to 
return home for a grand family meal. The remaining days of the 
Christmas season are spent visiting kin, especially on New Year's 
Day and Epiphany, January 6. The Christmas season is a time 
of visiting and receiving guests. It is also a time for reunion with 
all types of kin — blood, affinal, and ceremonial. Children especially 
are urged to visit godparents. 

During the Lenten season, most communities do a reading of 
the Passion narrative and a performance of a popular Passion play. 
The custom of reading or chanting of the Passion could be an adap- 
tation of a pre-Spanish practice of chanting lengthy epics, but its 
continuing importance in Philippine life probably reflects the popu- 
lar conception of personal indebtedness to Christ for His supreme 
sacrifice. At least one observer has suggested that Filipinos have, 
through the Passion, experienced a feeling of redemption that has 
been the basis for both millennial dreams and historical revolu- 
tionary movements for independence. 



101 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Indigenous Christian Churches 

Iglesia Filipina Independiente 

The Iglesia Filipina Independiente (Independent Philippine 
Church), founded by Gregorio Aglipay (1860-1940), received the 
support of revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo during the revolt 
against Spain and subsequent conflicts with American forces. It 
rode the tide of antifriar nationalism in absorbing Filipino Roman 
Catholic clergy and forcibly seizing church property at the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century. One out of every sixteen diocesan 
priests and one out of four Philippine Catholics followed Aglipay 
into the Iglesia Filipina Independiente in those years of violent na- 
tional and religious catharsis. The Iglesia Filipina Independiente, 
formally organized in 1902, thus enjoyed approximately five years 
of rapid growth, before a temporary decline in Philippine nation- 
alism sent its fortunes into precipitous decline. 

Many followers returned to Catholicism, especially after Ameri- 
cans and then Filipinos replaced Spanish priests. Among those who 
remained in the new church, a crippling schism emerged over doc- 
trinal interpretation, especially after 1919, when members were 
suddenly instructed to discard earlier church statements concern- 
ing the divinity of Christ. To some extent, the schism was caused 
by Aglipay himself, who shifted his theological views between 1 902 
and 1919. At first, he deemphasized doctrinal differences between 
his church and Roman Catholicism, and most of the independent 
church's priests followed Roman Catholic ritual — saying Mass, 
hearing confession, and presiding over folk religious-Catholic 
ceremonies just as always. Later, Aglipay moved closer to 
Unitarianism. 

In 1938 the church formally split. The faction opposing Agli- 
pay later won a court decision giving it the right to both the name 
and property of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. Followers of 
Aglipay, however, continued to argue that they represented true 
Aglipayanism. In the early 1990s, those Aglipayans who rejected 
the Unitarian stance and adhered to the concept of the Trinity were 
associated with the Protestant Episcopal church of the United States. 

Iglesia ni Kris to 

In the 1990s, all over Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and even 
northern Mindanao, unmistakable Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of 
Christ) places of worship, all similar in design and architecture, 
were being constructed for a rapidly growing membership. Founded 
by Felix Manalo Ysagun in 1914, the Iglesia ni Kristo did not at- 
tract much notice until after World War II, when its highly 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



authoritarian organization and evangelical style began to fill a need 
for urban and rural families displaced by rapid changes in Philip- 
pine society. The church, led by clergy with little formal educa- 
tion, requires attendance at twice-weekly services conducted in local 
Philippine languages, where guards take attendance and forbid en- 
trance to nonmembers. Membership dues, based on ability to pay, 
are mandatory. Members are expected to be "disciplined, clean, 
and God-fearing." Gamblers and drunks face the possibility of be- 
ing expelled. The church forbids (on penalty of expulsion) mar- 
riage to someone of another faith and membership in a labor union. 
The Iglesia ni Kristo also tells its members how to vote and is even 
respected for its ability to get out the vote for candidates of its choice. 

There are a number of reasons why so many Filipinos have joined 
such an authoritarian church, not the least of which is the institu- 
tion's ability to stay the decline of traditional Philippine vertical 
patron-client relationships, especially in urban areas. The church 
also has been successful in attracting potential converts through 
its use of mass rallies similar to Protestant revival meetings. The 
message is always simple and straightforward — listeners are told 
that the Iglesia ni Kristo is the mystical body of Christ, outside 
of which there can be no salvation. Roman Catholicism and Pro- 
testant churches are denounced — only through membership in the 
Iglesia ni Kristo can there be hope for redemption. 

Although the original appeal of the Iglesia ni Kristo was to mem- 
bers of the lower socioeconomic class, its puritanical precepts en- 
couraged social mobility, and many of its members were climbing 
the economic ladder. Whether the church would be able to main- 
tain its puritanical, authoritarian stance when more of its mem- 
bers reached middle-class status was difficult to predict. The church 
gave neither a count nor an estimate of its membership, but the 
rapid construction of elaborate buildings, including a campus for 
an Iglesia ni Kristo college adjacent to the University of the Philip- 
pines, would indicate that it was expanding. 

Protestantism 

From the start, Protestant churches in the Philippines were 
plagued by disunity and schisms. At one point after World War II, 
there were more than 200 denominations representing less than 3 
percent of the populace. Successful mergers of some denominations 
into the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and the forma- 
tion of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) 
brought a degree of order. In the 1990s, there remained a deep gulf 
and considerable antagonism, however, between middle-class-oriented 



103 



Philippines: A Country Study 

NCCP churches and the scores of more evangelical denominations 
sprinkled throughout the islands. 

Protestantism has always been associated with United States in- 
fluence in the Philippines. All major denominations in the United 
States, and some minor ones, sent missions to the Philippines, where 
they found the most fertile ground for conversions among some 
of the upland tribes not yet reached by Catholic priests and among 
the urban middle class. Most American school teachers who pi- 
oneered in the new Philippine public school system also were Prot- 
estants, and they laid the groundwork for Protestant churches in 
many lowland barrios. Filipinos who converted to Protestantism 
often experienced significant upward social mobility in the American 
colonial period. Most were middle-level bureaucrats, servants, law- 
yers, or small entrepreneurs, and some became nationally promi- 
nent despite their minority religious adherence. 

Protestant missionaries made major contributions in the fields 
of education and medicine. Throughout the islands, Protestant 
churches set up clinics and hospitals. They also constructed pri- 
vate schools, including such outstanding institutions of higher 
education as Central Philippine University, Silliman University, 
Philippine Christian College, and Dansalan Junior College in 
Marawi. 

The denominations planted by the early missionaries numbered 
among their adherents about 2 percent of the population in the 
late 1980s. Their influence was supplemented, if not overshadowed, 
by a number of evangelical and charismatic churches and para- 
religious groups, such as New Tribes Mission, World Vision, and 
Campus Crusade for Christ, which became active after World War 
II. Increased activity by these religious groups did not mean that 
the country had ceased to be primarily Catholic or that the older 
Protestant churches had lost their influence. It did indicate that 
nominal Catholics might be less involved in parish activities than 
ever, that the older Protestant churches had new rivals, and that, 
in general, religious competition had increased. 

An indication of this trend is seen in the change in the affilia- 
tion of missionaries coming to the Philippines. In 1986 there were 
1,931 non-Roman Catholic missionaries, not counting those iden- 
tified with the Church of Jesus Christ and Latter Day Saints. Of 
these, only sixty-three were from the denominations that sent mis- 
sionaries in the early 1900s. The rest were from fundamentalist 
churches or para-church groups (the terms are not necessarily ex- 
clusive). 



104 



Hospital in Manila 
Courtesy Lisowski Collection, Library of Congress 

Islam 

In the early 1990s, Filipino Muslims were firmly rooted in their 
Islamic faith. Every year many went on the hajj (pilgrimage) to 
the holy city of Mecca; on return men would be addressed by the 
honoritic "hajj" and women the honorific "hajji." In most Mus- 
lim communities, there was at least one mosque from which the 
muezzin called the faithful to prayer five times a day. Those who 
responded to the call to public prayer removed their shoes before 
entering the mosque, aligned themselves in straight rows before 
the minrab (niche), and offered prayers in the direction of Mecca. 
An imam, or prayer leader, led the recitation in Arabic verses from 
the Quran, following the practices of the Sunni (see Glossary) sect 
of Islam common to most of the Muslim world. It was sometimes 
said that the Moros often neglected to perform the ritual prayer 
and did not strictly abide by the fast (no food or drink in daylight 
hours) during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim calen- 
dar, or perform the duty of almsgiving. They did, however, 
scrupulously observe other rituals and practices and celebrate great 
festivals of Islam such as the end of Ramadan; Muhammad's birth- 
day; the night of his ascension to heaven; and the start of the Muslim 
New Year, the first day of the month of Muharram. 



105 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Islam in the Philippines has absorbed indigenous elements, much 
as has Catholicism. Moros thus make offerings to spirits (diwatas), 
malevolent or benign, believing that such spirits can and will have 
an effect on one's health, family, and crops. They also include pre- 
Islamic customs in ceremonies marking rites of passage — birth, mar- 
riage, and death. Moros share the essentials of Islam, but specific 
practices vary from one Moro group to another. Although Mus- 
lim Filipino women are required to stay at the back of the mosque 
for prayers (out of the sight of men), they are much freer in daily 
life than are women in many other Islamic societies. 

Because of the world resurgence of Islam since World War II, 
Muslims in the Philippines have a stronger sense of their unity as 
a religious community than they had in the past. Since the early 
1970s, more Muslim teachers have visited the nation and more 
Philippine Muslims have gone abroad — either on the hajj or on 
scholarships — to Islamic centers than ever before. They have 
returned revitalized in their faith and determined to strengthen the 
ties of their fellow Moros with the international Islamic community. 
As a result, Muslims have built many new mosques and religious 
schools, where students (male and female) learn the basic rituals 
and principles of Islam and learn to read the Quran in Arabic. A 
number of Muslim institutions of higher learning, such as the Jami- 
atul Philippine al-Islamia in Marawi, also offer advanced courses 
in Islamic studies. 

Divisions along generational lines have emerged among Moros 
since the 1960s. Many young Muslims, dissatisfied with the old 
leaders, asserted that datu and sultans were unnecessary in modern 
Islamic society. Among themselves, these young reformers were 
divided between moderates, working within the system for their 
political goals, and militants, engaging in guerrilla- style warfare. 
To some degree, the government managed to isolate the militants, 
but Muslim reformers, whether moderates or militants, were united 
in their strong religious adherence. This bond was significant be- 
cause the Moros felt threatened by the continued expansion of 
Christians into southern Mindanao and by the prolonged presence 
of Philippine army troops in their homeland. 

Ecumenical Developments 

The coming of Protestant missionaries was not welcomed by 
Catholic clergy, and, for several years, representatives of Catholic 
and Protestant churches engaged in mutual recrimination. Catholics 
were warned against involvement in Protestant activities, even in 
groups like the Young Men's Christian Association and the Young 
Women's Christian Association. Since the 1970s, hostility between 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



Catholics and many Protestant churches had lessened; churches 
emphasized the virtues rather than the alleged defects of other 
churches; and priests and pastors occasionally cooperated. Although 
the ecumenical emphasis did not eliminate competition and gained 
far more hold among older Protestant churches than among groups 
that had entered the Philippines more recently, the trend had sig- 
nificantly moderated religious tensions. 

Some tentative efforts toward ecumenical understanding also were 
made in relations between Christians and Muslims, delineating 
common ground in the mutual acceptance of much of the Old Testa- 
ment and New Testament of the Bible. Occasional conferences were 
held in an attempt to expand understanding. Their success by the 
early 1990s was limited but might indicate that, even in this tense 
area, improvement was possible. 

Church and State 

Church and state were officially separate in the 1990s, but reli- 
gious instruction could, at the option of parents, be provided in 
public schools. The Catholic Church's influence on the govern- 
ment was quite evident in the lack of resources devoted to family 
planning and the prohibition of divorce. 

The Catholic Church and, to a lesser extent, the Protestant 
churches engaged in a variety of community welfare efforts. These 
efforts went beyond giving relief and involved attempts to alter the 
economic position of the poor. Increasingly in the 1970s, these at- 
tempts led the armed forces of President Marcos to suspect that 
church agencies were aiding the communist guerrillas. In spite of 
reconciliation efforts, the estrangement between the churches and 
Marcos grew; it culminated in the call by Cardinal Jaime Sin for 
the people to go to the streets to block efforts of Marcos to remain 
in office after the questionable election of 1986 (see From Aqui- 
no's Assassination to People's Power, ch. 1; Political Role, ch. 5). 
The resulting nonviolent uprising was known variously as People's 
Power and as the EDSA Revolution (see Glossary). 

The good feeling that initially existed between the church and 
the government of President Aquino lasted only a short time after 
her inauguration. Deep-seated divisions over the need for revolu- 
tionary changes again led to tension between the government and 
some elements in the churches. 

Catholics fell into three general groups: conservatives who were 
suspicious of social action and held that Christian love could best 
be expressed through existing structures; moderates, probably the 
largest group, in favor of social action but inclined to cooperate 
with government programs; and progressives, who did not trust 



107 



Philippines: A Country Study 

the government programs, were critical both of Philippine business 
and of American influence, and felt that drastic change was need- 
ed. Progressives were especially disturbed at atrocities accompany- 
ing the use of vigilantes. They denied that they were communists, 
but some of their leaders supported communist fronts, and a few 
priests actually joined armed guerrilla bands. There appeared to 
be more progressives among religious-order priests than among 
diocesan priests. 

The major Protestant churches reflected the same three-way di- 
vision as the Catholics. The majority of clergy and missionaries 
probably were moderates. A significant number, however, sided 
with the Catholic progressives in deploring the use of vigilante 
groups against the guerrillas, asking for drastic land reform, and 
opposing American retention of military bases. They tended to 
doubt that a rising economy would lessen social ills and often op- 
posed the type of deflationary reform urged by the IMF (Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund — see Glossary). 

Education 

In 1991 the education system was reaching a relatively large part 
of the population, at least at the elementary level. According to 
1988 Philippine government figures, which count as literate every- 
one who has completed four years of elementary school, the over- 
all literacy rate was 88 percent, up from 82.6 percent in 1970. 
Literacy rates were virtually the same for women and men. Elemen- 
tary education was free and, in the 1987 academic year, was provid- 
ed to some 15 million schoolchildren, 96.4 percent of the age-group. 
High school enrollment rates were approximately 56 percent na- 
tionwide but were somewhat lower on Mindanao and in the Eastern 
Visayas region. Enrollment in institutions of higher learning ex- 
ceeded 1.6 million. 

Filipinos have a deep regard for education, which they view as 
a primary avenue for upward social and economic mobility. From 
the onset of United States colonial rule, with its heavy emphasis 
on mass public education, Filipinos internalized the American ideal 
of a democratic society in which individuals could get ahead through 
attainment of a good education. Middle-class parents make tremen- 
dous sacrifices in order to provide secondary and higher educa- 
tion for their children. 

Philippine education institutions in the late 1980s varied in qual- 
ity. Some universities were excellent, others were considered "diplo- 
ma mills" with low standards. Public elementary schools often 
promoted students regardless of achievement, and students, espe- 
cially those in poor rural areas, had relatively low test scores. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



The proportion of the national government budget going to edu- 
cation has varied from a high of 31.53 percent in 1957 to a low 
of 7.61 percent in 1981. It stood at 15.5 percent in 1987. The peso 
amount, however, has steadily increased, and the lower percent- 
age reflects the effect of a larger total government budget. Although 
some materials were still in short supply, by 1988 the school sys- 
tem was able to provide one textbook per subject per student. In 
1991 the Philippine government and universities had numerous 
scholarship programs to provide students from low-income fami- 
lies with access to education. The University of the Philippines fol- 
lowed a "socialized tuition" plan whereby students from higher 
income families paid higher fees and students from the lowest in- 
come families were eligible for free tuition plus a living allowance. 

Historical Background 

Many of the Filipinos who led the revolution against Spain in 
the 1890s were ilustrados. Ilustrados, almost without exception, came 
from wealthy Filipino families that could afford to send them to 
the limited number of secondary schools {colegios) open to non- 
Spaniards. Some of them went on to the University of Santo 
Tomas in Manila or to Spain for higher education. Although these 
educational opportunities were not available to most Filipinos, the 
Spanish colonial government had initiated a system of free, com- 
pulsory primary education in 1863. By 1898 enrollment in schools 
at all levels exceeded 200,000 students. 

Between 1901 and 1902, more than 1,000 American teachers, 
known as "Thomasites" for the S.S. Thomas, which transported 
the original groups to the Philippines, fanned out across the ar- 
chipelago to open barangay schools. They taught in English and, 
although they did not completely succeed in Americanizing their 
wards, instilled in the Filipinos a deep faith in the general value 
of education. Almost immediately, enrollments began to mushroom 
from a total of only 150,000 in 1900-1901 to just under 1 million 
in elementary schools two decades later. After independence in 
1946, the government picked up this emphasis on education and 
opened schools in even the remotest areas of the archipelago dur- 
ing the 1950s and the 1960s. 

Education in the Modern Period 

The expansion in the availability of education was not always 
accompanied by qualitative improvements. Therefore, quality be- 
came a major concern in the 1970s and early 1980s. Data for the 
1970s show significant differences in literacy for different regions of 
the country and between rural and urban areas. Western Mindanao 



109 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Region, for example, had a literacy rate of 65 percent as compared 
with 90 percent for Central Luzon and 95 percent for Metro Manila. 
A survey of elementary-school graduates taken in the mid-1970s 
indicated that many of the respondents had failed to absorb much 
of the required course work and revealed major deficiencies in read- 
ing, mathematics, and language. Performance was poorest among 
respondents from Mindanao and only somewhat better for those 
from the Visayan Islands, whereas the best performance was in 
the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions. 

Other data revealed a direct relationship between literacy lev- 
els, educational attainment, and incidence of poverty. As a rule, 
families with incomes below the poverty line could not afford to 
educate their children beyond elementary school. Programs aimed 
at improving work productivity and family income could alleviate 
some of the problems in education, such as the high dropout rates 
that reflected, at least in part, family and work needs. Other 
problems, such as poor teacher performance, reflected overcrowded 
classrooms, lack of particular language skills, and low wages. These 
problems, in turn, resulted in poor student performance and high 
repeater rates and required direct action. 

Vocational education in the late 1 980s was receiving greater em- 
phasis then in the past. Traditionally, Filipinos have tended to 
equate the attainment of education directly with escape from manual 
labor. Thus it has not been easy to win general popular support 
for vocational training. 

Catholic and Protestant churches sponsored schools, and there 
were also proprietary (privately owned, nonsectarian) schools. 
Neither the proprietary nor the religious schools received state aid 
except for occasional subsidies for special programs. Only about 
6 percent of elementary students were in private schools, but the 
proportion rose sharply to about 63 percent at the secondary level 
and approximately 85 percent at the tertiary level. About a third 
of the private school tertiary-level enrollment was in religiously af- 
filiated schools. 

In 1990 over 10,000 foreign students studied in the Philippines, 
mostly in the regular system, although there were three schools for 
international students — Brent in Baguio and Faith Academy and 
the International School in Manila. These schools had some Filipino 
students and faculty, but the majority of the students and faculty 
were foreign, mostly American. Faith Academy served primarily 
the children of missionaries, although others were admitted as space 
was available. 

Chinese in the Philippines have established their own system of 
elementary and secondary schools. Classes in the morning covered 



110 



Rural elementary school 
Courtesy Lisowski Collection, Library of Congress 

the usual Filipino curriculum and were taught by Filipino teachers. 
In the afternoon, classes taught by Chinese teachers offered instruc- 
tion in Chinese language and literature. 

In 1990 the education system offered six years of elementary in- 
struction followed by four years of high school. Children entered pri- 
mary school at the age of seven. Instruction was bilingual in Pilipino 
and English, although it was often claimed that English was being 
slighted. Before independence in 1946, all instruction was in En- 
glish; since then, the national language, Pilipino, has been increas- 
ingly emphasized. Until the compulsory study of Spanish was 
abolished in 1987, secondary and higher-education students had 
to contend with three languages — Pilipino, English, and Spanish. 

In 1991 all education was governed by the Department of Edu- 
cation, Culture, and Sports, which had direct supervision over pub- 
lic schools and set mandatory policies for private schools as well. 
Bureaus of elementary, secondary, and higher education super- 
vised functional and regional offices. District supervisors exercised 
direct administrative oversight of principals and teachers in their 
district. There was a separate office for nonformal education, which 
served students not working for a graduation certificate from a 
conventional school. Financing for public schools came from the 



111 



Philippines: A Country Study 

national treasury, although localities could supplement national ap- 
propriations. 

Education policies fluctuated constantly and were likely to be 
changed before teachers became accustomed to them. Areas of dis- 
agreement among Filipinos produced educational change as one 
faction or another gained control of a highly centralized public edu- 
cation administration. One example was the community school pro- 
gram that sought to involve schools in agricultural improvement. 
It was pushed vigorously in the 1950s, but little has been heard 
about it since. Another policy issue was the choice of a language 
of instruction. Until independence, English was, at least in the- 
ory, the language of instruction from first grade through college. 
The emphasis on English was followed by a shift toward local lan- 
guages and dialects, with simultaneous instruction in English and 
Pilipino in later grades. Then in 1974, at least in official directives, 
schools were told to drop the local language or dialect, and a 
bilingual — English and Pilipino — program was adopted. 

One of the most serious problems in the Philippines in the 1980s 
and early 1990s concerned the large number of students who com- 
pleted college but then could not find a job commensurate with 
their educational skills. If properly utilized, these trained person- 
nel could facilitate economic development, but when left idle or 
forced to take jobs beneath their qualifications, the group could 
be a major source of discontent. 

Health and Living Standards 

The struggle against disease has progressed considerably over 
the years. Health conditions in the Philippines in 1990 approxi- 
mated those in other Southeast Asian countries but lagged behind 
those in the West. Life expectancy, for instance, increased from 
51.2 years in 1960 to 69 years for women and 63 years for men 
in 1990 (see fig. 4). Infant mortality was 101 per 1,000 in 1950 
and had dropped to 51.6 per 1,000 in 1989. In 1923 approximately 
76 percent of deaths were caused by communicable diseases. By 
1980 deaths from communicable diseases had declined to about 
26 percent. 

In 1989 the ratio of physicians and hospitals to the total popula- 
tion was similar to that in a number of other Southeast Asian coun- 
tries, but considerably below that in Europe and North America. 
Most health care personnel and facilities were concentrated in urban 
areas. A substantial number of physicians and nurses migrated to 
the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, but there are no reliable 
figures to indicate what effect this had on the Philippines. Hospital 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 

equipment often did not function because there were insufficient 
technicians capable of maintaining it. The 1990 report of the 
Department of Health said, however, that centers for the repair 
and maintenance of hospital equipment expected to alleviate this 
problem. 

In 1987 a little more than one-half of the infants and children 
received a complete series of immunization shots, a major step in 
preventive medicine, but obviously far short of a desirable goal. 
The problem was especially difficult in rural areas. The Department 
of Health had attempted to provide every barangay with at least mini- 
mum health care, but doing so was both difficult and expensive, 
and the more remote areas inevitably received less attention. 

Although relatively few Filipinos had been infected with acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) as of the early 1990s, con- 
cern about the disease caused authorities to give it considerable 
attention. By April 1979, only three people had died from AIDS, 
two of whom were overseas Filipinos visiting the homeland and 
one an American civilian who had contracted the disease outside 
the Philippines. In 1985 the Department of Health and the Unit- 
ed States Naval Medical Research unit tested more than 17,000 
people, including some 14,000 hospitality girls in Olangapo and 
a number of other Filipino cities. They identified twenty-one women 
as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) carriers. The American 
sponsorship of the study was seized upon as an argument for end- 
ing the Military Bases Agreement with the United States (see For- 
eign Military Relations, ch. 5). A June 1990 Philippine government 
study reported that at that time AIDS was growing at the rate of 
four cases a month and that twenty people had died from the dis- 
ease. The study indicated that most AIDS cases in the Philippines 
were transmitted by heterosexual activity. An April 30, 1991, 
Department of Health report indicated that 240 Filipinos were in- 
fected with AIDS. 

Like many other countries, the Philippines has had a problem 
with illicit drugs. Official Philippine government statistics for 1989 
indicated only 1 ,733 addicts, but the assumption was that the real 
number was from ten to a hundred times as great. The govern- 
ment has instituted both education and treatment programs, but 
it was uncertain how effective these programs would be. There also 
was a problem with inadequately tested legal drugs. In 1983, more 
than 265 pharmaceutical products that were banned in many other 
countries were sold in the Philippines. The Department of Health 
succeeded in eliminating 128 of these products by 1988. Attempts 
to eliminate others have been blocked by the courts, which ruled 
that the department had acted without due process. 



113 



Philippines: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 

80 and over 
75-79 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 

5-9 

0-4 











I 




















■ 


□ 






















































MALE 










FEM 


*LE 












































































































V s7) 


/ / / 


b 






























































































































I I I I 

4 


2 




> 


( 


) 1 


-rm- 


2 


3 


[ i i i i | 
4 5 



POPULATION IN MILLIONS 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht, Philippine^ Wiesbaden, 1989, 19-20. 



Figure 4. Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1988 

Malnutrition has been a perennial concern of the Philippine 
government and health care professionals. In 1987 the Department 
of Health reported that 2.8 percent of preschoolers were suffering 
from third-degree malnutrition and 17.6 percent from second-degree 
malnutrition. To alleviate this problem, the government targeted 
food assistance for nearly 500,000 preschoolers and lactating mothers. 

Nutrition has shown some improvement. In 1955 government 
statistics estimated the daily per capita available food supply at only 
80 percent of sufficiency. In 1986 it had improved to 101.8 per- 
cent. In the same period, the consumption of milk nearly tripled. 

The Philippines has a dual health care system consisting of 
modern (Western) and traditional medicine. The modern system 
is based on the germ theory of disease and has scientifically trained 
practitioners. The traditional approach assumes that illness is caused 
by a breach of taboos set by supernatural forces. It is not unusual 
for an individual to alternate between the two forms of medicine. 
If the benefits of modern medicine are immediately obvious — 
eyeglasses, for instance — then there is little argument. If there is 
no immediate cure, the impulse to turn to the traditional healer 
is often strong. 

One type of traditional healer that attracted the attention of 
foreigners as well as Filipinos was the so-called psychic surgeon, 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



who professed to be able to operate without using a scalpel or draw- 
ing blood. Some practitioners attracted a considerable clientele and 
established lucrative practices. Travel agents in the United States 
credited these " surgeons" with generating travel to the Philippines. 

Although medical treatment had improved and services had ex- 
panded, pervasive poverty and lack of access to family planning 
detracted from the general health of the Philippine people. In 1990 
approximately 50 percent of the population was listed below the 
poverty line (down from 59 percent in 1985). A high rate of child- 
birth tended both to deplete family resources and to be injurious 
to the health of the mother. The main general health hazards were 
pulmonary, cardiovascular, and gastrointestinal disorders. 

The Philippines had a social security system, including medi- 
care, that provided wide coverage of the regularly employed ur- 
ban workers. It offered a partial shield against disaster, but was 
limited both by the generally low level of incomes, which reduced 
benefits, and by the exclusion of most workers in agriculture. In 
April 1989, out of more than 22 million employed individuals, a 
little more than 10.5 million were covered by social security. In 
health care and social security, as with other services, the Philip- 
pines entered the 1990s as a modernizing society struggling with 
limited success against heavy odds to apply scarce financial resources 
to provide its people with a better life. 

* * * 

One of the best recent books synthesizing the social and geo- 
graphic aspects of the Philippines is Jim Richardson's The Philip- 
pines. Robert Youngblood's Marcos Against the Church gives an 
excellent overview of contentious issues between church and govern- 
ment in the Marcos era and beyond. Religion, Politics and Rationali- 
ty in a Philippine Community, by Raul Pertierra, is an insightful 
portrayal of socio-religious interaction on the barangay level. Ken- 
neth Bauzon's Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philip- 
pines clarifies the basic difference in political thinking between 
Muslim and Christian, and W.K. Che Man's Muslim Separatism 
is an excellent work on that subject. 

Language Policy Formulation, Programming, Implementation, and Evalu- 
ation in Philippine Education (1565-1974), by Emma Bernabe, com- 
bines a historical approach to the language controversy with 
contemporary analysis, and The Role of English and Its Maintenance 
in the Philippines, edited by Andrew B. Gonzales, provides a detailed 
report on that subject. 



115 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Philippine Society and the Individual: Selected Essays of Frank Lynch 
1949-1976, edited by Aram A. Yengoyan and Perla Q. Makil, 
offers a careful treatment of Philippine values. James F. Eder's 
On the Road to Extinction: Depopulation, Deculturation, and Adaptive Well- 
Being Among the Batak of the Philippines is a provocative book on the 
upland tribes. 

For information on the physical setting of the Philippines, the 
major work is still Frederick L. Wernstedt and J. E. Spencer's, 
The Philippine Island World: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography. 

The following periodicals also are excellent sources of informa- 
tion on contemporary Philippine society: The Philippine Sociological 
Review, Solidarity, Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, Philippine 
Studies, and Pilipinas. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



116 



Modern high-rise buildings of Makati business district overlook residential 
area of Manila. 



THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY EXPERIENCED considerable 
difficulty in the 1980s. Real gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary) grew at an annual average of only 1.8 percent, less than the 
2.5 percent rate of population increase. The US$668 GNP per cap- 
ita income in 1990 was below the 1978 level, and approximately 
50 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. The 1988 
unemployment rate of 8.3 percent (12.3 percent in urban areas) 
peaked at 11.4 percent in early 1989, and the underemployment 
rate, particularly acute for poor, less-educated, and elderly peo- 
ple, was approximately twice that of unemployment. In 1988 about 
470,000 Filipinos left the country to work abroad in contract jobs 
or as merchant seamen. 

The economy had grown at a relatively high average annual rate 
of 6.4 percent during the 1970s, financed in large part by foreign- 
currency borrowing. External indebtedness grew from US$2.3 bil- 
lion in 1970 to US$24.4 billion in 1983, much of which was owed 
to transnational commercial banks. 

In the early 1980s, the economy began to run into difficulty be- 
cause of the declining world market for Philippine exports, trou- 
ble in borrowing on the international capital market, and a domestic 
financial scandal. The problem was compounded by the excesses 
of President Ferdinand E. Marcos' s regime and the bailing out by 
government-owned financial institutions of firms encountering 
financial difficulties that were owned by those close to the presi- 
dent. In 1983 the country descended into a political and economic 
crisis in the aftermath of the assassination of Marcos 's chief rival, 
former Senator Benigno Aquino, and circumstances had not im- 
proved when Marcos fled the country in February 1986. 

Economic growth revived in 1986 under the new president, 
Corazon C. Aquino, reaching 6.7 percent in 1988. But in 1988, 
the economy once again began to encounter difficulties. The trade 
deficit and the government budget deficit were of particular con- 
cern. In 1990 the economy continued to experience difficulties, a 
situation exacerbated by several natural disasters, and growth 
declined to 3 percent. 

The structure of the economy evolved slowly over time. The 
agricultural sector in 1990 accounted for 23 percent of GNP and 
slightly more than 45 percent of the work force. About 33 percent 
of output came from industry, which employed about 15 percent 
of the work force. The manufacturing subsector had developed 



119 



Philippines: A Country Study 

rapidly during the 1950s, but then it leveled off and did not in- 
crease its share of either output or employment. In 1990, 24 per- 
cent of GNP and 12 percent of employment were derived from 
manufacturing. The services sector, a residual employer, increased 
its share of the work force from about 25 percent in 1960 to 40 
percent in 1990. In 1990 services accounted for 44 percent of GNP. 

The Philippines is rich in natural resources. Land planted in rice 
and corn accounted for about 50 percent of the 4.5 million hect- 
ares of field crops in 1990. Another 25 percent of the cultivated 
area was taken up by coconuts, a major export crop. Sugarcane, 
pineapples, and Cavendish bananas also were important earners 
of foreign exchange. Forest reserves, however, once plentiful, 
have been extensively exploited to the point of serious depletion. 
Archipelagic Philippines is surrounded by a vast aquatic resource 
base. In 1990 fish and other seafood from the surrounding seas 
provided more than half the protein consumed by the average 
Filipino household. The Philippines also had vast mineral deposits. 
In 1988 the country was the world's tenth largest producer of cop- 
per, the sixth largest producer of chromium, and the ninth largest 
producer of gold. The country's only nickel mining company was 
expected to resume operation in 1991 and again produce large quan- 
tities of that metal. Petroleum exploration was ongoing, but dis- 
coveries were minimal, and the country was required to import 
most of its oil. 

Prior to 1970, Philippine exports consisted mainly of agricul- 
tural or mineral products in raw or minimally processed form. In 
the 1970s, the country began to export manufactured commodi- 
ties, especially garments and electronic components, and the prices 
of some traditional exports declined. By 1988 nontraditional ex- 
ports comprised 75 percent of the total value of goods shipped 
abroad. 

Political Economy of Development 

Economic Development until 1970 

In the mid-nineteenth century, a Filipino landowning elite de- 
veloped on the basis of the export of abaca (Manila hemp), sugar, 
and other agricultural products. At the onset of the United States 
power in the Philippines in 1898-99, this planter group was culti- 
vated as part of the United States military and political pacifica- 
tion program. The democratic process imposed on the Philippines 
during the American colonial period remained under the control 
of this elite. Access to political power required an economic basis 
and, in turn, provided the means for enhancing economic power. 



120 



The Economy 



The landowning class was able to use its privileged position directly 
to further its economic interests as well as to secure a flow of 
resources to garner political support and ensure its position as the 
political elite. Otherwise, the state played a minimal role in the 
economy. Hence no powerful bureaucratic group arose that could 
pursue a development program independent of the wishes of the 
landowning class. This situation remained basically unchanged in 
the early 1990s. 

At the time of independence in 1946, and in the aftermath of 
a destructive wartime occupation by Japan, Philippine reliance on 
the United States was even more apparent (see Economic Rela- 
tions with the United States after Independence, ch. 1). To gain 
access to reconstruction assistance from the United States, the 
Philippines agreed to maintain its prewar exchange rate with the 
United States dollar and not to restrict imports from the United 
States. For a time the aid inflow from the United States offset the 
negative balance of trade, but by 1949, the economy had entered 
a crisis. The Philippine government responded by instituting im- 
port and foreign-exchange controls that lasted until the early 1960s. 

Import restrictions stimulated the manufacturing sector. 
Manufacturing net domestic product (NDP — see Glossary) at first 
grew rapidly, averaging 12 percent growth per annum in real terms 
during the first half of the 1950s. NDP growth contributed to an 
average 7.7 percent growth in the GNP, a higher rate than in any 
subsequent five-year period. The Philippines had entered an import- 
substitution stage of industrialization, largely as the unintended 
consequence of a policy response to balance-of-payments pressures. 
In the second half of the 1950s, the growth rate of manufacturing 
fell by about a third to an average of 7.7 percent, and real GNP 
growth was down to 4.9 percent. Import demand outpaced exports, 
and the allocation of foreign exchange was subject to corruption. 
Pressure mounted for a change of policy. 

In 1962 the government devalued the peso (for value of the 
peso — see Glossary) and abolished import controls and exchange 
licensing. The peso fell by half to P3.90 to the dollar. Although 
traditional exports of agricultural and mineral products increased, 
the growth rate of manufacturing declined even further. Substan- 
tial tariffs had been put in place in the late 1950s, but they appar- 
ently provided insufficient protection. Pressure from industrialists, 
combined with renewed balance of payments problems, resulted 
in the reimposition of exchange controls in 1968. Manufacturing 
recovered slightly, growing an average of 6.1 percent per year in 
the second half of the decade. However, the sector was no longer 
the engine of development that it had been in the early 1950s. 



121 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Overall real GNP growth was mediocre, averaging somewhat un- 
der 5 percent in the second half of decade; growth of agriculture 
was more than a percentage point lower (see table 2, Appendix). 
The limited impact of manufacturing also affected employment. 
The sector's share of the employed labor force, which had risen 
rapidly during the 1950s to over 12 percent, plateaued (see table 
3, Appendix). Import substitution had run its course. 

To stimulate industrialization, technocrats within the govern- 
ment worked to rationalize and improve incentive structures, to 
move the country away from import substitution, and to reduce 
tariffs. Movements to reduce tariffs, however, met stiff resistance 
from industrialists, and government efforts to liberalize the econ- 
omy and emphasize export-led industrialization (see Glossary) were 
largely unsuccessful. 

Martial Law and Its Aftermath, 1972-86 

The Philippines found itself in an economic crisis in early 1970, 
in large part the consequence of the profligate spending of govern- 
ment funds by President Marcos in his reelection bid. The govern- 
ment, unable to meet payments on its US$2.3 billion international 
debt, worked out a US$27.5 million standby credit arrangement 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) that 
involved renegotiating the country's external debt and devaluing 
the Philippine currency to P6.40 to the United States dollar. The 
government, unwilling and unable to take the necessary steps to 
deal with economic difficulties on its own, submitted to the exter- 
nal dictates of the IMF. It was a pattern that would be repeated 
with increasing frequency in the next twenty years. 

In September 1972, Marcos declared martial law, claiming that 
the country was faced with revolutions from both the left and the 
right (see Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law, ch. 1). He gathered 
around him a group of businessmen, used presidential decrees and 
letters of instruction to provide them with monopoly positions with- 
in the economy, and began channeling resources to himself and 
his associates, instituting what came to be called "crony capital- 
ism." By the time Marcos fled the Philippines in February 1986, 
monopolization and corruption had severely crippled the economy. 

In the beginning, this tendency was not so obvious. Marcos 's 
efforts to create a "New Society" were supported widely by the 
business community, both Filipino and foreign, by Washington, 
and, de facto, by the multilateral institutions. Foreign investment 
was encouraged: an export-processing zone was opened, a range 
of additional investment incentives was created, and the Philip- 
pines projected itself onto the world economy as a country of low 



122 




Ayala Avenue, main thoroughfare of the Makati business district 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 

wages and industrial peace. The inflow of international capital in- 
creased dramatically. 

A general rise in world raw material prices in the early 1970s 
helped boost the performance of the economy; real GNP grew at 
an average of almost 7 percent per year in the five years after the 
declaration of martial law, as compared with approximately 5 per- 
cent annually in the five preceding years. Agriculture performed 
better that it did in the 1960s. New rice technologies introduced 
in the late 1960s were widely adopted. Manufacturing was able 
to maintain the 6 percent growth rate it achieved in the late 1960s, 
a rate, however, that was below that of the economy as a whole. 
Manufactured exports, on the other hand, did quite well, grow- 
ing at a rate twice that of the country's traditional agricultural ex- 
ports. The public sector played a much larger role in the 1970s, 
with the extent of government expenditures in GNP rising by 40 
percent in the decade after 1972. To finance the boom, the govern- 
ment resorted extensively to international debt, hence the charac- 
terization of the economy of the Marcos era as "debt driven." 

In the latter half of the 1970s, heavy borrowing from transna- 
tional commercial banks, multilateral organizations, and the United 
States and other countries masked problems that had begun to 
appear on the economic horizon with the slowdown of the world 



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Philippines: A Country Study 

economy. By 1976 the Philippines was among the top 100 recipients 
of loans from the World Bank and was considered a "country of 
concentration." Its balance of payments problem was solved and 
growth facilitated, at least temporarily, but at the cost of having 
to service an external debt that rose from US$2.3 billion in 1970 
to more than US$17.2 billion in 1980. 

There were internal problems as well, particularly in respect to 
the increasingly visible mismanagement of crony enterprises. A 
financial scandal in January 1981 in which a businessman fled the 
country with debts of an estimated P700 million required massive 
amounts of emergency loans from the Central Bank of the Philip- 
pines and other government-owned financial institutions to some 
eighty firms. The growth rate of GNP fell dramatically, and from 
then the economic ills of the Philippines proliferated. In 1980 there 
had been an abrupt change in economic policy, related to the chang- 
ing world economy and deteriorating internal conditions. The 
Philippine government had agreed to reduce the average level and 
dispersion of tariff rates and to eliminate most quantitative re- 
strictions on trade, in exchange for a US$200 million structural 
adjustment loan (see Glossary) from the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary). Whatever the merits of the policy shift, the timing was mis- 
erable. Exports did not increase substantially, but imports increased 
dramatically. The result was growing debt-service payments; emer- 
gency loans were forthcoming, but the hemorrhaging did not cease. 

It was into this situation that President Marcos 's foremost crit- 
ic, former Senator Benigno Aquino, came when he returned from 
exile in August 1983 and was assassinated. The assassination threw 
the country into an economic and political crisis that resulted even- 
tually, in February 1986, in the ending of Marcos 's twenty-one- 
year rule and his flight from the Philippines. In the meantime, debt 
repayment had ceased. Real GNP fell more than 11 percent be- 
fore turning back up in 1986, and real GNP per capita fell 17 per- 
cent from its high point in 1981 . In 1990 per capita real GNP was 
still 7 percent below the 1981 level. 

The Aquino Government 

In 1986 Corazon Aquino focused her presidential campaign on 
the misdeeds of Marcos and his cronies. The economic correctives 
that she proposed emphasized a central role for private enterprise 
and the moral imperative of reaching out to the poor and meeting 
their needs. Reducing unemployment, encouraging small-scale en- 
terprise, and developing the neglected rural areas were the themes. 

Aquino entered the presidency with a mandate to undertake a 
new direction in economic policy. Her initial cabinet contained 



124 



The Economy 



individuals from across the political spectrum. Over time, however, 
the cabinet became increasingly homogeneous, particularly with 
respect to economic perspective, reflecting the strong influence of 
the powerful business community and international creditors. The 
businesspeople and technocrats who directed the Central Bank and 
headed the departments of finance and trade and industry became 
the decisive voices in economic decision making. Foreign policy 
also reflected this power relationship, focusing on attracting more 
foreign loans, aid, trade, investment, and tourists (see Foreign Af- 
fairs, ch. 4). 

It soon became clear that the plight of the people had been subor- 
dinated largely to the requirements of private enterprise and the 
world economy. As the president noted in her state-of-the-nation 
address in June 1989, the poor had not benefited from the eco- 
nomic recovery that had taken place since 1986. The gap between 
the rich and poor had widened, and the proportion of malnourished 
preschool children had grown. 

The most pressing problem in the Philippine international po- 
litical economy at the time Aquino took office was the country's 
US$28 billion external debt. It was also one of the most vexatious 
issues in her administration. Economists within the economic plan- 
ning agency, the National Economic and Development Authority 
(NEDA), argued that economic recovery would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve in a relatively short period if the country 
did not reduce the size of the resource outflows associated with its 
external debt. Large debt-service payments and moderate growth 
(on the order of 6.5 percent per year) were thought to be incom- 
patible. A two-year moratorium on debt servicing and selective 
repudiation of loans where fraud or corruption could be shown 
were recommended. Business-oriented groups and their represen- 
tatives in the president's cabinet vehemently objected to taking 
unilateral action on the debt, arguing that it was essential that the 
Philippines not break with its major creditors in the international 
community. Ultimately, the president rejected repudiation; the 
Philippines would honor all its debts. 

Domestically, land reform was a highly contentious issue, in- 
volving economics as well as equity. NEDA economists argued that 
broad-based spending increases were necessary to get the econo- 
my going again; more purchasing power had to be put in the hands 
of the masses. Achieving this objective required a redistribution 
of wealth downward, primarily through land reform. Given Aqui- 
no's campaign promises, there were high expectations that a 
meaningful program would be implemented. Prior to the opening 
session of the first Congress under the country's 1987 constitution, 



125 



Philippines: A Country Study 

the president had the power and the opportunity to proclaim a sub- 
stantive land reform program (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 
4). Waiting until the last moment before making an announcement, 
she chose to provide only a broad framework. Specifics were left 
to the new Congress, which she knew was heavily represented by 
landowning interests. The result — a foregone conclusion — was the 
enactment of a weak, loophole-ridden piece of legislation (see Un- 
solved Political Problems, ch. 4). 

The most immediate task for Aquino's economic advisers was 
to get the economy moving, and a turn around was achieved in 
1986. Economic growth was low (1.9 percent), but it was positive. 
For the next two years, growth was more respectable — 5.9 and 6.7 
percent, respectively. In 1986 and 1987, consumption led the growth 
process, but then investment began to increase. In 1985 industrial 
capacity utilization had been as low as 40 percent, but by mid- 1988 
industries were working at near full capacity. Investment in dura- 
ble goods grew almost 30 percent in both 1988 and 1989, reflect- 
ing the buoyant atmosphere. The international community was 
supportive. Like domestic investment, foreign investment did not 
respond immediately after Aquino took office, but in 1987 it be- 
gan to pick up. The economy also was helped by foreign aid. The 
1989 and 1991 meetings of the aid plan called the Multilateral Aid 
Initiative, also known as the Philippine Assistance Plan, a multi- 
national initiative to provide assistance to the Philippines, pledged 
a total of US$6.7 billion. 

Economic successes, however, generated their own problems. 
The trade deficit rose rapidly, as both consumers and investors at- 
tempted to regain what had been lost in the depressed atmosphere 
of the 1983-85 period. Although debt-service payments on exter- 
nal debt were declining as a proportion of the country's exports, 
they remained above 25 percent. And the government budget deficit 
ballooned, hitting 5.2 percent of GNP in 1990. 

The 1988 GNP grew 6.7 percent, slightly more than the govern- 
ment plan target. Growth fell off to 5.7 percent in 1989, then plum- 
meted in 1990 to just over 3 percent. Many factors contributed 
to the 1990 decline. The country was subjected to a prolonged 
drought, which resulted in the increased need to import rice. In 
July a major earthquake hit Northern Luzon, causing extensive 
destruction, and in November a typhoon did considerable damage 
in the Visayas. There were other, more human, troubles also. The 
country was attempting to regain a semblance of order in the af- 
termath of the December 1989 coup attempt. Brownouts became 
a daily occurrence, as the government struggled to overcome the 
deficient power- generating capacity in the Luzon grid. In the worst 



126 



The Economy 



period, power- generating capacity was below peak demand by more 
than 300 megawatts, and the deficiency resulted in outages of four 
hours and more (see Energy, this ch.). Residents of Manila suffered 
from a lack of public transportation and clogged and overcrowded 
roadways; woefully inadequate garbage removal; and, in general, 
a declining city infrastructure. Industrial growth fell from 6.9 per- 
cent in 1989 to 1.9 percent in 1990; growth investment in 1990 
in both fixed capital and durable equipment declined by half when 
compared with the previous year. Government construction, which 
grew at 10 percent in 1989, declined by 1 percent in 1990. 

The Aquino administration appeared to be unable to work with 
the Congress to enact an economic package to overcome the coun- 
try's economic difficulties. In July, as the government deficit soared, 
Secretary of Finance Jesus Estanislao introduced a package of new 
tax measures. Then in October, stalemated with Congress, Aqui- 
no agreed to seek a reduction in the budget gap without new tax- 
es. Congress attacked the agreement as being an onerous imposition 
on an economy in crisis: growth would be stifled and the poor would 
be impacted negatively. The willingness of the Congress to pass 
the tax package called for in the IMF agreement was, however, 
in doubt. In 1990 Congress placed a 9 percent levy on all imports 
to provide revenues until an agreement could be reached with the 
administration on a tax package. In February 1991, however, it 
was learned that in its agreement with the IMF for new standby 
credits, the government had promised that it would indeed imple- 
ment new taxes. 

Accusations were widespread in Manila's press about the 1990-91 
impasse. On the one hand, it was claimed that Aquino and her 
advisers had no economic plan; on the other hand, the Congress 
was said to be unwilling to work with the president. Traditional 
political patterns appeared to be reasserting themselves, and the 
technocrats had little ultimate influence. One study of the first Con- 
gress elected under the 1987 constitution showed that only 31 out 
of 200 members of the House of Representatives were not previ- 
ously elected officials or directly related to the leader of a tradi- 
tional political clan. Business interests were also powerful, directly 
influencing the president to overrule already established policies, 
as in the 1990 program to simplify the tariff structure. Business 
and politics, however, have always been deeply interwoven in the 
Philippines; crony capitalism was not a deviant model, but rather 
the logical extreme of a traditional pattern. As the Philippines en- 
tered the 1990s, the crucial question for the economy was whether 
the elite would limit its political activities to jockeying for economic 



127 



Philippines: A Country Study 

advantage or would forge its economic and political interests in 
a fashion that would create a dynamic economy. 

Economic Planning and Policy 

The Philippines has traditionally had a private enterprise econ- 
omy both in policy and in practice. The government intervened 
primarily through fiscal and monetary policy and in the exercise 
of its regulatory authority. Although expansion of public sector en- 
terprises occurred during the Marcos presidency, direct state par- 
ticipation in economic activity has generally been limited. The 
Aquino government set a major policy initiative of consolidating 
and privatizing government-owned and government-controlled 
firms. Economic planning was limited largely to establishing tar- 
gets for economic growth and other macroeconomic goals, engag- 
ing in project planning and implementation, and advising the 
government in the use of capital funds for development projects. 

Development Planning 

The responsibility for economic planning was vested in the Na- 
tional Economic and Development Authority. Created in January 
1973, the authority assumed the mandate both for macroeconomic 
planning that had been undertaken by its predecessor organiza- 
tion, the National Economic Council, and project planning and 
implementation, previously undertaken by the Presidential Eco- 
nomic Staff. National Economic and Development Authority plans 
calling for the expansion of employment, maximization of growth, 
attainment of fiscal responsibility and monetary stability, provi- 
sion of social services, and equitable distribution of income were 
produced by the Marcos administration for 1974-77, 1978-82, and 
1983-88, and by the Aquino administration for 1987-92. Growth 
was encouraged largely through the provision of infrastructure and 
incentives for investment by private capital. Equity, a derivative 
goal, was to be achieved as the result of a dynamic economic ex- 
pansion within an appropriate policy environment that emphasized 
labor-intensive production. 

The National Economic and Development Authority Medium- 
Term Development Plan, 1987-92 reflected Aquino's campaign 
themes: elimination of structures of privilege and monopolization 
of the economy; decentralization of power and decision making; 
and reduction of unemployment and mass poverty, particularly in 
rural areas. The private sector was described as both the "initia- 
tor" and "prime mover" of the country's development; hence, 
the government was "to encourage and support private initiative," 
and state participation in the economy was to be minimized and 



128 



The Economy 



decentralized. Goals included alleviation of poverty, generation of 
more productive employment, promotion of equity and social 
justice, and attainment of sustainable economic growth. Goals were 
to be achieved through agrarian reforms; strengthening the col- 
lective bargaining process; undertaking rural, labor-intensive in- 
frastructure projects; providing social services; and expanding 
education and skill training. Nevertheless, as with previous plans, 
the goals and objectives were to be realized, trickle-down fashion, 
as the consequence of achieving a sustainable economic growth, 
albeit a growth more focused on the agricultural sector. 

The plan also involved implementing more appropriate, market- 
oriented fiscal and monetary polices, achieving a more liberal trade 
policy based on comparative advantage, and improving the effi- 
ciency and effectiveness of the civil service, as well as better en- 
forcement of government laws and regulations. Proper management 
of the country's external debt to allow an acceptable rate of growth 
and the establishment of a "pragmatic," development-oriented for- 
eign policy were extremely important. 

Economic performance fell far short of plan targets. For exam- 
ple, the real GNP growth rate from 1987 to 1990 averaged 25 per- 
cent less than the targeted rate, the growth rate of real exports was 
one-third less, and the growth rate of real imports was well over 
double. The targets, however, did provide a basis for discussion 
of consistency of official statements and whether the plan growth 
rates were compatible with the maintenance of external debt- 
repayment obligations. The plan also set priorities. Both Aquino's 
campaign pronouncements and the policies embodied in the plan- 
ning document emphasized policies that would favorably affect the 
poor and the rural sector. But, because of dissension within the 
cabinet, conflicts with Congress, and presidential indecisiveness, 
policies such as land and tax reform either were not implemented 
or were implemented in an impaired fashion. In addition, the 
Philippines curtailed resources available for development projects 
and the provision of government services in order to maintain good 
relations with international creditors. 

The Philippine government has undertaken to provide incen- 
tives to firms, both domestic and foreign, to invest in priority areas 
of the economy since the early 1950s. In 1967 an Investment In- 
centives Act, administered by a Board of Investments (BOI), was 
passed to encourage and direct investment more systematically. 
Three years later, an Export Incentives Act was passed, further- 
ing the effort to move the economy beyond import-substitution 
manufacturing. The incentive structure in the late 1960s and 1970s 
was criticized for favoring capital-intensive investment as against 



129 



Philippines: A Country Study 

investments in agriculture and export industries, as well as not being 
sufficiently large. Export incentives were insufficient to overcome 
other biases against exports embodied in the structure of tariff pro- 
tection and the overvaluation of the peso. 

The investment incentive system was revised in 1 983 , and again 
in 1987, with the goal of rewarding performance, particularly ex- 
porting and labor-intensive production. As a result of objections 
made by the United States and other industrial nations to export- 
subsidy provisions contained in the 1983 Investment Code, much 
of the specific assistance to exporters was removed in the 1987 ver- 
sion. The 1987 Investment Code delegates considerable discretion- 
ary power over foreign investment to the government Board of 
Investments when foreign participation in an enterprise exceeds 
40 percent. Legislation under consideration by the Philippine Con- 
gress in early 1991 would limit this authority. Under the new 
proposal, foreign participation exceeding 40 percent would be al- 
lowed in any area not covered by a specified "negative list." 

Fiscal Policy 

Historically, the government has taken a rather conservative 
stance on fiscal activities. Until the 1970s, national government 
expenditures and taxation generally were each less than 10 per- 
cent of GNP. (Total expenditures of provincial, city, and municipal 
governments were small, between 5 and 10 percent of national 
government expenditures in the 1980s.) Under the Marcos regime, 
national government activity increased to between 1 5 and 1 7 per- 
cent of GNP, largely because of increased capital expenditures and, 
later, growing debt-service payments. In 1987 and 1988, the ratio 
of government expenditure to GNP rose above 20 percent (see ta- 
ble 4, Appendix). Tax revenue, however, remained relatively sta- 
ble, seldom rising above 12 percent of GNP (see table 5, Appendix). 
Chronic government budget deficits were covered by internation- 
al borrowing during the Marcos era and mainly by domestic bor- 
rowing during the Aquino administration. Both approaches 
contributed to the vicious circle of deficits generating the need for 
borrowing, and the debt service on those loans creating greater 
deficits and the need to borrow even more. At 5.2 percent of GNP, 
the 1990 government deficit was a major consideration in the 1991 
standby agreement between Manila and the IMF. 

Over time, the apportionment of government spending has 
changed considerably (see table 6, Appendix). In 1989 the largest 
portion of the national government budget (43.9 percent) went for 
debt servicing. Most of the rest covered economic services and so- 
cial services, including education. Only 9.1 percent of the budget 



130 



The Economy 



was allocated for defense. The Philippines devoted a smaller propor- 
tion of GNP to defense than did any other country in Southeast 
Asia. 

The Aquino government formulated a tax reform program in 
1986 that contained some thirty new measures. Most export taxes 
were eliminated; income taxes were simplified and made more 
progressive; the investment incentives system was revised; luxury 
taxes were imposed; and, beginning in 1988, a variety of sales taxes 
were replaced by a 10 percent value-added tax — the central fea- 
ture of the administration's tax reform effort. Some administra- 
tive improvements also were made. The changes, however, did not 
effect an appreciable rise in the tax revenue as a proportion of GNP. 

Problems with the Philippine tax system appear to have more 
to do with collections than with the rates. Estimates of individual 
income tax compliance in the late 1980s ranged between 13 and 
27 percent. Assessments of the magnitude of tax evasion by cor- 
porate income tax payers in 1984 and 1985 varied from as low as 
PI. 7 billion to as high as PI 3 billion. The latter figure was based 
on the fact that only 38 percent of registered firms in the country 
actually filed a tax return in 1985. Although collections in 1989 
were P10. 1 billion, a 70 percent increase over 1988, they remained 
PI .4 billion below expectations. Tax evasion was compounded by 
mismanagement and corruption. A 1987 government study deter- 
mined that 25 percent of the national budget was lost to graft and 
corruption. 

Low collection rates also reinforced the regressive structure of 
the tax system. The World Bank calculated that effective tax rates 
(taxes paid as a proportion of income) of low-income families were 
about 50 percent greater than those of high-income families in the 
mid-1980s. Middle-income families paid the largest percentage. 
This situation was caused in part by the government's heavy reli- 
ance on indirect taxes. Individual income taxes accounted for only 
8.9 percent of tax collections in 1989, and corporate income taxes 
were only 18.5 percent. Taxes on goods and services and duties 
on international transactions made up 70 percent of tax revenue 
in 1989, about the same as in 1960. 

The consolidated public sector deficit — the combined deficit of 
national government, local government, and public-sector enter- 
prise budgets — which had been greatiy reduced in the first two years 
of the Aquino administration rose to 5.2 of GNP by the end of 
1990. In June 1990, the government proposed a comprehensive 
new tax reform package in an attempt to control the public sector 
deficit. About that time, the IMF, World Bank, and Japanese 
government froze loan disbursements because the Philippines was 



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Philippines: A Country Study 



not complying with targets in the standby agreement with the IMF. 
As a result of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, petroleum prices 
increased; the Oil Price Stabilization Fund put an additional strain 
on the budget. The sudden cessation of dollar remittances from 
contract workers in Kuwait and Iraq and increased interest rates 
on domestic debt of the government also contributed to the deficit. 

Negotiations between the Aquino administration and Congress 
on the administration's tax proposals fell through in October 1990, 
with the two sides agreeing to focus on improved tax collections, 
faster privatization of government-owned and government-con- 
trolled corporations, and the imposition of a temporary import levy. 
A new standby agreement between the government and the IMF 
in early 1991 committed the government to raise taxes and energy 
prices. Although the provisions of the agreement were necessary 
in order to secure fresh loans, the action increased the administra- 
tion's already fractious relations with Congress. 

Monetary Policy 

The Central Bank of the Philippines was established in June 1948 
and began operation the following January. It was charged with 
maintaining monetary stability; preserving the value and conver- 
tibility of the peso; and fostering monetary, credit, and exchange 
conditions conducive to the economic growth of the country. In 
1991 the policy-making body of the Central Bank was the Mone- 
tary Board, composed of the governor of the Central Bank as chair- 
man, the secretary of finance, the director general of the National 
Economic and Development Authority, the chairman of the Board 
of Investment, and three members from the private sector. In car- 
rying out its functions, the Central Bank supervised the commer- 
cial banking system and managed the country's foreign currency 
system. 

From 1975 to 1982, domestic saving (including capital consump- 
tion allowance) averaged 25 percent of GNP, about 5 percentage 
points less than annual gross domestic capital formation. This 
resource gap was filled with foreign capital. Between 1983 and 1989, 
domestic saving as a proportion of GNP declined on the average 
by a third, initially because of the impact of the economic crisis 
on personal savings and later more because of negative govern- 
ment saving. Investment also declined, so that for three of these 
years, domestic savings actually exceeded gross investment. 

From the time it began operations until the early 1980s, the Cen- 
tral Bank intervened extensively in the country's financial life. It 
set interest rates on both bank deposits and loans, often at rates 
that were, when adjusted for inflation, negative. Central Bank credit 



132 



The Economy 



was extended to commercial banks through an extensive system 
of rediscounting. In the 1970s, the banking system resorted, with 
the Central Bank's assistance, to foreign credit on terms that gener- 
ally ignored foreign-exchange risk. The combination of these fac- 
tors mitigated against the development of financial intermediation 
in the economy, particularly the growth of long-term saving. The 
dependence of the banking system on funds from the Central Bank 
at low interest rates, in conjunction with the discretionary authority 
of the bank, has been cited as a contributing factor to the financial 
chaos that occurred in the 1980s. For example, the proportion of 
Central Bank loans and advances to government-owned financial 
institutions increased from about 25 percent of the total in 1970 
to 45 percent in 1981-82. Borrowings of the government-owned 
Development Bank of the Philippines from the Central Bank in- 
creased almost 100-fold during this period. Access to resources of 
this sort, in conjunction with subsidized interest rates, enabled Mar- 
cos cronies to obtain loans and the later bailouts that contributed 
to the financial chaos. 

At the start of the 1980s, the government introduced a number 
of monetary measures built on 1972 reforms to enhance the bank- 
ing industry's ability to provide adequate amounts of long-term 
finance. Efforts were made to broaden the capital base of banks 
through encouraging mergers and consolidations. A new class of 
banks, referred to as "expanded commercial banks" or "uni- 
banks," was created to enhance competition and the efficiency of 
the banking industry and to increase the flow of long-term saving. 
Qualifying banks — those with a capital base in excess of P500 
million — were allowed to expand their operations into a range of 
new activities, combining commercial banking with activities of 
investment houses. The functional division among other categories 
of banks was reduced, and that between rural banks and thrift banks 
eliminated. 

Interest rates were deregulated during the same period, so that 
by January 1983 all interest rate ceilings had been abolished. Redis- 
counting privileges were reduced, and rediscount rates were set 
in relation to the cost of competing funds. Although the short-term 
response seemed favorable, there was little long-term change. The 
ratio of the country's money supply, broadly defined to include 
savings and time deposits, to GNP, around 0.2 in the 1970s, rose 
to 0.3 in 1983, but then fell again to just above 0.2 in the late 1980s. 
This ratio was among the lowest in Southeast Asia. 

Monetary and fiscal policies that were set by the government in 
the early 1980s contributed to large intermediation margins, the dif- 
ference between lending and borrowing rates. In 1988, for example, 



133 



Philippines: A Country Study 

loan rates averaged 16.8 percent, whereas rates on savings deposits 
were only slightly more than 4 percent. The Central Bank tradi- 
tionally maintained relatively high reserve requirements (the propor- 
tion of deposits that must remain in reserve), in excess of 20 percent. 
In 1990 the reserve requirement was revised upward twice, going 
from 21 percent to 25 percent. In addition, the government levied 
both a 5 percent gross tax on bank receipts and a 20 percent tax 
on deposit earnings, and borrowed extensively to cover budget 
deficits and to absorb excess growth in the money supply. 

In addition to large intermediation margins, Philippine banks 
offered significandy different rates for deposits of different amounts. 
For instance, in 1988 interest rates on six-month time deposits of 
large depositors averaged almost 13 percent, whereas small savers 
earned only 4 percent on their savings. Rates offered on six-month 
and twelve-month time deposits differed by only 1 percentage point, 
and the rate differential for foreign currency deposits of all availa- 
ble maturities was within a single percentage point range. Because 
savings deposits accounted for approximately 60 percent of total 
bank deposits and alternatives for small savers were few, the prob- 
ability of interest rate discrimination by the commercial banking 
industry between small, less-informed depositors and more affluent 
savers was quite high. Interest rates of time deposits also were bid 
up to reduce capital flight. This discrimination, coupled with the 
large intermediation margins, gave rise to charges by Philippine 
economists and the World Bank that the Philippine commercial 
banking industry was highly oligopolistic. 

Money supply growth has been highly variable, expanding during 
economic and political turmoil and then contracting when the 
Philippines tried to meet IMF requirements (see table 7, Appen- 
dix). Before the 1969, 1984, and 1986 elections, the money supply 
grew rapidly. The flooding of the economy with money prior to 
the 1986 elections was one reason why the newly installed Aquino 
administration chose to scrap the existing standby arrangement with 
the IMF in early 1986 and negotiate a new agreement. The Cen- 
tral Bank released funds to stabilize the financial situation follow- 
ing a financial scandal in early 1981, after the onset of an economic 
crisis in late 1983, and after a coup attempt in 1989. The money 
was then repurchased by the Treasury and the Central Bank in 
the form of the so-called Jobo bills — named after then Central Bank 
Governor Jose Fernandez — at high interest rates that peaked in 
October 1984 at 43 percent and were approaching 35 percent in 
late 1990. The interest paid on this debt necessitated even greater 
borrowing. By contrast, in 1984 and 1985, in order for the govern- 
ment to regain access to external capital, the growth rate of the 



134 



The Economy 



money supply was kept very tight. IMF dictates were met, the very 
high inflation rate abated, and the current account (see Glossary) 
was in surplus. Success, however, was obtained at the expense of 
a steep fall in output and high unemployment. 

Privatization 

When Aquino assumed the presidency in 1986, P31 billion, 
slightly more than 25 percent of the government's budget, was 
allocated to public sector enterprises — government-owned or govern- 
ment-controlled corporations — in the form of equity infusions, sub- 
sidies, and loans. Aquino also found it necessary to write off P130 
billion in bad loans granted by the government's two major finan- 
cial institutions, the Philippine National Bank and the Develop- 
ment Bank of the Philippines, "to those who held positions of power 
and conflicting interest under Marcos." The proliferation of in- 
efficient and unprofitable public sector enterprises and bad loans 
held by the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of 
the Philippines, and other government entities was a heavy legacy 
of the Marcos years. 

Burdened with 296 public sector enterprises, plus 399 other non- 
performing assets transferred to the government by the Philippine 
National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines, the 
Aquino administration established the Asset Privatization Trust 
in 1986 to dispose of government-owned and government-controlled 
properties. By early 1991, the Asset Privatization Trust had sold 
230 assets, with net proceeds of P14.3 billion. Another seventy- 
four public sector enterprises that were created with direct govern- 
ment investment were put up for sale; fifty-seven enterprises were 
sold wholly or in part for a total of about P6 billion. The govern- 
ment designated that about 30 percent of the original public sec- 
tor enterprises be retained and expected to abolish another 20 
percent. There was widespread controversy over the fairness of the 
divestment procedure and its potential to contribute to an even 
greater concentration of economic power in the hands of a few 
wealthy families. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 

Agricultural Geography 

In the late 1980s, nearly 8 million hectares — over 25 percent of 
total land — were under cultivation, 4.5 million hectares in field crops 
and 3.2 million hectares in tree crops. Population growth reduced 
the amount of arable land per person employed in agriculture from 
about one hectare during the 1950s to around 0.5 hectare in the 



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Philippines: A Country Study 



early 1980s. Growth in agricultural output had to come largely from 
multicropping and increasing yields. In 1988 double-cropping and 
intercropping resulted in 13.4 million hectares of harvested area, 
a total that was considerably greater than the area under cultiva- 
tion. Palay (unhusked rice) and corn, the two cereals widely grown 
in the Philippines, accounted for about half of total crop area. 
Another 25 percent of the production area was taken up by coco- 
nuts, a major export earner. Sugarcane, pineapples, and Caven- 
dish bananas (a dwarf variety) were also important earners of foreign 
exchange, although they accounted for a relatively small portion 
of cultivated area. 

Climatic conditions are a major determinant of crop production 
patterns (see The Climate, ch. 2). For example, coconut trees need 
a constant supply of water and do not do well in areas with a 
prolonged dry season. Sugarcane, on the other hand, needs moder- 
ate rainfall spread out over a long growing period and a dry sea- 
son for ripening and harvesting. Soil type, topography, government 
policy, and regional conflict between Christians and Muslims were 
also determinants in the patterns of agricultural activity. 

Agricultural Production and Government Policy 

The percentage of the population living in rural areas declined 
from 68 percent in 1970 to 57 percent in 1990, and the share of 
the labor force engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing also 
decreased to less than 50 percent by the late 1980s. Roughly two- 
thirds of agricultural households farmed their own land or were 
tenants; the others were landless agricultural workers. Some 75 per- 
cent of agricultural value added (see Glossary) came from crops 
and livestock. The remaining 25 percent came from forestry and 
fishing (see table 8, Appendix). Value added in agricultural crops 
grew rapidly in the early 1970s, averaging growth rates of 7.7 per- 
cent (see table 9, Appendix). In the 1980s, however, with the ex- 
ception of corn, which was in growing demand as an animal feed, 
the growth rate of agricultural production declined and was some- 
times negative for bananas and sugarcane. Low world prices com- 
bined with the high cost of inputs such as fertilizers were two of 
the most important reasons for the decline. 

The government pursued sometimes contradictory goals of main- 
taining cheap food and raw material prices, high farm income, food 
security, and stable prices, at times through direct intervention in 
agricultural markets. In 1981 the National Food Authority was 
created. It was empowered to regulate the marketing of all food 
and was given monopoly privileges to import grains, soybeans, and 
other feedstuffs. The ability of the National Food Authority and 



136 



Traditional methods of winnowing rice and plowing rice 
paddies are still extensively used. 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 



137 



Philippines: A Country Study 

its predecessor organizations to stabilize prices and keep them with- 
in the established price bands, at either the farm gate or the retail 
market, has been quite limited because of insufficient funds to 
affect the market, strict purchasing requirements, and corrupt 
practices among authority personnel. In 1985 the role of the Na- 
tional Food Authority was reduced, and price ceilings on rice were 
lifted. Beginning in the 1950s, government efforts to stimulate 
industrial development, such as tariffs on manufactured goods, over- 
valuation of the currency, export taxes on agricultural commodi- 
ties, and price controls had a deleterious effect on the agricultural 
sector, making it relatively unprofitable. On the other hand, irri- 
gation water was distributed at below-cost prices, and fertilizer 
manufacturing was subsidized. 

Beginning in the latter half of the 1970s, the Marcos regime gave 
increased attention to agriculture and the rural sector in general, 
including agribusiness development. The Aquino government con- 
tinued that emphasis, although its policy evolved from a commodity- 
specific orientation to a general, crop-diversification approach that 
relied more on market signals to guide crop selection. The rice- 
price stabilization program remained in effect, and a program was 
implemented to increase small-farmer access to postharvest facili- 
ties such as warehouses, rice mills, driers, and threshers. 

Providing credit to the agricultural sector, particularly to small- 
sized and medium- sized farmers had been a government policy since 
the early 1950s, one that met with mixed success at best. By the 
early 1980s, there were approximately 900 privately owned, rural 
banks, which were the principal implementors of government- 
sponsored, supervised credit schemes. The Masagana 99 program 
was initiated in the early 1970s to encourage adoption of new, high- 
yielding rice varieties. No-collateral, low-interest loans were made 
available to small farmers, mainly by privately owned, rural banks, 
with the government guaranteeing 85 percent of any losses suffered 
by the banks. In general, however, regulated interest rates made 
rural banks unattractive to depositors. 

In 1975 more than 500,000 farmers participated in the Masagana 
99 program. By 1985, however, the program had expired because 
of high arrearage and the tight monetary policy instituted as part 
of an agreement with the IMF. The program was revived in the 
Aquino administration's Medium-Term Development Plan, 
1987-92. According to a government report, however, as of 1988 
the program had not yet reached most of the intended beneficiaries. 
Government efforts were also underway to rehabilitate rural banks, 
the majority of which had experienced severe difficulties during 



138 



The Economy 



the economic crisis of the early 1980s and the subsequent mone- 
tary squeeze. 

Rice and the Green Revolution 

Rice is the most important food crop, a staple food in most of 
the country. It is produced extensively in Luzon, the Western 
Visayas, Southern Mindanao, and Central Mindanao (see fig. 5). 
In 1989 nearly 9.5 billion tons of palay were produced. In 1990 
palay accounted for 27 percent of value added in agriculture and 
3.5 percent of GNP. Per hectare yields have generally been low 
in comparison with other Asian countries. Since the mid-1960s, 
however, yields have increased substantially as a result of the cul- 
tivation of high-yielding varieties developed in the mid-1960s at 
the International Rice Research Institute located in the Philippines. 
The proportion of "miracle" rice in total output rose from zero 
in 1965-66 to 81 percent in 1981-82. Average productivity increased 
to 2.3 tons per hectare (2.8 tons on irrigated farms) by 1983. By 
the late 1970s, the country had changed from a net importer to 
a net exporter of rice, albeit on a small scale. 

This "green revolution" was accompanied by an expanded use 
of chemical inputs. Total fertilizer consumption rose from 668 tons 
in 1976 to 1,222 tons in 1988, an increase of more than 80 per- 
cent. To stimulate productivity, the government also undertook 
a major expansion of the nation's irrigation system. The area un- 
der irrigation grew from under 500,000 hectares in the mid-1960s 
to 1.5 million hectares in 1988, almost half of the potentially ir- 
rigable land. 

In the 1980s, however, rice production encountered problems. 
Average annual growth for 1980-85 declined to a mere 0.9 per- 
cent, as contrasted with 4.6 percent for the preceding fifteen years. 
Growth of value added in the rice industry also fell in the 1980s. 
Tropical storms and droughts, the general economic downturn of 
the 1980s, and the 1983-85 economic crisis all contributed to this 
decline. Crop loans dried up, prices of agricultural inputs increased, 
and palay prices declined. Fertilizer and plant nutrient consump- 
tion dropped 15 percent. Farmers were squeezed by rising debts 
and declining income. Hectarage devoted to rice production, lev- 
el during the latter half of the 1970s, fell an average of 2.4 percent 
per annum during the first half of the 1980s, with the decline 
primarily in marginal, nonirrigated farms. As a result, in 1985, 
the last full year of the Marcos regime, the country imported 
538,000 tons of rice. The situation improved somewhat in the late 
1980s, and smaller amounts of rice were imported. However, in 
1990 the country experienced a severe drought. Output fell by 



139 



Philippines: A Country Study 

1.5 percent, forcing the importation of an estimated 400,000 tons 
of rice. 

Coconut Industry 

The Philippines is the world's second largest producer of coco- 
nut products, after Indonesia. In 1989 it produced 11.8 million 
tons. In 1989, coconut products, coconut oil, copra (dried coco- 
nut), and desiccated coconut accounted for approximately 6.7 per- 
cent of Philippine exports. About 25 percent of cultivated land was 
planted in coconut trees, and it is estimated that between 25 per- 
cent and 33 percent of the population was at least partly depen- 
dent on coconuts for their livelihood. Historically, the Southern 
Tagalog and Bicol regions of Luzon and the Eastern Visayas were 
the centers of coconut production. In the 1980s, Western Minda- 
nao and Southern Mindanao also became important coconut- 
growing regions. 

In the early 1990s, the average coconut farm was a medium- 
sized unit of less than four hectares. Owners, often absentee, cus- 
tomarily employed local peasants to collect coconuts rather than 
engage in tenancy relationships. The villagers were paid on a piece- 
rate basis. Those employed in the coconut industry tended to be 
less educated and older than the average person in the rural labor 
force and earned lower- than-average incomes. 

Land devoted to cultivation of coconuts increased by about 6 
percent per year during the 1960s and 1970s, a response to devalu- 
ations of the peso in 1962 and 1970 and increasing world demand. 
Responding to the world market, the Philippine government en- 
couraged processing of copra domestically and provided investment 
incentives to increase the construction of coconut oil mills. The 
number of mills rose from twenty-eight in 1968 to sixty-two in 1979, 
creating substantial excess capacity. The situation was aggravat- 
ed by declining yields because of the aging of coconut trees in some 
regions. 

In 1973 the martial law regime merged all coconut-related, 
government operations within a single agency, the Philippine Coco- 
nut Authority (PC A). The PC A was empowered to collect a levy 
of P0.55 per 100 kilograms on the sale of copra to be used to stabi- 
lize the domestic price of coconut-based consumer goods, particu- 
larly cooking oil. In 1974 the government created the Coconut 
Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the development 
of a hybrid coconut tree. To finance the project, the levy was in- 
creased to P20. 

Also in 1974, coconut planters, led by the Coconut Producers 
Federation (Cocofed), an organization of large planters, took control 



140 




Figure 5. Major Agricultural Activ\ 



The Economy 



of the PCA governing board. In 1975 the PCA acquired a bank, 
renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank, to service the needs 
of coconut farmers, and the PCA director, Eduardo Cojuangco, 
a business associate of Marcos, became its president. Levies col- 
lected by the PCA were placed in the bank, initially interest-free. 
In 1978 the United Coconut Planters Bank was given legal authority 
to purchase coconut mills, ostensibly as a measure to cope with 
excess capacity in the industry. At the same time, mills not owned 
by coconut farmers — that is, Cocofed members or entities it con- 
trolled through the PCA — were denied subsidy payments to com- 
pensate for the price controls on coconut-based consumer products. 
By early 1980, the Philippine press reported that the United Coco- 
nut Oil Mills, a PCA-owned firm, and its president, Cojuangco, 
controlled 80 percent of the Philippine oil-milling capacity. Minister 
of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile also exercised strong influence over 
the industry as chairman of both the United Coconut Planters Bank 
and United Coconut Oil Mills and honorary chairman of Cocofed. 
An industry composed of some 0.5 million farmers and 14,000 
traders was, by the early 1980s, highly monopolized. 

In principle, the coconut farmers were to be the beneficiaries 
of the levy, which between March 1977 and September 1981 stabi- 
lized at P76 per 100 kilograms. Contingent benefits included life 
insurance, educational scholarships, and a cooking oil subsidy, but 
few actually benefited. The aim of the replanting program, con- 
trolled by Cojuangco, was to replace aging coconut trees with a 
hybrid of a Malaysian dwarf and West African tall varieties. The 
new palms were to produce five times the weight per year of exist- 
ing trees. The target of replanting 60,000 trees a year was not met. 
In 1983, 25 to 30 percent of coconut trees were estimated to be 
at least sixty years old; by 1988, the proportion had increased to 
between 35 and 40 percent. 

When coconut prices began to fall in the early 1980s, pressure 
mounted to alter the structure of the industry. In 1985 the Philip- 
pine government agreed to dismantie the United Coconut Oil Mills 
as part of an agreement with the IMF to bail out the Philippine 
economy. Later a 1988 United States law requiring foods using 
tropical oils to be labeled indicating the saturated fat content had 
a negative impact on an already ailing industry and gave rise to 
protests from coconut growers that similar requirements were not 
levied on oils produced in temperate climates. 

Sugar 

From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-1970s, sugar was 
the most important agricultural export of the Philippines, not only 



143 



Philippines: A Country Study 

because of the foreign exchange earned, but also because sugar was 
the basis for the accumulation of wealth of a significant segment 
of the Filipino elite. The principal sugarcane-growing region is the 
Western Visayas, particularly the island of Negros. In 1980 the 
region accounted for half the area planted in cane and two-thirds 
of the production of sugar. Unlike the cultivation of rice, corn, and 
coconuts, sugarcane is typically grown on large farms or hacien- 
das. In the mid-1980s, more than 60 percent of total production 
and about 80 percent of Negros' s output came from farms twenty- 
five hectares or larger. Countrywide, tenancy arrangements exist- 
ed for approximately half the sugarcane farms; however, they were 
generally the smaller ones, averaging 2.5 hectares in size and ac- 
counting for only slightly more than 20 percent of land planted 
in the crop. Elsewhere, laborers were employed, generally at very 
low wages. A survey undertaken in 1990 by the governor of Negros 
Occidental found that only one-third of the island's sugar planters 
were paying the then-mandated minimum wage of P72.50 per day. 
The contrast between the sumptuous lifestyles of Negros hacenderos 
and the poverty of their workers, particularly migrant laborers 
known as sacadas, epitomized the vast social and economic gulf 
separating the elite in the Philippines from the great mass of the 
population. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, sugar accounted for more than 20 per- 
cent of Philippine exports. Its share declined somewhat in the 1970s 
and plummeted in the first half of the 1980s to around 7 percent. 
The sugar industry was in a crisis. Part of the problem was a 
depressed market for sugar. A dramatic increase in the world price 
of sugar had occurred in 1974, peaking at US$0.67 per pound in 
December of that year. The following two years, however, saw 
prices fall to less than US$0.10 a pound and remain there for a 
few years before moving upward again toward the end of the de- 
cade. Sugar prices fell again in the early 1980s, bottoming in May 
1985 at less than US$0.03 per pound and averaging US$0.04 per 
pound for the year as a whole. In early 1990, prices had recovered 
to US$0.14 cents per pound, then declined to approximately 
US$0.08 to US$0.09 per pound. 

Historically, the Philippines was protected to a certain degree 
from vicissitudes of the world price of sugar by the country's ac- 
cess to a protected and subsidized United States market. In 1913 
the United States Congress established free trade with its Philip- 
pine colony, providing Filipino sugar producers unlimited access 
to the American market. Later, in 1934, a quota system on sugar 
was enacted and remained in force until 1974. Although Philip- 
pine sugar exports to the United States were restricted during this 



144 




Coconuts and sugarcane are the leading commercial 
crops. Abaca, dyed fibers of which are shown here, is less important. 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 



145 



Philippines: A Country Study 

period, the country continued to enjoy a relatively privileged po- 
sition. Philippine quotas for the United States market in the early 
1970s accounted for between 25 and 30 percent of the total, dou- 
ble that of other significant suppliers such as the Dominican Repub- 
lic, Mexico, and Brazil. After the quota law expired in 1974, 
Philippine sugar was sold on the open market, generally to unre- 
stricted destinations. As a consequence, shipments to the United 
States declined. 

On May 5, 1982, the United States reestablished a quota sys- 
tem for the importation of sugar. Allocations were based on a coun- 
try's share in sugar trade with the United States during the 1975-81 
period, the period during which Philippine sugar exports to the 
United States had dwindled. The Philippine allotment was 13.5 
percent. Efforts by the Philippine government to have it raised to 
25 percent, the country's approximate share during the previous 
quota period, were unsuccessful. The loss of sales imposed by the 
reduced quota share was compounded by a dramatic 40 percent 
drop in total United States imports of sugar in the mid-1980s as 
compared with the early 1970s. Philippine sugar exports to the Unit- 
ed States that had averaged just under 1.3 million tons per year 
in the 1968-71 period averaged only 284,000 tons from 1983 to 
1988, falling to approximately 161,000 tons in 1988. In 1988 only 
273 thousand hectares were sugar producing, about half that of 
the early 1970s. 

During the earlier quota period, Philippine producers enjoyed 
high profits, but operations were inefficient and lacking in mechani- 
zation. Sugar yields in the Philippines were among the lowest in 
the world. Increases in production occurred through expansion of 
land area devoted to sugarcane. With falling prices and the end 
of the United States quota, attempts to improve productivity 
through mechanization increased yields, but caused a dramatic fall 
in labor requirements, initially by 50 percent and, over a longer 
period, by an estimated 90 percent. In an island economy such 
as that of Negros, where sugar has accounted directly for 25 per- 
cent of employment, the consequent actual and potential lost liveli- 
hood was disastrous. 

The decline of the sugar industry was complicated by the 
monopolization that took place during the martial law period, a 
process not dissimilar to what occurred in the coconut industry. 
In 1976, as a reaction to the precipitous decline in sugar prices, 
Marcos established the Philippine Sugar Commission (Philsucom), 
placing at the head his close associate Roberto Benedicto. Philsu- 
com was given sole authority to buy and sell sugar, to set prices 
paid to planters and millers, and to purchase companies connected 



146 



The Economy 



to the sugar industry. A bank was set up in 1978, and the con- 
struction of seven new sugar mills was authorized at a cost of US$40 
million per mill. 

By the 1980s, considerable resistance to Philsucom and its trad- 
ing subsidiary, the National Sugar Trading Corporation (Nasutra) 
had been generated. As with the monopoly in the coconut indus- 
try, the government acquiesced in its 1985 agreement with the IMF 
to dismantle Nasutra. But the damage had been done. In a study 
undertaken by a group of University of the Philippines economists, 
losses to sugar producers between 1974 and 1983 were estimated 
to be between PI 1 billion and PI 4 billion. Aquino established the 
Sugar Regulatory Authority in 1986 to take over the institutions 
set up by Benedicto. 

Land Tenancy and Land Reform 

An important legacy of the Spanish colonial period was the high 
concentration of land ownership and the consequent widespread 
poverty and agrarian unrest (see The Decline of Spanish Rule, 
ch. 1). United States administrators and several Philippine presiden- 
tial administrations launched land reform programs to maintain 
social stability in the countryside. Lack of sustained political will, 
however, as well as landlord resistance, severely limited the im- 
pact of the various initiatives. 

Farm size is a significant indicator of concentration of owner- 
ship. Although nationwide approximately 50 percent of farms in 
1980 were less than two hectares, these small farms made up only 
16 percent of total farm area. On the other hand, only about 3 
percent of farms were over ten hectares, yet they covered approxi- 
mately 25 percent of farm area. Farms also varied in size based 
on crops cultivated. Rice farms tended to be smaller; only 9 per- 
cent of rice land was on farms as large as ten hectares. Coconut 
farms tended to be somewhat larger; approximately 28 percent of 
the land planted in coconuts was on farms larger than ten hectares. 
Sugarcane, however, generally was planted on large farms. Near- 
ly 80 percent of land planted in sugarcane was on farms larger than 
ten hectares. Pineapple plantations were a special case. Because 
the two largest producers were subsidiaries of transnational firms — 
Del Monte and Castle and Cooke — they were not permitted to own 
land directly. The transnationals circumvented this restriction, 
however, by leasing land. In 1987 subsidiaries of these two com- 
panies leased 21,400 hectares, 40 percent of the total hectarage 
devoted to pineapple production. 

In September 1972, the second presidential decree that Marcos is- 
sued under martial law declared the entire Philippines a land reform 



147 



Philippines: A Country Study 

area. A month later, he issued Presidential Decree No. 27, which 
contained the specifics of his land reform program. On paper, the 
program was the most comprehensive ever attempted in the Philip- 
pines, notwithstanding the fact that only rice and corn land were 
included. Holdings of more than seven hectares were to be pur- 
chased and parceled out to individual tenants (up to three hectares 
of irrigated, or five hectares of unirrigated, land), who would then 
pay off the value of the land over a fifteen-year period. Sharecrop- 
pers on holdings of less than seven hectares were to be converted 
to leaseholders, paying fixed rents. 

The Marcos land reform program succeeded in breaking down 
many of the large haciendas in Central Luzon, a traditional center 
of agrarian unrest where landed elite and Marcos allies were not 
as numerous as in other parts of the country. In the country as 
a whole, however, the program was generally considered a failure. 
Only 20 percent of rice and corn land, or 10 percent of total farm 
land, was covered by the program, and in 1985, thirteen years af- 
ter Marcos's proclamation, 75 percent of the expected beneficiaries 
had not become owner-cultivators. By 1988 less than 6 percent of 
all agricultural households had received a certificate of land trans- 
fer, indicating that the land they were cultivating had been 
registered as a land transfer holding. About half of this group, 2.4 
percent, had received titles, referred to as emancipation patents. 
Political commitment on the part of the government waned rather 
quickly, after Marcos succeeded in undermining the strength of 
land elites who had opposed him. Even where efforts were made, 
implementation was selective, mismanaged, and subject to con- 
siderable graft and corruption. 

The failure of the Marcos land reform program was a major 
theme in Aquino's 1986 presidential campaign, and she gave land 
reform first priority: "Land-to-the-tiller must become a reality, 
instead of an empty slogan." The issue was of some significance 
inasmuch as one of the largest landholdings in the country was her 
family's 15,000-hectare Hacienda Luisita. But the candidate was 
quite clear; the land reform would apply to Hacienda Luisita as 
well as to any other landholding. She did not actually begin to ad- 
dress the land reform question, however, until the issue was brought 
to a head in January 1987, when the military attacked a group of 
peasants marching to Malacanang, the presidential residence, to 
demand action on the promised land reform. Eighteen peasants 
were killed, and more than 100 were wounded. The event gal- 
vanized the government into action: a land reform commission was 
formed, and in July 1987, one week before the new Congress con- 
vened and her decree-making powers would be curtailed, Aquino 



148 



Modern hand plow 
Courtesy Lisowski Collection, Library of Congress 

proclaimed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. More 
than 80 percent of cultivated land and almost 65 percent of agricul- 
tural households were to be included in a phased process that would 
consider the type of land and size of holding. In conformity with 
the country's new constitution, provisions for "voluntary land shar- 
ing" and just compensation were included. The important details 
of timing, priorities, and minimum legal holdings, however, were 
left to be determined by the new Congress, the majority of whose 
members were connected to landed interests. 

Criticism of Aquino's plan came from both sides. Landowners 
thought that it went too far, and peasant organizations complained 
that the program did not go far enough and that by leaving the 
details to a landlord-dominated Congress, the program was doomed 
to failure. A World Bank mission was quite critical of a draft of 
the land reform program. In its report, the mission suggested that 
in order to limit efforts to subvert the process, the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Program needed to be carried out swiftly rather 
than in stages, and land prices should be determined using a 
mechanical formula rather than subjective valuation. The World 
Bank mission also was critical of a provision allowing incorporat- 
ed farm entities to distribute stock to tenants and workers rather 
than the land itself. The scheme would be attractive, the mission 



149 



Philippines: A Country Study 

argued, ''to those landowners who believed that they would not 
have to live up to the agreement to transfer the land to the 
beneficiaries." The mission's recommendations were largely ig- 
nored in the final version of the government's program. 

On June 10, 1988, a year after the proclamation, Congress passed 
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Landowners were al- 
lowed to retain up to five hectares plus three hectares for each heir 
at least fifteen years of age. The program was to be implemented 
in phases. The amount of land that could be retained was to be 
gradually decreased, and a non-land-transfer, profit-sharing pro- 
gram could be used as an alternative to actual land transfer. 

Especially controversial was the provision that allowed large land- 
owners to transfer a portion of the respective corporation's total 
assets equivalent in value to that of its land assets, in lieu of the 
land being subdivided and distributed to tenants and farm laborers. 
In May 1989, the 7,000 tenants of the Aquino family estate, Ha- 
cienda Luisita, agreed to take a 33 percent share of the hacienda's 
corporate stock rather than a portion of the land itself. Because 
the remaining two-thirds of the stock (the value of non-land cor- 
porate assets) remained with Aquino's family, effective control of 
the land did not pass to the tillers. Proponents of land reform con- 
sidered the stock-ownership provision a loophole in the law, and 
one that many large landowners would probably use. Following 
the example of the Hacienda Luisita, thirty-four agrocorporations 
had requested approval for a stock transfer as of mid- 1990. Although 
legal, the action of the president's family raised questions as to the 
president's commitment to land reform. 

It is difficult to estimate the cost, allowing for inflation, of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Early on, in 1988 es- 
timates ranged between PI 70 billion and P220 billion; the follow- 
ing year they were as high as P332 billion, of which P83 billion 
was for land acquisition and P248 billion for support services and 
infrastructure. The lowest mentioned figure averaged to PI 7 bil- 
lion a year, 2.1 percent of 1988 GNP in the Philippines and 8.9 
percent of government expenditure that year. The sum was well 
beyond the capacity of the country, unless tax revenues were in- 
creased substantially and expenditure priorities reordered. To cir- 
cumvent this difficulty, the Aquino government planned to obtain 
50 to 60 percent of the funding requirements from foreign aid. As 
of 1990, however, success had been minimal. 

Government claims that in the first three years of implementa- 
tion the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program met with con- 
siderable success were open to question. Between July 1987 and 
March 1990, 430,730 hectares were distributed. About 80 percent 



150 



The Economy 



of this, however, was from the continuation of the Marcos land 
reform program. Distribution of privately owned lands other than 
land growing rice and corn totaled 3,470 hectares; the total was 
insignificant not only in absolute terms, but also because it was 
only 2 percent of what had been targeted. The inability of the 
Department of Agrarian Reform to spend its budget also indicat- 
ed implementation difficulties. As of June 1990, the department 
had utilized only 44 percent of the PI 4. 2 billion allocated to it for 
the period January 1988-June 1990. In part because of Supreme 
Court rulings, the Department of Agrarian Reform cut its land 
acquisition target in late 1990 by almost half from 400,000 hect- 
ares to 250,000 hectares. 

Livestock 

In 1990 the livestock industry, consisting primarily of cattle, cara- 
bao (water buffalo), hogs, and chickens, accounted for almost 20 
percent of value added in the agricultural sector, up from 12 per- 
cent in 1980. Much of the growth came from the rapid expansion 
of poultry raising, which had begun to develop as a commercial 
industry in the 1960s. Chicken raising accounted for half of livestock 
value added in 1990 as compared with a quarter in 1970. Begin- 
ning in the late 1980s, commercial hog raisers also attempted to 
enter the international market by exporting live hogs to Hong Kong. 
Although carabao production increased as a result of an intensi- 
fied livestock dispersal program run by the government, the cara- 
bao and catde industries remained primarily backyard ventures. 

In the late 1980s, hogs provided 60 percent of total domestic meat 
production; chickens provided 15 percent; and cattle and carabao, 
about 20 percent. The country was relatively self-sufficient in hog 
and chicken production but imported approximately 4,500 tons of 
beef annually. The economic difficulties of the 1980s made the 
lower-priced chicken and carabao attractive substitutes for higher 
priced pork and beef, but carabao raising remained oriented primar- 
ily toward providing work animals. The dairy industry in the Philip- 
pines also was quite small. Liquid milk generally was not available 
in the market, and virtually all canned and dry milk was imported. 

Forestry 

Logging was a profitable business at the end of the 1980s. Actual 
forested land was estimated to be about 6.5 million hectares — more 
than 21.5 percent of Philippine territory — and much of that was in 
higher elevations and on steep slopes. The government facilitated 
the exploitation of the country's forest resources for the first three 
decades after independence by allocating the bulk of unclassified 



151 



Philippines: A Country Study 

land as public forest land eligible to be licensed for logging, and 
by implementing policies of low forest charges and export taxes. 
Logs were a major foreign-exchange earner. By 1977, 8.3 million 
hectares of forest area were licensed for logging. In the late 1970s, 
the government became aware of the dangers of deforestation and 
began to impose restrictions. The amount of forested land and the 
volume of forest exports declined. By 1988, 120 licensed loggers, 
operating on a total area of 4.74 million hectares, cut an estimat- 
ed 4.2 millon cubic meters of logs and exported 644 million board 
feet. The contribution of logs and lumber to total Philippine ex- 
ports declined from 25 percent in 1969 to 2 percent in 1988. 

In addition to the officially sanctioned logging industry, there 
has been considerable illegal logging. The full extent of this activi- 
ty was difficult to determine, but the discrepancy between Philip- 
pine and Japanese statistics on log exports from the Philippines 
to Japan provided one source of information. From 1955 through 
1986, log imports from the Philippines, according to Japanese statis- 
tics, averaged about 50 percent more than log exports to Japan 
according to Philippines statistics. In 1987 and 1988, the discrepancy 
was considerably reduced, perhaps an indication of the Aquino 
government's stricter enforcement policy. 

Another cause of deforestation was swidden agriculture, called 
kaingin in the Philippines. The method involves burning a portion 
of forest area to produce a fertilizing effect, planting a series of 
crops for two or three years, and then, after the soil has become 
depleted of nutrients, moving on to another location to allow the 
burned out area to rejuvenate. Often referred to as slash-and-burn 
agriculture, swidden as practiced by upland Filipino groups was 
ecologically sound as long as land was relatively plentiful. But since 
the 1960s, increased use of land for logging and migration of landless 
peasants from lowland areas has caused a scarcity of land. Burned- 
over areas were not allowed to lay fallow for a sufficient period, 
and the new migrants often had no knowledge of sound swidden 
practice. As a result, new growth was not allowed to mature be- 
fore being burned over again; extensive erosion occurred, and once- 
forested areas were transformed into grasslands. 

The widespread deforestation caused massive ecological destruc- 
tion. Beginning in the early 1980s, the government instituted refor- 
estation programs to stem the destruction. In 1981 Marcos made 
the granting of timber concessions conditional on the concession- 
aire's reforesting. After his ouster, however, the new secretary of the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources reported that 
90 percent of the 1 70 logging companies with concessions had failed 
to implement reforestation activities. The Aquino administration 



152 



The Economy 



also launched a reforestation program to replant 100,000 hectares 
per year, but it too met with limited success. In 1988, two years 
into the program, the government reforested 32,000 hectares and 
awarded reforestation contracts for another 4,500 hectares. Other 
initiatives included a program to employ upland dwellers in 
reforestation, limiting the extent of timber concessions, and con- 
trolling exports of forest products. Nongovernment, environmen- 
tal organizations also became involved in forest preservation efforts. 
One official noted that with more than 5 million hectares of forests 
already denuded, and with a deforestation rate of 1 19,000 hectares 
per year, the country would be facing a timber famine within a 
decade. Second-growth forests were too young to cut, so timber 
requirements for the near term would have to be met from the re- 
maining old-forest stands, leaving inadequate reserves for the medi- 
um term. 

Fishing 

The Philippines is surrounded by a vast aquatic resource base 
(see Physical Setting, ch. 2). In 1976 the government adopted a 
200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone covering some 2.2 mil- 
lion square kilometers. However, the country's traditional fishing 
grounds constituted a relatively small 126,500-square-kilometer 
area. Fish and other seafood provided more than half the protein 
consumed by the average Filipino household. Total fish produc- 
tion in 1989 was 2.3 million tons. Of this, 46 percent was caught 
by some 574,000 municipal and subsistence fishermen, who oper- 
ated small boats in shallow water, customarily no more than three 
kilometers offshore. These fishermen were among the poorest of 
the poor, with incomes averaging only 25 percent of the national 
average. Another 27 percent of the catch came from the approxi- 
mately 45,000 commercial fishermen. An equal proportion of the 
total catch was provided by the fast-growing aquaculture indus- 
try. Prawn production, mostly aquaculture, developed rapidly in 
the 1980s, averaging 31,000 tons during the 1984-87 period. In 
1988 exports of fishery products amounted to US$407 million, ap- 
proximately 6 percent of total exports. 

During much of the 1980s, the livelihood of small municipal and 
subsistence fishermen was undermined by low production, stagnating 
at approximately 1 million tons per year. A number of factors con- 
tributed to the low production: encroachment of commercial fisher- 
men into shallow waters, destruction of the marine environment, 
over-fishing, and construction of an increasing number of fish ponds. 
A large proportion of the mangrove forests was cleared to construct 
fishponds, seriously damaging the coastal ecological system. Coral 



153 



Philippines: A Country Study 



reefs sustained serious damage from illegal fishing with dynamite 
and cyanide, and from the muro-ami fishing technique by which 
young swimmers pound the coral with rocks attached to ropes to 
drive the fish into nets. Coral also was damaged by silting from 
erosion caused by deforestation, and inland freshwater lakes were 
polluted from industrial and agricultural wastes. 

Industry 

Manufacturing 

Immediately after independence, the government concentrated 
its efforts on reconstructing and rehabilitating the war-damaged 
economy. In 1949 import and foreign exchange controls were im- 
posed to alleviate a balance of payments problem. Imports fell dra- 
matically, providing a stimulus for the development of light industry 
oriented toward the domestic market. Manufacturing growth was 
rapid, averaging 9.9 percent per year during the 1950s. Initially, 
textiles, food manufactures, tobacco, plastics, and light fabrication 
of metals dominated. There also was some assembly of automo- 
biles and trucks and construction of truck and bus bodies. By the 
early 1960s, however, manufacturing growth declined to slightly 
less than the growth of GNP. The share of the labor force in 
manufacturing in 1988 was 10.4 percent, less than it was in 1956, 
although the share had grown to 12 percent in 1990. 

By the late 1980s, and in part the consequence of local content 
laws that were intended to enhance linkage among various manufac- 
turing industries and increase self-sufficiency, the industrial struc- 
ture had become more complex, with intermediate and capital goods 
industries relatively large for a country at the Philippines' stage 
of development (see table 10, Appendix). By the mid-1980s, an 
ambitious US$6 billion industrial development program originally 
undertaken by the Marcos regime in 1979 had resulted in opera- 
tional copper smelter-refinery, coco-chemical manufacturing, and 
phosphatic fertilizer projects. A cement-industry rehabilitation and 
expansion program and an integrated iron and steel mill project 
were still underway. A petrochemical complex appeared about to 
be undertaken in 1990, but was bogged down in a dispute over 
location and financing. 

Manufacturing output fell in the political and economic crisis 
of 1983, and industry in 1985 was working at as low as 40 percent 
of capacity. By the middle of 1988, after economic pump priming 
by the Aquino regime, industries were again working at full ca- 
pacity. In 1990 the Board of Investments approved investment 



154 



The Economy 



projects valued at US$3.75 billion, including US$1 .48 billion tar- 
geted to the manufacturing sector. 

Manufacturing production is geographically concentrated. In 
1990, 50 percent of industrial output came from Metro Manila (see 
Glossary) and another 20 percent from the adjoining regions of 
Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon (see fig. 6). Prior to 1986, 
government efforts to distribute industry more evenly were largely 
ineffective. In the post-Marcos economic recovery, however, in- 
vestment grew in small and medium-sized firms producing handi- 
crafts, furniture, electronics, garments, footwear, and canned goods 
in areas outside of Metro Manila, particularly in Cebu City and 
Davao City. 

In 1990 the industrial sector was inefficient and oligopolistic. 
Although small- and medium-sized firms accounted for 80 percent 
of manufacturing employment, they accounted for only 25 percent 
of the value added in manufacturing. Most industrial output was 
concentrated in a few, large establishments. For example, a six- 
month Senate inquiry determined in 1990 that eight of the coun- 
try's seventeen cement-manufacturing companies were under the 
control of a single firm. 

Mining 

The 1980s were difficult for mining in the Philippines. In 1990 
the mining and quarrying sector contributed 1.5 percent of GNP, 
approximately half the percentage it had accounted for ten years 
earlier. Mineral exports were 5.4 percent of merchandise trade in 
1988, whereas in 1980 they constituted 17.8 percent. Rising oper- 
ational costs and a depressed market severely affected the indus- 
try. In 1990 mining operations suffered from labor disputes, higher 
mandated wages, higher interest rates, typhoons, an earthquake, 
and power shortages. 

In the 1990s, the Philippines still had large deposits of copper, 
chromium, gold, and nickel, plus smaller deposits of cadmium, 
iron, lead, manganese, mercury, molybdenum, and silver. Indus- 
trial minerals included asbestos, gypsum, limestone, marble, phos- 
phate, salt, and sulfur. Mineral fuels included coal and petroleum. 

In 1988 the Philippines was the sixth largest producer of chro- 
mium in the world and ranked ninth in gold production and tenth 
in copper production. The country's nickel-mining company, 
Nonoc Mining and Industrial Corporation, ceased operation in 
March 1986 because of financial and labor difficulties. The Asset 
Privatization Trust, a government entity in charge of selling firms 
acquired by the government through foreclosure proceedings, sold 
Nonoc in late 1990. The new owners expected to resume operations 



155 



Philippines: A Country Study 





Copper 




Gold and silver 


@ 


Zinc 


(§) 


Nickel 


@ 


Chromite 


® 


Iron 




Petroleum 




Coal 



® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 




Hydroelectric power 


[1 


Geothermal power 


B 


Petroleum or coal-fired 




power 




Chemicals 




Cement 




Refined petroleum 


■ 


Fabricated metal products 




Smelted and processed 




metals 


|w] 


Forest products 


B 


Food and tobacco 


S 


Textiles and fibers 





75 150 Kilometers 





75 150 Miles 



SAMAR 




Davao 



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Mines, Mineral Industries of the Far East and South Asia, Washington, 1988, 100-109. 



Figure 6. Major Industrial Activity, 1988 



156 



The Economy 



in the middle of 1991 and produce some 28,700 tons a year, which 
would again make nickel a major export earner for the Philippines. 

Energy 

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Philippines sought growth and 
self-sufficiency in energy production. In 1972 the government al- 
tered the legal arrangements for oil exploration from concessions 
to service contracts, and serious oil exploration began in the mid- 
and late 1970s. As a result of exploration in the Palawan-Sulu 
seabed, oil was discovered in the Nido oil field in 1976. Commer- 
cial production began in 1979 and yielded 8.8 million barrels. Suc- 
cessful wells also were drilled in the Cadlao and Matinloc fields 
off Palawan in 1981 and 1982, but the fields were relatively small. 
The level of production varied during the 1980s but never exceeded 
5 million barrels in any one year. In 1988 local production — 2.2 
million barrels — accounted for only 3 percent of domestic oil use 
(see table 11, Appendix). A study released in early 1990, indicat- 
ing that the geology of the Philippines was a favorable indicator 
of possible additional petroleum deposits, was used by the govern- 
ment to encourage oil exploration firms. Production-sharing ar- 
rangements allowed a firm first to recover the cost of its investment, 
after which 60 percent of profits would go to the government. In 
December 1990, there were new discoveries of oil and natural gas 
off the northwest coast of Palawan Island. Tests showed that the 
oil well could have a flow rate of 6,000 barrels per day, with potential 
reserves of about 1 billion barrels. 

Between 1973 and 1983, power generation increased at an an- 
nual rate of 7.0 percent, two percentage points above the growth 
rate of real gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). In 1988 
the National Power Corporation, which produced approximately 
90 percent of the country's electricity, had a generating capacity 
of 5,772 megawatts. Of that, 42 percent was from oil-burning plants 
and 7 percent from dual oil-coal facilities. An additional 37 per- 
cent was from hydroelectric plants, and just under 15 percent was 
from geothermal plants. 

The Philippines had a wealth of potential energy resources. It 
ranked second behind the United States in production of electricity 
from geothermal sources. Installed capacity in 1988 was 828 mega- 
watts; estimated potential was 35,000 megawatts. Undeveloped 
hydroelectric potential of 3,771 megawatts also was identified. 
Coal resources, estimated to be 1.2 billion tons, also were plen- 
tiful, although of a rather poor grade for electrical generation. 
In addition to these sources, solar, animal waste, agriwaste, and 
other nonconventional sources were utilized for generating small 



157 



Philippines: A Country Study 



amounts of electricity and other energy needs in rural areas. Together 
they accounted for about 15 percent of energy consumption. 

In 1990 the Philippines was confronted with a crisis of insuffi- 
cient electrical generating capacity. Metro Manila and the thirty- 
three provinces in the Luzon power grid experienced brownouts 
of up to four hours per day, with the grid averaging a daily defi- 
ciency of 262 megawatts. At the root of the problem was the deci- 
sion by the Marcos regime to build a 620 megawatt nuclear-power 
plant on the Bataan Peninsula. The Aquino government decided 
not to use the facility because it was located on a seismic fault. As 
a result, a badly needed expansion of generating capacity in Lu- 
zon, which accounted for 75 percent of national electric consump- 
tion, did not come on line. The problem was compounded by 
inadequate planning and bureaucratic delays. There were delays 
in the building of a facility capable of generating 110 megawatts 
of geothermal power in Albay Province and a 300 megawatt coal- 
fired plant in Batangas Province. The short-term solution was to 
put up a series of gas-turbine plants with a combined rating of 500 
megawatts. Only 245 megawatts came on stream between 1987 
and 1989. Economists estimated that to achieve a 5.6 percent growth 
rate in real GNP, the country would need an additional 300 
megawatts of generating capacity yearly. 

Efforts also were being made to expand the country's rural elec- 
trification program. In 1985 it covered the franchise area of some 
120 electrical cooperatives, reaching around 2.7 million households. 
The government planned to expand the coverage to some 4 mil- 
lion households by 1992. 

The Service Sector 
Finance 

The Philippine financial system in the early 1990s was composed 
of banking institutions and nonbank financial intermediaries, in- 
cluding commercial banks, specialized government banks, thrift 
and rural banks, offshore banking units, building and loan associ- 
ations, investment and brokerage houses, and finance companies. 
The Central Bank and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
maintained regulatory and supervisory control. The Philippines 
had a relatively sophisticated banking system; however, the level of 
financial intermediation was low relative to the size of the econo- 
my. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of policy reforms 
were initiated to strengthen the system, but financial crises in 1981 
and 1983 short-circuited their full effect. The financial communi- 
ty has undertaken recovery efforts since 1986. 



158 



Jeepney, customized jeep used extensively for public transportation 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

Until the economic crisis of the mid-1980s, the largest commer- 
cial bank in the Philippines was the government-owned Philippine 
National Bank. Created in 1916 to provide agricultural credit for 
export crops, the Philippine National Bank accounted for 25 per- 
cent to 30 percent of commercial bank assets in the 1970s and early 
1980s. As the result of the accumulation of nonperforming assets, 
by 1987 the asset share of the Philippine National Bank had fallen 
by half. In 1988 there were twenty privately-owned domestic banks 
and four branches of foreign banks engaged in commercial bank- 
ing. Since the passage of the General Banking Act of 1948, for- 
eign investment in banking has been limited to 40 percent of 
domestic bank equity. Total assets of the commercial banking sys- 
tem in 1988 were about P330 billion. 

The Philippine government controlled three specialized banks 
in 1991 : the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Land Bank 
of the Philippines, and the Philippine Amanah Bank. The Develop- 
ment Bank of the Philippines, established in 1946 and initially 
designed to facilitate postwar rehabilitation, provided long-term 
finance. It supplied 47 percent of long-term loans and 15 percent 
of the medium-term loans. More than 70 percent of its loans were 
allocated to industry. The Land Bank of the Philippines, estab- 
lished in the early 1970s, financed the government land reform 



159 



Philippines: A Country Study 

program. The Philippine Amanah Bank, organized in the mid- 
1970s, served Muslims in the southern Philippines. Offshore bank- 
ing units have been allowed to do business in the Philippines since 
1977. Also since 1977, certain domestic banks have been allowed 
to take foreign-currency deposits and engage in foreign-currency 
lending. 

From its inception in 1948 until 1980, the Central Bank exten- 
sively regulated the commercial banking system and engaged in 
considerable rediscounting activity. Interest rates were set adminis- 
tratively, usually below the market clearing rate. Commercial bank 
lending tended to be short-term and granted to known, established 
borrowers. The system had periods of instability with several bank 
runs and a few failures. In 1980, at the instigation of the World 
Bank and the IMF, several measures were passed to increase com- 
petition in the financial sector, achieve greater efficiency, and in- 
crease borrowers' access to long-term funds. Large banks with a 
net worth of at least P500 million could engage in expanded com- 
mercial banking, or "unibanking," combining commercial and 
investment banking activities. In 1988 there were eight unibanks, 
including the Philippine National Bank. Further liberalization had 
occurred in 1983, when interest rates shifted from being ad- 
ministered to being market-determined. 

Interest-rate ceilings had led to an excess demand for loans and 
credit rationing. The Malacanang Palace interfered in loan deci- 
sions regarding state-owned banks, weakening the quality of bank 
portfolios. It was argued that a market-determined interest rate 
would make such behavior less rewarding and more difficult. 
However, before the interest rate reform could be initiated and 
before the expanded commercial bank reform had an impact on 
the banking industry, a series of crises hit the Philippines, throw- 
ing the country's financial system into disarray. 

The economic and political crisis that occurred in the aftermath 
of the assassination of Marcos's political rival, Benigno Aquino, 
resulted in a virtual collapse of much of the banking industry, par- 
ticularly the smaller institutions. The larger banks suffered sub- 
stantial losses from the drastic devaluations of the peso between 
1983 and 1985. Commercial bank loans increased slightiy in 1984, 
but then fell almost 30 percent in the following two years — from 
PI 16 billion to P83 billion — before turning upward again. Infla- 
tion during that three-year period was almost 80 percent. The two 
largest financial intermediaries, the Philippine National Bank and 
Development Bank of the Philippines, became insolvent, and a 
number of financial institutions failed, including the three largest 



160 



The Economy 



investment houses, three commercial banks, the majority of the 
more than 1,000 rural banks, and the largest savings bank. 

The Aquino government undertook a rehabilitation program for 
the Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philip- 
pines. In 1986 nonperforming assets of the two institutions were 
transferred to the government, reducing the value of the assets of 
the Philippine National Bank by 67 percent and that of the De- 
velopment Bank of the Philippines by 87 percent. The relative im- 
portance of these two banks in the financial sector diminished 
dramatically. The domestically owned commercial banking sector, 
however, became more concentrated. From the mid-1950s to the 
early 1980s, the five largest private domestic commercial banks ac- 
counted for about 35 percent of total assets of the private domestic 
commercial banks. By 1988 that ratio had risen to around 55 per- 
cent. The combined assets of the five private domestic commer- 
cial banks, the Philippine National Bank, and the two largest foreign 
branch banks accounted for two-thirds of total commercial bank 
assets, up from 56 percent in 1980. 

In 1990 the six largest commercial banks earned an estimated 
P7.9 billion in after-tax profits, an increase of 42 percent over 1989, 
which in turn was a 32 percent increase over 1988. A 1991 World 
Bank memorandum noted that the extent of bank profits indicat- 
ed a "lack of competition" and a ''market structure for financial 
services characterized by oligopoly." Philippine banks had the 
widest interest rate spread (loan rate minus deposit rate) in 
Southeast Asia. 

Transportation 

In 1988 there were 157,000 kilometers of roads, 26,000 of which 
were designated national (arterial) roads. Somewhat less than 50 
percent of national roads were all-weather. The Pan-Philippine 
Highway, also called the Maharlika Highway, running from Laoag 
City in Ilocos Norte to Zamboanga City at the southwest tip of 
Mindanao, was the country's main trunk road (see fig. 7). The 
highway passed through twenty-one provinces. In the 1980s, the 
national road system increased by 10 percent, and the portion that 
was surfaced with asphalt or concrete increased by 20 percent. The 
planning target for 1992 called for 100 percent of arterial roads 
to be all-weather and 95 percent to be paved. Local roads, however, 
were allowed to deteriorate. The condition of many roads was poor 
because of low design standards, substandard construction, inade- 
quate maintenance, and damage from over-loaded vehicles. A pro- 
gram of rehabilitation and improvement of the local road system 
was part of the plan objectives. 



161 



Philippines: A Country Study 

In 1988, 1.3 million motor vehicles were registered with the 
Bureau of Land Transportation. About 22 percent were motorcy- 
cles; 30 percent were private automobiles, and 38 percent were util- 
ity vehicles. A large number of the utility vehicles were jeepneys, 
jeeps converted for hire to carry passengers. In the late 1980s, Metro 
Manila experienced a combination of heavy traffic congestion and 
a shortage of transportation, reflecting an increasing number of 
private automobiles and an insufficient number of public convey- 
ance vehicles. A 1989 estimate indicated a shortage of 3,200 buses 
and 21,700 jeepneys in the Manila area, and many of the taxis 
and buses in Metro Manila were very old. 

In 1991 there were two international airports: Manila's Ninoy 
Aquino International Airport and Mactan International Airport 
near Cebu City. Slightly over 1 million visitors arrived in the Philip- 
pines by air in 1988. About half of the national airports were served 
by the main domestic and international carrier, Philippine Air 
Lines. No additional airport construction was anticipated in the 
Medium-Term Development Plan, 1987-92. Thereafter, Ma- 
nila's international airport, which is too small to handle expected 
increases in air traffic, would need to be relocated. During the talks 
between the United States and the Philippines in 1990 concerning 
the future of the two major United States military facilities in the 
Philippines, there was public discussion of relocating the interna- 
tional airport to the United States facility, Clark Air Base, and mak- 
ing Ninoy Aquino a domestic airport. 

There was a network of 622 public and 314 private seaports in 
the Philippine archipelago in the late 1980s. Six ports — Manila, 
Cebu, Iloilo, Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, and Davao — handled 
approximately 80 percent of public port traffic. In 1988 a major 
construction project was underway at the Manila International Con- 
tainer Terminal. There were an ongoing series of port improve- 
ment projects, plans for a fishing port program, and a program 
to develop roll-on-roll-off capacity in order to link sea and road 
transportation systems. 

In 1987 there were more than 3,000 passenger and cargo ships 
in the interisland shipping industry, with a total registered cargo 
tonnage of 417,500 tons. The ships accounted for about 85 per- 
cent of interisland cargo movements and nearly 10 percent of 
passenger-kilometers traveled nationwide. Somewhat less than one- 
third of the ships were liner vessels; the remainder were tramp ships. 
Liner ships were generally imported secondhand from Japan and 
in 1987 had an average age of about nineteen years. Although the 
industry was highly regulated, it was criticized for moving goods 



162 





Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




The Economy 



slowly and inefficiently and for safety violations, particularly over- 
loading passengers during peak periods of travel. 

The Philippines in 1 990 had one main railroad line running north 
out of Manila 266 kilometers to San Fernando City in La Union 
Province and 474 kilometers south to Legaspi City in Albay 
Province. The system had deteriorated over the years, with utili- 
zation declining to a tenth of the passenger traffic and a twentieth 
of the freight carried in 1960. In the first 10 months of 1990, the 
railroad carried 30,000 tons of freight, down from 48,000 in 1989. 
During the same period, passenger service turned around, however, 
climbing from 210 million passenger-kilometers in 1989 to 226 mil- 
lion in 1990. 

The Philippine National Railroad began a project in 1990-91 
to upgrade its southern track system, utilizing a PI. 2 billion loan 
from Japan. When completed in 1993, the upgraded system would 
cut travel time from Manila to Bicol substantially. 

In 1984 a Light Rail Transit system began operation in Metro 
Manila, running from Baclaran in the south to Monumento in the 
North. The fifteen-kilometer system provided some relief from 
Metro Manila's highly congested traffic network. 

Telecommunications and Postal Services 

The Philippine telecommunication system in 1989 consisted of 
some fifty-five telephone companies, seven domestic record carri- 
ers, four international record carriers, and two satellite ground sta- 
tions. Approximately 70 percent of the country's telephone lines 
were located in Metro Manila. In 1989 there were 4.7 telephones 
per 100 persons in Metro Manila but only 0.8 telephones per 100 
persons in the country as a whole. The country had approximate- 
ly 380 radio stations broadcasting to 4 million receivers in English 
and all the major Philippine languages and dialects, and 42 televi- 
sion stations transmitting to 6 million receivers, mainly in Filipi- 
no and English. The mail volume handled by the more than 2,000 
post offices in the Philippines doubled from approximately 400 mil- 
lion pieces in 1979 to approximately 800 million pieces in 1988. 

Tourism 

Tourism developed rapidly in the 1970s, with visitors number- 
ing 1 million in 1980. Thereafter, the industry went into a slump, 
reaching the 1 million visitor mark again only in 1988. In that year, 
the average length of stay was 12.6 days, up from 8.9 days in 1987. 
Many of the visitors, however, were emigrant Filipinos returning 
for periodic visits with families and friends. In 1988 an average 
of 73 percent of Manila's 8,500 hotel rooms were occupied. 



165 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Estimates of tourist revenue varied considerably. In 1988 the 
Central Bank estimated it at US$405 million, 11 percent of the 
country's nonmerchandise exports. Using a different formula, the 
Department of Tourism estimated tourism earnings at US$1.45 
billion. Most tourists entered the country through Manila, but the 
city had relatively few amenities and suffered from congestion, pol- 
lution, and crime. Intramuros, the colonial Spanish walled city, 
had not been fully restored since its destruction at the end of World 
War II. Political instability in the country during the 1980s also 
was a deterrent to tourism. The Medium-Term Development Plan 
called for promotion of both domestic and international tourism. 

Employment and Labor Relations 

A high rate of population growth, lack of access to land, insuf- 
ficient job creation in industry, and a history of inappropriate 
economic policies contributed to high unemployment and under- 
employment and a relatively high proportion of the labor force 
being in low-productivity, service sector jobs in the late 1980s. Real 
wages were low, having declined at about 3 percent per year since 
1960, and relatively weak labor unions were unable to substan- 
tially affect the deterioration of workers' earning power. 

Labor Force and Employment 

Population growth averaged 2.9 percent from 1965 to 1980 and 
2.5 percent in the late 1980s (see Population Growth, ch. 2). Despite 
the fact that more than 40 percent of the population was below 
fifteen years of age, the growth of the working- age population — 
those fifteen years of age and older — was even more rapid than 
total population growth. In the 1980s, the working-age population 
grew by 2.7 percent annually. In addition, the labor force partici- 
pation rate — the proportion of working-age people who were in 
the labor force — rose approximately 5 percentage points during the 
1980s, largely because of the increase in the proportion of women 
entering the work force. Hence the actual labor force grew by 
750,000 people, or approximately 4 percent, each year during the 
1980s. 

Agriculture, which had provided most employment, employed 
only approximately 45 percent of the work force in 1990, down 
from 60 percent in 1960. Manufacturing industry was not able to 
make up the difference. Manufacturing's share of employed peo- 
ple remained stable at about 12 percent in 1990. 

The service sector (commerce, finance, transportation, and a host 
of private and public services), perforce, became the residual em- 
ployer, accounting for almost 40 percent of the work force in 1988 



166 



The Economy 



as contrasted with 25 percent in 1960. Much of this growth was 
in small-scale enterprises or self-employment activities such as hawk- 
ing and vending, repair work, transportation, and personal ser- 
vices. Such endeavors are often referred to as the "informal sector," 
because of the lack of record keeping by such enterprises and a 
relative freedom from government regulation, monitoring, or 
reporting. Informal sector occupations were characterized by low 
productivity, modest fixed assets, long hours of work, and low 
wages. According to a 1988 study of urban poor in Metro Manila, 
Cebu, and Davao cities published in the Philippine Economic Jour- 
nal, more than half of the respondents engaged in informal sector 
work as their primary income-generating activity. 

Unemployment, which had averaged about 4.5 percent during 
the 1970s, increased drastically following the economic crises of 
the early 1980s, peaking in early 1989 at 11.4 percent. Urban areas 
fared worse; unemployment in mid- 1990, for example, remained 
above 15 percent in Metro Manila. 

Beyond the unemployment generated from economic mis- 
management and crises was a more long-term, structural employ- 
ment problem, a consequence of the highly concentrated control 
of productive assets and the inadequate number of work places creat- 
ed by investment in the industrial economy. The size and growth 
of the service sector was one indicator. Underemployment was 
another. 

Underemployment has been predominantly a problem for poor, 
less educated, and older people. The unemployed have tended to 
be young, inexperienced entrants into the labor force, who were 
relatively well educated and not heads of households. In the first 
half of the 1980s, approximately 20 percent of male household heads 
and 35 percent of female household heads were unable to find more 
than forty days of work a quarter. 

Overseas migration absorbed a significant amount of Philippine 
labor. From the late 1940s through the 1970s, migrants were largely 
Filipino members of the United States armed services, profession- 
als, and relatives of those who had previously migrated. After liber- 
alization of the United States Immigration and Nationality Act in 
October 1965, the number of United States immigrant visas is- 
sued to Filipinos increased dramatically from approximately 2,500 
in 1965 to more than 25,000 in 1970. Most of those emigrating 
were professionals and their families. By 1990 Filipino-Americans 
numbered 1.4 million, making them the second largest Asian com- 
munity in the United States. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, quite a different flow of migration de- 
veloped: most emigrants were workers engaged in contract work 



167 



Philippines: A Country Study 



in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere. Although 
some were professionals, the majority were production, construc- 
tion, and transport and equipment workers or operators, as well 
as service workers. An increasing number also were merchant sea- 
men. Inasmuch as wages paid for overseas contract work have been 
a multiple of what Filipinos could earn at home, such employment 
opportunities have been in great demand. Government statistics 
show that overseas placements of land-based workers increased from 
12,500 in 1975 to 385,000 in 1988, a growth rate of about 30 per- 
cent per annum. The number of seamen also increased, from 23,500 
in 1975, to almost 86,000 in 1988. The average stay abroad was 

3.1 years for land-based workers and 6.3 years for seamen. 

In 1982 the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
was established in the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration consolidated 
responsibility for regulating overseas land-based workers and sea- 
men, supervising recruitment, as well as adjudicating complaints 
and conflicts. The agency also was tasked with promoting employ- 
ment opportunities abroad for Filipinos. Overseas employment 
created two benefits for the economy: jobs and foreign exchange. 
The total number of placements abroad from 1980 through 1988, 

3.2 million, was about one-half the growth in the country's labor 
supply during that period. Remittances through the banking sys- 
tem for the period 1983 to 1988 totaled approximately US$4.6 bil- 
lion, an amount equal to 14 percent of merchandise exports during 
the same period. The Central Bank estimated that remittances pass- 
ing through "informal channels" might be as much as twice the 
documented figure. If so, export of labor would be the largest sin- 
gle earner of foreign exchange. 

Labor Relations 

From independence in 1946 until martial law was declared in 
1972, the government encouraged collective bargaining and, ex- 
cept for setting up a commission in 1970 to supervise the fixing 
of minimum wages, involved itself minimally in labor relations. 
For most of the martial law period (1972-81), strikes were forbid- 
den or severely limited. The Marcos labor code of 1974 made ar- 
bitration compulsory. The right to strike was partially restored in 
1976, but with considerable restrictions. The Aquino government 
took a somewhat more liberal approach to labor, but some of the 
structures of the Marcos period remained. 

Organized labor in the Philippines has been relatively weak. In 
1986 it was estimated that about 2.2 million Filipinos were part 
of the union movement, accounting for approximately 20 percent 



168 




Coastal fishing, mainly with wooden-hulled outriggers, 
is a major source of employment. 
Courtesy Philippine Tourist Research and Planning Organization 

of the wage-and-salary work force, or 10 percent of the total labor 
force. These workers were organized into some 2,000 unions, half 
of which were not connected to a national union or federation. In 
1987 only 350,000 workers were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. 

The largest union body was the Trade Union Congress of the 
Philippines (TUCP). Formed in December 1974, it was desig- 
nated the official labor center of the Philippines by the Marcos 
government. Another labor organization, the Kilusang Mayo Uno 
(KMU), or the May First Movement, was formed in July 1980, 
bringing together nine broadly based, more ideologically oriented 
unions. The two major union centers represented sharply differ- 
ent visions of the role of unions in society. Although TUCP sup- 
ported Marcos, it represented itself as a proponent of nonpolitical 
unionism, concerned primarily with the collective bargaining 
process. The KMU was more openly political, projecting itself as 
a proponent of "genuine, militant, and nationalist unionism." Going 
beyond collective bargaining, the KMU called for the formation 
of worker solidarity movements and advocated a nationalist-oriented 
alternative to the prevailing economic and social policies of the 
government. The Labor Advisory and Consultative Council 



169 



Philippines: A Country Study 

(LACC), formed at the onset of the Aquino administration in 1986 
by then Labor Minister Agusto Sanchez, drew the various factions 
of the labor movement together to advise the Ministry of Labor 
and Employment. Membership in LACC included the KMU, the 
Federation of Free Workers, Lakas Ng Manggagawa Labor Center, 
and, for a short while, the TUCP. 

When Aquino came into office in 1986, she had the backing of 
a wide spectrum of the population, including those affiliated with 
labor unions. In her May 1 speech that year, before a large and 
enthusiastic gathering of labor groups, Aquino presented a pack- 
age of labor-law reforms, including extending the right to strike, 
making it easier to petition for a union certification election, and 
abrogating repressive labor legislation decreed by the Marcos 
government. Soon, however, the president began to shift ground 
as she received vigorous protests by both Filipino and foreign 
businessmen against her May Day promises. The pledges were 
rethought, modified in some cases, and not promulgated in others. 
This willingness to respond to the interests of the boardroom rather 
than the shop floor also extended to official appointments. In par- 
ticular, her first minister of labor, Agusto Sanchez, was considered 
to be too prolabor and eased out within a year of his appointment. 

The TUCP was generally supportive of the Aquino government, 
but the KMU and other progressive unions resisted the conserva- 
tive drift of her administration through strikes, demonstrations, 
and antigovernment rallies. The KMU gained influence through 
its leadership of the national strike, or Welga ng Bayan, in 1987, 
1989, and 1990. From September to December 1990, the KMU 
led a series of general strikes in response to dramatic increases in 
the prices of petroleum products. These labor actions were note- 
worthy both because of a heightened level of conflict between strikers 
and the authorities and because of the participation of profession- 
als and other middle-class groups. 

Repression of labor activists, widespread during the Marcos era, 
resurfaced early in the Aquino administration. In November 1986, 
the chairman of the KMU was murdered. The following January, 
the army opened fire on a march of the Peasant Movement of the 
Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas — KMP) and their 
supporters who were protesting the lack of government action on 
land reform. Eighteen were killed and nearly 100 wounded. In 1990 
the government charged two KMU labor leaders with sedition: 
Medardo Roda, the head of PISTON, a federation of drivers; and 
Crispin Beltran, the chairman of KMU. Old charges of slander 
and fraud dating back to 1967 and 1971 were revived against 
Beltran. The government also imprisoned the leader of the KMP, 



170 



The Economy 



Jaime Tadeo, on ten-year-old fraud charges initiated against him 
by the Marcos government. After a 1990 violent strike, during 
which an estimated 500 participants were arrested, both the mili- 
tary and government officials suggested banning the KMU as a 
communist-front organization. 

Economic Welfare 

In 1990 the Philippines had not yet recovered from the economic 
and political crisis of the first half of the 1980s. At PI 8,41 9, or 
US$668, per capita, GNP in 1990 remained, in real terms, below 
the level of 1978. A major thrust of Aquino's 1986 People Power 
Revolution was to address the needs of impoverished Filipinos. One 
of the four principles of her "Policy Agenda for People-Powered 
Development" was promotion of social justice and poverty allevi- 
ation. Government programs launched in 1986 and 1987 to generate 
employment met with some success, reversing the decline of the 
first half of the decade, but these efforts did little to alleviate the 
more chronic aspects of Philippine poverty. 

Extent of Poverty 

Individuals are said to be in absolute poverty when they are un- 
able to obtain at least a specified minimum of the food, clothing, 
and shelter that are considered necessary for continued survival. 
In the Philippines, two such minimums have been established. The 
poverty line is defined in terms of a least-cost consumption basket 
of food that provides 2,016 calories and 50 grams of protein per 
day and of nonfood items consumed by families in the lowest quin- 
tile of the population. In 1988 the poverty line for a family of six 
was estimated to be P2,709 per month. The subsistence level is 
defined as the income level that allows purchase of the minimum 
food requirements only. 

In 1985 slightly more than half the population lived below the 
poverty line, about the same proportion as in 1971. The propor- 
tion of the population below the subsistence level, however, declined 
from approximately 35 percent in 1971 to 28 percent in 1985. The 
economic turndown in the early 1980s and the economic and po- 
litical crisis of 1983 had a devastating impact on living standards. 

The countryside contained a disproportionate share of the poor. 
For example, more than 80 percent of the poorest 30 percent of 
families in the Philippines lived in rural areas in the mid-1980s. 
The majority were tenant farmers or landless agricultural workers. 
The landless workers, fishermen, and forestry workers were found 
to be the poorest of the poor. In some rural regions — the sugar- 
growing region on the island of Negros being the most egregious 



171 



Philippines: A Country Study 

example — there was a period in which malnutrition and famine 
had been widespread. 

Urban areas also were hard hit, with the incidence of urban 
poverty increasing between 1971 and 1985 by 13 percentage points 
to include half the urban population. The urban poor generally 
lived in crowded slum areas, often on land or in buildings without 
permission of the owner; hence, they were referred to as squatters 
(see Urban Social Patterns, ch. 2). These settlements often lacked 
basic necessities such as running water, sewerage, and electricity. 
According to a 1984 government study, 44 percent of all occupied 
dwellings in Metro Manila had less than thirty square meters of 
living area, and the average monthly expenditure of an urban poor 
family was PI, 315. Of this amount, 62 percent was spent on food 
and another 9 percent on transportation, whereas only P57 was 
spent on rent or mortgage payments, no doubt because of the ex- 
tent of squatting by poor families. About 55 percent of the poor 
surveyed who were in the labor force worked in the informal sec- 
tor, generally as vendors or street hawkers. Other activities included 
service and repair work, construction, transport services, or petty 
production. Women and children under fifteen years of age con- 
stituted almost 60 percent of those employed. The majority of the 
individuals surveyed possessed a high school education, and 30 per- 
cent had a skill such as dressmaking, electrical repair, plumbing, 
or carpentry. Nevertheless, they were unable to secure permanent, 
full-time positions. 

Causes of Poverty 

From one perspective, poverty is a function of total output of 
an economy relative to its population — GNP per capita — and the 
distribution of that income among families. In the World Bank's 
World Development Report, 1990, the Philippines was ranked at the 
lower end of the grouping of lower middle-income economies. Given 
its relative position, the country should be able to limit the extent 
of poverty with a reasonably equitable sharing of the nation's in- 
come. In fact, the actual distribution of income was highly skewed 
(see table 12, Appendix). Although considerable underreporting 
was thought to occur among upper-income families, and incorrect 
reporting from lack of information was common, particularly with 
respect to noncash income, the data were adequate to provide a 
broad overview. 

In 1988 the most affluent 20 percent of families in the Philip- 
pines received more than 50 percent of total personal income, with 
most going to the top 10 percent. Below the richest 10 percent of 
the population, the share accruing to each decile diminished rather 



172 



The Economy 



gradually. A 1988 World Bank poverty report suggested that there 
had been a small shift toward a more equal distribution of income 
since 1961. The beneficiaries appear to have been middle-income 
earners, however, rather than the poor. 

The World Bank report concluded, and many economists as- 
sociated with the Philippines concurred, that the country's high 
population growth rate was a major cause of the widespread poverty, 
particularly in the rural areas. Implementation of a government- 
sponsored family-planning program, however, was thwarted by stiff 
opposition from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church (see 
Population Control, ch. 2). Church pronouncements in the late 
1980s and early 1990s focused on injustice, graft and corruption, 
and mismanagement of resources as the fundamental causes of 
Philippine underdevelopment. These issues were in turn linked to 
the concentration of control of economic resources and the struc- 
ture of the economy. Land ownership was highly unequal, but land 
reform initiatives had made little progress. 

In urban areas also, the extent of poverty was related to the con- 
centrated control of wealth. Considerable portions of both indus- 
try and finance were highly monopolized. Access to finance was 
severely limited to those who already possessed resources. The most 
profitable investment opportunities were often in areas in which 
tariff or other forms of government protection ensured high profits 
but did not necessarily result in rapidly expanding employment 
opportunities. In her election campaign, President Aquino pledged 
to destroy the monopolies and structures of privilege aggravated 
by the Marcos regime. She looked to the private sector to revital- 
ize the economy, create jobs for the masses of Filipinos, and lead 
the society to a higher standard of living. The state-protected mo- 
nopolies were dismantled, but not the monopoly structure of the 
Philippine economy that existed long before Marcos assumed pow- 
er. In their privileged positions, the business elite did not live up 
to the President's expectations. As a consequence, unemployment 
and, more importantly for the issue of poverty, underemployment 
remained widespread. 

International Economic Relations 

International Trade 

At independence in 1946, the Philippines was an agricultural 
nation tied closely to its erstwhile colonizer, the United States. This 
fact was most clearly observed in trade relations between the two 
countries. In 1950 the value of the Philippines' ten principal 
exports — all but one being agricultural or mineral products in raw 



173 



Philippines: A Country Study 

or minimally processed form — added up to 85 percent of the coun- 
try's exports. For the first twenty-five years of independence, the 
structure of export trade remained relatively constant. 

The direction of trade, however, did not remain constant. In 
1949, 80 percent of total Philippine trade was with the United States. 
Thereafter, the United States portion declined as that of Japan rose. 
In 1970 the two countries' share was approximately 40 percent each, 
the United States slightly more and Japan slightly less. The pat- 
tern of import trade was similar, if not as concentrated. The Unit- 
ed States share of Philippine imports declined more rapidly than 
Japan's share rose, so that by 1970 the two countries accounted 
for about 60 percent of total Philippine imports. After 1970 Philip- 
pine exporters began to find new markets, and on the import side 
the dramatic increases in petroleum prices shifted shares in value 
terms, if not in volume. In 1988 the United States accounted for 
27 percent of total Philippine trade, Japan for 19 percent. 

At the time of independence and as a requirement for receiving 
war reconstruction assistance from the United States, the Philip- 
pine government agreed to a number of items that, in effect, kept 
the Philippines closely linked to the United States economy and 
protected American business interests in the Philippines. Manila 
promised not to change its (overvalued) exchange rate from the 
prewar parity of P2 to the dollar, or to impose tariffs on imports 
from the United States without the consent of the president of the 
United States. By 1949 the situation had become untenable. Im- 
ports gready surpassed the sum of exports and the inflow of dollar 
aid, and a regime of import and foreign-exchange controls was in- 
itiated, which remained in place until the early 1960s. 

The controls initially reduced the inflow of goods dramatically. 
Between 1949 and 1950, imports fell by almost 40 percent to 
US$342 million and surpassed the 1949 level in only one year during 
the 1950s. Being constrained, imports of goods and nonfactor ser- 
vices as a proportion of GNP declined during the 1950s, ending 
the decade at 10.6 percent, about the same percentage as that of 
exports. By the late 1950s, however, exchange controls had begun 
to lose their effectiveness as most available foreign exchange was 
committed for required imports. A tariff law was passed in 1957, 
and, from 1960 to early 1962, import and exchange controls were 
phased out. Exports and imports increased rapidly. By 1965 the 
import to GNP ratio was more than 17 percent. Another accelera- 
tion of imports occurred in the early 1970s, this time raising the 
import to GNP ratio to around 25 percent, the level at which it 
remained into the 1990s. Imports in the 1970s were increasingly 
being financed by external debt rather than by exports. 



174 



The Economy 



The composition of imports evolved after independence as in- 
dustrial development occurred and commercial policy was modi- 
fied. In 1949, about 37 percent of imports were consumer goods. 
This proportion declined to around 20 percent during the exchange- 
and-import control period of the 1950s. By the late 1960s, con- 
sumer imports had been largely replaced by domestic production. 
Imports of machinery and equipment increased, however, as the 
country engaged in industrialization, from around 10 percent in 
the early 1950s to double that by the mid-1960s. As a result of the 
surge in petroleum prices in the 1970s, the import share of both 
consumer and capital goods fell somewhat, but their relative mag- 
nitudes remained the same. 

Regardless of the trade regime, the Philippines had difficulty in 
generating sufficient exports to pay for its imports. In the forty 
years from 1950 through 1990, the trade balance was positive in 
only two years: 1963 and 1973. For a few years after major devalu- 
ations in 1962 and 1970, the current account was in surplus, but 
then it too turned negative. Excessive imports remained a problem 
in the late 1980s. Between 1986 and 1989, the negative trade balance 
increased tenfold from US$202 million to US$2.6 billion (see ta- 
ble 13, Appendix). 

In 1990 weaker world prices for Philippine exports, higher 
production costs, and a slowdown in the economies of the Philip- 
pines' major trading partners restrained export growth to only 
slightly more than 4 percent. Increasing petroleum prices and heavy 
importation of capital goods, including power- generating equip- 
ment, helped push imports up almost 17 percent, resulting in a 
50 percent jump in the trade deficit to more than US$4 billion. 
Reducing the drain on foreign exchange has became a major 
government priority. 

A number of factors contributed to the rather dismal trade his- 
tory of the Philippines. The country's terms of trade (see Glossary) 
have fallen for most of the period since 1950, so that in the late 
1980s, a given quantity of exports could buy only 55 percent of 
the volume of imports that it could buy in the early 1950s. A sec- 
ond factor was the persistent overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
The peso was devalued a number of times, falling from a pre- 
independence value of P2 to the dollar to P28 in May 1990. The 
adjustments, however, had not stimulated exports or curtailed im- 
ports sufficiently to bring the two in line with one another. 

A third consideration was the country's trade and industrial poli- 
cies, including tariff protection and investment incentives. Many 
economists have argued that these policies favorably affected import- 
substitution industries to the detriment of export industries. In the 



175 



Philippines: A Country Study 

1970s, the implementation of an export-incentives program and 
the opening of an export-processing zone at Mariveles on the Ba- 
taan Peninsula reduced the biases somewhat. The export of 
manufactures (e.g., electronic components, garments, handicrafts, 
chemicals, furniture, and footwear) increased rapidly. Additional 
export-processing zones were constructed in Baguio City and on 
Mactan Island near Cebu City. During the 1970s and early 1980s, 
nontraditional exports (i.e., commodities not among the ten lar- 
gest traditional exports) grew at a rate twice that of total exports. 
Their share of total exports increased from 8.3 percent in 1970 to 
61.7 percent in 1985. At the same time that nontraditional exports 
were booming, falling raw material prices adversely affected the 
value of traditional exports. 

In 1988 the value of nontraditional exports was US$5.4 billion, 
75 percent of the total. The most important, electrical and elec- 
tronic equipment and garments, earned US$1 .5 billion and US$1 .3 
billion, respectively. Both of these product groups, however, had 
high import content. Domestic value added was no more than 20 
percent of the export value of electronic components and probably 
no more than twice that in the garment industry. Another rapidly 
growing export item was seafood, particularly shrimps and prawns, 
which earned US$307 million in 1988. 

The World Bank and the IMF as well as many Philippine 
economists had long advocated reduction of the level of tariff pro- 
tection and elimination of import controls. Those in the business 
community who were engaged in import-substitution manufactur- 
ing activities, however, opposed reductions. They feared that they 
could not successfully compete if tariff barriers were lowered. 

In the early 1980s, the Philippine government reached agree- 
ment with the World Bank to reduce tariffs by about one-third and 
to lift import restrictions on some 3,000 items over a five- to six- 
year period. The bank, in turn, provided the Philippines with a 
financial sector loan of US$150 million and a structural adjustment 
loan for US$200 million, to provide balance-of-payments relief while 
the tariff wall was reduced. Approximately two-thirds of the changes 
had been enacted when the program ground to a halt in the wake 
of the economic and political crisis that followed the August 1983 
assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino. 

In an October 1986 accord with the IMF, the Aquino govern- 
ment agreed to liberalize import controls and to eliminate quan- 
titative barriers on 1,232 products by the end of 1986. The target 
was accomplished for all but 303 products, of which 180 were in- 
termediate and capital goods. Agreement was reached to extend 
the deadline until May 1988 on those products. The liberalizing 



176 



The Economy 



impact was reduced in some cases, however, by tariffs being erected 
as quantitative controls came down. 

A tariff revision scheme was put forth again in June 1990 by 
Secretary of Finance Jesus Estanislao. After an intracabinet struggle, 
Aquino signed Executive Order 413 on July 19, 1990, implementing 
the policy. The tariff structure was to be simplified by reducing 
the number of rates to four, ranging from 3 percent to 30 percent. 
However, in August 1990, business groups successfully persuad- 
ed Aquino to delay the tariff reform package for six months. 

Foreign Investment 

Foreign participation in the Philippine economy was a controver- 
sial issue throughout much of the twentieth century. The 1935 Com- 
monwealth Constitution contained several provisions limiting the 
areas of economic activity in which non-Filipinos could participate. 
Operation of public utilities, exploitation of natural resources, and 
ownership of public lands were limited to Filipinos or corporations 
controlled by Filipinos. Control of banking and credit was limited 
to Filipinos with the passage of the General Banking Act in 1948, 
and the Retail Nationalization Act of 1954 restricted ownership 
in retail trade to Filipinos. Except in specifically designated areas, 
foreigners could invest only through joint ventures with Filipino 
capitalists. Legal decisions altered the interpretation of various re- 
strictive measures, as did Marcos decrees during the martial law 
era, but the basic restrictions remained and were reaffirmed in the 
1987 constitution. Constraints on foreigners also were aimed at 
non-Filipino residents in the Philippines. The 1987 constitution, 
for example, includes a provision similar to one in the 1935 con- 
stitution defining as natural-born citizens only those individuals 
whose mother or father was a citizen. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission ruled in September 1990 that firms engaging in busi- 
ness in areas of the economy that had been at least partially na- 
tionalized could not employ non-Filipinos in management positions. 
Liberalization of rules limiting areas of foreign investment was being 
considered in the Philippine Congress in early 1991. 

Despite legal restrictions, foreign investment has played a promi- 
nent role in Philippine economic development. In 1948 approxi- 
mately 50 percent of the assets in manufacturing, commerce, and 
mining were foreign owned, as were 80 percent of electricity as- 
sets. By 1970, however, foreign ownership in manufacturing, com- 
merce, and mining had declined to around 40 percent, and very 
little foreign investment remained in utilities. Incomplete data for 
the early 1980s indicated that foreigners controlled about 30 per- 
cent of the assets of the 1 ,000 largest corporations operating in the 



177 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Philippines at that time. Central Bank statistics, reporting inflows 
without taking divestments into account, showed foreign invest- 
ment inflows between 1970 and 1988 totaling US$2.9 billion. Half 
went to manufacturing, of which chemicals and food were the most 
important industries; 24 percent was invested in petroleum refin- 
ing; and 12 percent was in banking and other financial institutions 
(see table 14, Appendix). 

United States corporations have been the largest foreign inves- 
tors in the Philippines. Because of the colonial relationship between 
the United States and the Philippines, as well as a postindepen- 
dence agreement protecting United States business interests, United 
States citizens were not bound by Philippine citizenship restric- 
tions with respect to foreign investment until 1974. A government 
survey showed that 80 percent of foreign investment in 900 of the 
1,000 largest firms in 1970 was American. In the late 1980s, the 
United States remained the largest foreign investor, but its dominant 
position had been eroded. According to Central Bank statistics, 
United States investment between 1970 and 1988 totaled US$1.6 
billion, more than one-half the total of foreign-owned equity in the 
country (see table 15, Appendix). Japan was second with US$396 
million, almost 14 percent. The Central Bank reports for 1989 
showed registration of US$310 million in foreign investment. The 
United States had the largest investment with US$68.8 million, 
followed by Japan with US$51 .9 million. Also important were Hong 
Kong with US$16.9 million, the Netherlands with US$15.8 mil- 
lion, and Taiwan with US$14.7 million. 

Although foreign investors were forbidden by the Philippine con- 
stitution to either own or lease public agricultural lands, there were 
124 transnational agribusiness firms operating in the Philippines 
in 1985, of which 58 were directly engaged in the cultivation of 
cash crops on the southern island of Mindanao. As early as the 
1920s, Del Monte Corporation had established a pineapple planta- 
tion in Bukidnon in northern Mindanao. B.F. Goodrich and Good- 
year Tire Corporation came in the 1950s, and Castle and Cooke 
entered in the 1960s, setting up a pineapple plantation in South 
Cotabato Province. The Philippine government facilitated invest- 
ment of foreign enterprises in plantations through the government- 
owned National Development Corporation, which acquired land 
and leased it to the investors. Foreign-owned firms also were able 
to get around leasing prohibitions by entering into growers' agree- 
ments with landowners and subsequently changing the agreement 
to allow direct cultivation of the land. Such arrangements have 
generated considerable controversy. 



178 



The Economy 



In the late 1980s, pineapples were cultivated directly by Del 
Monte and the Castle and Cooke subsidiary, Dole Philippines. 
Together their plantations comprised 21 ,400 hectares in 1987. These 
two transnational corporations, along with a third, United Brands, 
also produced bananas, almost exclusively for sale in Japan. Produc- 
tion arrangements in the banana industry were more complicated 
than those in the pineapple industry, involving contract production- 
marketing arrangements with domestic agribusinesses and small 
growers, as well as direct cultivation. The three transnational cor- 
porations each controlled directly or through contract arrangements 
about 5,000 hectares of land planted in bananas in the late 1980s. 
In 1988 exports of bananas totaled US$146 million, and those of 
canned pineapples US$83 million. 

External Debt 

On October 17, 1983, the government announced that the Philip- 
pines was unable to meet debt-service obligations on its foreign- 
currency debt of US$24.4 billion and was asking for a ninety-day 
moratorium on its payments. Subsequent requests were made for 
moratorium extensions. The action was the climax of an increas- 
ingly difficult balance of payments situation. Philippine develop- 
ment during the decade of the 1970s had been facilitated by 
extensive borrowing on the international capital market. Between 
1973 and 1982, the country's indebtedness increased an average 
of 27 percent per year. Although government- to- government loans 
and loans from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank were granted at lower-than-market 
rates of interest, the debt-service charges on those and commer- 
cial loans continued to mount. In 1982 payments were US$3.5 bil- 
lion, approximately the level of foreign borrowing that year and 
greater than the country's total debt in 1970. The next year, 1983, 
interest payments exceeded the net inflow of capital by about 
US$1 .85 billion. The debt burden became unsustainable when com- 
bined with the downturn in the world economy; increasing interest 
rates; a domestic financial scandal that occurred when a business- 
man fled the country with debts estimated at P700 million, escalat- 
ing unrest at the excesses of the Marcos regime; and the political 
crisis that followed the Aquino assassination (see table 16, Ap- 
pendix). 

The Philippines had turned to the IMF previously in 1962 and 
1970 when it had run into balance of payments difficulties. It did 
so again in late 1982. An agreement was reached in February 1983 
for an emergency loan, followed by other loans from the World 
Bank and transnational commercial banks. Negotiations began 



179 



Philippines: A Country Study 

again almost immediately after the moratorium declaration between 
Philippine monetary officials and the IMF. The situation became 
complicated when it came to light that the Philippines had under- 
stated its debt by some US$7 billion to US$8 billion, overstated 
its foreign-exchange reserves by approximately US$1 billion, and 
contravened its February 1983 agreement with the IMF by allow- 
ing a rapid increase in the money supply. A new standby arrange- 
ment was finally reached with the IMF in December 1984, more 
than a year after the declaration of the moratorium. In the mean- 
time, additional external funds became nearly impossible to obtain. 

In each of these arrangements with the IMF, the Philippines 
agreed to certain conditions to obtain additional funding, gener- 
ally including devaluation of the peso, liberalization of import re- 
straints, and tightening of domestic credit (limiting the growth of 
the money supply and raising interest rates). The adjustment mea- 
sures demanded by the IMF in the December 1984 agreement were 
harsh, and the economy reacted severely. Because of its financial 
straits, however, the government saw no option but to comply. 
Balance of payments targets were met for the following year, and 
the current account turned positive in FY (fiscal year — see Glos- 
sary) 1986, the first time in more than a decade. But there was 
a cost: interest rates rose to as high as 40 percent, and real GNP 
declined 1 1 percent over 1984 and 1985. The dire economic situa- 
tion contributed to Aquino's victory in the February 1986 presiden- 
tial election. 

When Marcos fled to the United States later that month, the 
Philippine external debt had grown to over US$27 billion. The 
country's most immediate concern was meeting debt-service pay- 
ments. Reduction in the size of the debt was a longer term issue. 
Debt servicing, US$3 billion in 1986, was a drain on both the coun- 
try's foreign-exchange earnings and its investible surplus. Tech- 
nocrats in the National Economic and Development Authority 
recommended declaring another moratorium, this time for two 
years, to allow the country a breathing space. Measures were in- 
troduced in Congress in 1986 and subsequent years to cap annual 
debt-service payments. The Aquino administration and the Cen- 
tral Bank, however, consistently resisted both tactics, opting in- 
stead for a cooperative approach with the country's creditors. 

Some of the government and government-guaranteed debt was 
incurred under questionable circumstances, and there were per- 
sistent demands for repudiation of those loans that could be shown 
to be fraudulent. In November 1990, the Freedom from Debt Coa- 
lition, a nongovernmental organization, presented findings from 
its investigation on six potentially fraudulent loans, together worth 



180 



The Economy 



between US$4 billion and US$6 billion. The largest, a US$2.5 bil- 
lion loan for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, 
involved allegations of irregularities in bidding procedures and de- 
sign, overpricing, and kickbacks. The Aquino government previ- 
ously had filed a civil suit in the United States against Westinghouse 
Corporation, the corporation with which the Marcos government 
had contracted to build the nuclear power plant. The Philippines 
continued to pay interest payments of US$300,000 per day on the 
nuclear plant loans while the case was under litigation. In response 
to the coalition's findings, however, the president said that the coun- 
try would not pay fraudulent loans, a statement interpreted as a 
major policy change. 

Government negotiators dealt mainly with three groups of cre- 
ditors in their efforts to reduce the burden of debt servicing. The 
first, and in some ways the most important, was the IMF, because 
its imprimatur was considered necessary to conclude arrangements 
with other creditors. The second was the Paris Club, an informal 
organization of official creditors. The third group was the com- 
mercial bank creditors, numbering 330 as of 1990. Bank negotia- 
tions generally were with the twelve-member bank advisory 
committee, chaired by Manufacturers Hanover Trust. 

The standby agreement that the Marcos government had 
negotiated with the IMF in 1985 was discontinued shortly after 
Aquino assumed office. The agreed-upon targets with respect to 
government spending and increases in the money supply had been 
wildly exceeded as Marcos dipped into government coffers in a 
desperate effort to win the 1986 election. In addition, the govern- 
ment wished to negotiate a more growth-oriented arrangement. 
An agreement on repayment terms for US$506 million of loans 
was concluded eight months later in October 1986. In January 1987, 
an agreement was reached with the Paris Club to stretch out over 
ten years, with a five-year grace period, US$870 million of loans 
that were to have been paid in 1987 and the first half of 1988. The 
IMF accord also triggered the release of US$350 million in new 
loans by commercial bank creditors that had been held up when 
the agreement with the IMF broke down in early 1986. In March 
1987, the Philippines and the twelve-bank advisory committee came 
to terms on the rescheduling of the country's US$13.2 million debt 
to private banks and a reduction in the rate of interest. Signing 
of the agreement was delayed, however, by a group of creditor banks 
led by Barclays Bank of Britain, who demanded that the Philip- 
pine government guarantee the US$57 million debt of a private 
fertilizer firm, Planters Products, Inc. An accommodation was not 
reached until December 1987. 



181 



Philippines: A Country Study 

A second round of negotiations began in 1989. The Paris Club 
restructured US$2.2 million of debt coming due between Septem- 
ber 1988 and June 1990. The IMF and commercial bank agree- 
ments allowed the Philippines to undertake, in early 1990, a 
three-pronged program under Brady Plan (see Glossary) guide- 
lines. First, the government used funds from the World Bank, IMF, 
and other sources to repurchase US$1.31 billion of government 
debt from private banks at the 50 percent discount at which they 
were selling on the secondary market. This action reduced the coun- 
try's debt by some US$650,000, and, in the process, the number 
of creditor banks fell from 483 to 330. Second, debt coming due 
between 1990 and 1994 was rescheduled. Last, some eighty banks 
subscribed to US$700 million in new loans. 

In July 1990, it was reported that the IMF had reviewed Philip- 
pine economic performance and found it "favorable" for the period 
between October 1989, when the loan agreement was reached, and 
March 1990. By September, however, the situation had turned 
around. Agreed-upon targets had not been met with respect to the 
sizes of the government budgetary deficit, the trade balance, or 
the country's international reserves. As a consequence, the IMF 
refused to release the September tranche (installment of funds) to 
the Philippines. In turn, Manila canceled the 1989 standby agree- 
ment and reopened negotiations with the IMF. A new agreement 
was announced in early 1991 . It involved a three-year credit pack- 
age, totaling US$375 million, only one-third of the US$1.17 bil- 
lion loan package suspended the previous September. Among other 
things, the agreement required the Philippines to implement new 
revenue-raising measures by the end of August 1991. 

As a consequence of the country's failure to meet the Septem- 
ber standby agreement targets, the commercial banks in Febru- 
ary 1991 refused to disburse the last US$1 15 million of the US$706 
million credit line agreed to in early 1990. At a meeting with Filipino 
officials, the bank advisory committee also declined to discuss 
providing some US$500 million in new funds. In February 1991, 
the Philippine government also said that it would ask the Paris Club 
for deferment of payment on US$1 billion in debts falling due from 
June 30, 1991 to July 31, 1992. In a measure to reduce the risk 
of lending to the government by commercial banks, in February 
1991 the Philippines indicated that it would approach multilateral 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian De- 
velopment Bank for cofinancing, in return for which the Philip- 
pine government would give up the possibility of rescheduling. 

Efforts to reduce the external debt included encouraging direct 
investment in the economy. In August 1986, the Philippines 



182 



The Economy 



initiated a debt-equity conversion program, which allowed poten- 
tial investors who could acquire Philippine debt instruments to con- 
vert them into Philippine pesos for the purpose of investing in the 
Philippine economy. Because the value of the debt in the secon- 
dary market was substantially less than its face value (about half, 
at the time), the swap arrangement allowed investors to acquire 
pesos at a discount rate. 

Most of the swapped debt was held by the Central Bank, which 
could provide the peso proceeds to retire the debt only through is- 
suing new money, with obvious inflationary consequences. For this 
reason, the program was suspended in April 1988. At that time, 
US$917 million in debt reduction had taken place. Other issues 
were raised, however, about both the benefits to the Philippines 
and the fairness of the conversion program. Debt-equity swaps, 
it was argued, amounted to a considerable gain to investors, cost- 
ing much less in dollars than was received in pesos. If an invest- 
ment had taken place without the swap, a very large subsidy would 
not have been involved. Second, a considerable portion of the con- 
versions appeared to have been by Filipinos bringing their wealth 
back into the country. Critics questioned whether those who en- 
gaged in capital flight should be awarded a premium for return- 
ing their wealth to the Philippines. There also was the question 
of the arbitrage possibilities of "round tripping," whereby inves- 
tors with pesos engaged in capital flight to obtain foreign curren- 
cy, which was used through the swap to achieve a much larger 
amount of pesos. Alternatively, an individual with dollars could 
engage in a swap and then convert pesos back into dollars through 
the exchange market. Although the government had some regula- 
tions concerning length of investment, the process was ripe for 
abuse. Nevertheless, the government resumed the program in De- 
cember 1990 with an auction of US$7 million in debt paper. The 
new program was reported to have been altered to reduce infla- 
tionary pressures. 

In March 1991, Philippine officials raised the issue of "condo- 
nation," or debt forgiveness, of Philippine debt with United States 
officials, requesting that the United States accord the Philippines 
similar treatment to that accorded Egypt and Poland. The United 
States resisted the entreaty, pointing out that whereas US$33 bil- 
lion of Poland's US$48 billion debt was official, all but 20 percent 
of the Philippine debt was owed to commercial banks. 

The Aquino administration spent an enormous amount of time 
and effort negotiating with various creditor groups to lower interest 
rates, reschedule the country's debt, and reduce the magnitude of 
the debt. A number of innovative schemes were undertaken; more 



183 



Philippines: A Country Study 

were discussed. It was a process, however, that essentially meant 
running fast to stay in place. The size of the country's external 
debt in June 1990, US$26.97 billion, was about the same as the 
US$26.92 billion the country owed at the end of 1985, shortly be- 
fore Aquino took office. Debt-service payments also changed very 
little: US$2.57 billion in 1985 as opposed to US$2.35 billion in 
1990. The balance of payments pressures remained. The growth 
of the Philippine economy, however, caused the ratio of the coun- 
try's debt to GNP to decline from 83.5 in 1985 to 65.2 in 1989, 
whereas that of debt service to exports fell from 32.0 to 26.3 over 
the same period. Projected debt servicing in September 1990 for 
the 1990s showed a rise from US$2.35 billion in 1990 to US$3.25 
billion in 1995, falling off to US$2.08 billion in 1999. 

Development Assistance 

Official development assistance (ODA) includes grants and loans 
at concessional rates from official donors, both bilateral (individu- 
al country) and multilateral (e.g., the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank). In the early independence period, 90 percent 
of aid was bilateral grant aid, almost entirely from the United States. 
By the 1960s, however, there was growing assistance from multi- 
lateral organizations and Japan, 85 to 90 percent of which was in 
the form of loans (see table 17, Appendix). During the 1970s and 
1980s, concessionary loans became the dominant mode of assistance 
from all sources, averaging in excess of 80 percent of the total (see 
table 18, Appendix). 

Following Aquino's accession to the presidency in 1986, ODA 
increased, primarily from the United States, Japan, the World 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. In the first three years 
of the Aquino government, 1986 to 1988, concessionary loan com- 
mitments increased 60 percent above the last three years of the Mar- 
cos regime, 1983-85, from an average of US$764 million to 
US$1,233 million per year. Grant-aid commitments increased even 
more, jumping 150 percent from an average of US$195 million 
to an average of US$486 million. 

In November 1987, a bipartisan group of four members of the 
United States Congress proposed a major multinational aid 
initiative — a "mini Marshall Plan" — to help the Philippines ad- 
dress the manifold economic problems that were the legacy of the 
Marcos regime, support economic reform in that country, and help 
ensure the return of the Philippines to democracy. The initial 
proposal suggested US$5 billion in additional aid over a five-year 
period, along with a substantial increase in private foreign invest- 
ment. By the time the program was announced, the goal of the 



184 



The Economy 



Multilateral Aid Initiative had risen to US$10 billion, mainly, but 
not always, divided equally between ODA and private investment. 

At the request of Japan, the Multilateral Aid Initiative — also 
referred to as the Philippine Assistance Plan — was set up under 
the Consultative Group, a group of international agencies and coun- 
tries established in 1971 at the request of the Marcos government 
to coordinate assistance programs to the Philippines and chaired 
by the World Bank. The Multilateral Aid Initiative was clearly 
meant to precipitate a substantially larger flow of aid than had been 
committed to the Philippines in the two years since Marcos had 
fled the country. 

The first Multilateral Aid Initiative pledging session, held in 
Tokyo, July 3-5, 1989, resulted in aid commitments of US$2.8 
billion, plus US$600 million in debt relief by the Japanese. In the 
Philippines, the extent of "additional" aid was cast as a measure 
of international support for the Aquino regime. The country had 
received official development assistance commitments of about 
US$2.4 billion in 1988. Given that figure and estimates of the size 
of aid projects that were then under discussion between the Philip- 
pines and potential donors, estimates of new funds generated at 
the Tokyo pledge session ranged from US$250 million to US$1.5 
billion to the full US$3.4 billion. The government, accordingly, 
received criticisms or plaudits as one judged the extent of success 
in generating new funds. 

In 1990 there was no pledging session, reportedly because of the 
suspension of the IMF agreement in March 1990. A second ses- 
sion was held in Hong Kong on February 25 and 26, 1991, with 
a total of US$3.3 billion pledged. The Philippine government 
reported that by the end of 1990, the full amount pledged at the 
Tokyo session had been committed; however, actual disbursements 
were only US$839 million. Donor government representatives at 
the Hong Kong session expressed support publicly for the enact- 
ment of economic policies that Aquino advisers had worked out 
with the IMF, as well as concern over the resistance of the Philip- 
pine Congress to their implementation. The size of pledges and 
the willingness to comment on internal Philippine policy issues in- 
dicated that the donor nations hoped that the Philippines would 
be able to undertake a viable economic program but were concerned 
that it would be unable to do so. 

Political Economy of United States Military Bases 

In early 1991, the Philippine government was in ongoing ne- 
gotiations with the United States on the future status of United 
States naval and air facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base (see 



185 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Relations With the United States, ch. 4; Foreign Military Rela- 
tions, ch. 5). What would normally be an issue of foreign policy 
and national security became a major domestic political issue and 
took on an economic dimension of considerable importance. At 
the domestic level, the conflict was between those who argued that 
the continuing presence of the United States bases was an infringe- 
ment on Philippine sovereignty and a continuation of a neocolonial 
relationship and those who, for a combination of internal securi- 
ty, foreign relations, and economic reasons, saw the need for main- 
taining the presence of the bases. President Aquino, through 1990, 
refused to publicly commit herself to a position; however, it was 
clear that her government was working to reach accommodation 
with the United States. As negotiations progressed, the economic 
issue became prominent. 

There were three economic considerations from the point of view 
of the Philippine government. First, the proportion of the Philip- 
pine budget allocated for its armed forces was the smallest in the 
region, a fact linked to the presence of United States air and naval 
forces in the Philippines, as well as direct military assistance. Sec- 
ond, in the latter half of the 1980s, the bases directly employed 
between 42,000 and 68,000 Filipinos and contracted for goods and 
services from Filipino businesses. During this period, yearly base 
purchases of goods and services in the Philippine economy (when 
corrected for the estimated import content of the goods purchased) 
was in the range of P6.0 billion to P8.3 billion. 

A third and politically very important consideration was the sum 
given to the Philippines by the United States in connection with 
the presence of the bases, referred to as aid by United States offi- 
cials and as rent by the Filipinos. Base-related payments were first 
agreed to in 1979 when United States president Jimmy Carter made 
a "best effort" pledge to secure US$500 million for the Philippines 
from the United States Congress over a five-year period. In 1983 
another five-year commitment was made, this time for US$900 mil- 
lion. In October 1988, the Philippines' Secretary of Foreign Af- 
fairs Raul Manglapus and United States' Secretary of State George 
Schultz signed a two-year agreement for US$962 million, an 
amount double the previous compensation but substantially less 
than the US$2.4 billion that the Philippines initially demanded. 
In 1991 talks over the future of the bases and the size and terms 
of the aid or rent that would be given in consideration for con- 
tinued United States access to military facilities in the Philippines 
was the most important unresolved issue. The decision of the Philip- 
pine administration to bring Secretary of Finance Jesus Estanislao 



186 



The Economy 



into the negotiations in March 1991 was a further indication of 
the economic importance of the bases to the Philippine government. 

* * * 

Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr. and Gemelino M. Bautista's The 
Emergence of the Philippine Economy is a concise history of the Philip- 
pine economy from the pre-Hispanic period until the 1960s, and 
Frank H. Golay's The Philippines is an excellent overview of the 
1945-59 period. Romeo M. Bautista, John H. Power, and others 
offer a major critique of Philippine industrialization policy and an 
argument for liberalizing the economy in Industrial Promotion Poli- 
cies in the Philippines. The argument in favor of continued protec- 
tionism is put forth in Alejandro Lichauco's Nationalist Economics, 
and Alichir Ishii's National Development Policies and the Business Sector 
in the Philippines explores several aspects of the interaction between 
the business sector and the government. Yujiro Hay ami, Ma. Agnes 
R. Quisumbing, and Lourdes S. Adriano's Toward an Alternative 
Land Reform Paradigm reviews the history of land reform and cur- 
rent reform efforts, and suggests an alternative policy. The 
monopolization and control of export agriculture industries dur- 
ing the martial law period are examined by Gary Hawes in The 
Philippine State and the Marcos Regime. Elias T. Ramos's Dualistic Un- 
ionism and Industrial Relations has the only extensive discussion of 
the development of unions in the Philippines. 

An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis, a collective work of 
University of the Philippines economists edited by Emmanuel S. 
De Dios, provides insight into the 1983 economic crisis. Walden 
Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson's Development Debacle and 
Robin Broad's Unequal Alliance criticize World Bank activities in 
the Philippines. The Philippine Institute for Development Studies 
has produced a number of studies of specific aspects of the econo- 
my. Its Survey of Philippine Development Research series contains arti- 
cles that survey research on specific areas of the economy. 
Specialized studies include Rosa Linda P. Tidalgo and Emmanuel 
F. Esguerra's Philippine Employment in the Seventies, and James K. 
Boyce's The Political Economy of External Indebtedness, which examines 
the extent of capital flight from the Philippines. 

A Guide to Philippine Economic and Business Information Sources, edited 
by David G. Timberman, provides a good bibliography of news- 
letters, government documents, and other material of interest to 
Philippines businesses. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography.) 



187 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Malacanang Palace in Manila, the official residence of the president 



AS PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO entered the final year 
of her six-year term in 1991, she presided over a demoralized na- 
tion reeling from the effects of natural calamities and economic 
malaise. The country had slid into dictatorship and gross economic 
mismanagement during Ferdinand E. Marcos 's twenty-year presi- 
dency. When Aquino was elevated to the presidency in an inspiring 
People's Power Revolution in 1986, Filipinos' hopes rose. Inevita- 
bly, the stark realities of the nation's economic and political predica- 
ments tarnished Aquino's image. 

Aquino's achievements, however, were significant. She helped 
topple a dictator who had unlimited reserves of wealth, force, and 
cunning. She replaced a disjointed constitution that was little more 
than a fig leaf for Marcos' s personalistic rule with a democratic, 
progressive document that won overwhelming popular approval 
in a nationwide plebiscite. She renounced the dictatorial powers 
she inherited from Marcos and returned the Philippines to the rule 
of law; she lived with the checks on her own power inherent in 
three-branch government; and she scheduled national elections to 
create a two-chamber legislature and local elections to complete 
the country's redemocratization. 

The 1987 constitution returned the Philippines to a presidential 
system. The national government is in theory highly centralized, 
with few powers devolving to provincial and municipal govern- 
ments. In fact, local potentates often reserve powers to themselves 
that the national government is not even aware of. The national 
government consists of three branches: the executive, headed by 
the president; two houses of Congress, the Senate and the House 
of Representatives; and the Supreme Court, which heads an in- 
dependent judiciary. A bill of rights guarantees political freedoms, 
and the constitution provides for regular elections. 

The performance of these institutions was, of course, conditioned 
by Philippine history and culture, and by poverty. For example, 
the twenty-four members of the Senate, elected by nationwide ballot, 
in the 1980s were drawn almost entirely from old, prominent fami- 
lies. Senators staked out liberal, nationalist positions on symbolic 
issues, such as military base rights for the United States, but were 
exceedingly cautious about any structural changes, such as land re- 
form, that could jeopardize the economic positions of their families. 

Political parties grew in profusion after the Marcos martial-law 
regime (1972-81) was ended. There were 105 political parties 



191 



Philippines: A Country Study 

registered in 1988. As in the pre-Marcos era, most legal political 
parties were coalitions, built around prominent individuals, that 
focused entirely on winning elections, not on what to do with the 
power achieved. There was littie to distinguish one party from 
another ideologically, which was why many Filipinos regarded the 
political system as irrelevant. 

President Aquino's early years in office were punctuated by a 
series of coup attempts. Her greatest frustration, and a most seri- 
ous impediment to economic development, was a fractious, politi- 
cized army. Some officers wanted to regain the privileges they 
enjoyed under Marcos; others dreamed of saving the nation (see 
Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law, ch. 1; Political Role, ch. 5). 
Although all coup attempts failed, they frightened away foreign 
investors, forced Aquino to fire cabinet members of whom the army 
did not approve, pushed her policies rightward, and lent an air 
of impermanence to her achievements. 

Criticism of the Aquino administration came from all parts of 
the political spectrum. Filipino communists refused to participate 
in a government they saw as a thin cover for oligarchy. The 
democratic left criticized Aquino for abandoning sweeping reform 
and for her pro-business and pro- American policies. Her own vice 
president, Salvador H. Laurel, castigated her mercilessly from the 
beginning and even encouraged the army to overthrow her. The 
far right (sugar barons, military malcontents, and ex-Marcos cro- 
nies) characterized her as naive and ineffective and ridiculed her 
for being what she always said she was, a "simple housewife." In 
reality she was far more than that. Amidst this cacophony, Aquino 
seemed to have calmly accepted that she would not be able to resolve 
the Philippines' deeply rooted structural problems and that it would 
be enough to have restored political democracy. She prepared the 
ground for her successor. 

The Roman Catholic Church also was a major political factor. 
It had reverted to a less visible (but no less influential) role than 
in the declining years of Marcos 's rule, when its relative invulner- 
ability to harassment spurred priests and nuns to become political 
activists. Most church leaders criticized human rights abuses by 
military units or vigilantes, but they supported constitutional 
government. Cardinal Jaime Sin, who played such a pivotal role 
in Aquino's triumph over Marcos, recognized her personal virtue 
but denounced the corruption that stained her administration. Some 
parish priests, disgusted by the country's extreme polarization of 
wealth and power, cooperated with the New People's Army (see 
The Communist Insurgency, ch. 5). 



192 



Government and Politics 



The communist insurgency had not been eradicated, although 
guerrillas posed less of a threat than they did before 1986. Despite 
being weakened by murderous internal purges, the New People's 
Army was a real alternative to the elected government. The class 
inequities it condemned and had fought against for more than 
twenty years continued to grow in the early 1990s. The govern- 
ment's fight against Filipino Muslim separatists in Mindanao like- 
wise continued, also at a diminished level. 

Philippine foreign relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
colored by the contradiction between the country's nationalistic feel- 
ings and the fact of its economic dependency on other nations. Af- 
ter nearly fifty years of independence, Filipinos still viewed their 
national identity as undefined and saw international respect as elu- 
sive. They chafed at perceived constraints on their sovereign 
prerogatives and resented the power of foreign business owners and 
military advisers. Yet, as a poor nation deeply in debt to private 
banks, multilateral lending institutions, and foreign governments, 
the Philippines had to meet conditions imposed by its creditors. 
This situation was galling to nationalists, especially because the 
previous regime had squandered its borrowed money. Filipinos also 
sought to achieve a more balanced foreign policy to replace the 
uncomfortably close economic, cultural, military, and personal ties 
that bound them to the United States, but this was unlikely to hap- 
pen soon. 

Government Structure 

In 1991 the government was led by President Corazon C. Aquino, 
who was head of state, chief executive, and commander in chief 
of the armed forces. The vice president, who under the Philippine 
constitution need not belong to the same party as the president, 
was Salvador H. Laurel. Aquino did not seek to create a political 
party to perpetuate her rule, preferring instead to rely on her per- 
sonal popularity, which initially was strong but diminished through- 
out her term. 

Constitutional Framework 

The Philippines has a long history of democratic constitutional 
development. The Malolos constitution of 1898-99 reflected the 
aspirations of educated Filipinos to create a polity as enlightened 
as any in the world (see The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty 
of Paris, ch. 1). That first constitution was modeled on those of 
France, Belgium, and some of the South American republics. Pow- 
ers were divided, but the legislature was supreme. A bill of rights 
guaranteed individual liberties. The church was separated from 



193 



Philippines: A Country Study 

the state, but this provision was included only after a long debate 
and passed only by a single vote. The Malolos constitution was 
in effect only briefly; United States troops soon installed a coloni- 
al government, which remained in effect until the establishment 
of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 (see Commonwealth Pol- 
itics, 1935-41, ch. 1). 

The 1935 constitution, drawn up under the terms of the Tydings- 
McDuffie Act, which created the Philippine Commonwealth, also 
served as a basis for an independent Philippine government from 
1946 until 1973 (see Independence and Constitutional Government, 
1945-72, ch. 1). The framers of the Commonwealth constitution 
were not completely free to choose any type of government they 
wanted, inasmuch as their work had to be approved by United 
States president Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, many were 
legal scholars familiar with American constitutional law; it is not 
surprising, then, that they produced a document strongly modeled 
on the United States Constitution. In fact, the 1935 constitution 
differed from the United States document in only two important 
respects: government was unitary rather than federal, local govern- 
ments being subject to general supervision by the president; and 
the president could declare an emergency and temporarily exer- 
cise near-dictatorial power. This latter provision was used by Mar- 
cos after September 1972, when he declared martial law. 

The 1935 constitution seemed to serve the nation well. It gave 
the Philippines twenty-six years of stable, constitutional govern- 
ment during a period when a number of other Asian states were 
succumbing to military dictatorship or communist revolution. By 
the late 1960s, however, many Filipinos had come to believe that 
the constitution only provided a democratic political cloak for a 
profoundly oligarchic society. A constitutional convention was called 
to rewrite the basic law of the land. 

The delegates selected to rewrite the constitution hoped to re- 
tain its democratic essence while deleting parts deemed to be un- 
suitable relics of the colonial past. They hoped to produce a 
genuinely Filipino document. But before their work could be com- 
pleted, Marcos declared martial law and manipulated the constitu- 
tional convention to serve his purposes. The 1973 constitution was 
a deviation from the Philippines' commitment to democratic ideals. 
Marcos abolished Congress and ruled by presidential decree from 
September 1972 until 1978, when a parliamentary government with 
a legislature called the National Assembly replaced the presiden- 
tial system. But Marcos exercised all the powers of president un- 
der the old system, plus the powers of prime minister under the 



194 



Main entrance to Malacanang Palace 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

new system. When Marcos was driven from office in 1986, the 1973 
constitution was also jettisoned. 

After she came to power on March 25, 1986, Aquino issued 
Presidential Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated an interim 
"Freedom constitution" that gave her sweeping powers theoreti- 
cally even greater than those Marcos had enjoyed. She promised, 
however, to use her emergency powers only to restore democracy, 
not to perpetuate herself in power. She claimed that she needed 
a free hand to restore democracy, revive the economy, gain con- 
trol of the military, and repatriate some of the national wealth that 
Marcos and his partners had purloined. Minister of Justice Nep- 
tali Gonzales described the Freedom Constitution as "civilian in 
character, revolutionary in origin, democratic in essence, and tran- 
sitory in character." The Freedom Constitution was to remain in 
effect until a new legislature was convened and a constitutional con- 
vention could write a new, democratic constitution to be ratified 
by national plebiscite. The process took sixteen months. 

Although many Filipinos thought delegates to the Constitution- 
al Commission should be elected, Aquino appointed them, saying 
that the Philippines could not afford the time or expense of an elec- 
tion. On May 25, 1986, she selected forty-four names from 
hundreds suggested by her cabinet and the public. She appointed 



195 



Philippines: A Country Study 

respected, prominent citizens and, to be on the safe side, prohibit- 
ed them from running for office for one year after the constitu- 
tion's ratification. Delegates had the same profile as those who had 
drawn up the constitutions of 1898 and 1935: they were wealthy 
and well educated. They represented a range of political stances: 
some were leftists and some were ardent nationalists, but moder- 
ate conservatives held a majority. There were thirty lawyers, in- 
cluding two former Supreme Court justices. A nun, a priest, and 
a bishop represented the interests of the Catholic Church. Eight 
commissioners had also served in the aborted constitutional con- 
vention of 1972. Five seats on the fifty-member commission were 
reserved for Marcos supporters, defined as members of Marcos 's 
New Society Movement, and were filled by former Minister of 
Labor Bias Ople and four associates. One seat was reserved for 
the Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ), which, however, declined 
to participate. One of Aquino's appointees, leftist movie producer 
Lino Brocka, resigned, so the final number of commissioners was 
forty-eight. 

The commission divided itself into fourteen committees and be- 
gan work amidst great public interest, which, however, soon waned. 
Long, legalistic hearings were sometimes poorly attended. Aquino 
is known to have intervened to influence only one decision of the 
commission. She voiced her support of a loophole in the constitu- 
tion's antinuclear weapons provision that allowed the president to 
declare that nuclear weapons, if present on United States bases, 
were "in the national interest." 

The commissioners quickly abandoned the parliamentary govern- 
ment that Marcos had fancied, and arguments for a unicameral 
legislature also were given short shrift. Most delegates favored a 
return to something very much like the 1935 constitution, with 
numerous symbolic clauses to appease "cause-oriented" groups. 
The most controversial proposals were those pertaining to the Philip- 
pine claim to Sabah, presidential emergency powers, land reform, 
the rights of labor, the role of foreign investment, and United States 
military base rights. Special attention focused on proposals to declare 
Philippine territory a nuclear-free zone. 

Aquino had asked the Constitutional Commission to complete 
its work within ninety days, by September 2, 1986. Lengthy pub- 
lic hearings (some in the provinces) and contentious floor debates, 
however, caused this deadline to be missed. The final version of 
the constitution, similar to a "draft proposal" drawn up in June 
by the University of the Philippines Law School, was presented 
to Aquino on October 1 5 . The commission had approved it by a 
vote of forty-four to two. 



196 



Government and Politics 



Tlie constitution, one of the longest in the world, establishes three 
separate departments of government: executive, legislative, and 
judicial. It mandates a number of independent commissions: the 
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, continued 
from the old constitution; and two others, the Commission on Hu- 
man Rights and the Commission on Good Government, formed 
in reaction to Marcos's abuses. The Commission on Good Govern- 
ment is charged with the task of repossessing ill-gotten wealth ac- 
quired during the Marcos regime. 

Some ambitious Filipino politicians hoped that the new consti- 
tution would invalidate the 1986 presidential election and require 
that a new election be held. Their hopes were dashed by the "tran- 
sitory provisions" in Article 17 of the new constitution that con- 
firmed Aquino in office until June 30, 1992. Other officials first 
elected under the new constitution also were to serve until 1992. 

Article 3, the bill of rights, contains the same rights found in 
the United States Constitution (often in identical wording), as well 
as some additional rights. The exclusionary rule, for example, pro- 
hibits illegally gathered evidence from being used at a trial. Other 
rights include a freedom-of-information clause, the right to form 
unions, and the requirement that suspects be informed of their right 
to remain silent. 

The church and state are separated, but Catholic influence can 
be seen in parts of the constitution. An article on the family down- 
plays birth control; another clause directs the state to protect the 
life of the unborn beginning with conception; and still another clause 
abolishes the death penalty. Church-owned land also is tax-exempt. 

The explosive issue of agrarian reform is treated gingerly. The 
state is explicitly directed to undertake the redistribution of land 
to those who till it, but "just compensation" must be paid to present 
owners, and Congress (expected to be dominated by landowners) 
is given the power to prescribe limits on the amount of land that 
can be retained. To resolve the controversial issue of United States 
military bases, the constitution requires that any future agreement 
must be in the form of a treaty that is ratified by two-thirds of the 
Senate and, if the Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the 
votes cast in a national referendum. 

Many provisions lend a progressive spirit to the constitution, 
but these provisions are symbolic declarations of the framers' hopes 
and are unenforceable. For example, the state is to make decent 
housing available to underprivileged citizens. Priority is to be given 
to the sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. Wealth and 
political power are to be diffused for the common good. The state 



197 



Philippines: A Country Study 



shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service. To be 
implemented, all of these declarations of intent required legislation. 

Aquino scheduled a plebiscite on the new constitution for Febru- 
ary 2, 1987. Ratification of the constitution was supported by a 
loose coalition of centrist parties and by the Catholic Church. The 
constitution was opposed by both the Communist Party of the 
Philippines — Marxist Leninist (referred to as the CPP) and the 
leftist May First Movement (Kilusang Mayo Uno). They opposed 
it for three reasons: the constitution was tepid on land reform, it 
did not absolutely ban nuclear weapons from Philippine territory, 
and it offered incentives to foreign investors. But the communists 
were in disarray after their colossal mistake of boycotting the elec- 
tion that overthrew Marcos, and their objections carried little 
weight. The constitution faced more serious opposition from the 
right, led by President Aquino's discontented, now ex-defense 
minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, who reassembled elements of the old 
Nacionalista Party to campaign for a no vote to protest what he 
called the "Aquino dictatorship." 

Aquino toured the country campaigning for a yes vote, trading 
heavily on her enormous personal prestige. The referendum was 
judged by most observers to turn more on Aquino's popularity than 
on the actual merits of the constitution, which few people had read. 
Her slogan was "Yes to Cory, Yes to Country, Yes to Democra- 
cy, and Yes to the constitution. ' ' Aquino also showed that she was 
familiar with traditional Filipino pork-barrel politics, promising 
voters in Bicol 1,061 new classrooms "as a sign of my gratitude" 
if they voted yes. 

The plebiscite was fairly conducted and orderly. An overwhelm- 
ing three- to-one vote approved of the constitution, confirmed Aq- 
uino in office until 1992, and dealt a stunning defeat to her critics. 
Above all else, the victory indicated a vote for stability in the midst 
of turmoil. There was only one ominous note: a majority of the 
military voted against the referendum. Aquino proclaimed the new 
constitution in effect on February 11, 1987, and made all mem- 
bers of the military swear loyalty to it. 

National Government 

Under the constitution, the government is divided into execu- 
tive, legislative, and judicial departments. The separation of pow- 
ers is based on the theory of checks and balances. The presidency 
is not as strong as it was under the 1973 constitution. Local govern- 
ments are subordinated to the national government (see fig. 8). 



198 



Government and Politics 



Executive Department 

Article 6 of the 1987 constitution restores the presidential sys- 
tem with certain modifications. The president is elected by a direct 
vote of the people for a term of six years and is not eligible for re- 
election. The president must be a natural-born citizen of the Philip- 
pines, at least forty years of age, and a resident of the Philippines 
for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. 

The president is empowered to control all the executive depart- 
ments, bureaus, and offices, and to ensure that the laws are faith- 
fully executed. Presidential nominations of heads of executive 
departments and ambassadors are confirmed by a Commission on 
Appointments, consisting of twelve senators and twelve represen- 
tatives. The president may grant amnesty (for example, to former 
communists, Muslim rebels, or military mutineers) with the con- 
currence of a majority of all the members of Congress and, as chief 
diplomat, negotiate treaties, which must be ratified by two- thirds 
of the Senate. 

The constitution contains many clauses intended to preclude repe- 
tition of abuses such as those committed by Marcos. The presi- 
dent's spouse cannot be appointed to any government post (a 
reaction to Imelda Marcos 's immoderate accumulation of titles and 
powers). The public must be informed if the president becomes 
seriously ill (a reaction to the belated discovery of numerous kidney- 
dialysis machines in Marcos 's bedroom in Malacafiang). The presi- 
dent is prohibited from owning any company that does business 
with the government. And the armed forces must be recruited 
proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as is practica- 
ble, in order to prevent a future president from repeating Mar- 
cos's ploy of padding the officer corps with people from his home 
province. 

Constitutional safeguards also prevent the president from rul- 
ing indefinitely under emergency powers. Martial law may be 
proclaimed, but only for sixty days. The president must notify Con- 
gress of the institution of martial law within forty-eight hours, and 
Congress can revoke martial law by a simple majority vote. The 
president may not abolish Congress. The Supreme Court may 
review and invalidate a presidential proclamation of martial law. 
Of course, Congress can grant the president emergency powers 
at any time. 

The vice president has the same term of office as the president 
and is elected in the same manner. The vice president also may 
serve as a member of the cabinet. No vice president may serve for 
more than two successive terms. The president and vice president 



199 



Philippines: A Country Study 



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200 



Government and Politics 



are not elected as a team. Thus, they may be ideologically opposed, 
or even personal rivals. 

In 1991 the president's cabinet consisted of the executive secre- 
tary (who controlled the flow of paper and visitors reaching the 
president), the press secretary, the cabinet secretary, and the na- 
tional security adviser, and the secretaries of the following depart- 
ments: agrarian reform; agriculture; budget and management; 
economic planning; education, culture, and sports; environment 
and natural resources; finance; foreign affairs; health; interior and 
local governments; justice; labor and employment; national defense; 
public works and highways; science and technology; social welfare 
and development; tourism; trade and industry; and transportation 
and communications. Cabinet members directed a vast bureau- 
cracy — 2.6 million Filipinos were on the government payroll in 
1988. 

The bureaucracy in the late 1980s was overseen by a constitu- 
tionally independent Civil Service Commission, the members of 
which were appointed by the president to a single nonrenewable 
term of seven years. Because the constitution prohibits defeated 
political candidates from becoming civil servants, bureaucratic po- 
sitions cannot be used as consolation prizes. 

Two problems, in particular, have plagued the civil service: cor- 
ruption (especially in the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue) and the natural tendency, in the absence of a 
forceful chief executive, of cabinet secretaries to run their depart- 
ments as independent fiefdoms. Bribes, payoffs, and shakedowns 
characterized Philippine government and society at all levels. The 
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated in 1988 
that one-third of the annual national budget was lost to corrup- 
tion. Corruption also occurred because of cultural values. The Filipi- 
no bureaucrat who did not help a friend or relative in need was 
regarded as lacking a sense of utang na loob, or repayment of debts 
(see Social Values and Organization, ch. 2). Many Filipinos recog- 
nize this old-fashioned value as being detrimental to economic de- 
velopment. A 1988 congressional study concluded that because of 
their "personalistic world view," Filipinos were "uncomfortable 
with bureaucracy, with rules and regulations, and with standard 
procedures, all of which tend to be impersonal. ' ' When faced with 
such rules, they often "ignore them or ask for exceptions." 

Legislative Department 

The Philippines is unusual among developing countries in hav- 
ing a strong, bicameral legislature. The constitution establishes a 
24-seat Senate and a House of Representatives with 200 elected 



201 



Philippines: A Country Study 



representatives and up to 50 more appointed by the president. Sen- 
ators are chosen at large, and the twenty-four highest vote-getters 
nationwide are elected. Senators must be native-born Filipinos at 
least thirty-five years old. The term of office is six years, and sen- 
ators cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. 

House of Representatives members are elected in single-member 
districts (200 in 1991), reapportioned within three years of each 
census. Representatives must be native-born Filipinos and at least 
twenty-five years of age. Their term of office is three years, except 
for those elected in May 1987, who did not have to face the elec- 
torate until 1992. They may not serve for more than three con- 
secutive terms. In addition, President Aquino was to be empowered 
to appoint to the House of Representatives up to twenty-five peo- 
ple from "party lists." This stipulation was intended to provide 
a kind of proportional representation for small parties unable to 
win any single-member district seats. However, Congress did not 
pass the necessary enabling legislation. The president also is al- 
lowed to appoint up to twenty-five members from so-called sec- 
toral groups, such as women, labor, farmers, the urban poor, 
mountain tribes, and other groups not normally well-represented 
in Congress "except the religious sector." Making these appoint- 
ments would have provided an opportunity for Aquino to reward 
her supporters and influence Congress, but she has left most such 
positions unfilled. All members of both houses of Congress are re- 
quired to make a full disclosure of their financial and business in- 
terests. 

The constitution authorizes Congress to conduct inquiries, to 
declare war (by a two- thirds vote of both houses in joint session), 
and to override a presidential veto with a two-thirds vote of both 
houses. All appropriations bills must originate in the House, but 
the president is given a line-item veto over them. The Senate rati- 
fies treaties by a two-thirds vote. 

The first free congressional elections in nearly two decades were 
held on May 11, 1987. The pre-martial law Philippine Congress, 
famous for logrolling and satisfying individual demands, was shut 
down by Marcos in 1972. The 1973 constitution created a rubber- 
stamp parliament, or National Assembly, which only began func- 
tioning in 1978 and which was timid in confronting Marcos until 
some opposition members were elected in May 1984. In the 1987 
elections, more than 26 million Filipinos, or 83 percent of eligible 
voters, cast their ballots at 104,000 polling stations. Twenty- three 
of twenty-four Aquino-endorsed Senate candidates won. The lone 
senator opposed to Aquino was former Minister of Defense Juan 
Ponce Enrile, her husband's former jailer and her one-time 



202 



Government and Politics 



defender. Enrile was seated as the twenty-fourth and final mem- 
ber of the Senate, after the Supreme Court ordered the Commis- 
sion on Elections to abandon plans for a recount. The new 
legislature was formally convened on July 27, 1987. The leader 
of the Senate is the Senate president, who stands next in the line 
of succession for the presidency after the country's vice president. 
Generally, the Senate had a reputation as a prestigious body with 
a truly national outlook, in contrast to the House of Representa- 
tives, which had more parochial concerns. 

At least three-quarters of those elected to the House were en- 
dorsed by Aquino, but her influence was less than these results 
might seem to indicate. She never formed her own political party 
but merely endorsed men and women with various ideologies, who, 
because of their illustrious family names and long political ex- 
perience, were probably going to win anyway. Out of 200 elected 
House members, 169 either belonged to or were related to old-line 
political families. Philippine politics still was the art of assembling 
a winning coalition of clans. 

Congress did not hesitate to challenge the president. For exam- 
ple, in September 1987, less than two months after the new Con- 
gress convened, it summoned the presidential executive secretary 
to testify about the conduct of his office. The following year, Con- 
gress also rejected Aquino's proposed administrative code, which 
would have conferred greater power on the secretary of national 
defense. 

The internal operation of Congress has been slowed by ineffi- 
ciency and a lack of party discipline. Legislation often has been 
detained in the forty-three House and thirty-six Senate commit- 
tees staffed with friends and relatives of members of Congress. In- 
dicative of the public frustration with Congress, in 1991 the National 
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and the Makati Busi- 
ness Club formed a group called Congresswatch to monitor the 
activities of sitting congress members and promote accountability 
and honesty. 

Judicial Department 

The legal system used in the early 1990s was derived for the most 
part from those of Spain and the United States. Civil code proce- 
dures on family and property and the absence of jury trial were 
attributable to Spanish influences, but most important statutes 
governing trade and commerce, labor relations, taxation, bank- 
ing and currency, and governmental operations were of United 
States derivation, introduced at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 



203 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such lower 
courts as may be established by law. The 1981 Judicial Reorgani- 
zation Act provides for four main levels of courts and several spe- 
cial courts. At the local level are metropolitan trial courts, municipal 
trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts. The next level con- 
sists of regional trial courts, one for each of the nation's thirteen 
political regions, including Manila. Courts at the local level have 
original jurisdiction over less serious criminal cases; more serious 
offenses are heard by the regional level courts, which also have ap- 
pellate jurisdiction. At the national level is the Intermediate Ap- 
pellate Court, also called the court of appeals. Special courts include 
Muslim circuit and district courts in Moro (Muslim Filipino) areas, 
the court of tax appeals, and the Sandiganbayan. The Sandigan- 
bayan tries government officers and employees charged with vio- 
lation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 

The Supreme Court, at the apex of the judicial system, consists 
of a chief justice and fourteen associate justices. It has original juris- 
diction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, 
and consuls, and over petitions for injunctions and writs of habeas 
corpus; it has appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which the con- 
stitutionality of any treaty, law, presidential decree, proclamation, 
order, or regulation is questioned. The Supreme Court also may 
hear appeals in criminal cases involving a sentence of life in prison. 
Article 3 of the constitution forbids the death penalty "unless, for 
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress here- 
after provides for it." 

The Supreme Court also regulates the practice of law in the 
Philippines, promulgates rules on admission to the bar, and dis- 
ciplines lawyers. To be admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philip- 
pines, candidates must pass an examination that is administered 
once annually. Professional standards are similar to those of the 
United States; the Integrated Bar Association's code borrows heavily 
from the American Bar Association's rules. Some 30,000 attorneys 
practiced law in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, more than one- 
third of them in Manila. Counsel for the indigent, while not al- 
ways available, is provided by government legal aid offices and var- 
ious private organizations. Many of the private groups are active 
in representing "social justice" causes and are staffed by volunteers. 

Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts are 
appointed by the president from a list of at least three nominees 
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. The 
Judicial and Bar Council consists of a representative of the Integrat- 
ed Bar, a law professor, a retired member of the Supreme Court, 
and a representative of the private sector. Presidential appointments 



204 



Government and Politics 



do not require confirmation. Supreme Court justices must be at 
least forty years of age when appointed and must retire at age 
seventy. According to Article 11 of the constitution, members of 
the Supreme Court "may be removed from office on impeachment 
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the constitution, trea- 
son, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal 
of public trust." The House has exclusive power to initiate cases 
of impeachment. The Senate tries such cases, and two-thirds of 
the Senate must concur to convict someone. The judiciary is guaran- 
teed fiscal autonomy. 

The armed forces maintain an autonomous military justice sys- 
tem. Military courts are under the authority of the judge advocate 
general of the armed forces, who is also responsible for the prose- 
cutorial function in the military courts. Military courts operate un- 
der their own procedures but are required to accord the accused 
the same constitutional safeguards received by civilians. Military 
tribunals have jurisdiction over all active-duty members of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 

The traditional independence of the courts had been heavily com- 
promised in the Marcos era. Because the 1973 constitution allowed 
Marcos to fire members of the judiciary, including members of 
the Supreme Court, at any time, anyone inclined to oppose him 
was intimidated into either complying or resigning. None of his 
acts or decrees was declared unconstitutional. The thirteen Marcos- 
appointed Supreme Court justices resigned after he fled, and 
Aquino immediately appointed ten new justices. 

The Philippines has always been a highly litigious society, and 
the courts often were used to carry on personal vendettas and fam- 
ily feuds. There was widespread public perception that at least some 
judges could be bought. Public confidence in the judicial system 
was dealt a particular blow in 1988 when a special prosecutor al- 
leged that six Supreme Court justices had pressured him to "go 
easy" on their friends. The offended justices threatened to cite the 
prosecutor for contempt. Aquino did not take sides in this dispute. 
The net effect was to confirm many Filipinos' cynicism about the 
impartiality of justice. 

Justice was endlessly delayed in the late 1980s. Court calendars 
were jammed. Most lower courts lacked stenographers. A former 
judge reported in 1988 that judges routinely scheduled as many 
as twenty hearings at the same time in the knowledge that lawyers 
would show up only to ask for a postponement. One tax case heard 
in 1988 had been filed 50 years before, and a study of the tax court 
showed that even if the judges were to work 50 percent faster, it 
would take them 476 years to catch up. Even in the spectacular 



205 



Philippines: A Country Study 

case of the 1983 murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, the judicial 
system did not function speedily or reliably. It took five years to 
convict some middle-ranking officers, and although the verdict 
obliquely hinted at then Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver's ulti- 
mate responsibility, the court never directiy addressed that question. 

The indictment of former Minister of Defense Enrile on the 
charge of "rebellion with murder" shows that the courts can be 
independent of the president, but also that powerful people are han- 
dled gently. Enrile was arrested on February 27, 1990, for his al- 
leged role in the December 1989 coup attempt in which more than 
100 people died. Because Enrile was powerful, he was given an 
air-conditioned suite in jail, a telephone, and a computer, and a 
week later he was released on 100,000 pesos (for value of the peso — 
see Glossary) bail. In June 1990, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the charges against him. A further test of the court system was ex- 
pected in the 1990s when criminal and civil charges were to be 
brought against Imelda Marcos. In 1991 Aquino agreed to allow 
the former first lady, who could not leave New York City without 
the permission of the United States Department of Justice, to return 
to the Philippines to face charges of graft and corruption. Swiss 
banking authorities agreed to return approximately US$350 mil- 
lion to the Philippine government only if Marcos were tried and 
convicted. Marcos did not seem to be reluctant to face the Philip- 
pine courts. 

Local Government 

The national government in the 1990s sought to upgrade local 
government by delegating some limited powers to local subdivi- 
sions and by encouraging people to participate in community af- 
fairs. Local autonomy was balanced, however, against the need 
to ensure effective political and administrative control from Manila, 
especially in those areas where communist or Muslim insurgents 
were active. In practice, provincial governors gained considerable 
leverage if they could deliver a bloc of votes to presidential or 
senatorial candidates. Control over provinces generally alternated 
between two rival aristocratic families. 

During Marcos's authoritarian years (1972-86), a Ministry of 
Local Government was instituted to invigorate provincial, 
municipal, and barangay (see Glossary) governments. But, Mar- 
cos's real purpose was to establish lines of authority that bypassed 
provincial governments and ran straight to Malacanang. All local 
officials were beholden to Marcos, who could appoint or remove 
any provincial governor or town mayor. Those administrators who 



206 



Government and Politics 



delivered the votes Marcos asked for were rewarded with commu- 
nity development funds to spend any way they liked. 

After the People's Power Revolution, the new Aquino govern- 
ment decided to replace all the local officials who had served Mar- 
cos. Corazon Aquino delegated this task to her political ally, 
Aquilino Pimentel. Pimentel named officers in charge of local 
governments all across the nation. They served until the first local 
elections were held under the new constitution on January 18, 1988. 
Local officials elected in 1988 were to serve until June 1992, un- 
der the transitory clauses of the new constitution. Thereafter, terms 
of office were to be three years, with a three- term limit. 

Organization 

The 1987 constitution retains the three-tiered structure of local 
government. There were seventy-three provinces in 1991 (see fig. 
9). The province was the largest local administrative unit, headed 
by the elected governor and aided by a vice governor, also elected. 
Other officials were appointed to head offices concerned with 
finance, tax collection, audit, public works, agricultural services, 
health, and schools. These functionaries were technically subor- 
dinate to the governor but also answered to their respective cen- 
tral government ministries. Lower ranking functionaries, appointed 
by the governor, were on the provincial payroll. 

Chartered cities stood on their own, were not part of any 
province, did not elect provincial officials, and were not subject 
to any provincial taxation, but they did have the power to levy their 
own taxes. As of 1991 , there were sixty-one chartered cities headed 
by a mayor and a vice mayor. The mayor had some discretionary 
power of local appointment. 

Municipalities were subordinate to the provinces. In 1991 there 
were approximately 1,500 municipalities. At the lowest level, with 
the least autonomy, were barangays, rural villages and urban neigh- 
borhoods that were called barrios until 1973. In 1991 there were 
about 42,000 barangays. 

Various reorganization schemes have been undertaken to in- 
vigorate local government. One of the most far-reaching and ef- 
fective was the creation of a Metro Manila (see Glossary) 
government in the mid-1970s to bring the four cities and thirteen 
municipalities of the capital region under a single umbrella. Metro 
Manila is an example of what geographers call the Southeast Asian 
primate city, a single very large city that is the center of industry, 
government, education, culture, trade, the media, and finance (see 
Urban Social Patterns, ch. 2). No other Philippine city rivaled 
Manila; all others were in a distinctly lesser league. Continued rapid 



207 



Philippines: A Country Study 

population growth meant that the boundaries of Metro Manila were 
expected to expand in the 1990s. 

During martial law, the provinces were grouped into twelve 
regions, and that arrangement was continued in the Apportion- 
ment Ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution. Because these 
regions did not have taxing powers or elected officials of their own, 
however, they were more an administrative convenience for the 
departments of the national government than a unit of genuine 
local importance. In 1991 approximately 90 percent of government 
services were provided by the national government. Attempts by 
Aquino to decentralize delivery of some services were resisted by 
members of Congress because such moves deprived them of 
patronage. 

The single biggest problem for local government has been in- 
adequate funds. Article 10 of the constitution grants each local 
government unit the power to create its own sources of revenue 
and to levy taxes, but this power is "subject to such guidelines and 
limitations as the Congress may provide." In practice, taxes were 
very hard to collect, particularly at the local level where officials, 
who must run for reelection every three years, were concerned about 
alienating voters. Most local government funding came from Ma- 
nila. There is a contradiction in the constitution between local au- 
tonomy and accountability to Manila. The constitution mandates 
that the state "shall ensure the autonomy of local governments," 
but it also says that the president ' ' shall exercise general supervi- 
sion over local governments." The contradiction was usually 
resolved in favor of the central government. 

Regional Autonomy 

By the 1990s, Philippine nationalism had not fully penetrated 
two regions of the country inhabited by national minorities: the 
Muslim parts of Mindanao and the tribal highlands of northern 
Luzon. Some Muslims and hill tribespeople did not consider them- 
selves Filipinos, although they were citizens. Muslim separatism 
has a very long history. The Spaniards, Americans, and Japanese 
all had difficulty integrating the fiercely independent Moros into 
the national polity, and independent governments in Manila since 
1946 have fared little better (see Marcos and the Road to Martial 
Law, 1965-72, ch. 1). The Moro insurgency has waxed and waned 
but never gone away. Enough Muslims participated in the 1987 
elections to elect two of the twenty-four senators, but continuing 
land disputes were major factors preventing reconciliation between 
Christians and Muslims in Mindanao. The grievances of tribal 
groups, such as the Ifugao and Igorot, in northern Luzon were 



208 




Source: Based on information from Manila Times, October, 13, 1990, 3. 

Figure 9. Regions and Provinces, 1990 



210 



Government and Politics 



of more recent origin, having been stoked by ill-considered Mar- 
cos administration dam-building schemes that entailed flooding val- 
leys in the northern Luzon cordillera where the tribal groups lived. 
When Aquino came to power, she was confronted with a Moro 
National Liberation Front demand for separation from the Philip- 
pines and a Cordillera People's Liberation Army allied with the 
New People's Army. Aquino boldly negotiated a cease-fire with 
the Moro National Liberation Front, and her constitutional com- 
missioners provided for the creation of autonomous regions in Mus- 
lim parts of Mindanao and tribal regions of northern Luzon (see 
The Moros, ch. 5). 

Article 10 of the constitution directed Congress to pass within 
eighteen months organic acts creating autonomous regions, provid- 
ing that those regions would be composed only of provinces, cit- 
ies, and geographic areas voting to be included in an autonomous 
region. Congress passed a bill establishing the Autonomous Region 
in Muslim Mindanao, with Cotabato City designated as the seat 
of government, and Aquino signed the bill into law on August 1, 
1989. The required plebiscite was set for November 19, 1989, in 
thirteen provinces in Mindanao and the island groups stretching 
toward Borneo. The plebiscite campaign was marred by violence, 
including bombings and attacks by rebels. Aquino flew to Cotabato 
on November 6, 1990, to formally inaugurate the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao. She had already signed executive 
orders devolving to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Minda- 
nao the powers of seven cabinet departments: local government; 
labor and employment; science and technology; public works and 
highways; social welfare and development; tourism; and environ- 
ment and natural resources. Control of national security, foreign 
relations, and other significant matters remained with the nation- 
al government. Because many of the provinces to be included ac- 
tually had Christian majorities, and because the Moro National 
Liberation Front, dissatisfied with what it perceived to be the limi- 
tations of the new law, urged a boycott, only four provinces 
(Tawitawi, Sulu, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur) elected to join 
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Cotabato City it- 
self voted not to join. Hence, a new capital had to be identified. 
In 1991 Maranaos, Maguindanaos, and Tausugs were disputing 
where the capital should be (see fig. 3). Indications were that the 
government of the autonomous region would not have superviso- 
ry power over local government officials. 

Congress passed a similar law creating a Cordillera Autonomous 
Region. However, in a referendum held in five provinces (Abra, 
Benguet, Mountain, Kalinga-Apayao, and Ifugao) on January 29, 



211 




Classification of Provinces by Geographic Regions 



ILOCOS 

llocos Norte (1) 
Abra (2) 
llocos Sur (3) 
Mountain (4) 
La Union (5) 
Benguet (6) 
Pangasinan (7) 



BICOL 

Camarines Norte (32) 
Camarines Sur (33) 
Catanduanes (34) 
Albay (35) 
Sorsogon (36) 
Masbate (37) 



NORTHERN MINDANAO 

Surigao del Norte (57) 
Camiguin (58) 
Agusan del Norte (59) 
Misamis Oriental (60) 
Bukidnon (62) 
Agusan del Sur (63) 



CAGAYAN VALLEY 

Batanes (8) 
Cagayan (9) 
Kalinga-Apayao (10) 
Isabela (11) 
Itugao (12) 
Nueva Vizcaya (13) 
Quirino (14) 



CENTRAL LUZON 

Nuera Ecija (15) 
Tarlac(16) 
Zambales (17) 
Pampanga (18) 
Bulacan (19) 
Bataan (20) 



IV SOUTHERN TAGALOG 

Aurora (21) 
Quezon (22) 
Rizal (23) 
Cavite (24) 
Laguna (25) 
Batangas (26) 
Marinduque (27) 
Mindoro Oriental (28) 
Mindoro Occidental (29) 
Romblon (30) 
Palawan (31) 



VI WESTERN VISAYAS 

Aklan (38) 
Capiz (39) 
Antique (40) 
lloilo (41) 

Negros Occidental (42) 



VII CENTRAL VISAYAS 

Cebu (43) 

Negros Oriental (44) 
Bohol (45) 
Siquijor (46) 



VIII EASTERN VISAYAS 

Northern Samar (47) 
Samar (48) 
Eastern Samar (49) 
Leyte (50) 
Southern Leyte (51) 



IX WESTERN MINDANAO 

Zamboanga del Norte (52) 
Zamboanga del Sur (53) 
Basilan (54) 

Misamis Occidental (61) 
Lanao del Norte (69) 



XI SOUTHERN MINDANAO 

Surigao del Sur (64) 
Davao Oriental (65) 
Davao del Norte (66) 
Davao del Sur (67) 



CENTRAL MINDANAO 

South Cotabato (68) 
North Cotabato (71) 
Sultan Kudarat (73) 



AUTONOMOUS REGION IN 
MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) 

Sulu (55) 
Tawitawi (56) 
Lanao del Sur (70) 
Maguindanao (72) 



NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR) 



Philippines: A Country Study 



1990, autonomy failed in all provinces except Ifugao. The reasons 
for rejection were thought to be fear of the unknown and a cam- 
paign against autonomy waged by mining companies that feared 
higher taxation. In 1991 the Supreme Court voided the Cordillera 
Autonomous Region, saying that Congress never intended that a 
single province could constitute an autonomous region. 

Politics 

In 1991 Philippine politics resembled nothing so much as the 
"good old days" of the pre-martial law period — wide-open, some- 
times irresponsible, but undeniably free. Pre-martial law politics, 
however, essentially were a distraction from the nation's serious 
problems. The parties were completely nonideological. Therefore, 
politicians and office-holders switched parties whenever it seemed 
advantageous to do so. Almost all politicians were wealthy, and 
many were landlords with large holdings. They blocked moves for 
social reform; indeed, they seemed not to have even imagined that 
society required serious reform. Congress acquired a reputation 
for corruption that made the few honest members stand out. When 
Marcos closed down Congress in 1972, hardly anyone was disap- 
pointed except the members themselves. 

The February 1986 People's Power Revolution, also called the 
EDS A Revolution (see Glossary), had restored all the prerequisites 
of democratic politics: freedom of speech and press, civil liberties, 
regularly scheduled elections for genuine legislatures, plebiscites, 
and ways to ensure honest ballot counting. But by 1991 , the return 
to irrelevant politics had caused a sense of hopelessness to creep 
back into the nation that five years before had been riding the eu- 
phoric crest of a nonviolent democratic revolution. In 1986 it seemed 
that democracy would have one last chance to solve the Philippines' 
deep-rooted social and economic problems. Within five years, it 
began to seem to many observers that the net result of democracy 
was to put the country back where it had been before Marcos: a 
democratic political system disguising an oligarchic society. 

The Inheritance from Marcos 

Democratic institutions were introduced to the Philippines by 
the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
apparent success of these imported practices gave the Philippines 
its reputation as "the showcase of democracy in Asia." Before 1972 
the constitutional separation of powers was generally maintained. 
Political power was centralized in Manila, but it was shared by 
two equally influential institutions, the presidency and Congress. 



212 



Government and Politics 



The checks and balances between them, coupled with the open- 
ness of bipartisan competition between the Nacionalista and Liberal 
parties, precluded the emergence of one-person or one-party rule. 
Power was transferred peacefully from one party to another through 
elections. The mass media, sensational at times, fiercely criticized 
public officials and checked government excess. 

Marcos inflicted immeasurable damage on democratic values. 
He offered the Filipino people economic progress and national dig- 
nity, but the results were dictatorship, poverty, militarized polit- 
ics and a politicized military, and greatly increased dependence 
on foreign governments and banks. His New Society was supposed 
to eliminate corruption, but when Marcos fled the country in 1986, 
his suitcases contained, according to a United States customs agent, 
jewels, luxury items, and twenty-four gold bricks. Estimates of Mar- 
cos's wealth ran from a low of US$3 billion to a high of US$30 
billion, and even after his death in 1989, no one knew the true value 
of his estate, perhaps not even his widow. 

If Marcos had been merely corrupt, his legacy would have been 
bad enough, but he broke the spell of democracy. The long evolu- 
tion of democratic institutions, unsatisfactory though it may have 
been in some ways, was interrupted. The political culture of 
democracy was violated. Ordinary Filipinos knew fear in the night. 
An entire generation came of age never once witnessing a genuine 
election or reading a free newspaper. Classes that graduated from 
the Philippine Military Academy were contemptuous of civilians 
and anticipated opportunities for influence and perhaps even wealth. 
Marcos 's worst nightmare came true when Corazon Aquino used 
the power of popular opinion to bring him down. 

Aquino inherited a very distorted economy. The Philippines owed 
about US$28 billion to foreign creditors. Borrowed money had not 
promoted development, and most of it had been wasted on show- 
case projects along Manila Bay, or had disappeared into the pock- 
ets and offshore accounts of the Marcos and Romualdez families 
and their friends and partners. Many Filipinos believed that they 
would be morally justified in renouncing the foreign debt on 
grounds that the banks should have known what the Marcoses were 
doing with the money. Even Cardinal Jaime Sin declared it "moral- 
ly wrong" to pay foreign creditors when Filipino children were 
hungry. Aquino, however, resolutely pledged to pay the debt. 
Otherwise, the nation would be cut off from the credit it needed. 
Although the Philippines could pay the interest on the debt every 
year, it could not pay the principal. This never-ending debt natur- 
ally inflamed Filipino nationalism. A Freedom From Debt Coalition 



213 



Philippines: A Country Study 

advocated using the money to help the unemployed instead of send- 
ing the hard currency abroad. 

The Rise of Corazon Aquino 

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, universally and affectionately 
known as "Cory," was a Philippine president quite unlike those 
who preceded her. Observers have groped for the right word to 
characterize the Aquino presidency. She was first called a "revolu- 
tionary," but later a mere "reformer." When the old landed fami- 
lies recaptured the political system, she was called a "restorationist." 

She was born in 1933 into one of the richest clans in the Philip- 
pines, the powerful Cojuangcos of Tarlac Province. Her maiden 
name indicates Chinese mestizo ancestry; her Chinese great- 
grandfather's name could have been romanized to Ko Hwan-ko, 
but, following the normal practice of assimilationist Catholic 
Chinese-Filipinos, all the Chinese names were collapsed into one, 
and a Spanish first name was taken. Aquino neither sought power 
nor expected it would come to her. Her life was that of a privileged, 
well-educated girl sent abroad to the Ravenhill Academy in 
Philadelphia, the Notre Dame Convent School in New York, and 
Mount St. Vincent College, also in New York. She studied 
mathematics and graduated with a degree in French in 1953, then 
returned to the Philippines to study law, but soon married the rest- 
less, rich scion of another prominent Tarlac family, Benigno ("Ni- 
noy") Aquino, Jr. Benigno Aquino became a mayor, a governor, 
and a flamboyant senator, and he probably would have been elected 
president of the Philippines in 1973 had Marcos not suspended elec- 
tions. On the same night in 1972 when Marcos declared martial 
law, he sent troops to arrest Benigno Aquino. Senator Aquino was 
incarcerated for some seven years, after which Marcos allowed him 
to go to the United States. In August 1983, believing that Marcos 
was dying, Aquino ventured back to Manila and was gunned down 
just seconds after being escorted from the airplane (see From Aqui- 
no's Assassination to People's Power, ch. 1). Aquino's murder gal- 
vanized the Filipino people and was the beginning of the end for 
Marcos. 

The Coalition Comes Undone, 1986-87 

Ferdinand Marcos had perfected the art of ruling by dividing 
his enemies: scaring some, chasing others out of the country, playing 
one clan against another, and co-opting a few members of each 
prominent provincial family. The "oppositionists," as the controlled 
Manila press called them, were never united while Marcos was in 



214 



President Corazon Aquino, 1990 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 




Malacanang, and only through the intervention of Cardinal Jaime 
Sin did they agree on a unified ticket to oppose Marcos in the ' ' snap 
election" that the ailing dictator suddenly called for February 1986. 
The widow Aquino had public support but no political organiza- 
tion, whereas the old-line politico Salvador H. "Doy" Laurel had 
an organization but little popular support. After difficult negotia- 
tions, Laurel agreed to run for vice president on a ticket with Aqui- 
no. Aquino won on February 7, 1986, but the margin of victory 
will never be known, for the election was marred by gross fraud, 
intimidation, ballot box stuffing, and falsified tabulation. 

Aquino had to perform a delicate balancing act between left and 
right, within society at large and later within her own cabinet. 
Aquino and Laurel triumphed in good part because of the defec- 
tion of Enrile, who was then minister of defense, and Fidel V. Ra- 
mos, the acting chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
Both men had served Marcos loyally for many years but now found 
themselves pushed aside by General Fabian Ver, Marcos 's per- 
sonal bodyguard and commander of the Presidential Security Com- 
mand. They risked their lives defying Marcos and Ver at the crucial 
moment. Enrile and Ramos conceived of the new government as 
a coalition in which they would have important roles to play. Laurel 
saw it the same way. 

In one sense, the Aquino government initially was a coalition — it 
drew support from all parts of the political spectrum. The middle 



215 



Philippines: A Country Study 

class was overwhelmingly behind "Cory," the democratic alter- 
native to Marcos. Most leftists saw her as "subjectively" progres- 
sive even if she was "objectively" bourgeois. They hoped she could 
reform Philippine politics. On the right, only those actually in league 
with Marcos supported him. Aquino's support was very wide and 
diverse. 

The coalition, however, began unraveling almost immediately. 
Enrile thought that Aquino should declare her government "revolu- 
tionary," because that would mean that the 1986 elections were 
illegitimate and that new presidential elections would be held soon. 
When Aquino made it clear that she intended to serve out her en- 
tire six-year term, Enrile and Laurel set out to undermine her. Ra- 
mos took a cautiously ambivalent position but ultimately supported 
Aquino. Without his loyalty, Aquino would not have survived the 
many coup attempts she successfully put down. 

Aquino's political honeymoon was brief. Arturo Tolentino, Mar- 
cos's running mate in the February election, proclaimed himself 
acting president on July 6, 1986, but that attempt to unseat Aqui- 
no was short-lived. By October 1986, Enrile was refusing to at- 
tend cabinet meetings on the grounds that they were "a waste of 
the people's money." Aquino fired him the next month, after he 
was implicated in a coup plan code-named "God Save the Queen" 
(presumably because the conspirators hoped to keep Aquino on 
as a figurehead). The plotters were suppressed, and on the morn- 
ing of November 23, Aquino met with her entire cabinet, except 
for Laurel, who was playing golf. She asked for the resignations 
of all other members of her cabinet and then jettisoned those leftists 
who most irritated the army and replaced Enrile with Rafael Ileto 
as the new minister of national defense. Aquino started a pattern, 
repeated many times since, of tactically shifting rightward to head 
off a rightist coup. 

Enrile was out of the government, but Laurel remained in, 
despite his vocal, public criticism of Aquino. She relieved him of 
his duties as minister of foreign affairs on September 16, 1987, but 
could not remove him from the vice presidency. A month later, 
Laurel publicly declared his willingness to lead the country if a coup 
succeeded in ousting Aquino. The next year, he told the press that 
the presidency "requires a higher level of competence" than that 
shown by Aquino. 

The disintegration of the original Aquino-Laurel-Enrile coali- 
tion was only part of a bigger problem: The entire cabinet, govern- 
ment, and, some would say, even the entire nation, were permeated 
with factionalism. Aquino also had difficulty dealing with the mili- 
tary. The first serious dispute between Aquino and the military 



216 



Government and Politics 



concerned the wisdom of a cease-fire with the New People's Army. 
Aquino held high hopes that the communists could be coaxed down 
from the hills and reconciled to democratic participation if their 
legitimate grievances were addressed. She believed that Marcos 
had driven many people to support the New People's Army. 

The Philippine military, which had been fighting the guerrillas 
for seventeen years, was hostile to her policy initiative. When talks 
began in September 1986, military plotters began work on the "God 
Save the Queen" uprising that was aborted two months later. Aqui- 
no tried reconciliation with the Moro National Liberation Front 
and sent her brother-in-law to Saudi Arabia, where he signed the 
Jiddah Accord with the Moro National Liberation Front on Janu- 
ary 4, 1987. A coup attempt followed three weeks later. In the wake 
of these coup attempts, Aquino reformed her cabinet, but she also 
submitted to military demands that she oust Executive Secretary 
Joker Arroyo, a political activist and her longtime confidant. Her 
legal counsel, Teodoro Locsin, whom the military considered a 
leftist, and her finance secretary, Jaime Ongpin, also had to go. 
(Ongpin was later found dead; the coroner's verdict was suicide, 
although he was left-handed and the gun was in his right hand.) 

Aquino had been swept into office on a wave of high expecta- 
tions that she would be able to right all of the wrongs done to the 
Philippines under Marcos. When she could not do this and when 
the same problems recurred, Filipinos grew disillusioned. Many 
of Aquino's idealistic followers were dismayed at the "Mendiola 
Massacre" in 1987 in which troops fired into a crowd of protest- 
ing farmers right outside Malacafiang. The military was simply 
beyond her control. The entire staff of the Commission on Hu- 
man Rights resigned in protest even though Aquino herself joined 
the protestors the next day. Those people who hoped that Aquino 
would liberally use emergency power to implement needed social 
changes were further dismayed by the fate of her promised land 
reform program. Instead of taking immediate action, she waited 
until the new Congress was seated and turned the matter over to 
them. That Congress, like all previous Philippine legislatures, was 
dominated by landowners, and there was very little likelihood that 
these people would dispossess themselves. 

Aquino's declining political fortunes were revealed in public opin- 
ion polls in early 1991 that showed her popularity at an all-time 
low, as protesters marched on Malacafiang, accusing her of betray- 
ing her promises to ease poverty, stamp out corruption, and widen 
democracy. Nevertheless, Aquino's greatest achievement in the first 
five years of her term was to begin the healing process. 



217 



Philippines: A Country Study 



The President and the Coup Plotters 

Philippine politics between 1986 and 1991 were punctuated by 
President Aquino's desperate struggle to survive physically and po- 
litically a succession of coup attempts that culminated in a large, 
bloody, and well-financed attempt in December 1989. This attempt, 
led by renegade Colonel Gregorio Honasan, involved upwards of 
3,000 troops, including elite Scout Rangers and marines, in a coor- 
dinated series of attacks on Camp Crame and Camp Aquinaldo, 
Fort Bonifacio, Cavite Naval Base, Villamor Air Base, and on 
Malacafiang itself, which was dive-bombed by vintage T-28 air- 
craft. Although Aquino was not hurt in this raid, the situation ap- 
peared desperate, for not only were military commanders around 
the country waiting to see which side would triumph in Manila, 
but the people of Manila, who had poured into the streets to pro- 
tect Aquino in February 1986, stayed home this time. Furthermore, 
Aquino found it necessary to request United States air support to 
put down this uprising. 

Politically this coup was a disaster for Aquino. Her vice presi- 
dent openly allied himself with the coup plotters and called for her 
to resign. Even Aquino's staunchest supporters saw her need for 
United States air support as a devastating sign of weakness. Most 
damaging of all, when the last rebels finally surrendered, they did 
so in triumph and with a promise from the government that they 
would be treated "humanely, justly, and fairly." 

A fact-finding commission was appointed to draw lessons from 
this coup attempt. The commission bluntly advised Aquino to ex- 
ercise firmer leadership, replace inefficient officials, and retire mili- 
tary officers of dubious loyalty. On December 14, 1989, the Senate 
granted Aquino emergency powers for six months. 

One of the devastating results of this insurrection was that just 
when the economy had finally seemed to turn around, investors 
were frightened off, especially since much of the combat took place 
in the business haven of Makati. Tourism, a major foreign-exchange 
earner, came to a halt. Business leaders estimated that the mutiny 
cost the economy US$1.5 billion (see Tourism, ch. 3). 

Political Parties 

Philippine political parties are essentially nonideological vehi- 
cles for personal and factional political ambition. The party sys- 
tem in the early 1990s closely resembled that of the pre-martial 
law years when the Nacionalista and Liberal parties alternated in 
power. Although they lacked coherent political programs, they 



218 



Government and Politics 



generally championed conservative social positions and avoided tak- 
ing any position that might divide the electorate. Each party tried 
to appeal to all regions, all ethnic groups, and all social classes and 
fostered national unity by never championing one group or region. 
Neither party had any way to enforce party discipline, so politi- 
cians switched capriciously back and forth. The parties were es- 
sentially pyramids of patron-client relationships stretching from the 
remotest villages to Manila. They existed to satisfy particular de- 
mands, not to promote general programs. Because nearly all sen- 
ators and representatives were provincial aristocrats, the parties 
never tackled the fundamental national problem: the vastly in- 
equitable distribution of land, power, and wealth. 

Ferdinand Marcos mastered that party system, then altered it 
by establishing an all-embracing ruling party to be the sole vehicle 
for those who wished to engage in political activity. He called it 
the New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan). The New 
Society Movement sought to extend Marcos' s reach to far corners 
of the country. Bureaucrats at all levels were well-advised to join. 
The New Society Movement offered unlimited patronage. The 
party won 163 of 178 seats in the National Assembly in 1978 and 
easily won the 1980 local elections. In 1981 Marcos actually had 
to create his own opposition because no one was willing to run 
against him. 

Opposition Parties 

The New Society Movement fell apart when Marcos fled the 
country. A former National Assembly speaker, Nicanor Yniguez, 
tried to "reorganize" it, but others scrambled to start new parties 
with new names. Bias Ople, Marcos's minister of labor, formed 
the Nationalist Party of the Philippines (Partido Nacionalista ng 
Pilipinas) in March 1986. Enrile sought political refuge in a revival 
of the country's oldest party, the Nacionalista Party, first formed 
in 1907 (see A Collaborative Philippine Leadership, ch. 1). Enrile 
used the rusty Nacionalista machinery and an ethnic network of 
Ilocanos to campaign for a no vote on the constitution and, when 
that failed, for his election to the Senate. Lengthy negotiations with 
mistrustful political "allies" such as Ople and Laurel delayed the 
formal reestablishment of the Nacionalista Party until May 1989. 
Enrile also experimented with a short-lived Grand Alliance for 
Democracy with Francisco "Kit" Tatad, the erstwhile minister of 
information for Marcos, and the popular movie-star senator, Joseph 
Estrada. In 1991 Enrile remained a very powerful political figure, 
with landholdings all over the Philippines and a clandestine net- 
work of dissident military officers. 



219 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Vice President Laurel had few supporters in the military but long- 
term experience in political organizing. From his family base in 
Batangas Province, Laurel had cautiously distanced himself from 
Marcos in the early 1980s, then moved into open opposition un- 
der the banner of a loose alliance named the United Nationalist 
Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Eventually, the UNIDO be- 
came Laurel's personal party. Aquino used the party's organiza- 
tion in February 1986, although her alliance with Laurel was never 
more than tactical. UNIDO might have endured had Aquino's allies 
granted Laurel more patronage when local governments were re- 
organized. As it was, Laurel could reward his supporters only with 
positions in the foreign service, and even there the opportunities 
were severely limited. The party soon fell by the wayside. Laurel 
and Enrile formed the United Nationalist Alliance, also called the 
Union for National Action, in 1988. The United Nationalist Alli- 
ance proposed a contradictory assortment of ideas, including switch- 
ing from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government, 
legalizing the Communist Party of the Philippines, and extending 
the United States bases treaty. By 1991 Laurel had abandoned these 
ad hoc creations and gone back to the revived Nacionalista Party, 
in a tentative alliance with Enrile. 

In 1991 a new opposition party, the Filipino Party (Partido Pilipi- 
no), was organized as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of 
Aquino's estranged cousin Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco. De- 
spite the political baggage of a long association with Marcos, Coju- 
angco had the resources to assemble a powerful coalition of clans. 

The Liberal Party, a democratic-elitist party founded in 1946, 
survived fourteen years of dormancy (1972 to 1986), largely through 
the staunch integrity of its central figure, Senate president Jovito 
Salonga, a survivor of the Plaza Miranda grenade attack of Sep- 
tember 1971. In 1991 Salonga also was interested in the presiden- 
cy, despite poor health and the fact that he was a Protestant in a 
largely Catholic country. 

In September 1986, the revolutionary left, stung by its short- 
sighted boycott of the February election, formed a legal political 
party to contest the congressional elections. The Partido ng Bayan 
(Party of the Nation) allied with other left-leaning groups in an 
Alliance for New Politics that fielded 7 candidates for the Senate 
and 103 for the House of Representatives. However, it gained ab- 
solutely nothing from this exercise. The communists quickly 
dropped out of the electoral arena and reverted to guerrilla warfare. 
As of 1991, no Philippine party actively engaged in politics espoused 
a radical agenda. 



220 



Government and Politics 



Progovemment Parties 

In 1978 the imprisoned former senators Benigno Aquino and 
Lorenzo Tanada organized a political party named Lakas ng Bayan 
(Strength of the Nation; also known by its abbreviated form, 
LAB AN, meaning fight). LAB AN won 40 percent of the Manila 
vote in parliamentary elections that year but was not given a sin- 
gle seat in Marcos 's New Society Movement-dominated parliament. 
After Aquino went into exile in the Jnited States, his wife's brother, 
former Congressman Jose Cojuangco, managed LABAN. Co- 
juangco forged an alliance with the Pilipino Democratic Party 
(PDP), a regional party with strength in the Visayas and Minda- 
nao, that had been organized by Aquilino Pimentel, the mayor of 
Cagayan de Oro City. The unified party was thereafter known as 
PDP— LABAN, and it— along with UNIDO— conducted Corazon 
Aquino's presidential campaign against Marcos. 

In its early years, PDP-LABAN espoused a strongly nationalist 
position on economic matters and United States base rights, aspiring 
to "democratize power and socialize wealth." Later, after Aqui- 
no became president, its rhetorical socialism evaporated. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, PDP-LABAN had the distinct advan- 
tage of patronage. Aquino named Pimentel her first minister of 
local government, then summarily dismissed every governor and 
mayor in the Philippines. Pimentel replaced them with officers in 
charge known personally to him, thereby creating an instant 
pyramid of allies throughout the country. Some, but not all, of these 
officers in charge won election on their own in the January 1988 
local elections. 

PDP-LABAN was not immune from the problems that gener- 
ally plagued Philippine political parties. What mainly kept the party 
together was the need to keep Aquino in power for her full six- 
year term. In June 1988, the party was reorganized as the Strug- 
gle of Filipino Democrats (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino). 
Speaker of the House Ramon Mitra was its first president, but he 
resigned the presidency of the party in 1989 in favor of Neptali 
Gonzales. 

In 1990 Aquino announced the formation of a movement called 
Kabisig (Arm-in- Arm), conceived as a nongovernmental organi- 
zation to revive the spirit of People's Power and get around an ob- 
stinate bureaucracy and a conservative Congress. By 1991 its 
resemblance to a nascent political party worried the more tradi- 
tional leadership, particularly Mitra. Part of Aquino's governing 
style was to maintain a stance of being "above politics." Although 
she endorsed political candidates, she refused to form a political 



221 



Philippines: A Country Study 

party of her own, relying instead on her personal probity, spiritu- 
ality, and simple living to maintain popular support. 

Voting and Elections 

Elections in the Philippines are the arena in which the country's 
elite families compete for political power. The wealthiest clans con- 
test national and provincial offices. Families of lesser wealth com- 
pete for municipal offices. In the barangays, where most people are 
equally poor, election confers social prestige but no real power or 
money. 

Voting rates have generally been high (approximately 80 to 85 
percent in national elections), despite obstacles such as difficult 
transportation, the need to write out the names of all candidates 
in longhand, and, occasionally, the threat of violence. Filipinos en- 
joy and expect elections so much that even Ferdinand Marcos dared 
not completely deny them this outlet. Instead, he changed the rules 
to rig the elections in his favor. 

Until 1972 Philippine elections were comparable to those in Unit- 
ed States cities during early industrialization: flawed, perhaps, by 
instances of vote-buying, ballot-box stuffing, or miscounts, but 
generally transmitting the will of the people. A certain amount of 
election-related violence was considered normal. Marcos overturned 
this system with innovations such as asking voters to indicate by 
a show of hands if they wanted him to remain in office. In the snap 
election of 1986, Marcos supporters tried every trick they knew 
but lost anyway. The heroism of the democratic forces at that time 
inspired many Filipinos. 

The 1987 constitution establishes a new system of elections. The 
terms of representatives are reduced from four years to three, and 
the presidential term is lengthened from four years to six. Sena- 
tors also serve a six-year term. The constitution's transitory pro- 
visions are scheduled to expire in 1992, after which there is to be 
a three-year election cycle. Suffrage is universal at age eighteen. 
The constitution established a Commission on Elections that is em- 
powered to supervise every aspect of campaigns and elections. It 
is composed of a chairperson and six commissioners, who cannot 
have been candidates for any position in the immediately preced- 
ing elections. A majority of the commissioners must be lawyers, 
and all must be college-educated. They are appointed by the presi- 
dent with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and 
serve a single seven-year term. The Commission on Elections en- 
forces and administers all election laws and regulations and has ori- 
ginal jurisdiction over all legal disputes arising from disputed results. 
To counter the unwholesome influence occasionally exercised 



222 



Government and Politics 



by soldiers and other armed groups, the commission may depute 
law enforcement agencies, including the Armed Forces of the Philip- 
pines. In dire situations, the commission can take entire munici- 
palities and provinces under its control, or order new elections. 

The constitution also empowers the commission to "accredit 
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. ' ' This refers to the 
National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), a private 
group established in the 1950s, with advice and assistance from 
the United States, to keep elections honest. NAMFREL was in- 
strumental in the election of President Ramon Magsaysay in 1953, 
and played a minor role in subsequent presidential elections. It 
lapsed into inactivity during the martial law years, then played an 
important role in Aquino's 1986 victory. NAMFREL recruited 
public-spirited citizens (320,000 volunteers in 104,000 precincts 
in the 1987 congressional elections) to watch the voting and moni- 
tor ballot-counting, and it prepared a "quick count," based mostly 
on urban returns, to publicize the results immediately. Because 
the Commission on Elections can take weeks or even months to 
certify official returns, the National Movement for Free Elections 
makes it harder for unscrupulous politicians to distort the results. 
NAMFREL itself has sometimes been denounced by election losers 
as being a tool of United States intervention and has not always 
been impartial. In 1986 it favored Aquino, and its chairman, Jose 
Concepcion, was subsequently named Aquino's minister of trade 
and industry. 

The final decision on all legislative elections rests with the elec- 
toral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives. Each 
electoral tribunal is composed of nine members, three of whom 
are members of the Supreme Court designated by the chief justice. 
The remaining six are members of the Senate or the House, cho- 
sen on the basis of proportional representation from parties in the 
chamber. 

The first congressional elections under the 1987 constitution were 
held on May 11, 1987. Political parties had not really coalesced. 
Seventy-nine separate parties registered with the Commission on 
Elections, and voters had a wide range of candidates to choose from: 
84 candidates ran for 24 Senate seats, and 1,899 candidates ran 
for 200 House seats. The elections were considered relatively clean, 
even though the secretary of local government ordered all gover- 
nors and mayors to campaign for Aquino-endorsed candidates. 
There were sixty-three election-related killings. Some of these deaths 
were attributable to small-town family vendettas, whereas others 
may have had ideological motives. The armed forces charged that 
communists used strong-arm tactics in areas they controlled, and 



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Philippines: A Country Study 

the communists in turn claimed that nineteen of their election work- 
ers had been murdered. Election results showed a virtual clean 
sweep for candidates endorsed by Aquino. 

The next step in redemocratization was to hold local elections 
for the first time since 1980. When Aquino took office, she dis- 
missed all previously elected officials and replaced them with peo- 
ple she believed to be loyal to her. Local elections were originally 
scheduled for August 1987, but because many May 1987 congres- 
sional results were disputed and defeated candidates wanted a 
chance to run for local positions, the Commission on Elections post- 
poned local elections first to November 1987 and then to January 
18, 1988. More than 150,000 candidates ran for 16,000 positions 
as governor, vice governor, provincial board member, mayor, vice 
mayor, and town council member, nationwide. 

More than a hundred people were killed in election-related vio- 
lence in 1988. Elections had to be postponed in six Muslim 
provinces, two Ilocano provinces, two New People's Army- 
dominated provinces, and Ifugao because of unsettled conditions. 
The Commission on Elections assumed direct control of many 
towns, including some parts of Manila. The formerly unwritten 
rule of Filipino politics that political killings be confined to follow- 
ers and henchmen and not to the candidates themselves now seemed 
to have been broken: Thirty-nine local candidates were killed in 
the 1988 campaign. Aquino remained aloof from the 1988 local 
elections, but many candidates claimed her backing. Personalities 
and clan rivalries seemed to take precedence over ideological issues. 

The final step in redemocratization was the thrice-postponed 
March 1989 election for barangay officials. Some 42,000 barangay 
captains were elected. At this level of neighborhood politics, no 
real money or power was involved, the stakes were small, and elec- 
tion violence was rare. The Commission on Elections prohibited 
political parties from becoming involved. 

The Return of Old-Style Politics in the Countryside 

Philippine politics, along with other aspects of society, rely heavily 
on kinship and other personal relationships. To win a local elec- 
tion, one must assemble a coalition of families. To win a provin- 
cial election, the important families in each town must be drawn 
into a wider structure. To win a national election, the most promi- 
nent aristocratic clans from each region must temporarily come 
together. A family's power is not necessarily precisely correlated 
with wealth — numbers of followers matter more — but the middle 
class and the poor are sought mainly for the votes that they can 
deliver. Rarely will they be candidates themselves. 



224 



Political graffiti on a wall in residential Manila 
Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

The suspension of elections during martial law seemed at first 
to herald a radical centralization of power in Manila, specifically 
in the Marcos and Romualdez clans, but traditional provincial 
oligarchs resurfaced when Aquino restored elections. To the dis- 
may of her more idealistic followers, Aquino followed her brother's 
advice and concluded agreements with many former Marcos sup- 
porters who were probably going to win elections anyway. About 
70 percent of the candidates elected to the House of Representa- 
tives in 1987 were scions of political dynasties. They included five 
relatives of Aquino: a brother, an uncle, a sister-in-law, a brother- 
in-law, and a cousin. Another brother-in-law was elected to the 
Senate. The newly elected Congress passed a bill prohibiting close 
relatives of government officials from becoming candidates, but 
it did not take effect until after the 1988 local elections. Many of 
the same prominent families who had dominated Philippine socie- 
ty from the Spanish colonial period returned to power. Common- 
ly, the same two families vie for control of provinces. The specific 
reason for social and political bipolarity is not known, but it nour- 
ishes feuds between rival clans that are renewed generation after 
generation. 

Coercion is an alternative to buying votes. Because the popula- 
tion of the Philippines has multiplied by a factor of nine in the 



225 



Philippines: A Country Study 

twentieth century, there is not enough land to go around (see Migra- 
tion, ch. 2). As a result, tenant-landlord relationships have become 
more businesslike and less personal, and some old elite families 
now rely on force to protect their interests. Article 18 of the con- 
stitution directs the dismantling of all "private armies," but it 
seemed unlikely that it could be enforced. 

Church-State Relations 

During the Spanish colonial period, the Catholic Church was 
extensively involved in colonial administration, especially in rural 
areas (see The Friarocracy, ch. 1). With the advent of United States 
control, the Catholic Church relinquished its great estates. Church 
and state officially were separated, although the church, counting 
more than 80 percent of the population as members, continued to 
have influence when it wanted to exert it. For much of the Marcos 
administration, the official church, led by archbishop of Manila, 
Cardinal Jaime Sin, adopted a stance of "critical collaboration." 
This meant that although Sin did not flatly condemn Marcos, he 
reserved the right to criticize. Below the cardinal, the church was 
split between conservative and progressive elements, and some 
priests joined the communist-dominated National Democratic Front 
through a group named Christians for National Liberation (see 
Church and State, ch. 2). Cardinal Sin was instrumental in the 
downfall of Marcos. He brokered the critical, if temporary, recon- 
ciliation between Aquino and Laurel and warned the Marcoses that 
vote fraud was "unforgivable." In radio broadcasts, he urged 
Manilefios to come into the streets to help the forces led by Enrile 
and Ramos when they mutinied in February 1986. The church, 
therefore, could legitimately claim to be part of the revolutionary 
coalition. 

Aquino is a deeply religious woman who has opened cabinet 
meetings with prayers and sought spiritual guidance in troubled 
times. Although there were reports that the Vatican in late 1986 
had instructed Cardinal Sin to reduce his involvement in politics, 
Aquino continued to depend on him. The Catholic Bishops Con- 
ference of the Philippines issued a pastoral letter urging people to 
vote yes in the 1987 constitutional plebiscite. In March 1987, Sin 
announced that he was bowing out of politics, but two months later 
he broadcast his support for ten Aquino-backed candidates for the 
Senate and recommended that voters shun candidates of the left. 
In 1990 Sin defined his attitude toward the government as one of 
' ' critical solidarity . ' ' 

The church was very pleased with provisions of the 1987 consti- 
tution that ban abortion and restore a limited role for religion in 



226 



Government and Politics 



public education. The constitution is essentially silent on the mat- 
ter of family planning. The church used its very substantial influence 
to hinder government family-planning programs. Despite the fact 
that the population grew by 100,000 people per month in the late 
1980s, Cardinal Sin believed that the Marcos government had gone 
too far in promoting contraception. He urged Aquino to "repeal, 
or at least revise" government family-planning programs. In Au- 
gust 1988, the bishops conference denounced contraception as "de- 
humanizing and ethically objectionable." For churchmen, this was 
an issue not to be taken lightly. One bishop called for the church 
to "protect our people from the contraceptive onslaught" and the 
bishops conference labelled rapid population growth a "non- 
problem." In 1989 the United States Department of Commerce 
projected the Philippine population at 130 million by the year 
2020 — in a country the size of California (see Population Control, 
ch. 2). 

Civil-Military Relations 

The Philippines had an unbroken tradition of civilian control 
of the military until martial law was imposed in 1972. Under Ar- 
ticle 2 of the 1987 constitution, civilian authority is again, "at all 
times, supreme over the military." Many military leaders found 
this fact difficult to accept. Under Marcos, they could count on 
authorization to take a hard line against communists and Muslim 
separatists, on opportunities to run civilian businesses and indus- 
tries, and on being consulted on most matters. 

Under Aquino, the officers could feel a chill coming from 
Malacafiang. Aquino retired all "overstaying generals," signed 
cease-fires with the communists and the Moro National Libera- 
tion Front, harbored "leftist" advisers in her presidential office, 
released political prisoners (including New People's Army found- 
er Jose M. Sison), and only grudgingly improved military pay. 
Aquino also established a Commission on Human Rights to in- 
vestigate and publicize instances of military abuse and only later 
broadened the commission's mandate to include atrocities com- 
mitted by the New People's Army. 

Military Factions 

In 1983, the year of crisis resulting from the Benigno Aquino 
assassination, members of the Philippine Military Academy class 
of 1971 formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). 
Notable among its leaders was the chief of Enrile's security detail, 
Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan. RAM first demonstrated 
against corruption in the armed forces in 1985, while Marcos was 



227 



Philippines: A Country Study 

president. Most RAM officers, including Honasan, have not sup- 
ported a political idealogy. They viewed themselves as protectors 
of the people against corrupt, incompetent civilians. Others es- 
poused an agenda with a populist, or even leftist tone. By 1990 
RAM was said to no longer stand for Reform the Armed Forces 
Movement but rather for Rebolusyonariong Alyansang Makabayan, 
or Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance. 

The military in 1991 contained many factions based on loyal- 
ties to military and civilian patrons, military academy class ties, 
linguistic differences, and generational differences. One faction con- 
sisted of those still loyal to Marcos; others consisted of those loyal 
to Enrile or to Ramos. Discord existed between Tagalogs and II- 
ocanos. Graduates of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio 
were at odds with reserve and noncommissioned officers. Within 
the Philippine Military Academy faction, loyalties ran according 
to year of graduation. Another faction, the Young Officers' 
Union (YOU), was made up of a younger group of officers, dis- 
tinct from RAM. YOU leaders were well educated; some were in- 
telligence officers who had penetrated the communist underground 
and might have gained some respect for communist organizing prin- 
ciples, revolutionary puritanism, and dedication to ideology. They 
studied the writings of the late Filipino nationalist Claro M. Rec- 
to, espoused a doctrine they called Philippine nationalism, and were 
reported to believe that a social revolution could be sparked by a 
military uprising. By 1991 politicized military officers began to focus 
less on Aquino than on her possible successors. Whatever political 
leaders it supported, the Philippine military in the 1990s was ex- 
pected by some observers to remain fractured, factionalized, and 
frustrated, and civilian control was by no means guaranteed. 

Vigilantes 

Starting in 1987 a new, unsettling element clouded civil-military 
relations: vigilante groups that hunted down suspected communists 
and other leftists. The first and most famous such group was Alsa 
Masa (Masses Arise), which virtually eliminated communist in- 
fluence from the Agdao slum area of Davao City. The potential 
for civilians to accomplish what the military could not aroused offi- 
cial interest. Soon there were more than 200 such groups across 
the country, with names that hinted at their violent, cult-like na- 
ture: Remnants of God; Guerrero of Jesus; Sin, Salvation, Life, 
and Property; Rock Christ; and the frightening Tadtad (Chop- 
Chop), which liked to pose its members for photographs with the 
severed heads of their victims. Vigilantes often carried magical 



228 



Government and Politics 



amulets to ward off bullets, and their rituals were sometimes per- 
formed to loud rock music. 

Domestic human rights groups, such as Task Force Detainees, 
and international monitors, such as Amnesty International, pub- 
licized incidents of torture. Amnesty International asserted that tor- 
ture of communist rebels and sympathizers had become a common 
practice. One paramilitary group in 1988 responded to such criti- 
cism by shooting the Filipino regional chairman of Amnesty In- 
ternational. Six human rights lawyers were killed in the first three 
years of the Aquino government. More than 200 critics of the 
government were victims of extrajudicial executions. Many 
vigilantes carried pistols; others were skilled with long, heavy knives 
called bolos. 

Despite many documented abuses, United States and Philippine 
government officials have spoken in support of some vigilante 
groups. Aquino cited Alsa Masa's success in Davao as a legitimate 
exercise of People's Power. Her secretary of local government, 
Jaime Ferrer, ordered all local officials to set up civilian volunteer 
organizations or face dismissal. Ferrer was gunned down on Au- 
gust 2, 1987, for this and other anticommunist activities. The 
government made a distinction between ad hoc vigilante groups 
and the civilian volunteer organizations. The latter, which includ- 
ed Nation Watch (Bantay Bayan), were to conform to the follow- 
ing guidelines set forth on October 30, 1987, by the Department 
of National Defense: membership in the organizations was to be 
voluntary, members were to be screened by the police, the organi- 
zations were to be defensive, and they were to eschew identifica- 
tion with individual landowners or politicians. Ramos fully 
supported the civilian volunteer organizations. He described their 
relationship to the uniformed military as "synergistic" and in 1989 
grouped all 20,000 civilian volunteer organizations together un- 
der an umbrella organization called the National Alliance for 
Democracy. In reality, the lines between official and unofficial 
vigilante groups were often blurred. Large businesses have donat- 
ed money to the National Alliance for Democracy and used its mem- 
bers as strikebreakers to counter leftist unions. 

The Media 

The constitution guarantees freedom of the press and also pro- 
vides free access to records, documents, and papers pertaining to 
official acts. Government officials, however, tended to be leery of 
reporters, who sometimes ran stories gathered from a single source 
or based on hearsay. Libel suits were frequent in the 1980s. 



229 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Traditionally, major newspapers published in Manila have been 
owned by elite families. Prior to 1972, Philippine newspapers were 
freewheeling, often publishing unsubstantiated stories, but willing 
to expose wrongdoing in high places. When Marcos declared martial 
law in 1972, he confiscated the assets of newspapers owned by fam- 
ilies not part of his coalition. From 1972 to 1986, although 
newspapers were not officially government-owned or government- 
supported, they were controlled by Marcos 's relatives, friends, and 
cronies. After the assassination of Aquino in August 1983, 
newspapers gradually became more politically independent. When 
Marcos fled in 1986, the Commission on Good Government con- 
fiscated the assets of crony-owned newspapers, and the exuberant 
Philippine press revived quickly. In many cases newspapers were 
operated by the families that had controlled them prior to martial 
law. In 1991 there were approximately thirty daily newspapers in 
the Philippines. Twelve mainly English-language broadsheets 
provided serious news. Fourteen tabloids, mostly Tagalog and 
Cebuano, offered sensationalism. Four newspapers were printed 
in Chinese. Only one newspaper, the Manila Bulletin, had consis- 
tently shown a profit. Another, the Inquirer, began to show a profit 
in 1990. Most other newspapers were losing concerns used by the 
businesspeople who owned them to influence government policy 
and officials. 

Television stations in Manila were very profitable to the wealthy 
investors who owned them. They also emerged as a significant po- 
litical factor, and coup attempts often featured assaults on televi- 
sion stations. There were very few television stations outside Manila. 
Radio, however, reached people in remote areas, even villages 
without electricity. Radio stations in the provinces tended to be 
owned by wealthy local families involved in politics. 

Unsolved Political Problems 

In 1991, after five years of democracy, many systemic political 
problems remained. These included the twin insurgencies, the sput- 
tering economy, the skewed distribution of wealth and land, and 
widespread human rights abuses. 

As of 1991, the New People's Army had been in the field for 
twenty-two years and was further from being able to seize power 
than it had been a decade before. Many trends were unfavorable. 
More than a hundred communist leaders had been captured, armed 
troop strength was down, weapons were in short supply, and morale 
was low. Still, the government could not eliminate the New Peo- 
ple's Army (see The Counterinsurgency Campaign, ch. 5). The 
stalemate made the government seem ineffective. Despite the decline 



230 



Government and Politics 



in the late 1980s in the fortunes of the international communist 
movement and the Communist Party of the Philippines, the com- 
munists, as the only Philippine political party addressing the 
problems of the very poor, could not be discounted. 

The Moro National Liberation Front and other rebellious Mus- 
lim armies on Mindanao remained in a state of discontent in the 
early 1990s. As had been the case under four regimes (Spanish, 
American, Japanese, and Filipino), there were scant prospects that 
the Muslims could be fully integrated into Philippine society. They 
were unlikely to be satisfied with the limited autonomy over a limit- 
ed region embodied in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Min- 
danao. Neither the government nor the Moro National Liberation 
Front could win a final victory. Consequently, the problem was 
likely to continue to fester. 

The Philippine economy has exemplified the "revolution of ris- 
ing expectations." In the early 1990s, Manilenos watched Ameri- 
can movies, and provincianos watched films made in Manila. Even 
rural villagers dreamed of cars, cities, excitement, and an end to 
the grinding poverty that condemned them to hunger and their 
children to malnutrition. Filipinos had high aspirations, as shown 
by the sacrifices they made to send their children to college, but 
most were doomed to bitter disappointment. The Philippine econ- 
omy, strapped with a US$28 billion debt inherited from the Mar- 
cos administration, offered only limited opportunities (see External 
Debt, ch. 3). 

One of the greatest disappointments of the Aquino years was 
the lack of progress in the agrarian reform program. Aquino could 
have used her political honeymoon and her inherited dictatorial 
powers to divest the old aristocrats of their estates and pass out 
land to the farmers who actually tilled it, but she waited until the 
new Congress was elected and gave the job to them. About 90 per- 
cent of Congress members were landowners. The version of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program passed by the Congress 
was signed as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law by Presi- 
dent Aquino on June 10, 1988. It included many loopholes deliber- 
ately added by members of Congress to enable landowners 
(including themselves) to evade the intent of the law. A bloc of land- 
owning legislators led by Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, resisted 
efforts to pass more effective agrarian reform measures. 

The Commission on Human Rights, established under the 1987 
constitution, had not been effective, at least in its first four years. 
The constitution grants the commission broad powers to monitor 
the government's compliance with international treaty obligations 
on human rights. The commission, however, claiming that it could 



231 



Philippines: A Country Study 



not investigate abuses that occur "in an environment of war," as 
of the end of 1989 had resolved only about 10 percent of the cases 
brought before it and had reverted to investigating ordinary civil 
police matters. Even notorious cases, such as the 1987 Lupao Mas- 
sacre, in which seventeen villagers, including six children and two 
octogenarians, were lined up and shot after an engagement between 
the army and guerrillas, did not result in any military or civilian 
convictions. In 1990 the Supreme Court decided that warrantless 
arrests of suspected subversives were constitutional. 

Foreign Affairs 

Philippine foreign policy in the early 1990s was broadly 
prodemocratic and pro- Western in orientation. Philippine inter- 
national prestige was at an all-time high when Marcos was over- 
thrown. During the Aquino administration, the Philippines pursued 
active, nationalist policies aimed at promoting "genuine indepen- 
dence" and economic development. As a charter member of the 
United Nations, the Philippines participated in all its functional 
groups, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization; the World 
Health Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization; and the Economic and Social Com- 
mission for Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the Philippines has 
been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), the 
World Bank (see Glossary), and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. The Philippines was a founding member of the Asian 
Development Bank, which is headquartered in Manila. 

Article 2 of the constitution states that "the State shall pursue 
an independent foreign policy." For historical, economic, cultur- 
al, and strategic reasons, the Philippines has been tied most close- 
ly to the United States. Economic necessity dictated maintaining 
a smooth working relationship with Japan. Filipinos wanted a for- 
eign policy oriented more toward their Southeast Asian neighbors, 
but for most purposes implementing such a policy was not high 
on their agenda. The proximity and large population of China, 
plus the presence of Chinese in the Philippines, required amicable 
relations with Beijing. Because of the Muslim separatist movement, 
and also for economic reasons, relations with Middle Eastern coun- 
tries became more important in the 1970s and 1980s. 

Filipino Nationalism 

Filipino nationalism, which is an important element of foreign 
policy, showed every sign of intensifying in the early 1990s. Diverse 
elements in Philippine society have been united in opposition to 



232 



Government and Politics 



their common history of foreign subjugation, and this opposition 
often carried an anti- American undertone. 

Leftists have long held that Philippine history is a story of failed 
or betrayed revolutions, with native compradors selling out to for- 
eign invaders. In the post-Marcos years, this thesis received wide 
acceptance across the political spectrum. The middle class was 
deeply disillusioned because five successive United States adminis- 
trations had acquiesced to Marcos 's dictatorship, and Filipino con- 
servatives nursed grievances long held by the left. 

Relations with the United States 

Precisely because the "special relationship" between the Unit- 
ed States and the Philippines has been lengthy and intimate, it some- 
times has resembled a family feud. Aquino enjoyed great prestige 
and popularity in the United States and was named Time maga- 
zine's "Woman of the Year" for 1986. Aquino had spent much 
of her early life in the United States and returned in September 
1986 for a triumphant tour of Washington, New York, Boston, 
and San Francisco, culminating in an address to an emotion-filled 
joint session of the United States Congress and a congressional 
pledge of strong support for her government. Soon after, however, 
Philippine and United States government leaders faced substan- 
tial differences on economic and military issues. 

United States officials frequently expressed concern that Aquino 
was not reforming her government quickly enough to preempt the 
New People's Army's appeal. And, although United States offi- 
cials repeatedly warned coup plotters that the United States would 
cut military aid if they overthrew Aquino, many Filipinos worried 
that what they perceived as the United States government's ob- 
session with national security might tempt the United States to sup- 
port a military coup. To allay these fears, the United States 
dispatched two fighter planes to protect Aquino during the Decem- 
ber 1989 coup attempt. Nevertheless, recriminations resumed with- 
in months. Irritated by US$96 million in aid cuts, Aquino refused 
to meet Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney when he visited Ma- 
nila in February 1990. 

In the late 1980s, Philippine-United States relations were be- 
deviled by a new problem: heightened concern for the safety of 
United States military and civilian personnel in the Philippines. 
Two United States airmen were shot and killed in Angeles City 
in 1987. In 1989 Colonel James N. Rowe, who was serving with 
the United States Joint Military Advisory Group, was assassinated 
near the United States military compound in Quezon City. (In Feb- 
ruary 1991, two communists were sentenced to life imprisonment 



233 



Philippines: A Country Study 



for the murder of Rowe.) At least ten other United States citizens 
were killed by communists in the Philippines between 1986 and 
1991. United States Peace Corps volunteers were withdrawn in 
1990, when intelligence sources claimed to have uncovered plans 
for mass abductions. One volunteer was said to have been kid- 
napped by the New People's Army, but he emerged unharmed. 
Finally, in 1990 the United States government authorized hazardous 
duty pay for diplomats, troops, and other federal employees in the 
Philippines. 

United States access to air and naval bases in the Philippines 
dominated Philippine-United States relations in 1991, with emo- 
tional issues of Philippine nationalism often weighing more heavily 
than economic or strategic arguments. The Military Bases Agree- 
ment of 1947, as amended in 1979 and updated in 1983 and 1988, 
was set to expire in September 1991 (see Foreign Military Rela- 
tions, ch. 5). Clark Air Base, located north of Manila in the plain 
of Central Luzon, was a logistical hub for the United States Thir- 
teenth Air Force, and Subic Bay Naval Base was an extremely 
valuable repair and resupply facility for the United States Seventh 
Fleet. Approximately 15,000 United States military personnel (ex- 
clusive of sailors temporarily ashore at Subic), 1,000 defense 
civilians, and 24,000 military dependents were assigned to the bases. 
The United States maintained that both bases were vital for power 
projection in the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Middle Eastern 
theaters and wanted indefinite access to both facilities, along with 
the Crow Valley gunnery range north of Subic Bay and some 
smaller communications installations. 

Extension of United States base rights became a pivotal issue 
in Manila politics. The need for some sort of military alliance with 
the United States was rarely questioned, but the physical presence 
of the bases has irritated nationalists beyond endurance. The so- 
cially deformed communities outside their gates were seen as a na- 
tional disgrace. Angeles City (near Clark) and Olongapo City (near 
Subic) had innumerable bars and thousands of prostitutes, which 
caused Filipinos to be concerned about acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS; see Health and Living Standards, ch. 2). There 
were numerous criminal gangs and smugglers, and criminal juris- 
diction was a perennial problem. 

The nuclear issue complicated matters. Article 2 of the consti- 
tution says that the Philippines, "consistent with national interest, 
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in 
its territory. ' ' Interpreted strictiy, this article challenged the United 
States policy of never confirming or denying the presence of nuclear 



234 



Government and Politics 



weapons at any specific location. Aquino finessed the issue, ap- 
parently determining that it was in the national interest not to do 
anything to make the United States leave the bases. But the Philip- 
pine Senate in June 1988 passed by a vote of nineteen to three a 
bill that would have banned from the Philippines the "develop- 
ment, manufacture, acquisition, testing, use, introduction, instal- 
lation, or storage" of nuclear weapons. The bill was defeated in 
the House, but its margin of passage in the Senate indicated poten- 
tial difficulty in obtaining the votes of the two-thirds of the Senate 
required to ratify any future base agreement. 

Despite negative developments in Philippine-United States re- 
lations, congruent interests in the early 1990s bound the two coun- 
tries. United States foreign aid to the Philippines in 1990 reached 
nearly US$500 million; United States private investment stood at 
more than US$1 billion; and the United States and Japan were 
key donors to the Multilateral Aid Initiative, also known as the 
Philippine Assistance Plan, which offered some debt relief and new 
credit in return for desired structural reforms (see Development 
Assistance, ch. 3). Political activity in Filipino- American communi- 
ties in the United States added another dimension to Philippine- 
United States relations. Early maneuvering for the 1992 Philippine 
presidential election was as feverish among these communities on 
the United States west coast as it was in Manila. 

Relations with Asian Neighbors 

For decades the Philippines was an active proponent of region- 
alism. In 1954 it joined Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Thailand, and the United States in the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization against the perceived threat from the Chinese 
and Indochinese communist regimes. This alliance was phased out 
in 1977. 

Manila's quest for regional cooperation received a significant 
boost in the 1965-66 period, when bilateral problems between In- 
donesia and Malaysia that had been known as the confrontation — 
until then the main obstacle to regionalism in Southeast Asia — 
gave way to neighborliness. In August 1967, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to pursue economic, social, 
cultural, and technical cooperation. 

The Philippines was also party to a multilateral dispute over 
ownership of the Kalayaan Islands, as Filipinos call some of the 
Spratlys, a scattered group of atolls west of the Philippine island 
of Palawan and east of Vietnam, also claimed in toto or partially 
by China, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam (see External Defense, 



235 



Philippines: A Country Study 

ch. 5). Tomas Clomas, a Manila lawyer, visited the islands in 1956, 
claimed them for himself, named them Kalayaan (Freedomland), 
then asked the Philippine government to make them a protectorate. 
Philippine troops were sent to the Kalayaans in 1968. All parties 
to the dispute were interested in possible offshore oil around the 
islands. The law of the sea grants to any country that receives in- 
ternational recognition of a claim to even a rock sticking out of 
the water exclusive economic rights to all resources, including oil, 
within a 200-nautical-mile radius of that point. Manila regularly 
tried to extract from the United States a declaration that it would 
defend the Philippines' claim to the Kalayaans as part of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
United States of America, but the United States just as regularly 
refused so to interpret that treaty. 

Aquino broke the tradition that a Philippine president's first over- 
seas trip was to Washington. She visited Jakarta and Singapore 
in August 1986. Indonesian president Soeharto promised not to 
aid Muslim separatists in Mindanao but cautioned Aquino not to 
attempt reconciliation with communist insurgents. Singapore's 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew echoed Soeharto 's warning. Both 
leaders encouraged the Philippines to find a way to extend United 
States base rights. Although the governments espoused differing 
world views, the Philippines has had few disputes with Indonesia 
or Singapore, and relations remained neighborly in the early 1990s. 
The Philippines enjoyed a cooperative relationship with Thailand. 
The two countries in 1991 had no disputes and many common in- 
terests, including a history of security cooperation with the Unit- 
ed States. 

Malaysia 

Philippine relations with Malaysia have been bedeviled by a lin- 
gering dispute over the status of Sabah, the northeast corner of 
Borneo. The Philippines based its case on a claim to territories that 
were part of the former Sultanate of Sulu, a nineteenth-century 
entity whose territory straddled the present maritime boundary be- 
tween Malaysia and the Philippines. In 1991 one descendent of 
the sultan, a Filipino citizen, still received a stipend stemming from 
cession of the sultanate to a British company. Philippine presidents 
have revived this claim occasionally. It was revealed in 1968 that 
Marcos was training a team of saboteurs on Corregidor for infiltra- 
tion into Sabah. Marcos later decided to drop the claim, but the 
aggrieved Malaysians insisted on such an explicit, humiliating pub- 
lic renunciation that no Philippine president could meet their con- 
ditions. The Philippine constitution, by not mentioning Sabah, 



236 



Government and Politics 



seems to have dropped the claim. Aquino rushed a bill to Con- 
gress in November 1987 to renounce the claim once and for all, 
hoping to get the issue out of the way before Malaysia's Prime 
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad arrived for the ASEAN summit 
in December, but Congress did not act. 

Vietnam 

There was little diplomatic or cultural intercourse between the 
Philippines and Vietnam until the 1960s. The Philippines contribut- 
ed a small civic action unit to the United States effort during the 
Vietnam War but refused to allow the United States to mount B-52 
bombing runs from Clark Air Base. (The aircraft flew from Guam 
and were refueled from Clark.) Beginning in 1975, tens of thou- 
sands of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees entered the model 
refugee camp set up by the United Nations at Morong on the Ba- 
taan Peninsula. A clean, well-run place, it provided Vietnamese 
and Cambodians bound for the United States with training in En- 
glish, American history, and vocational skills. The Philippines 
joined other ASEAN states in opposing Vietnam's occupation of 
Cambodia, even indicating a willingness to support the Khmer 
Rouge, if necessary, to rid Cambodia of Vietnamese forces. 

Japan 

Philippine-Japanese relations were smooth and successful in the 
early 1990s, despite bitter memories of the cruelty of the Japanese 
during their occupation of the Philippines in World War II. In 
mid- 1986 the Philippines, concerned about Japan's possible 
remilitarization, joined with other Asian nations to protest the adop- 
tion of revisionist history textbooks by the Japanese education minis- 
try. For the majority of Filipinos, however, World War II memories 
have faded or are nonexistent. Japan was a major source of de- 
velopment funds, trade, investment, and tourism in the 1980s, and 
there have been few foreign policy disputes between the two nations. 

Aquino visited Japan in November 1986 and met with Emperor 
Hirohito, who offered his apologies for the wrongs committed by 
Japan during World War II. New aid agreements also were con- 
cluded during this visit. Aquino returned to Japan in 1989 for Hiro- 
hito 's funeral and in 1990 for the enthronement of Emperor Akihito. 

China 

Philippine relations with China and Taiwan were cautious in 
the 1990s. Manila's relations with Beijing had been hostile in the 
1950s and 1960s. The unspoken threat of Chinese aid to the New 
People's Army was ever present but never materialized. Since the 



237 



Philippines: A Country Study 

opening of diplomatic relations between Manila and Beijing in 1973, 
the relationship has been correct but not warm. By contrast, the 
Filipino-Chinese business community has had many connections 
with relatives and partners in Taiwan. 

In 1988 Aquino visited China, met with elder statesman Deng 
Xiaoping, and made a ceremonial pilgrimage to her ancestral home 
and temple in Fujian Province. The closer relationship fostered by 
that trip later dissipated because of Beijing's sensitivity to what was 
perceived as a Philippine bias in favor of Taiwan. A Philippine 
government spokesperson had inadvertently referred to a visiting 
delegation from Taiwan as representatives of "the Republic of Chi- 
na." The disclosure of a secret visit to Taiwan, made by the Philip- 
pine secretary of foreign affairs, Raul Manglapus, in October 1989, 
upset Beijing even more. In 1990 Aquino reaffirmed the Philip- 
pines' one-China policy, but she reserved the right to develop trade 
and economic ties with Taiwan. China, for its part, has sought 
with limited success to conduct an "oil diplomacy" with the Philip- 
pines, a country greatly dependent on imported oil. In December 
1990, Aquino welcomed the Chinese premier, Li Peng, to Manila 
after having earlier suspended official contacts in the wake of the 
June 1989 violence around Beijing's Tiananmen Square. 

Relations with the Soviet Union 

The Philippine government was always deeply suspicious of the 
Soviet Union because of Moscow's ideological support for com- 
munist insurgents. Marcos sometimes dispatched his wife to 
Moscow, but only for the purpose of reminding Washington that 
there were alternatives to exclusive reliance on the West for aid. 
Soviet Communist Party general secretary Leonid Brezhnev 
reciprocated by voicing support of Manila in opposition to the Com- 
munist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army. The 
government of Mikhail Gorbachev was embarrassed by its own 
diplomatic clumsiness in dispatching the sole foreign ambassador 
to attend Marcos 's pitiful final inauguration on February 25, 1986, 
but it later opened cautious diplomatic dialogue with the Aquino 
government and promised to continue to refuse support to the Com- 
munist Party of the Philippines and its New People's Army. In 
1988 Moscow played on the Philippine-United States bases con- 
troversy by offering to pull out from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam 
in return for United States withdrawal from Clark and Subic bases, 
an initiative that withered on the vine. In 1991 Moscow hoped to 
acquire access to Philippine ports and dockyards for its fishing fleet 
as a result of warmer relations with Manila. 



238 



Government and Politics 



Relations with the Middle East 

There are three dimensions to Philippine relations with Middle 
Eastern countries: oil dependence, Muslim separatism, and labor 
conditions for Filipino contract workers in Saudi Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf states. The Philippines required reasonably priced 
oil, and fluctuations in world oil prices caused serious problems 
for the Philippines. Among the problems were politically incendi- 
ary strikes by the drivers of jeepneys, jeeps converted to carry pas- 
sengers, which were a vital form of public transport in Manila. 
For this reason, the Philippine government was very conscious of 
the need to maintain amicable relations with Middle Eastern oil 
producers and of the effect that its treatment of the Muslim minority 
could have on those relations. Furthermore, although Moro Na- 
tional Liberation Front leader Nur Misuari lived and worked in 
Libya and Saudi Arabia, Arab leaders were reticent in their sup- 
port for Misuari. In addition, as of January 1991, there were an 
estimated 495,300 Filipinos working in the Middle East, includ- 
ing 390,000 in Saudi Arabia, 2,000 in Kuwait, and 50 in Iraq. 
Those workers were a major source of Philippine hard currency 
earnings, but their presence also made the Philippines vulnerable 
to volatile changes in Middle Eastern politics. 

As her administration entered its final year, Aquino could look 
with some satisfaction on her great achievements of restoring 
democracy and returning the Philippines to normalcy. The politi- 
cal system appeared to be stabilizing, as citizens and soldiers im- 
patient for change pinned their hopes on national and local elections 
scheduled for 1992. The great unanswered question was whether 
normalcy was enough for a country with an underperforming econ- 
omy, a semifeudal social system, and a rapidly growing popula- 
tion. Democracy faced one of its toughest challenges in the 
Philippines. 

* * * 

The single best source for understanding Philippine politics and 
society is the new edition of David J. Steinberg's concise, insight- 
ful The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place. Bryan Johnson's 
The Four Days of Courage is a gripping account of the February Revo- 
lution of 1986. Raymond Bonner's controversial Waltzing with a 
Dictator provides a highly detailed account of what he sees as a sym- 
biotic relationship between Marcos and various United States 
administrations. Articles by Benjamin Muego, David Rosenberg, 
and Gareth Porter in Steven Dorr and Deborah Mitchell's The 



239 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Philippines in a Changing Southeast Asia offer valuable information on 
the Philippines' relationships with its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
The Aquino s ofTarlac, by Filipino writer Nick Joaquin, supplies ex- 
cellent background material on President Aquino and her family, 
and an article by Stanley Karnow in the New York Times Magazine, 
"Cory Aquino's Downhill Slide," reports sympathetically but dis- 
appointedly on the Aquino presidency. 

Gregg R. Jones, an American who spent time in the hills with 
communist rebels, reveals much about the guerrilla movement in 
his Red Revolution. Two detailed reports on human rights in the 
Philippines are Amnesty International's Philippines: A Summary of 
Amnesty International^ Concerns and Asia Watch's, "The Philippines." 
Everyday Politics in the Philippines, by Benedict J. Kerkvliet, gives 
villagers' views of political and social life, and a detailed, probing 
series of articles by John McBeth about the resurgence of provin- 
cial dynasties is found in the Far Eastern Economic Review. An in- 
sightful analysis of Filipino nationalism and how it is interwoven 
with religious imagery is contained in three essays by Ian Buruma 
published in The New York Review of Books. 

For a year-to-year summary of political developments, the best 
sources are the annual survey articles appearing in the February 
issues of Asian Survey and in the Far Eastern Economic Review's 
Asia Yearbook. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



240 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Main gate of Fort Santiago in Intramuros, Manila 



Geographically insulated from the turmoil and 

conflict that plagued the Southeast Asian mainland during the de- 
cades after World War II, Filipinos perceived no direct external 
threat to their island nation. Challenges came from within. A se- 
ries of rural insurgencies plagued the Philippines. In 1990 the 
government faced three major challenges: Muslim separatists, the 
communist New People's Army (NPA), and, ironically, the Philip- 
pine military, traditionally the government's protector. The rebel- 
lion by Filipino Muslims in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago 
seemed the least menacing of the three major challenges to the 
government. Commonly known as Moros, the Muslims had waged 
guerrilla warfare since 1972, alternately pressing for either seces- 
sion or increased autonomy. The intensity of the Moro insurgen- 
cy, however, had significantly declined since its violent peak in the 
mid-1970s. Divisions over leadership and goals among the three 
main Moro factions, reduced external support, pressure by the 
armed forces, and government political accommodations — including 
the creation in 1990 of a Muslim autonomous region — contained 
periodic threats of a resurgent Moro rebellion in the 1990s. 
Although government forces and Muslim rebels clashed only oc- 
casionally by 1991, the government still respected the Moros' po- 
litical and military power and guarded against escalating violence 
in the south. 

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military 
arm, the NPA, presented a greater challenge to the government. 
Using the Maoist strategy of protracted people's war, the com- 
munists had pursued a ''national democratic revolution" since the 
late 1960s. After slow but steady expansion through the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the communist rebellion grew rapidly during Presi- 
dent Ferdinand E. Marcos 's last years. By 1985 the NPA oper- 
ated in a considerable majority of the country's seventy-three 
provinces and exercised substantial control in some 20 percent of 
Philippine villages. 

Following Corazon C. Aquino's rise to power in 1986, the 
strength of the NPA peaked, then began to decline. The advent 
of a popular president was only the first of several significant set- 
backs for the communists; some were caused by the communists 
themselves. The CPP's failure to participate in the downfall of Mar- 
cos and the subsequent reversal of the rebels' fortunes sparked un- 
precedented debate within the party over how to pursue the struggle. 



243 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Repeated arrests of top insurgent cadres also prompted a bloody 
purge of the rebels' ranks as the communists attempted to weed 
out suspected government informants. Frustrated with the party's 
inability to raise more funds domestically through "revolutionary 
taxes," combined voluntary and coerced donations, the CPP in- 
creasingly turned to foreign sources in the late 1980s. Most funds 
came from sympathetic western political, labor, and charitable 
groups. Breaking with a longstanding policy of " self-sufficiency, " 
the communists also pursued foreign government support. As of 
1991, however, there was no evidence that any nation had respond- 
ed to the CPP's appeal. With an estimated 18,000 to 23,000 full- 
time guerrillas in 1991, the CPP and the NPA remained a potent, 
although not immediate, threat to the government. 

Ironically, the Philippine military, long the state's defender 
against insurgency, posed the most serious threat to the democrat- 
ically elected government of President Aquino. Most observers 
traced the military's unprecedented rebelliousness to the Marcos 
martial law era (1972-81). As the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) grew rapidly in size during the 1970s, so did the involve- 
ment of its leaders in the nation's political life. Professionalism erod- 
ed as Marcos loyalists were rewarded with key positions in the 
military, government, and civilian corporations. By February 1986, 
the military was deeply factionalized and widely criticized by 
human rights groups for abuses and corruption. In the wake 
of a fraudulent tally of the presidential election and Marcos 's 
refusal to step aside, a group of reform-minded officers mutinied 
and sparked a popular revolt that unseated Marcos and allowed 
Corazon Aquino to assume the presidency. The group was led by 
the commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Lieutenant General 
Fidel V. Ramos, and Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce 
Enrile. 

Military rebellions continued under Aquino. Three, in July 1986 
and January and April 1987, were relatively small affairs led by 
disgruntled former Marcos loyalists. A potentially serious plot in 
October to November 1986 was stillborn and resulted in the removal 
of the minister of national defense, Juan Ponce Enrile. The rebel- 
lions of August 1987 and December 1989, however, were credible 
coup attempts that, by most accounts, almost toppled the presi- 
dent. They were led by many of the same reformist officers that 
had helped bring Aquino to power. Although only a fraction of 
the AFP actively supported the coup attempts, many personnel were 
said to be sympathetic to the mutineers' complaints about the 
government. The threat of yet another military rebellion persisted 



244 



National Security 



in 1991 but had diminished considerably as rebel leaders surren- 
dered to the government and talks began between military leaders 
and rebels. 

When not distracted by coup attempts, the 153,500-member 
armed forces focused on combating the communist insurgency and, 
to a lesser extent, the threat of a rejuvenated Moro rebellion. The 
ground forces dominated the counterinsurgency effort. The smaller 
navy and air force provided support and a limited patrol capabili- 
ty. Improvements in the military's image, discipline, and perfor- 
mance during the late 1980s contributed to reversing CPP growth. 

With nearly all available resources committed to internal secu- 
rity functions, the AFP's conventional capabilities were modest. 
The nation had faced no threat of direct foreign aggression since 
Japan's invasion during World War II. The United States and the 
Philippines were parties to a mutual defense treaty, and should a 
credible external threat emerge, the military would be likely to rely 
on support from the United States. A separate treaty, which was 
to expire in 1991, provided for the maintenance of several United 
States military installations in the Philippines. Negotiations on the 
future of the American bases beyond September 1991 were ongo- 
ing in mid- 1991. 

The Armed Forces in National Life 
Historical Background 

Philippine military tradition traces the formal beginnings of the 
national armed forces to the military force established under the 
revolutionary government in 1897 by Emilio Aguinaldo. The 
revolutionary army fought successively for independence from Spain 
and the United States (see The 1896 Uprising and Rizal's Execu- 
tion, ch. 1). Although this revolutionary army was disbanded in 
late 1 899 after Aguinaldo recognized the futility of meeting the nu- 
merically superior and better armed United States forces in fron- 
tal engagements, a guerrilla war against the United States continued 
until 1903. According to their own ethos, the armed forces of the 
late twentieth century had inherited the people's mandate to de- 
fend the sovereignty of the Philippine nation. 

The United States colonial government, installed in 1899, made 
no attempt to resurrect the defeated Philippine army, but military 
and paramilitary forces still played an important role in national 
life. For example, the Philippine Scouts were an indigenous mili- 
tary force integrated with the United States forces maintained in 
the Philippines for external defense. 



245 



Philippines: A Country Study 

The Philippine Constabulary, established by the United States 
administration in 1901, played an important and enduring role. 
Although originally staffed by Filipinos and led by Americans, the 
Philippine Constabulary acquired a Filipino chief in 1917, and by 
1933 nearly all its officers were Filipino. Constables performed a 
wide variety of public service roles, acting as jail guards, post- 
masters, game wardens, and telegraph repairmen, and the Philip- 
pine Constabulary's melding of police, paramilitary, and civilian 
functions provided a model for the later establishment of the armed 
forces. 

The Philippine Constabulary's role in national life waned in the 
1920s as civilian institutions began to develop, but military influence 
rose again with the establishment of the army in 1936, the year 
after the Philippines achieved commonwealth status. The new army 
was closely patterned after the United States model. It was envi- 
sioned as a small, professional force of some 10,000 regulars, who 
were to be augmented by a reserve force with an eventual strength 
of 400,000 by independence — promised for 1946. Although the ar- 
my's relatively small size seemed to ensure that it would play only 
a small part in national life, its role in putting down a number of 
peasant revolts, as well as the growing Japanese threat, forced the 
army into a more prominent position in the late 1930s. At the be- 
ginning of World War II, the Philippine army supported United 
States forces; when the latter withdrew, it continued protracted 
guerrilla warfare to combat the Japanese occupation. 

Following World War II, the military's influence waxed and 
waned, based on internal security threats and the inclinations of 
the national administration. The armed forces became involved 
in partisan politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s and influenced 
the 1946 and 1949 elections. In the early 1950s, career officers filled 
high government posts in the administration of Ramon Magsay- 
say (1953-57). The drive to defeat the Huk (see Glossary) rebel- 
lion in the mid- to late 1940s also involved the military in Central 
Luzon's local government and led to a great expansion of the armed 
forces' civic action mission (see The Magsaysay, Garcia, and 
Macapagal Administrations, 1953-65, ch. 1). During the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the military's influence declined. Under the ad- 
ministrations of presidents Carlos P. Garcia (1957-61) and Dios- 
dado Macapagal (1961-65), military budgets were reduced, civic 
action was trimmed, and the armed forces were kept relatively 
subordinate to civilian control. 

The ascent of Ferdinand Marcos to power in 1965 reversed the 
trend toward professionalism in the AFP. During the twenty years 
of his rule, he granted unprecedented power to the Philippine 



246 



National Security 



military, which became more deeply involved than ever before in 
the country's political life. On taking office, he reorganized the 
AFP and shuffled personnel to increase his personal control over 
the military. A former army officer himself, Marcos was comfort- 
able with military men and developed the armed forces into his 
principal power base. 

The declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972 set the stage 
for enlarging the role of the military in society. The armed forces 
became the government's principal tool to combat the fledgling com- 
munist insurgency and, during the mid-1970s, the violent Mus- 
lim rebellion. The AFP budget grew rapidly and its strength 
increased threefold. Civic action operations expanded as part of 
the military's program to aid rural development, increase support 
for the government, and undercut the insurgents. The military was 
involved in administering the national criminal justice system, par- 
ticularly in insurgent-affected areas. The military also was direct- 
ly involved in the management of the economy as AFP officers took 
charge of many major companies, moving far from the original 
model of a small, apolitical military that performed functions strictly 
limited to conventional defense against outside aggression. 

Although the AFP's influence diminished somewhat following 
the end of martial law in 1981, Marcos continued to control the 
military closely through his close friend General Fabian Ver, whom 
he had installed as AFP chief of staff in 1981 . The president directed 
promotions and assignments and delayed retirements, ensuring that 
officers personally loyal to him filled key positions. 

Filipinos increasingly criticized the personalization and manipu- 
lation of the military by Marcos, especially following the military's 
alleged involvement in the 1983 assassination of his political rival, 
Benigno Aquino. Discontent also emerged in the military and 
played a decisive role in Marcos's overthrow. Critical of Marcos' s 
domination of the military and of the alleged corruption and in- 
competence of senior officers, a group of mid-level AFP officers 
founded a reform movement — the Reform the Armed Forces Move- 
ment (RAM) — in 1982. These officers, led by then Minister of Na- 
tional Defence Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel V. 
Ramos spearheaded the February 1986 military leadership of the 
popular revolt that ultimately toppled Marcos. 

Despite the Aquino government's attempts to depoliticize the 
Philippine military, the February 1986 rebellion against Marcos 
was not the last uprising. Units loyal to the deposed president mu- 
tinied in Manila only months after Aquino took office, and by 1991 
there had been six open rebellions against her rule. The two most 
serious, in August 1987 and December 1989, were led by the RAM 



247 



Philippines: A Country Study 



officers that had helped bring her to power. In 1991 discontented 
elements of the AFP, led by fugitive RAM founders, still threat- 
ened to unseat the president. 

External Defense 

The Philippines perceived no serious threat of external aggres- 
sion in 1991. The reduction in the Soviet naval and air presence 
in Vietnam and a more benign Soviet foreign policy had eased fears 
of involvement in superpower contention. Although some Filipi- 
nos were wary of the growth of Japanese military capabilities, Japan 
was not seen as a near- term threat. 

The Philippines had two territorial disputes in 1991 that had na- 
tional security implications. The first concerned a shallow section 
of the South China Sea west of the Philippine archipelago containing 
some small islands that were part of the larger group of Spratly 
Islands. Referred to as Kalayaan by the Philippines, it is a rich 
fishing area that had been identified as a potential source of petrole- 
um deposits (see Relations with Asian Neighbors, ch. 4). The Sprat- 
ly s, however, were claimed in toto by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, 
whereas Malaysia laid claim to parts of the continental shelf un- 
derlying the southernmost islands in the chain. 

The Philippine government first put forth informal claims to 
Kalayaan in the mid-1950s. In 1978 Marcos made formal claims 
by declaring that fifty-seven of the islands were part of Palawan 
Province by virtue of their presence on the continental margin of 
the archipelago. The Philippine military, which first occupied three 
of the islands in 1968, continued to garrison marines on several 
islands. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan also occupied several islands. 
Although the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed in the Spradys 
in March 1988, as of 1991 the Philippines had not been involved 
in any military confrontations over the islands. 

The other territorial dispute involved the Malaysian state of 
Sabah on northern Borneo. In 1962, when the British- administered 
territories of Sarawak and Sabah were incorporated into Malay- 
sia, the Philippines notified Britain of its claim to Sabah on the 
grounds that it formed part of the Sultanate of Sulu and had only 
been leased to British traders beginning in 1878. When Malaysia 
was formed in 1963, the Philippines established diplomatic rela- 
tions but then immediately broke relations over the Sabah issue 
and did not reestablish them until 1969. Marcos publicly renounced 
the claim to Sabah in 1977, but Malaysia insisted that total renun- 
ciation required a constitutional amendment. The issue was clouded 
by ties between Muslims in the southern Philippines and Sabah, 



248 



National Security 



and by Philippine allegations — denied by Malaysia — that Sabah 
afforded sanctuary to Moro rebels. 

Political Role 

The military exerted a strong influence on political life during 
the early 1990s. Observers generally agreed that the unprecedent- 
ed rebelliousness of the armed forces was rooted in the AFP's po- 
litical role in the Marcos era. Although the military historically had 
had a symbiotic relationship with Philippine politicians, the mar- 
tial law era (1972-81) produced tremendous growth in the AFP's 
political role. The growing insurgent challenge spurred rapid growth 
in the AFP and increased the military's involvement in politics as 
deployed units worked with local governments to combat the reb- 
els and military tribunals dispensed justice in insurgent-affected 
areas. As a result, AFP officers became important power brokers 
at all levels of society, and favored officers were given key govern- 
ment positions or placed on the boards of state-run companies (see 
The Inheritance from Marcos, ch. 4). 

As popular opposition to Marcos grew in the wake of the 1983 
Aquino assassination, the president increasingly relied on the mili- 
tary as his principal power base. Marcos concentrated power in 
the hands of General Fabian Ver, who, as military chief of staff 
and head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority, en- 
sured that critical positions were filled by officers unquestionably 
loyal to the president. Ver's family and proteges and other ethnic 
Ilocanos were advanced, often at the expense of better qualified 
candidates. Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos, vice chief of staff 
and later Aquino's chief of staff and secretary of national defense, 
pointed to political manipulation of the armed forces as a key fac- 
tor in his decision to break with Marcos in February 1986. 

The RAM was openly critical of Marcos 's politicizing of the AFP. 
Nominally led by Colonel Gregorio Honasan, RAM consisted most- 
ly of graduates of the prestigious Philippine Military Academy, 
many from Honasan's class of 1971. RAM officers first gained 
wider public attention in 1985 when, at an academy alumni pa- 
rade, they openly protested before Marcos and AFP leaders. The 
officers called for military reforms that would address the problems 
of favoritism, incompetence, and corruption in senior leadership. 
Later, these reformists played a key role, along with Ramos and 
Enrile, in initiating the People's Power (see Glossary) revolution 
that brought Corazon Aquino to power (see From Aquino's As- 
sassination to People's Power, ch. 1). 

Following the change of government, Enrile, reappointed to head 
the Ministry of National Defense, and new Chief of Staff General 



249 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Ramos undertook a series of internal reforms designed to profes- 
sionalize the renamed New Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Af- 
ter one year, in 1987, the military reverted to its former name, 
Armed Forces of the Philippines.) Twenty- two generals, whose 
retirements Marcos had postponed, were quickly dismissed along 
with other senior officers perceived as Marcos loyalists. In an 
effort to reduce the armed forces' involvement in government, 
officers assigned to positions outside the armed forces were recalled. 
The 1987 Philippine constitution permanently bars retirement ex- 
tensions, military service in civilian positions, and the involvement 
of military personnel in politics. A widespread program of reedu- 
cation and retraining was initiated to instill professional values at 
all levels. 

Despite government efforts, the military did not "return to the 
barracks," at least not for long. During Aquino's first four years, 
military elements repeatedly rebelled (see Civil-Military Relations, 
ch. 4). The first rebellion occurred in July 1986, only five months 
after the president had taken office. Several hundred Marcos sup- 
porters backed Arturo Tolentino, who had been Marcos' s vice 
presidential running mate in the February election, in a takeover 
of the elegant Manila Hotel. Following calls for Marcos 's return 
to the presidency, the mutineers surrendered and were punished 
with fifty push-ups. Later in 1986, RAM officers — seen as heroes 
of the February revolution — again emerged as a political force. 
Rampant rumors of an imminent RAM coup in November led 
the president to dismiss Enrile, who was seen as the RAM lead- 
ers' mentor. Aquino also dismissed several "leftists" from her cabi- 
net in an apparent response to military critics. 

Military rebellions continued in 1987, culminating in a coup at- 
tempt that seriously threatened Aquino's presidency. On January 
27, Marcos loyalists struck again, seizing a Manila television sta- 
tion and some military targets. Although the government quickly 
contained the rebellion, holdouts did not surrender until four days 
later. During April, a smaller group of military rebels briefly oc- 
cupied the Philippine army headquarters in what became known 
as the Black Saturday rebellion. The mutineers surrendered with- 
in hours. 

On August 28, RAM launched the most serious coup attempt 
up to that time. In Manila, Honasan led hundreds of troops in 
attacks on television stations, Villamor Air Base, and the Mala- 
canang Palace. The palace assault failed, and rebel forces eventu- 
ally rallied at Camp Aguinaldo where they seized the AFP General 
Headquarters. Military rebels also seized several military camps 
around the country in simultaneous revolts. The coup collapsed 



250 



National Security 



after the first day, and Honasan escaped with several hundred fol- 
lowers. Many believed the coup came perilously close to success. 

Underlying the RAM move was deep-seated military dissatis- 
faction with the government and the belief among military officers 
that they sometimes had an obligation to intervene in the nation's 
political life. Reformist leaders complained that the Aquino govern- 
ment was critical of the military and unfairly lenient toward the 
communists. They called for further reform of the government and 
military and for a more effective counterinsurgency program. A 
poll of military officers prior to the August coup attempt showed 
broad support for RAM's grievances and substantial support for 
its tactics. More than 75 percent of those polled blamed political 
incompetence and corruption for NPA growth. Almost all supported 
a military role in national development, and almost half thought 
the AFP might have to seize political power to prevent a communist 
takeover. Following the revolt, the Aquino government respond- 
ed to some military complaints by improving military pay and 
benefits. 

More than two years passed before RAM acted again, this time 
with the support of several generals, some Marcos loyalists, and 
a shadowy new military group called the Young Officers' Union. 
This long and bloody coup attempt began on December 1, 1989, 
when rebels launched a series of attacks in Manila and seized a 
major air base in Cebu. Elite marine and army Scout Ranger units 
briefly held parts of the army and air force headquarters and Ma- 
nila's Ninoy Aquino International Airport before moving against 
Camp Aguinaldo. Although the attack on the armed forces head- 
quarters failed, rebels seized part of Manila's Makati financial dis- 
trict and bombed the presidential palace grounds. United States 
warplanes from Clark Air Base overflew rebel bases in a show of 
support for the president, but they did not fire on the mutineers. 
The Makati standoff ended on December 7 with the negotiated sur- 
render of the Scout Rangers, and the Cebu rebellion collapsed two 
days later. Nearly 100 people died in the fighting, and more than 
600 people were injured. 

The shadow of the 1989 coup attempt and threat of further mili- 
tary unrest hung over much of 1990. Perceived political instabili- 
ty discouraged investors and contributed to an economic downturn, 
and frequent coup rumors and Manila bombings attributed to mili- 
tary rebels fueled several serious coup scares in the capital. With- 
in the rebel movement, the younger, more radical idealists in the 
Young Officers' Union emerged as a growing force. The group's 
public statements portrayed them as social revolutionaries. Mean- 
while, a presidentially appointed panel investigated the 1989 coup 



251 



Philippines: A Country Study 



and its causes. The Davide Commission concluded that, although 
many complaints of the military were legitimate, a hidden 
agenda — a desire for the power and privilege that the military en- 
joyed under Marcos — animated the rebel movement. 

The Counterinsurgency Campaign 

The armed forces' primary mission in the late 1980s was com- 
bating the communist insurgency. During Marcos' s last years, the 
communist movement had expanded rapidly in political influence 
and military strength. By 1986, when Aquino came to power, the 
armed forces estimated that there were some 22,500 regular NPA 
guerrillas active in sixty-three of the country's seventy-three 
provinces. Reported insurgent strength peaked the following year 
at about 26,000 people. The Muslim insurgency, meanwhile, was 
relatively quiet. Although the military maintained forces in Moro 
areas, clashes with government forces were infrequent and the threat 
of a full-scale resurgence was low (see The Communist Insurgen- 
cy; The Moros, this ch.). 

Despite many well-publicized programs, the counterinsurgen- 
cy effort in the early and mid-1980s was clearly failing to stem the 
rising tide of communist influence. Government estimates of NPA 
strength more than tripled between 1983 and 1986, from around 
6,000 to more than 20,000. Recognizing the growing problem, 
Marcos escalated the counterinsurgency effort, emphasizing civic 
action. Under the aegis of the Home Defense Program, military 
units constructed roads and schools, provided disaster relief, as- 
sisted in maintaining security and public utilities, and performed 
law enforcement. Army engineer units, greatiy expanded with Unit- 
ed States assistance, played a key role in these development efforts. 
The armed forces also took part in literacy projects and the Na- 
tional Livelihood Program, which were designed to improve the 
standard of living in rural areas. 

These programs notwithstanding, the government lost ground 
in its efforts to win hearts and minds. Part of the reason was the 
declining popularity of the Marcos government and increasing criti- 
cism of the armed forces. Many Filipinos felt that those in the mili- 
tary, particularly in the Philippine Constabulary and the militia, 
the Civilian Home Defense Force, had become increasingly abu- 
sive and corrupt. Human rights groups documented numerous petty 
crimes as well as more serious instances of unlawful arrest, tor- 
ture, and "salvaging," the assassination of suspects and detainees. 
Most victims were suspected insurgents or their supporters. Pub- 
lic respect for the military eroded, and relations between the armed 
forces and important groups, such as the Roman Catholic Church, 



252 



Headquarters of the Department of National Defense, Manila 

Courtesy Robert L. Worden 

deteriorated. Attempts to improve discipline within the armed forces 
through retraining, punishment, and dismissal appeared to do lit- 
tle to quell growing public fear and suspicion. 

Initially, the Aquino government reversed the decline in human 
rights performance and made notable strides in restoring the tar- 
nished image of the military. The 1987 constitution outlawed tor- 
ture and all forms of "secret and incommunicado detention." It 
also established a permanent Commission on Human Rights and 
directed that the militia, constabulary, and police forces — frequent 
targets of abuse complaints — be disbanded. The armed forces were 
far less abusive in 1986 according to human rights groups. However, 
military discipline apparently worsened over the next two years. 
In 1987 military personnel were primary suspects in the assassi- 
nation of a prominent leftist political activist and in two other in- 
cidents that resulted in the deaths of twelve Manila demonstrators 
and seventeen rural villagers. International human rights moni- 
tors alleged that abuses in 1988 were as bad as they were under 
Marcos. In an apparent reaction to mounting criticism, the mili- 
tary renewed efforts to improve civil-military relations, and reported 
abuse by the military declined over the next two years. 

Human rights remained a concern in 1991. According to the 
United States Department of State's 1990 annual human rights 



253 



Philippines: A Country Study 

report to Congress, abuses — including extrajudicial killings — 
continued. The report also criticized the government's failure to 
prosecute those responsible for the crimes. Lapses in the adminis- 
tration of justice were attributed in part to the strong imperative 
of the military to protect its own members, who were tried in mili- 
tary courts. Convictions on human rights violations were rare. Still, 
by 1990 the overall armed forces human rights record under Aquino 
was much improved over the Marcos era. 

Although the Aquino government scored other successes in its 
counterinsurgency campaign, initial efforts proved disappoint- 
ing. The new administration hoped that many NPA personnel 
could be coaxed out of the hills following the overthrow of Marcos 
and took up the theme of reconciliation in 1986. One of Aquino's 
first acts was to release political detainees, including captured CPP 
chairman Jose Maria Sison. Later, following talks with senior rep- 
resentatives of the communist National Democratic Front, the 
government agreed to a sixty-day cease-fire, which ended in Febru- 
ary 1987. The president also issued an executive order establish- 
ing the National Reconciliation and Development Program. The 
revived rebel amnesty program was inaugurated in January 1987 
to encourage NPA defections by offering land, job training, and 
assimilation into society. The reconciliation approach was a dis- 
appointment to the government, however, as few insurgents sur- 
rendered. As a result, Aquino altered government strategy in March 
1987 when she announced the "unleashing" of the military. 

Following the 1986 change of government, the military resumed 
full-scale counterinsurgency operations with a new strategy known 
as Mamamayan, meaning people. Mamamayan was similar in most 
respects to the previous counterinsurgency, or COIN, plan, Mar- 
cos's Katatagan (stability), but added President Aquino's theme 
of reconciliation to the original program of "clear, hold, consoli- 
date, and develop." The revised COIN plan called for military 
units, with the cooperation of other government agencies, to sys- 
tematically clear areas of insurgents, to hold the region against 
returning guerrillas, to consolidate support for the government, 
and to develop the area economically. The first task — clearing rebel- 
infested areas — was seen as the task of mobile forces — the army 
battalions and constabulary special action forces. The role of holding 
and consolidating liberated regions was assigned to territorial 
forces — the constabulary, police, and militia units. 

The updated counterinsurgency strategy was complemented by 
revamped armed forces tactics that were generally credited with 
contributing to the insurgency's decline during the late 1980s. Un- 
der Aquino, the military continued its shift away from conventional 



254 



National Security 



methods such as food blockades, cordon and search operations, and 
hamletting (the forced relocation of villages controlled or threatened 
by the NPA). These methods, employed during the 1970s war 
against the Moros, were too often ineffective and counterproduc- 
tive because they frequently alienated the populace. In other 
respects, the military's approach to COIN efforts changed little. 
Most military units operated as they had under Marcos, in static 
positions protecting town halls, businesses, and major roads. 

The deployment of special operations teams beginning in 1987 
and the formation of new militia units in 1988 were touted by mili- 
tary leaders as important steps toward more effective COIN. Spe- 
cial operations teams were squad-sized military counterinsurgency 
teams dispatched to CPP-influenced villages to dismantie the com- 
munists' political infrastructure by conducting civic action and 
propaganda programs. These teams worked in conjunction with 
the newly revamped militia, now called the Citizens Armed Forces 
Geographic Units (CAFGUs), to provide security to each remote 
barangay (see Glossary). The CAFGUs replaced the Civilian Home 
Defense Force, which was frequently criticized as abusive by hu- 
man rights groups. Local anticommunist vigilante groups, some 
associated with the military, also proved effective deterrents to com- 
munist organizing and NPA activity in certain areas (see Organi- 
zation and Training, this ch.). 

Improved military intelligence also played an important role in 
undercutting the insurgency in the late 1980s. Military intelligence 
agents repeatedly captured top CPP and NPA cadres and gathered 
revealing CPP and NPA documents. Rodolfo Salas, the CPP's 
former chairman, was among numerous central committee mem- 
bers rounded up. The fear of government intelligence penetrations 
of communist ranks contributed to devastating purges of rebel ranks 
between 1985 and 1988. 

Perhaps the biggest contribution to the counterinsurgency cam- 
paign in the late 1980s was political, not military. Communist lead- 
ers admitted that Aquino, by restoring popular government and 
democratic institutions, significantly set back the revolutionary 
movement. Further civilian contributions in the fight against the 
communists were encouraged by the creation in 1987 of Peace and 
Order Councils. Established at all levels of government, the coun- 
cils consisted of political and military leaders as well as selected 
community representatives and were charged with fostering greater 
civilian involvement and cooperation in what traditionally had been 
a military counterinsurgency struggle. A 1989 United States mili- 
tary study, however, concluded that the COIN effort remained 



255 



Philippines: A Country Study 



largely a military effort despite the communist insurgency's polit- 
ical character. 

Foreign and Filipino critics of the government's COIN program 
further alleged that the communist insurgency had endured for more 
than twenty years because the Philippines had not effectively ad- 
dressed the social and cultural roots of the rural rebellion. The com- 
munist rebellion, it was said, was fed by the same social and 
economic inequities that had prompted previous peasant uprisings. 
The disparity between the small, but very wealthy, elite and the 
many impoverished was fundamental to the appeal of the revolu- 
tionary movement. Issues such as land reform resonated strongly 
among poor farmers, who also complained of abuses by landlords 
and politicians. Until such grievances were resolved, observers not- 
ed, they would continue to fuel insurgent activity in the country. 

Recruitment and Personnel 

The combined strength of the four armed services at the end of 
1990 was approximately 153,500. The army had some 68,000 
troops, the constabulary 45,000, the air force 15,500, and the navy 
25,000, including about 8,000 in the marines and 2,000 in the coast 
guard. After rapid growth during the 1970s, when armed forces 
strength trebled, total military strength remained relatively stable 
in the 1980s. (There were 155,000 personnel in the Philippine mili- 
tary in 1980.) Because the Philippines had a relatively youthful 
population, maintaining the strength of the armed forces was not 
a drain on human resources. More than 8 million men were of 
military age, between eighteen and thirty-two. Military strength 
per capita was only 2.3 per 1,000 population, lower than nearly 
all the country's Asian neighbors. 

Although universal service was mandatory, the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines was a de facto volunteer force. The 1980 Na- 
tional Service Law provided the legal basis for conscription and 
required all citizens — male and female— to perform service in the 
military, civic welfare, or law enforcement agencies. However, the 
law was never fully implemented. Conscription was not necessary 
during the 1980s because volunteers greatly outnumbered avail- 
able slots. Despite the inherent danger of military service during 
the fight against the communist insurgency, limited employment 
opportunities for unskilled young adults ensured an abundant sup- 
ply of volunteers. The armed forces had no recruiting apparatus; 
units instead recruited locally to fill vacancies. Potential recruits 
had to be eighteen years old, unmarried, and possess a high school 
diploma. 



256 



National Security 



Officers were commissioned from three major sources. Regular 
officers were commissioned from the prestigious Philippine Mili- 
tary Academy, which produced 15 percent of all officers. Some 65 
percent were graduates of Citizen Military Training, formerly the 
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). Most received reserve 
commissions, whereas some, called "integrees," were integrated 
into the regular officer corps. Enlisted personnel who completed 
Officer Candidate School accounted for some 18 percent of all 
officers. The other 2 percent of officers received direct commis- 
sions as medical or legal professionals or graduated from foreign 
military academies. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) did not con- 
stitute the professional corps found in most Western armies and 
were only marginally involved in leadership and decision making. 

Ethnic and linguistic differences were important in the military. 
Local recruiting ensured that personnel were drawn from all sec- 
tions of the country, but certain regions were disproportionately 
represented. The majority of military personnel spoke Tagalog and 
were from the heartland of central and southern Luzon. Despite 
continuing efforts to increase the number of Muslims in the mili- 
tary, Moros from the southern Philippines were underrepresent- 
ed. Traditionally, Ilocanos from northern Luzon comprised a 
disproportionate share of officer and enlisted ranks. This empha- 
sis was especially true under Marcos, who tended to promote fel- 
low Ilocanos to positions of power in the armed forces and police. 
Because of this tendency — shared by previous presidents — the 1987 
constitution directs that the "armed forces shall be recruited propor- 
tionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable." 
Although language and dialect compelled people from the same 
region to associate with one another, these groups were not so ex- 
clusive that they formed significant factions. 

A variety of internal divisions plagued the officer corps in the 
late 1980s. The most significant rifts essentially were political — 
between those who supported the government and those who ad- 
vocated its overthrow. The military-sparked popular revolt against 
Marcos and the subsequent series of uprisings against Aquino 
brought military leaders into direct, sometimes bloody, conflict. 
A variety of military factions and fraternal groups, including RAM, 
Young Officers' Union, and Marcos loyalists, emerged as impor- 
tant antigovernment players (see Political Role, this ch.). In an 
effort to contain the influence of these groups, the government or- 
dered military fraternal organizations disbanded in 1987. However, 
through clandestine contacts, RAM, the Young Officers' Union, 
and Marcos loyalists orchestrated the 1989 coup attempt with the 
support of three generals. These groups remained active in 1991, 



257 



Philippines: A Country Study 

criticizing government and military leaders and threatening another 
coup attempt. Their activities continued to undermine the authority 
of the military chain of command. 

Following the 1989 coup attempt, the president's military ad- 
viser, a retired army commander, attributed the involvement of 
so many junior leaders to a "generational gap" in the armed forces 
between mostly loyal senior officers and the more rebellious junior 
ranks. He credited younger officers' better education for the ten- 
dency of some, like those in the Young Officers' Union, to become 
more involved in politics and to question the directives of their su- 
periors. 

Frictions created by perceived inequity in the military's personnel 
system also dogged the officer corps. Although the divisive Marcos- 
era practice of extending generals beyond their scheduled retire- 
ment was discontinued in 1986, other controversial practices con- 
tinued under Aquino. Officers with reserve commissions — the 
majority of the officer corps — complained that the personnel sys- 
tem favored regular officers, especially Philippine Military Academy 
(PMA) graduates. Although past regimes, such as the Marcos re- 
gime, had advanced ROTC graduates, nearly all top generals un- 
der Aquino were academy alumni. Bonds between PMA graduates, 
especially classmates, tended to perpetuate this favoritism. In 1986 
reservists formed an organization similar to the PMA alumni as- 
sociation to promote their interests. The presidentially appointed 
Davide Commission investigating the causes of the 1989 coup at- 
tempt identified another source of discontent — the role of personal 
ties in promotions and assignments. Observers noted that the 
patron-client ties and personal loyalties that were typical of Philip- 
pine society were perhaps the biggest factor in the career prospects 
for officers. 

Women belonged to a separate Women's Auxiliary Corps in each 
of the services. Except for Officer Candidate School, they were 
trained separately. Women were assigned to a limited number of 
specified support positions and were a relatively small part of the 
total force. 

Defense Spending and Industry 

After steadily declining defense spending during the early 1980s, 
the defense budget grew in the latter half of the decade. Military 
spending in 1988 totaled 14.14 billion pesos (for value of the peso — 
see Glossary), or US$680 million, about 1.7 percent of the coun- 
try's gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). The 1988 budget 
represented a greater than 50 percent increase in real spending for 
defense (adjusted for inflation) over 1985, the last full year Marcos 



258 



National Security 



was in office. Defense spending as a proportion of national govern- 
ment expenditures also grew during Aquino's tenure, from a 1985 
low of 7.7 percent, to 9.1 percent in 1989. Still, the military's share 
of the national budget, like total military spending, did not approach 
the peaks reached during the Moro wars of the 1970s. In 1979 the 
Philippines spent more than PI 7 billion (US$806 million) for 
defense, a figure that represented almost 17 percent of the govern- 
ment's budget. 

Budget figures do not include United States security assistance, 
which represented a substantial portion of total spending on the 
Philippine military. United States military aid increased signifi- 
cantly after Aquino came to power, accounting for 80 percent of 
military spending on procurement, operations, and maintenance 
in 1989. United States military aid that year amounted to US$127.6 
million. Most of the assistance — US$125 million — was provided 
as a grant under the Military Assistance Program; the US$2.6 mil- 
lion balance funded training for Filipinos under the United States 
International Military Education and Training Program. During 
the 1988 review of the Military Bases Agreement, the United States 
pledged its best efforts to increase grant aid to the Philippine mili- 
tary to US$200 million annually in 1990 and 1991. 

The thrust of United States security assistance efforts in the late 
1980s was to help the Philippine armed forces better combat the 
communist insurgency. Improved tactical mobility and commu- 
nications and better equipped soldiers were top priorities. Between 
1986 and 1989, the United States sent the Philippines almost 2,900 
military vehicles, nearly 50 helicopters, more than 1,650 radios, 
approximately 225,000 military uniforms, and more than 150,000 
pairs of combat boots. Other assistance items included assorted in- 
fantry weapons and ammunition and medical equipment. 

The Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) program, initiated in 
1974, took the development of a domestic defense industry as its 
objective. Defense officials contracted SRDP projects with the 
government arsenal and local manufacturers, encouraging the use 
of indigenous raw materials and production capacity. Projects in- 
cluded domestic production of small arms, radios, and assorted am- 
munition. One of the most significant SRDP operations was the 
manufacture of the M-16A1 rifle under license from Colt Indus- 
tries, an American company. According to a 1988 statement by 
the Philippine armed forces chief of staff, the SRDP not only in- 
creased Philippine self-reliance, but also cut costs, provided jobs, 
and saved much-needed foreign-exchange funds. 

Despite growing budgets and increased foreign military aid, the 
armed forces still was described in 1989 as one of the most poorly 



259 



Philippines: A Country Study 



funded militaries in Asia. Philippine defense spending on a per cap- 
ita and per soldier basis remained the lowest of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, despite an active com- 
munist insurgency. One study of the military concluded that the 
armed forces suffered from major resource problems. The author 
cited serious shortages of vehicles, helicopters, radios, basic infan- 
try equipment, and spare parts. Food, medicine, and clothing also 
were said to be in chronically short supply. Shortages were com- 
pounded by an inefficient logistics system hobbled by red tape and 
corruption. Soldiers' poor living and working conditions often were 
mentioned as underlying factors in the military's discipline 
problems. Top AFP leaders acknowledged many of these short- 
comings and were attempting to correct the mismanagement of 
resources. 

Plans in 1990 called for modernizing the military, particularly 
the air force and navy — services whose forces had received rela- 
tively little funding because of the army's extended counterinsur- 
gency campaign. Many of the navy's major ships and craft were 
World War II-era, and the aging fleet was increasingly difficult 
to maintain. Modernization plans called for phasing out inefficient 
ships, refitting others, and acquiring more patrol craft. Using Unit- 
ed States military aid, the navy contracted in 1989 for thirty-five 
fast patrol craft, thirty of which were to be assembled in the Philip- 
pines by 1997. The air force inventory, described as one of the 
most primitive in the region, likewise was to be enhanced by major 
purchases under a ten-year modernization scheme. The United 
States was scheduled to deliver twenty-nine MD-520 attack helicop- 
ters between 1990 and 1992. The air force also was hoping to add 
two squadrons of modern fighters such as the United States F-16 
to its fleet of nine F-5s. 

The Structure of the Armed Forces 

Commonwealth Act 1 , the National Defense Act of 1935, man- 
dated the formation of the Army of the Philippines, comprising 
all eventual land, sea, air, and national police forces. The existing 
Philippine Constabulary was abolished and used as the nucleus of 
the new army. The Philippine Constabulary's air force became the 
army's air arm, and a small maritime element, the Offshore Patrol, 
was added in 1939. Coincident with a reorganization of the govern- 
ment following independence, the military forces were redesignated 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1947. That organization 
was essentially an army command in which air force, maritime, 
and police internal security units were constituted as subordinate 
commands. A more fundamental reorganization of the military 



260 



National Security 



establishment in 1950, which was brought about in part by the grow- 
ing Huk insurgency (see The Huk Rebellion, ch. 1), established 
four separate services — army, navy, air force, and national police — 
under a joint headquarters. The national police was renamed the 
Philippine Constabulary in 1959. The army continued to dominate 
the command structure, however, until 1960 when the headquar- 
ters was converted to a truly joint command. 

The Philippines deployed combat forces abroad on three occa- 
sions. Expeditionary forces served in the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) under the United Nations Command between 1950 and 
1955. Also under United Nations auspices, air force officers and 
enlisted personnel were sent to the Republic of the Congo (now 
Zaire) in 1963. From 1966 until the early 1970s, the 2,000-strong 
Philippine Civic Action Group, composed mainly of engineer, secu- 
rity, medical, and rural community development teams, was ac- 
tive in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). 

The 1987 constitution mandated further changes in the struc- 
ture of the armed forces. The existing militia, the Civilian Home 
Defense Force, was ordered disbanded and was replaced begin- 
ning in 1988 with a new auxiliary force under the direct control 
of military regulars. More significantly, the 1987 constitution calls 
for the government "to establish and maintain one police force, 
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character." Pur- 
suant to that mandate, Aquino signed a law directing that the Philip- 
pine Constabulary, one of the four military services, be combined 
with the civilian Integrated National Police to form the Philippine 
National Police. The process of integrating the two organizations 
under a newly created Department of Interior and Local Govern- 
ment began on January 1, 1991. 

Organization and Training 

The 1987 constitution mandates civilian control of the military 
and establishes the president as commander in chief of the armed 
forces. The president also heads the National Security Council, 
ostensibly the policy-making and advisory body for matters con- 
nected with national defense. President Aquino reestablished the 
council in 1986 through an executive order that provided for a Na- 
tional Security Council director to advise the president on nation- 
al security matters and for a National Security Council Secretariat. 
The council itself is composed of the president and at least nine 
others: the vice president; the AFP chief of staff; National Securi- 
ty Council director; the executive secretary; and the secretaries of 
foreign affairs, national defense, interior and local government, 
justice, and labor and employment (called ministers before 1987). 



261 



Philippines: A Country Study 

By the end of 1990, however, the National Security Council had 
only convened twice. 

Much of the real authority for policy development appeared to 
reside with a smaller cabinet group that met more frequently. A 
cabinet Cluster for Political and Security Affairs, known as Cluster 
E, routinely advised the president on national security matters. 
Cluster E membership was more limited, but included key mem- 
bers of the National Security Council, such as its director and the 
secretaries of national defense, foreign affairs, justice, and finance. 

Responsibility for national security was vested in the Depart- 
ment of National Defense. The principal functions of the depart- 
ment in 1991 were to defend the state against internal and external 
threats and, through the Philippine National Police, to maintain 
law and order. A broad interpretation of these roles historically 
has involved the department in national development tasks, includ- 
ing civic action, to address the causes for internal unrest. The secre- 
tary of national defense, by law a civilian, was charged with advising 
the president on defense matters and developing defense policy. 

Authority over the AFP's four services was vested in the chief 
of staff, a general. The chief of staff exercised command through 
the General Headquarters, which was located with the Department 
of National Defense in Manila's Camp Aguinaldo. Immediately 
subordinate to him was the vice chief of staff, a lieutenant gener- 
al, and the deputy chief of staff, a major general who was the mili- 
tary's chief administrator. The General Headquarters was staffed 
with a coordinating staff, J- 1 through J-9, and a special staff. Coor- 
dinating staff officers included deputies for personnel, intelligence, 
operations, logistics, plans, comptroller, civil-military operations, 
and education and training. Also subordinate to the chief of staff 
were the various specified and support commands and area uni- 
fied commands (see fig. 10). 

Throughout the country, the regionally based area unified com- 
mands exercised operational control over AFP units of all services 
deployed in their regions. AFP General Headquarters created six 
area commands in 1987 and 1988 by combining the thirteen region- 
al unified commands that had been formed in 1983. Area com- 
mand boundaries were defined by the country's numbered political 
regions (see fig. 9). Northern Luzon Command incorporated 
regions 1, 2 and 3; Southern Luzon Command encompassed region 
4 (except Palawan) and region 5; Visayas Command covered the 
Visayan Islands in regions 6, 7, and 8; and Southern Command 
incorporated the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 
regions 9 through 12. The AFP's Western Command was responsi- 
ble for the province of Palawan (part of region 4) and for Philippine 



262 



National Security 



claims in the Spratly Islands. The sixth area command, the Na- 
tional Capital Region Command, had operational control over mili- 
tary units in metropolitan Manila. Area commanders directed 
counterinsurgency operations in their respective areas, but sup- 
port functions — such as training and logistics — were left to the mili- 
tary support services and joint commands such as the AFP's 
Logistics Command and Training Command. 

The armed forces maintained several military training institu- 
tions in 1991. Foremost among these was the Philippine Military 
Academy, founded in 1905 to train Filipino officers for the Philip- 
pine Constabulary. Located at Fort del Pilar, Baguio, the acade- 
my trained future officers of all four services. Male cadets between 
the ages of seventeen and twenty-three were selected through a high- 
ly competitive examination for a four-year course, patterned on 
the United States Military Academy, leading to a bachelor of science 
degree and an officer's commission. Attrition took a heavy toll. 
Only about 100 of the 400 cadets admitted each year completed 
the course. Graduates were given their choice of service within es- 
tablished quota limits, with preference given to those with the 
highest class standing. The Philippine Constabulary was most often 
a cadet's first choice, reflecting the potential for developing sup- 
plementary income and local influence that came with the job. 
Officers assigned to the navy and air force usually attended orien- 
tation courses before being assigned to their units. 

Reserve officers were trained under the Citizen Military Train- 
ing system, formerly known as the Reserve Officer Training Corps. 
Basic military training under this system was mandatory for all 
high school students. Male college students were required to take 
additional basic training and had the option of advanced training 
leading to a reserve officer's commission. A small number of Citizen 
Military Training graduates were integrated into the regular officer 
corps. Women were commissioned into the Women's Auxiliary 
Corps of one of the services following training at selected univer- 
sities. Officer Candidate School was a third source of commissions. 
Candidates were required to have a bachelor's degree and were 
accepted from the enlisted ranks and the civilian sector. In the late 
1980s, women were admitted with men to this one-year program 
taught at the AFP's Training Command at Camp Capinpin, near 
Manila, in Rizal Province. 

Career training for officers was patterned after that in the Unit- 
ed States. The AFP's Command and General Staff College pre- 
pared officers of all services for command, staff, and managerial 
positions normally assigned to field- grade officers. Only 25 per- 
cent of mid- grade officers were chosen to attend the eight-month 



263 



Philippines: A Country Study 




AFP-WIDE SUPPORT 
AND SEPARATE UNITS 



MAJOR SERVICES 



PHILIPPINE 
ARMY 



PHILIPPINE 
CONSTABULARY 



AREA COMMANDS 

~1 — 



NORTHERN 

LUZON 
COMMAND 



PHILIPPINE 
AIR FORCE 



PHILIPPINE 
NAVY 



SOUTHERN 

LUZON 
COMMAND 



VISAYAS 
COMMAND 



NATIONAL CAPITAL 
REGION COMMAND 







WESTERN 
COMMAND 



SOUTHERN 
COMMAND 



Disbanded January 1, 1991, in favor of a civilian Philippine National Police. 



Source: Based on information from United States, Allied Army Training Study of the Republic 
of the Philippines, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1989, 60. 



Figure 10. Organization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 1989 



264 



National Security 



cause at Fort Bonifacio in Manila. The National Defense College, 
also at Fort Bonifacio, was the military's senior education institu- 
tion. A select group of senior officers and government officials at- 
tended a course given each year at the college and received master's 
degrees in national security administration. The curriculum was 
designed to provide the broad perspective necessary for national 
policy making. 

Acknowledging systemic weaknesses, the AFP undertook several 
programs to upgrade training in the late 1980s. To improve man- 
agement of the training system, training staffs were established in 
the AFP's General Headquarters and added to service and unified 
command staffs in 1988. The Training Command was organized 
at Camp Capinpin. In addition to conducting a variety of train- 
ing for enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 
officers, the Training Command was charged with developing in- 
struction and standardizing common training among the services. 

Army 

The Philippine army was formally organized in 1936 after the 
United States accorded the Philippines commonwealth status in 
1935, but it traced its origins to the rebel forces established in 1896 
to fight for national independence. The army was intended to be 
a small standing army modeled on the United States Army, but 
army strength varied widely over the years, depending on the in- 
ternal threat. After dramatic growth during the 1970s, total army 
strength remained relatively stable during the 1980s. With some 
68,000 troops in 1990, the army was by far the largest of the ser- 
vices. The commanding general, a major general, directiy controlled 
the service's administrative, logistics, and training functions from 
headquarters at Fort Bonifacio in Manila, but area unified com- 
mands exercised operational control over nearly all combat units. 
Army units were actively involved in the fight against the com- 
munist insurgency and, to a lesser extent, monitored the mostly 
dormant Muslim rebellion. 

The army's major tactical units were its eight light infantry di- 
visions. Three divisions were headquartered on the northern Is- 
land of Luzon, two were based in the central Visayan Islands, and 
three operated on the southern island of Mindanao. All except one 
consisted of three brigades, and that one had two brigades. Although 
the army's overall strength did not change, during the late 1980s 
it was structurally expanded, from the four divisions that had ex- 
isted since 1983 to eight in 1990. The basic maneuver unit was 
the infantry battalion. Although authorized to contain some 600 
soldiers, battalions typically had 500 troops or fewer assigned. 



265 



Philippines: A Country Study 



In addition to these infantry formations, the army had a light 
armored brigade, eight artillery battalions, three engineer brigades, 
and a construction battalion. Support units included a service sup- 
port brigade, a training command, a signal group, an intelligence 
and security group, a civil-military operations battalion, and a 
finance center. The elite army Scout Ranger regiment, a special- 
ized counterinsurgency force, was disbanded following its partici- 
pation in the 1989 coup attempt. 

The army's weapons were appropriate to its light infantry force 
structure and counterinsurgency mission (see table 19, Appendix). 
Major items included 41 light tanks, 85 armored infantry fighting 
vehicles, 285 armored personnel carriers, and assorted light and 
medium towed artillery. Most arms and equipment were of Unit- 
ed States make or design, although sources of weapons and sup- 
plies had diversified since the 1970s. The standard infantry weapon 
was the United States M-16A1 rifle, manufactured in the Philip- 
pines under a license agreement. 

The army operated a variety of schools for its arms and branches. 
The Army Training Command was located at Fort Magsaysay in 
Nueva Ecija, north of Manila. The training command provided 
basic training for enlisted personnel and officers and advanced train- 
ing in some specialties such as infantry and artillery. Specialized 
training in other areas, such as armor, intelligence, and engineer- 
ing, was the responsibility of service extension schools operated by 
the commanders of those army units. Many soldiers, however, 
never attended centralized military schools, but instead were trained 
by army divisions at basic training centers throughout the country. 

Navy 

The navy, the newest of the services, traces its ancestry to the 
Offshore Patrol, which was formed as part of the army in Febru- 
ary 1939. It became autonomous and was redesignated the Philip- 
pine Naval Patrol in 1947. After the armed forces reorganized in 
1950, the force became known as the navy. Naval personnel strength 
of approximately 25,000 in 1990 included marine, coast guard, and 
naval air units. Naval headquarters was in Manila, close to its major 
base at Cavite, south of the city. Other major naval bases were 
located in Zamboanga City, Cebu City, and at Subic Bay on Lu- 
zon, west of Manila. The Subic Bay facility, probably without peer 
as a deep-water port in the region, was used almost exclusively by 
the United States Navy. 

The navy's principal mission was to protect and police the na- 
tion's 7,100 islands with a combined coastiine of 36,289 kilome- 
ters, double that of the United States, and the Philippines' claimed 



266 



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exclusive economic zone (EEZ — see Glossary) of 200 nautical miles. 
The navy also had important support missions for the other armed 
forces and agencies of the government, especially in transporting 
troops and equipment between islands. It occasionally joined with 
other services in conducting joint operations and amphibious as- 
saults. Through its subordinate coast guard arm, the navy was 
responsible for enforcement of maritime laws and regulations and 
countering widespread smuggling, poaching, and pirating in Philip- 
pine waters, including interception of covert supply lines to insur- 
gent groups. The navy was hard-pressed to fulfill its broad 
responsibilities; senior naval officers candidly admitted that the fleet 
was too small and ill-maintained to patrol its large coastline and 
EEZ effectively and to protect the Philippine claim to Kalayaan. 

The navy was commanded by a rear admiral, known as the flag 
officer in command, who was supported by vice and deputy flag 
officers in command. Major naval operating forces came under 
the commander of the fleet, who directed the naval air, special 
warfare, assault craft, amphibious, and patrol groups. The navy 
also maintained six naval districts that supervised deployed naval 
forces under the operational control of the area unified commanders. 
The naval headquarters controlled the training command, coast 
guard and marine commands, and the naval support group, all 
of which provided supply and maintenance support to the fleet. 

All major combatants in the fleet were former United States ships, 
most of World War II vintage. In late 1989, the navy maintained 
three frigates and eleven corvettes, none with missiles (see table 
20, Appendix). Consistent with the navy's mission, the mainstays 
of the fleet were patrol boats, including twelve coastal and thirty- 
nine inshore patrol craft. The navy also used eleven amphibious 
ships and some seventy-five landing craft for inter-island transport. 

Many of the navy's ships, however, were in poor repair and of 
questionable operational capability. Roughly one-third of the ships 
were said to be serviceable, and only about twenty of them put 
to sea regularly. Because of these operational deficiencies, which 
the navy attributed to budget shortfalls, the navy embarked on a 
modernization program in 1990. Plans called for the overhaul of 
some ships and for the acquisition of thirty-five new patrol craft. 
Several older ships, including four frigates, had been decommis- 
sioned in the late 1980s, and more retirements of inoperable ships 
were planned. 

The coast guard, established in 1967, was the navy's law en- 
forcement arm. Its responsibilities included testing and licensing 
seamen and vessels, providing navigational aids, and protecting 
life and property at sea. To fulfill these missions, the coast guard 



267 



Philippines: A Country Study 

operated nearly ninety small patrol boats and conducted search and 
rescue operations with two larger boats, a fixed- wing aircraft, and 
a helicopter. In 1990 the coast guard commander, a navy commo- 
dore, supervised some 2,000 personnel and eight operational dis- 
tricts. 

Although the marine corps mission was to conduct amphibious 
operations, in practice the marines generally were employed in as- 
sisting the army and constabulary in counterinsurgency operations 
against the Moros and communists. The service was commanded 
by the marine commandant, a brigadier general, and headquar- 
tered at Fort Bonifacio in Manila. The marine corps grew modesdy 
during the 1980s; strength in 1990 was about 8,000 troops, up from 
6,800 troops in 1983. The marine corps organization grew com- 
mensurately, from two brigades to four. The ten marine battal- 
ions were equipped with a variety of mostly United States-made 
equipment, including amphibious vehicles, armored personnel car- 
riers, and howitzers. Their performance in counterinsurgency oper- 
ations had earned marines the reputation for being a well-disciplined 
and well-respected force, but their support of Marcos in 1986 and 
involvement in a subsequent coup attempt against Aquino tarnished 
the marines' image. 

Air Force 

Traditionally, the air force's primary mission was air defense 
of the nation. In the mid-1980s, however, the air force shifted its 
principal effort to supporting the ground forces in counterinsur- 
gency operations, using both fixed- wing aircraft and helicopters. 
The air force's other roles included search and rescue, transporta- 
tion, and communications for all services. The Air Force Security 
Command (formerly the Aviation Security Command) was respon- 
sible for security of the nation's airports. The air force regularly 
took part in disaster relief and emergency operations in coopera- 
tion with civilian organizations and participated in national develop- 
ment programs. 

The air force was headquartered at Villamor Air Base (former- 
ly called Nichols Air Base) in Manila and was commanded by a 
two-star general. Other major bases included Basa and Clark air 
bases in Pampanga Province, Fernando Air Base in Batangas 
Province, Sangley Point Air Base in Cavite Province, and Mac- 
tan Air Base in Cebu Province. Flight training was conducted at 
the Air Force Flying School located at Fernando Air Base. Clark 
Air Base in Central Luzon was used primarily by United States 
forces based or training there. Although normally based at one of 
these facilities, aircraft, especially helicopters, routinely operated 



268 



National Security 



out of forward bases throughout the country in support of area com- 
mands' counterinsurgency operations. With approximately 15,500 
officers and enlisted personnel, the air force was slightly smaller 
in 1990 than in the early 1980s, when personnel totaled 16,800. 

The air force inventory in 1990 included fifteen combat aircraft 
and seventy-one armed helicopters, all United States-made (see table 
21, Appendix). In 1987, the Philippines grounded its fleet of F-8 
Crusaders, leaving only two squadrons of F-5 Freedom Fighters 
to provide air defense. The fighters were armed with United States- 
made AIM-9B Sidewinder missiles. Counterinsurgency operations 
were supported by a squadron of eight T-28D Trojan propeller- 
driven trainer/attack airplanes, and a wing equipped with fifty-five 
Bell UH-IH/Iroquois transport helicopters and sixteen AUH-76 
attack helicopters. 

Support units included seven transport squadrons; three train- 
ing squadrons; a presidential airlift wing; and assorted reconnais- 
sance, search and rescue, and liaison aircraft. Aircraft assigned to 
these elements were obtained from many countries, including Brit- 
ain, Australia, Italy, and the Netherlands as well as the United 
States. In 1990 the air force expanded its capabilities by acquiring 
a variety of new aircraft. The Philippines received four Italian S-21 1 
jet trainers and contracted for delivery of fourteen more. In addi- 
tion, the air force was to receive twenty-nine United States-made 
MD-520 attack helicopters and hoped to upgrade its fighter fleet 
with the purchase of two squadrons of more modern fighters. 

Philippine Constabulary 

The Philippine Constabulary, which was to be disbanded and 
absorbed into a civilian police force beginning in 1991, was the 
oldest of the nation's four armed forces. It was established by the 
United States colonial government in 1901 to preserve peace and 
order and provided the nucleus of the first regular division of the 
Commonwealth's army in 1936. It remained an element within 
the army (after 1946 as the Military Police Command) until 1950 
when it was reestablished as a separate force. It was formally re- 
named the Philippine Constabulary in 1959. 

After its renaming, the Philippine Constabulary officially con- 
stituted a national police force and essentially operated as a gen- 
darmerie, holding primary authority for law enforcement and 
domestic security. It was responsible for dealing with large-scale 
crime, conducting wide-area operations, and enforcing the peace 
and national laws, especially in remote areas where other forces 
were nonexistent or ineffective. The constabulary also played a 
prominent role in combating the Moro and communist insurgencies. 



269 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Following the creation of the Integrated National Police in 1975, 
the constabulary operated with the new force under a joint com- 
mand structure (see Law Enforcement, this ch.). 

Organized and equipped along military lines, the constabulary 
was headed in 1990 by a major general, who served concurrently 
as the director general of the Integrated National Police. He was 
assisted by deputies for the Philippine Constabulary and Integrat- 
ed National Police, and by his Camp Crame, Manila, headquar- 
ters staff, which was similar to the AFP's General Headquarters 
staff. Constabulary forces throughout the country were supported 
and controlled through a system of regional commands, with one 
command in each of the country's twelve political regions. Under 
the operational control of the area commands, the regional com- 
mands controlled subordinate Philippine Constabulary and In- 
tegrated National Police provincial commands. These 73 provincial 
headquarters in turn supervised 234 constabulary companies, which 
were the constabulary's line units. Regional Special Action Com- 
panies provided backup to the line companies and acted as coun- 
terinsurgency strike forces. An additional area command, known 
both as Capital Command and the Metropolitan Police Force, 
directed Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police 
elements in Manila. Metropolitan District Commands performed 
a similar function in eight of the nation's other major urban areas. 

The constabulary also had a variety of specialized units with na- 
tionwide responsibilities that operated independently of the regional 
command system. These included the Criminal Investigative Ser- 
vice, Highway Patrol Group, Security Group, Crime Lab, and Sup- 
port Command. The Philippine Constabulary Training Command 
was responsible for instructing enlisted constables and their officers, 
whose training paralleled that of the army. In 1983 the constabu- 
lary created an elite national reaction force, the Philippine Con- 
stabulary Special Action Force, with the capability to combat 
terrorism, hijacking, and insurgency. These additions contribut- 
ed to the overall growth of members of the constabulary during 
the 1980s, from approximately 33,500 in 1980, to an estimated 
45,000 members in 1990. 

On January 1, 1991, the Philippine Constabulary and the In- 
tegrated National Police were combined to form the Philippine Na- 
tional Police. The Philippine National Police took immediate 
responsibility for most former Integrated National Police functions, 
including fire and jail services, and was to assume responsibility 
for the counterinsurgency effort from the AFP after two years, in 
1993. Few details were available at the end of 1990 on how the 



270 



National Security 



military planned to effect the transfer of police and, ultimately, 
counterinsurgency responsibilities to civilian control. 

Reserves and Auxiliaries 

The Philippine reserve program was founded on the citizen army 
concept laid out in the National Defense Act of 1935, whereby 
defense would be provided by a limited professional cadre backed 
by citizen reservists rather than by a large conscript army. In 1989 
the AFP claimed that active forces of about 153,500 people were 
backed by some 800,000 reservists. However, this number proba- 
bly included all eligible former soldiers, many of whom might be 
difficult to recall. Other sources placed total reserve strength at 
128,000— approximately 100,000 in the army, 12,000 in the navy, 
and 16,000 in the air force. Only a small fraction of these — less 
than 50,000 — were thought to be actively involved in the reserve 
program. 

The AFP reserve program was administered by an element of 
the General Headquarters staff, within the office of civil-military 
operations. Reserve forces fell into two major categories: Auxil- 
iary Reserve Units and Citizens Armed Forces Geographic Units 
(CAFGUs). Reservists of the first category were predesignated 
civilians in critical public sector jobs, such as electric power and 
water service, who were subject to federal mobilization. They had 
no military training and were not intended to support military oper- 
ations directly in the event of a call-up. 

The CAFGUs consisted of both inactive military reserve forces 
and militia units actively involved in counterinsurgency. Each ser- 
vice had its own inactive CAFGU reserve component. On paper, 
the army had thirteen divisions of CAFGU reservists, one in each 
political region, including Manila. These units, however, never 
trained nor even conducted organizational meetings. Instead, 
Regional Community Defense Units — which administered the 
Citizen Military Training program — maintained rosters of individu- 
al reservists. A few reserve officers participated at their own ex- 
pense in annual training, but there was no individual training for 
enlisted reservists. 

CAFGU active auxiliaries — essentially militia who provided for 
village self-defense — were the heart of the reserve program. Un- 
der the direct control of the active military, they replaced the 
Marcos-era Civilian Home Defense Force, a poorly trained and 
equipped force widely criticized as being corrupt and abusive. Mem- 
bers of the active CAFGUs were full-time militia who were recruited 
and based in their home areas, where they were charged with 
defending against insurgent attacks. CAFGU companies were 



271 



Philippines: A Country Study 



trained and commanded by active officers and NCOs of the army 
and constabulary. If mobilized, the militia were to become part 
of their sponsoring active army or constabulary unit. The 720 
CAFGU active auxiliary companies had around 64,000 members 
in 1990. 

Other armed groups, labeled vigilantes, were sometimes spon- 
sored or endorsed by the military. Aquino initially praised some 
of these anticommunist citizens' groups — such as Davao City's Alsa 
Masa (Masses Arise) — for their success at discouraging communist 
insurgent activity in their neighborhoods during the late 1980s. In 
1988, however, an international human rights group charged that 
Philippine vigilantes had committed "grave violations on a wide 
scale." Armed forces-sponsored self-defense groups who were un- 
armed were not so controversial. These civilian volunteer organi- 
zations, including Bantay Bayan (Nation Watch), supported the 
military by reporting insurgent activity in their barangays. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The rank structure of the armed forces in the early 1990s was 
very similar to that of counterpart services in the United States. 
There were, however, no warrant officer ranks in any of the four 
armed forces, and all four services maintained seven enlisted grades 
rather than nine as in the United States system. The army, air force, 
and constabulary used the same ranks and insignia. Officer ranks 
corresponded to their United States counterparts, except that naval 
flag officers were called commodores and admirals but were equiva- 
lent to United States Navy rear admirals. The single full general 
in the nation in 1990 was a constabulary officer who had received 
his fourth star by virtue of his position as the AFP chief of staff. 
Likewise, the AFP vice chief of staff was the only lieutenant general, 
and the four service chiefs were major generals or equivalent. The 
military had some 100 general officers. AFP uniforms reflected the 
military's close ties to the United States and the Philippines' hot, 
humid climate. Field uniforms for all services were a mixture of 
American-style olive-drab and camouflage jungle fatigues. Because 
of chronic uniform shortages, military personnel often wore civilian 
clothes, making armed soldiers difficult to distinguish from militia, 
insurgents, vigilantes, or members of private security forces. Dress 
uniforms were similar to those worn by United States forces, made 
of summer-weight tan or white fabric (see figs. 11 and 12). 

Salary and Benefits 

Pay was poor but fairly competitive with the civilian economy 
and the standard of living of the average Filipino, ensuring that 



272 



National Security 



the AFP never lacked sufficient volunteers. Still, many soldiers lived 
at or below the poverty line. The average private made the equiva- 
lent of about US$50 a month, and not even senior officers could 
afford to live lavishly on their salary alone. In apparent recogni- 
tion of the impact of poor pay on military morale, Aquino autho- 
rized additional benefits and a pay increase that averaged 60 percent 
in the wake of the 1987 coup attempt. Benefits included housing, 
medical and dental care, commissary privileges, insurance, death 
benefits, and a retirement plan for service of twenty to thirty years. 

Foreign Military Relations 

The Philippines maintained its closest military relations with the 
United States. Close contacts were based on cooperative ventures, 
such as joint exercises, and on longstanding military links. Mili- 
tary relations were first established in the colonial era when the 
United States helped the Philippines to develop its military. The 
United States and the Philippines maintained their relationship as 
allies during World War II and the postwar period. Most Philip- 
pine military institutions were modeled after United States coun- 
terparts, and the United States remained the AFP's principal 
benefactor in 1990, providing substantial funds and training. For- 
mal relations between the armed forces of the two countries were 
based on two agreements: the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, 
which provided for United States facilities in the Philippines, and 
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States of America. 

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippines and the Unit- 
ed States each agreed that "an armed attack in the Pacific Area 
on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety." Both nations pledged that in such an event each "would 
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu- 
tional processes." The United States government guaranteed to 
defend the security of the Philippines against external aggression 
but not necessarily against internal subversion. The treaty was the 
basis for an annual joint exercise, known as Balikatan, between 
the two nations. 

Signed in 1947 by the government of the newly independent 
Philippines, the Military Bases Agreement originally provided the 
United States with ninety-nine years of access. Almost from the 
beginning, however, several Military Bases Agreement-related is- 
sues were the subject of controversy in the Philippines, arousing 
sometimes strident opposition to the presence of United States bases. 
Some Filipinos saw the facilities as an infringement on Philippine 
sovereignty and a vestige of the country's colonial past. Some also 



273 



Philippines: A Country Study 



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274 



Philippines: A Country Study 

charged that the agreement's rules on criminal jurisdiction shield- 
ed United States military personnel from Philippine law and that 
the economic and military aid provided by the United States as 
compensation was inadequate. Finally, opponents blamed the Unit- 
ed States military for conditions in towns around the facilities, which 
were notorious for their red-light districts and consequent social 
problems. 

Amendments to the text of the Military Bases Agreement ad- 
dressed some Philippine concerns but did not quell opposition al- 
together. A 1959 amendment shortened the duration of the 
agreement with a proviso that either party could terminate the 
agreement with one year's notice after 1991 . Amendments in 1965 
revised legal jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. After long 
and difficult negotiations in the late 1970s, the agreement again 
was amended in 1979 to reaffirm Philippine sovereignty over the 
bases, ensure the United States unhampered access to the facili- 
ties, and provide for a thorough review of the agreement every five 
years. The first review, in 1983, resulted in several further con- 
cessions to Philippine demands for increased sovereignty. The Unit- 
ed States also pledged its best efforts to provide the Philippines with 
US$900 million in economic and military aid over the next five 
years (1984-88), up from US$500 million over the previous five 
years. The seven months of negotiation during the 1988 Military 
Bases Agreement review were highly contentious. The United States 
agreed to increase efforts to provide the Philippines with US$481 
million in aid annually over the two remaining years of the agree- 
ment's fixed term. 

In 1990 Philippine and United States representatives began a 
new round of negotiations on the future of United States bases. 
The 1987 constitution states that a treaty approved by the Philip- 
pine Senate is necessary for foreign bases to remain in the country 
after 1991. Only a few of the twenty-two original United States 
military facilities established in 1947 remained in the Philippines 
in 1990. The two most important were the Subic Bay Naval Base, 
in Zambales Province (and the adjacent naval air station at Cubi 
Point), and Clark Air Base, a large facility in Pampanga Province, 
northwest of Manila. Other ancillary facilities included John Hay 
Air Station in Benguet Province, San Miguel Naval Communica- 
tions Station in Zambales Province, and Wallace Air Station in 
La Union Province. 

After preliminary talks in May 1990, negotiations began in ear- 
nest in September and were continued into 1991 . Citing constitu- 
tional requirements and the amended Military Bases Agreement, 
Philippine negotiators notified United States officials early in the 



276 



National Security 



talks that, without a new treaty, United States access to the bases 
would be terminated in 1 99 1 . Philippine officials further stated that 
their goal was to reach agreement on United States military 
phaseout, a move that would satisfy Philippine sensitivities over 
sovereignty. At the same time, Philippine officials were anxious 
to minimize the adverse impact of a United States withdrawal on 
the bases' 22,000 workers and on the surrounding communities. 
Before the talks began, a joint Philippine executive-legislative com- 
mission drafted a plan for the conversion of the bases to Philip- 
pine military and commercial uses. The chief United States 
negotiator, meanwhile, announced United States plans to withdraw 
its air fighter wing at Clark Air Base as part of an overall plan to 
reduce forces in the region. 

As part of bases-related compensation, the United States con- 
tinued to provide financial, equipment, and logistical support to 
the Philippine military throughout the 1980s. The effect of Unit- 
ed States-supplied equipment, training, and logistical support on 
the AFP would be difficult to overstate. Most Philippine military 
equipment was of United States design or manufacture, and, despite 
growing self-reliance and more Philippine purchases from other 
countries, United States assistance provided for most AFP capital 
procurement. Also, the United States had funded the military edu- 
cation of more than 20,000 Filipinos between 1950 and 1990. In 
the late 1980s, approximately seventy officers and senior enlisted 
personnel studied at United States military schools each year. Some 
Filipinos attended the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, and a smaller number graduated from United States naval, 
air force, and coast guard academies. 

Military relations with regional neighbors were conducted 
primarily within the framework of ASEAN. ASEAN had no defense 
function, however, and its members were committed to establish- 
ing a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" in the region. Out- 
side the ASEAN framework, the Philippines conducted joint 
military training exercises on a bilateral basis with some regional 
neighbors. In addition, members of the Philippine armed forces 
trained in Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, as well 
as in Britain, Germany, and Belgium. 

Intelligence and Security Agencies 

The period following the overthrow of the Marcos regime brought 
important changes to the Philippines' intelligence and security struc- 
ture. During the martial law era (1972-81), the volume and scope 
of government intelligence activity had greatly expanded. The pre- 
eminent intelligence agency was the National Intelligence and 



277 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Security Authority, headed by General Fabian Ver, a close Mar- 
cos confidant and chief of staff of the Philippine armed forces. By 
the end of Marcos 's tenure, the National Intelligence and Securi- 
ty Authority and the rest of the country's intelligence apparatus 
were heavily focused on tracking the president's political opponents. 
Security agents were suspected of numerous human rights abuses. 

The revamp of the nation's intelligence system commenced with 
Aquino's rise to power. The new government significantly curtailed 
intelligence operations and purged many of General Ver's opera- 
tives. Drafters of the 1987 constitution installed legal safeguards 
against the kind of abuses committed by the Marcos intelligence 
and security apparatus. The National Intelligence and Security 
Authority, tainted by its close association with the deposed presi- 
dent, was renamed the National Intelligence Coordinating Agen- 
cy and refocused its efforts away from political opposition leaders 
to internal security threats, especially the communist insurgency. 
Notable intelligence successes against the communist rebels dur- 
ing the late 1980s were an apparent result of this reorientation. 
Government operatives repeatedly captured top CPP and NPA 
cadres, prompting devastating purges within the insurgent ranks 
as guerrillas attempted to ferret out the sources of intelligence 
penetrations. 

In 1990 Aquino issued an executive order authorizing her na- 
tional security adviser to oversee the National Intelligence Coor- 
dinating Agency and other elements of the intelligence community. 
The adviser was empowered to audit the agencies and was charged 
with ensuring that they were responsive to the needs of the presi- 
dent and the National Security Council. The secretaries of national 
defense and justice, whose departments performed intelligence func- 
tions, were directed to work with the national security adviser to 
fulfill the president's mandate. 

The Department of Justice's principal intelligence-gathering or- 
gan, the National Bureau of Investigation, was formed in 1936 as 
the Division of Investigation and patterned after the United States 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The bureau's principal mission 
was to assist the Philippine Constabulary and police in crime de- 
tection and investigation, freeing them to concentrate on main- 
taining peace and order. Collection of intelligence on internal 
security threats was considered a related function. 

The Department of National Defense, meanwhile, maintained 
an extensive intelligence apparatus. Although little was publicly 
revealed about its organization or operation, it was known that the 
military's principal intelligence organ was the Intelligence Service 
of the AFP. Headed by a brigadier general, Intelligence Service 



278 



National Security 



units operated throughout the country. Their mission in 1990 
included not only pursuing insurgents, but also gathering infor- 
mation on military coup plotters and participants. The military 
services, too, maintained their own intelligence arms. The regi- 
mental-size Intelligence and Security Group supported the army 
while the Constabulary Security Group served Philippine Constabu- 
lary leaders. The division of responsibilities among these military 
intelligence agencies and the institutional mechanisms, if any, that 
were set up to coordinate their activities were unclear. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

When Aquino assumed office in February 1986, she immedi- 
ately began dismantling repressive restrictions on civil and public 
liberties. Political prisoners, including top communist leaders, were 
released. Restrictions on the media's ability to report freely and 
to criticize the nation's leaders were removed. Aquino also allowed 
far greater freedom of political expression. 

Although she enjoyed broad public support, Aquino inherited 
a variety of internal security threats from her predecessor. Chief 
among them was the insurgency inspired by the CPP and its mili- 
tary arm, the NPA. After modest growth during the first two years 
of Aquino's tenure, insurgent strength waned in the late 1980s. 
Although communist guerrillas remained active throughout most 
of the country, internal dissension and improved AFP tactics had 
reduced their threat. Meanwhile, Muslim insurgents in the south 
threatened to resume their armed struggle for independence or au- 
tonomy. A combination of political maneuvering within the govern- 
ment, continued Moro factionalism, and decreased foreign support, 
however, reduced prospects for open rebellion. By 1990 the Mus- 
lims, although locally active and still a potent military force, showed 
little inclination to resume full-scale conflict. 

Repeated military rebellions and coup attempts constituted the 
most pressing challenge to Aquino's authority. The highly politi- 
cized military generally was seen as another legacy of the Marcos 
regime. Military dissidents exploited widely shared grievances in 
order to recruit supporters for their rebellions. These grievances 
were at the root of military restiveness. Many officers complained 
that the Aquino government was insensitive to the military's con- 
cerns and that her administration was corrupt and unable to lead. 

Aquino also faced a serious crime problem within the Philip- 
pines. A variety of social and cultural factors contributed to the 
problem. Widespread poverty and the growing urbanization of the 
nation's traditionally rural society often were cited as contributors. 
The crime rate generally paralleled the state of the economy, 



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Philippines: A Country Study 

dramatically worsening during the mid-1980s before improving at 
decade's end. Violence, long common in Philippine society, was 
aggravated by insurgency and the prevalence of high-powered fire- 
arms. Drugs were a modest but growing problem, and CPP-inspired 
terrorism against Philippine officials, and sometimes Americans, 
escalated in the late- 1980s. 

To deal with criminal activity, the government focused on im- 
proving the performance of the police and the courts. Aquino took 
several steps to remedy widespread skepticism about the fairness 
and effectiveness of the judicial system. She ended presidential po- 
litical interference in judicial affairs and took steps to speed the 
sluggish legal process and reduce the logjam of court cases. Efforts 
to improve Integrated National Police discipline and professional- 
ism continued, with special attention given to the perception that 
police were excessively corrupt and abusive. 

The Communist Insurgency 

The Philippine communist insurgency of the 1990s was rooted 
in the nation's history of peasant rebellion. Rural revolts — isolated 
and unsuccessful — were common during the early part of the twen- 
tieth century and before. Discontent among peasants over land 
tenancy and growing population pressures inspired increasing vio- 
lence in the 1930s, especially in Central Luzon where isolated 
peasant rebellions gave way to better organized, sometimes revolu- 
tionary movements. After World War II, tensions between peasants 
and the government-backed landlords grew, leading to the Huk 
rebellion. Formerly anti-Japanese guerrillas, the Huk (see Glos- 
sary) fighters were associated with the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas — PKP), which had 
been established in 1930. The rebellion waned during the early 
1950s, but Huk supporters and the remnants of the Huk army later 
played important roles in the founding of the NPA in the late 1960s. 

The CPP guerrilla movement, the NPA, was a successor to the 
PKP-Huk actions. Jose Maria Sison and a handful of young revolu- 
tionaries founded the CPP — Marxist Leninist, now usually referred 
to as the CPP, in Central Luzon on December 26, 1968. It soon 
became the core communist political organization, leaving just a 
small remnant of the original PKP. The NPA was formed the fol- 
lowing March with sixty former Huk fighters. The new party has 
been a result of an internal schism in the parent PKP, created by 
ideological differences and by personal animosity between Sison 
and PKP leaders. The CPP pursued a Maoist-inspired program 
unlike the Soviet-sponsored PKP. The PKP eventually renounced 



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National Security 



armed insurrection and, in 1990, was an inconsequential, quasi- 
legal political party with about 5,000 members. The outlawed CPP, 
meanwhile, aggressively pursued its guerrilla war, and in 1990 field- 
ed some 18,000 to 23,000 full-time insurgents. 

Ideology and Strategy 

The CPP's ideology was taken largely from Chinese communism 
and adapted to circumstances in the Philippines. CPP chairman 
Sison's writings, which drew heavily on Mao Zedong's philosophy, 
provided the theoretical basis for the movement. Chief among 
them was Philippine Society and Revolution, published in 1970 under 
the pseudonym Amado Guerrero and often referred to as the 
CPP's bible. Sison characterized the Philippines as a semifeudal, 
semicolonial society "ruthlessly exploited" by United States im- 
perialists, the "comprador big bourgeoisie," landlords, and bureau- 
cratic capitalists. Armed revolution was viewed as the only way 
to overthrow the "United States-Marcos regime" (later the "United 
States- Aquino regime"), free the people from their oppression, and 
institute a people's democratic revolution. This proletarian revo- 
lution to overthrow the exploiting classes was to be propelled by 
an alliance between peasants and workers. 

Sison's works outlined several important strategic maxims. The 
revolution had to be flexible, adapt itself to local situations, and 
employ self-criticism. CPP strategy emphasized political over mili- 
tary struggle. The key was to create a broad national alliance, es- 
tablish front groups, and employ coalitions to broaden support for 
the CPP's revolutionary struggle. On the military front, the party 
adopted the Maoist principle of protracted people's war, attempt- 
ing to establish a strong rural base and encircle the cities from the 
countryside. Finally, the CPP's chairman emphasized that the revo- 
lution must exploit the country's fractured geography by spread- 
ing throughout the mountainous island nation. 

Development of the Revolutionary Movement 

Sison's dictums were evident in the party's early development. 
On the theory that the Huks were defeated because their uprising 
was localized, the CPP emphasized expansion to other regions of 
Luzon, and to other islands. After several devastating routs by con- 
centrated AFP attacks, in 1974 the NPA abandoned its early at- 
tempts to form Chinese-style base areas. From the CPP's birthplace 
in Central Luzon, guerrilla cadres established operations in remote 
areas of Northern Luzon, the Bicol Peninsula, Samar Island, and 
on the southern island of Mindanao. In each of these impoverished 
areas, the NPA undertook to support local residents in disputes 



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Philippines: A Country Study 

with the central government, local military and civilian officials, 
and landlords. In most areas, the communists were able to take 
advantage of peasant unrest over land issues by embracing the 
theme of land reform. 

Government initiatives did little to check the slow, steady growth 
of the NPA in the 1970s. Sison and NPA chief Bernabe Buscay- 
no, alias Commander Dante, were arrested, and more than a dozen 
CPP and NPA leaders were captured or killed during 1976 and 
1977. The government also mounted major anti-insurgency cam- 
paigns in Northern Luzon and elsewhere. Still, the communists 
continued to broaden their base of popular support, expand the 
geographical reach of the movement, and escalate their attacks on 
military and government targets. Several factors helped the com- 
munists gain support: the NPA's decentralized organization, which 
granted local commanders wide autonomy; Philippine geography, 
which prevented easy access to remote rebel-dominated areas; the 
armed forces' preoccupation with the Moro insurgency; and the 
continued appeal of the insurgents' pledges to solve specific 
grievances against the government and provide a better life for dis- 
contented Filipinos. 

In 1983 Philippine officials estimated that the communists ex- 
ercised substantial control over 2 to 3 percent of the nation's vil- 
lages and that the NPA fielded some 6,000 full-time guerrillas. The 
insurgency grew rapidly after that year, largely as a result of growing 
political turmoil and increasing discontent with the Marcos govern- 
ment. By 1986, when Aquino came to power, approximately 22,500 
NPA fighters were operating throughout nearly all the country's 
provinces. Equally important, some 20 percent of the Philippines' 
40,000 villages were influenced by the communists. Although they 
admitted that they were not yet in a position to bring down the 
government, CPP leaders calculated that they were in the final phase 
of the "strategic defensive" and would soon be able to fight the 
government to a draw and take the offensive. 

The overthrow of Marcos, however, threw the communist move- 
ment into disarray. The former president's unpopularity was the 
party's best recruiting theme. Strategic errors added to the com- 
munists' woes. The CPP's call for a boycott of the 1986 presiden- 
tial election was overwhelmingly rejected by Filipinos and by many 
of the communists' local political organs. Party leaders later con- 
fessed that the strategy was a major blunder that left the insurgents 
with no role in the change of government. The CPP's chairman, 
Rodolfo Salas, resigned in 1986 in the midst of an unprecedented 
strategic debate within the communist ranks. Many party cadres 
called for a conciliatory policy toward the new and popular Aquino 



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National Security 



government, and for open political participation. Initially the CPP 
adopted a policy of "critical collaboration" with the Aquino ad- 
ministration, but after the lapse of the sixty-day cease-fire in Febru- 
ary 1987, the NPA resumed all-out armed attacks. In 1987, after 
intense and prolonged debate, the party's executive committee con- 
firmed the primacy of the armed struggle and renewed the CPP's 
commitment to a protracted people's war. 

A series of setbacks challenged the communists through the end 
of the 1980s. The advent of a popular president especially hurt CPP 
support among the Philippine middle class, students, labor, and 
other mosdy urban segments of society. Recruiting suffered, as did 
domestic financial support for the guerrillas. Villages in areas largely 
controlled by the NPA failed to support CPP-backed candidates 
in the May 1987 congressional elections. The government also suc- 
ceeded in capturing a number of top CPP and NPA leaders, par- 
ticularly in 1987 and 1988. Among them were Rodolfo Salas, the 
former party chairman, and Romulo Kintanar, the NPA chief. Kin- 
tanar, however, escaped from prison only months after his 1988 
arrest. One result of the repeated roundups of key leaders was a 
series of bloody internal party purges during 1987 and 1988; 
rebels suspected of being government informers were executed or 
expelled. Philippine military leaders publicized widely the mass 
graves of suspected penetration agents. Popular support for the 
insurgents waned, and rebel morale was devastated. Mindanao, 
long an NPA stronghold, was especially hard hit by the loss of up 
to one-half of insurgent cadres. 

By the end of the 1980s, NPA strength had begun to decline. 
According to government figures, full-time guerrilla strength was 
24,000 to 26,000 in 1988, the year that Aquino said would be seen 
as the turning point in the government's counterinsurgency effort. 
The NPA was then operating in sixty of the nation's seventy- three 
provinces and claimed a following of some 500,000 Filipinos. By 
1 99 1 , the government estimated that insurgent strength had fallen 
to 18,000 to 23,000 guerrillas. Still, the military believed that the 
rebels exercised considerable control over more than 18 percent 
of the Philippines' roughly 42,000 villages, and around 30,000 
Filipinos were thought to be CPP members. (Other estimates of 
rebel strength and influence varied widely; one unofficial source 
placed NPA strength at 34,000.) 

Leadership and Organization 

The CPP was nominally led by its Central Committee, which 
in 1989 had some thirty full and nine alternate members. In the 
party's decentralized structure, the Central Committee acted as 



283 



Philippines: A Country Study 

the highest policy-making body and provided theoretical guidance 
to lower echelons. The Central Committee met infrequently, 
however, and real power was vested in members of its Political 
Bureau. The Political Bureau was thought to have at least nine 
members in 1989, but it attempted to meet only once every six 
months. Day-to-day decisions were made by a five-member Ex- 
ecutive Committee. In late 1989, the committee included the party's 
acting chairman, Benito Tiamzon; Wilma Austria-Tiamzon, his 
wife; Ricardo Reyes; Romulo Kintanar; and Jose Maria Sison. 
Sison, the CPP's founder, was actively speaking and writing in 
support of the revolution while living in self-imposed exile in the 
Netherlands. Despite Sison' s denials, the military maintained that 
he continued to direct the CPP from abroad as its chairman in ab- 
sentia. 

CPP political and military operations were monitored and con- 
trolled through a system of territorial and functional organs. The 
basic work of party political cadres and military commanders was 
directed by six territorial commissions: Northern Luzon, Central 
Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, and Manila-Rizal 
(see fig. 13). In keeping with the CPP's policy of "democratic cen- 
tralism," party affairs were managed by committees at echelons 
down to village level. Beneath the territorial commissions were six- 
teen regional and island party committees, which oversaw front, 
district, and section committees. At the bottom of the CPP's or- 
ganizational hierarchy were local party branches and barrio revolu- 
tionary committees. In a parallel organization, the NPA maintained 
operational commands at each level of the CPP structure to coor- 
dinate the movement's political and military struggle. 

Less was known about the organization and function of the 
party's national-level functional commissions, but the existence of 
at least three — the National United Front Commission, the Finance 
Commission, and the Military Commission — seemed certain in 
1990. The Military Commission, whose apparent role was to direct 
and coordinate NPA activity, was directed by Executive Committee 
member Romulo Kintanar, who was often described as the NPA's 
commander. Establishing, directing, and sustaining party front 
groups was the function of the United Front Commission, which 
guided the CPP-dominated National Democratic Front and other 
political fronts and, through the Middle Forces Department, the 
activities involved in pursuing the party's interests in other areas, 
such as relations with the Catholic Church. The CPP's Finance 
Commission presumably managed taxation, fund-raising, and 
spending. Another organ, the National Organization Commission, 



284 



National Security 



reportedly was to be dissolved, along with the Manila-Rizal Com- 
mission, to form the National Urban Center Commission in 
mid- 1990. 

Political Organizing and Front Groups 

The CPP's efforts to broaden its grass-roots political support were 
based on the party cadres' systematic organization of support at 
the village level. The communists' network of barangay cells provided 
for the NPA's physical support and made the communists a po- 
tent political movement. Typically, a small band of CPP and NPA 
organizers first conducted a "social investigation" of a targeted 
barangay and identified key leaders and major sources of discon- 
tent. The cadres mixed with the people and gained their confidence 
by lending assistance, such as help in harvesting crops or in provid- 
ing rudimentary medical care. Later, in a series of well-established 
steps, they set up an organizing committee and front groups 
representing peasants, youth, and others. Eventually, the organizing 
committee became the barrio revolutionary committee, the fun- 
damental element of the communists' shadow government. The 
CPP's methodology for organizing barangays clearly had been suc- 
cessful. 

Through the country, the communists' National United Front 
Commission operated a wide variety of front groups designed to 
draw legal left-wing organizations and sympathetic individuals into 
collaboration with the CPP. As part of this alliance-building pro- 
gram directed mainly at the "middle forces," the CPP maintained 
fronts targeted at labor, students, intellectuals, church workers, 
human rights groups, women, businessmen, and peasants, as well 
as umbrella political fronts. In some cases, these fronts were wide- 
ly recognized as communist-controlled, and the party had difficulty 
attracting and keeping partners because of its dominance. In other 
instances, the CPP's influence was not as obvious, and fronts oper- 
ated with greater outside participation and some autonomy. In 
general, the front groups prospered in the mid-1980s as a result 
of growing opposition to the Marcos government. Aquino's more 
popular presidency, however, frustrated the CPP's efforts to sus- 
tain and build on its legal and quasi-legal partnerships with "cause- 
oriented" groups. 

The CPP's principal political front was the National Democrat- 
ic Front. Many of the party's other fronts — such as those aimed 
at the students and the church — operated under the broad National 
Democratic Front umbrella. Founded in April 1973, the front em- 
phasized nationalist themes over communist ideology in order to 
attract broader participation. Because its strong links to the CPP 



285 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



NORTHERN LUZON 
COMMISSION 



South 
China 
Sea 






International 




boundary 




PPP torritnrial pnmmiccinn 


i 


boundaries 


NPA guerrilla fronts 


V///////A 


Areas where Moro 




insurgents most active 




h 


75 1 50 Kilometers 





75 150 Miles 



MANILA-RIZAL 
COMMISSION 



MINDORO \ \ 



(Priifippine N 
Sea ^ 

SOUTHERN LUZON 
COMMISSION 

, (\CA TANDUANES 
ISLAND 



SAMAR 





TAWITAWI 
X ISLAND 

sulu CekBesSea 

ARCHIPELAGO 

/ *) ' 



MINDANAO 

MINDANAO 
COMMISSION 



Source: Based on information from Jose Maria Sison, with Ranier Werning, The Philip- 
pine Revolution: The Leader's View, New York, 1989, xxii; and Stanley Karnow, In 
Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines, New York, 1989, 429. 



Figure 13. Areas of Insurgent Organization and Activity, 1989 



286 



National Security 



were recognized, however, the National Democratic Front remained 
underground. As a result, the CPP moved in May 1985 to estab- 
lish another, even broader front, the New Nationalist Alliance 
(Bagong Alyansang Makabayan — BAYAN). Many of the CPP's 
other fronts quickly affiliated with the new political umbrella group. 
Although BAYAN 's founders included many well-known non- 
communists, the CPP's early move to take control of BAYAN 's 
council and agenda resulted in numerous defections. 

The radicalization of elements in the Catholic Church begin- 
ning in the late 1960s provided another avenue for the expansion 
of CPP front operations. Recognizing how the church's unparalleled 
credibility and extensive infrastructure could benefit the revolu- 
tion, the communists made the Catholic Church a primary target. 
The party established a front, Christians for National Liberation, 
in 1972 with the express purpose of penetrating the church. In 1986 
an activist claimed that Christians for National Liberation had 
a clandestine membership of over 3,000 clergy and lay workers. 
Radical clergy and church activists, many adopting liberation 
theology (see Glossary), supported the insurgency in a variety of 
ways. Some church activities even provided facilities and finan- 
cial and logistical support to the guerrillas. Other church activists 
joined the NPA, and several well-known priests led guerrilla bands. 
As a result, the armed forces became deeply distrustful of the 
church's role, especially in remote rural areas where the NPA was 
most active. There, some of the church's Basic Christian Com- 
munities — support groups for poor peasants — fell under communist 
control. 

Another prominent target of CPP front operations was the work- 
ers' movement (see Employment and Labor Relations, ch. 3). The 
communists' flagship labor front was the Kilusang Mayo Uno (May 
First Movement — KMU). An umbrella organization formed in 
1980, the KMU claimed 19 affiliated labor federations, hundreds 
of unions, and 650,000 workers in 1989. Although it denied its ties 
to the CPP, the movement had an openly political and revolution- 
ary agenda. As one of the country's largest labor groups, it played 
a prominent role in the anti-Marcos movement. However, the 
KMU-led general strikes during the Aquino administration some- 
times turned violent. Peasant farmers were the target of another 
CPP-sponsored front, the Peasant Movement of the Philippines 
(Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas). Established in 1985, this 
movement claimed 500,000 members and 2 million supporters for 
its agenda, which revolved around land reform. 



287 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Military Operations and Tactics 

The NPA's armed insurrection followed the traditional pattern 
of guerrilla warfare. NPA units were formed at the regional and 
front levels and were normally company- sized or smaller. Main 
regional guerrilla units usually had 80 to 150 fighters, whereas 
secondary units had 30 to 60 fighters. NPA operations were, by 
design, extremely decentralized, with local commanders having 
wide latitude to conduct attacks as they chose. Typically, NPA ele- 
ments avoided contact with AFP troops by remaining in remote, 
mountainous areas until ready to stage an attack. For an assault, 
they concentrated their forces, forming companies and sometimes 
battalions to overwhelm government troops. Afterward, they dis- 
persed to avoid AFP retaliation. 

Isolated government outposts of the constabulary, police, and 
militia were favorite targets. The NPA also attacked public build- 
ings such as town halls as a demonstration of its power. The 
property of uncooperative landowners and businessmen was another 
common target. The communists normally attacked private 
property to punish owners for alleged abuses or to coerce the pay- 
ment of "revolutionary taxes." Attacks on the country's infra- 
structure were rare; the NPA's demolition of several bridges on 
Luzon's Bicol Peninsula in 1987 created a popular backlash that 
apparently caused the NPA to abandon the tactic. 

The communists' traditionally rural struggle came to the cities 
in the mid-1980s with the dramatic increase in NPA assassinations. 
Beginning in 1984, Davao City became the laboratory for the NPA's 
developing urban warfare strategy. There, armed city partisan 
units, known popularly as "sparrow teams," murdered local offi- 
cials, constables, police, and military personnel in a sustained ter- 
ror campaign. The NPA selectively targeted unpopular officials, 
claiming that the killings provided revolutionary justice. The NPA's 
Davao City offensive ended in 1986, but not before Romulo Kin- 
tanar, the mastermind of the Davao City offensive and future NPA 
chief, had initiated a similar operation in Manila. The tempo of 
sparrow assassinations in the capital increased slowly after 1984, 
then rose dramatically in 1987. Some 120 officials, including 
Aquino's secretary of local government, were assassinated by the 
NPA that year. As sparrow activity escalated, NPA targeting be- 
came more indiscriminate. 

The guerrillas also targeted Americans in 1987 for the first time 
since the early 1970s. After threatening to strike official Ameri- 
cans for their support of the Philippine counterinsurgency effort, 
the NPA killed two United States airmen, an American retiree, 



288 



National Security 



and a Filipino outside Clark Air Base in October. In April 1989, 
NPA assassins struck United States Army Colonel James N. Rowe, 
a senior officer at the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, 
on his way to work in Manila. Several other attacks on United States 
servicemen and contractors followed in 1989 and 1990. 

The NPA obtained most weapons from the Philippine military 
in raids and ambushes. Some guns and ammunition also were pur- 
chased locally. As a result, the guerrillas were armed much like 
the AFP, with an assortment of American-designed small arms, 
such as the M-16 rifle. NPA commanders complained, however, 
that weapons shortages hampered their operations. The Philippine 
military estimated that only one-half to two-thirds of NPA fight- 
ers had high-powered rifles. There were no indications in 1990 of 
foreign-supplied weapons. 

Overall, life in the NPA was austere and demanding. Living 
conditions were harsh, the food generally poor, medical care primi- 
tive, and danger constant. The NPA relied on the party's exten- 
sive network of peasant supporters in remote villages. The masa 
(masses) provided food and lodging to mobile guerrilla bands and 
warned of approaching government troops. The CPP's base also 
facilitated communication among party and NPA elements through 
courier, telephone, and telegraph networks. By the late 1980s, NPA 
communications had become more sophisticated; long-range ra- 
dios were used more frequently. Although women were given equal 
status as NPA fighters, they were normally given secondary sup- 
port roles in guerrilla units. Discipline in the NPA was strict, 
designed to win the support of the people by ensuring that the NPA 
was not discredited by its members' misbehavior. Punishment under 
the CPP's system of revolutionary justice ranged from reprimand 
to expulsion and execution. 

Financing and Foreign Support 

The CPP traditionally relied on "revolutionary taxes" as the 
principal income for what the communists portrayed as a self- 
sufficient, home-grown movement. In the areas where they were 
active, CPP and NPA cadres obtained funds from individuals and 
businesses through a combination of coercion and persuasion. The 
party's peasant supporters usually were more forthcoming, provid- 
ing a few pesos and supplies such as rice to local guerrilla fighters. 
However, the CPP obtained most of its funds by extorting money 
from businesses — such as logging, mining, and planting — that oper- 
ated in guerilla zones. NPA units commonly promised not to fo- 
ment labor strikes, restrict the transport of goods, destroy company 
property, or assassinate executives in return for money or material 



289 



Philippines: A Country Study 

support. The communists enforced their threats through NPA at- 
tacks on uncooperative owners and businesses. In addition, the 
rebels derived some revenues from growing and selling marijuana 
in remote areas. 

During the 1980s, foreign nongovernment financing, mainly 
from sympathetic leftist groups in Western Europe, but also from 
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and other Asian 
countries, became increasingly important to the rebels. By 1990 
the AFP chief of staff estimated that support from foreign sym- 
pathizers netted the CPP from US$6 million to US$9 million an- 
nually, an amount that rivaled the estimated US$7.5 to US$10 
million that the CPP netted in domestic revenues. Increased for- 
eign donations resulted in part from intensified "international 
solidarity work' ' by the communist-controlled National Democratic 
Front through its international office in the Netherlands. Luis Jalan- 
doni, a former Catholic priest, headed the CPP's fund-raising and 
international liaison efforts. He was joined in this work by Jose 
Maria Sison, the CPP's founder and reputed chairman in absen- 
tia, following Sison 's release by Aquino in 1986. Donated monies 
frequently were funneled through party front groups, such as the 
KMU labor federation. 

The CPP also began to appeal openly for support from sym- 
pathetic foreign governments for the first time during the late 1980s. 
Although there was no evidence that any foreign government had 
responded to the CPP's request in 1990, this campaign represented 
a dramatic departure from the communists' self-reliant approach, 
long a source of pride. (Two Chinese attempts to ship weapons 
to the Philippine communists — in 1972 and 1974 — were intercepted 
by the AFP. Chinese support apparentiy ended in 1975.) The policy 
reversal resulted from the CPP's conclusion that more and better 
weapons were needed to escalate the war against government forces 
and that domestic revenues could not be increased without aggravat- 
ing growing popular resentment of rebel taxation. 

The Moro Insurgency 

The Philippines has had a long history of Moro insurgent move- 
ments dating back to Spanish rule. Resistance to colonization was 
especially strong among the Muslim population of southwestern 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. With pride in their cultural 
heritage and a strong desire for independence, Moros fought Chris- 
tian and foreign domination. Spanish control over the Moros was 
never complete, and the Muslim struggle carried over into the 
United States colonial era. The Moros earned a reputation as fierce 
fighters in combat against United States troops (see War of 



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National Security 



Resistance, ch. 1). Following independence, Filipino Muslims con- 
tinued to resist Manila's rule, leading to widespread conflict in the 
1970s. 

More immediate causes of insurgency rose out of the increasing 
lawlessness in the southern Philippines during the late 1960s, when 
violence associated with political disputes, personal feuds, and 
armed gangs proliferated. In this climate of civil turmoil, longstand- 
ing tensions between Moro and Christian communities escalated. 
Already in competition over land, economic resources, and politi- 
cal power, the Moros became increasingly alarmed by the immigra- 
tion of Christians from the north who were making Moros a 
minority in what they felt was their own land (see Muslim Filipi- 
nos, ch. 2). By mid- 1972, partisan political violence, generally divid- 
ed along religious lines, gripped all of Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago. After martial law was declared in September 1972 
and all civilians were ordered to surrender their guns, spontane- 
ous rebellions arose among Moros, who traditionally had equated 
the right to carry arms with their religious heritage and were sus- 
picious of the government's intentions toward them. In its initial 
phases, the rebellion was a series of isolated uprisings that rapidly 
spread in scope and size. But one group, the Moro National Liber- 
ation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari, managed to bring most 
partisan Moro forces into the loosely unified MNLF framework. 
Fighting for an independent Moro nation, the MNLF received sup- 
port from Muslim backers in Libya and Malaysia. When the con- 
flict reached its peak in 1973-75, the military arm of the MNLF, 
the Bangsa Moro Army, was able to field some 30,000 armed fight- 
ers. The military responded by deploying 70 to 80 percent of its 
combat forces against the Moros. Destruction and casualties, both 
military and civilian, were heavy; an estimated 50,000 people were 
killed. The government also employed a variety of nonmilitary tac- 
tics, announced economic aid programs and political concessions, 
and encouraged factionalism and defections in the Muslim ranks 
by offering incentives such as amnesty and land. The government's 
programs, and a sharp decrease in the flow of arms from Malaysia, 
set back the Moro movement. In 1976 the conflict began to wane. 

Talks between the government and the Moros began in late 1976 
under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
a union of Muslim nations to which the Moros looked for support. 
The talks led to an agreement between the Philippine government 
and the MNLF signed in Tripoli that year providing for Moro au- 
tonomy in the southern Philippines and for a cease-fire. After a 
lull in the fighting, the truce broke down in 1977 amid Moro charges 
that the government's automony plan allowed only token self-rule. 



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Philippines: A Country Study 



The Moro rebellion never regained its former vigor. Muslim fac- 
tionalism was a major factor in the movement's decline. Differing 
goals, traditional tribal rivalries, and competition among Moro lead- 
ers for control of the movement produced a three-way split in the 
MNLF during the late 1970s. The first break occurred in 1977 when 
Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Min- 
danao, formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which advo- 
cated a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the 
government. Misuari's larger and more militant MNLF was fur- 
ther weakened during that period when rival leaders formed the 
Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, drawing many Mindanao 
Maranaos away from the MNLF, dominated by Misuari's Sulu- 
based Tausug tribe. The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization 
eventually collapsed, giving way to the Moro National Liberation 
Front-Reformist Movement. Moro factionalism, compounded by 
declining foreign support and general war weariness, hurt the Mus- 
lim movement both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. 
Moro fighting strength declined to about 15,000 by 1983, and Mus- 
lim and government forces only occasionally clashed during Mar- 
cos's last years in office. 

In keeping with her campaign pledge of national reconciliation, 
Aquino initiated talks with the MNLF — the largest of the three 
major factions — in 1986 to resolve the conflict with Muslim sep- 
aratists. Discussions produced a cease-fire in September, followed 
by further talks under the auspices of the Organization of the Is- 
lamic Conference. In January 1987, the MNLF signed an agree- 
ment relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions 
and accepting the government's offer of autonomy. The Moro Is- 
lamic Liberation Front, the next largest faction, refused to accept 
the accord and initiated a brief offensive that ended in a truce later 
that month. Talks between the government and the MNLF over 
the proposed autonomous region continued sporadically through- 
out 1987 but eventually deadlocked. Following the government's 
successful diplomatic efforts to block the MNLF's latest bid for Or- 
ganization of the Islamic Conference membership, the MNLF offi- 
cially resumed its armed insurrection in February 1988, but little 
fighting resulted. 

The government, meanwhile, pressed ahead with plans for Mus- 
lim autonomy without the MNLF's cooperation. Article 10 of the 
1987 constitution mandates that the new congress establish an 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In the November 1989 
plebiscite, only two Mindanao provinces — Maguindanao and 
Lanao del Sur— and two in the Sulu Archipelago — Sulu and 
Tawitawi — opted to accept the government's autonomy measure. 



292 



National Security 



The fragmented four-province Autonomous Region for Muslim 
Mindanao, with its own governor and unicameral legislature, was 
officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990. 

Armed activity by the Moros continued at a relatively low level 
through the late 1980s, with sporadic clashes between government 
and Muslim forces. The military still based army and marine bat- 
talions in Moro areas to maintain order in 1990, but far fewer units 
than it had in the 1970s. (Four battalions were on Jolo Island, a 
Moro stronghold, down from twenty-four at the rebellion's height.) 
Most of the endemic violence in Muslim areas was directed at rival 
clans, not at the military's peacekeeping forces. The Moro move- 
ment remained divided along tribal lines in three major factions. 
Misuari's MNLF forces in the Sulu Archipelago totaled 15,000, 
and the Mindanao-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the 
MNLF-Reformist Movement fielded around 2,900 and 900 troops, 
respectively. Weakened by these divisions, Muslim infighting, and 
the formation of an autonomous region, the Moro armies did not 
appear to be an imminent threat. Still, the MNLF, which did not 
recognize the autonomous region, showed no sign of surrender- 
ing, and it promised to remain a potent military and political force 
in the southern Philippines. 

Crime 

Despite some improvement in law and order, crime remained 
a major problem through the end of the 1980s. Police attributed 
the country's chronic crime problems to a variety of social and cul- 
tural factors. Widespread poverty and rapid population growth were 
frequently cited. Population pressures and a shortage of land and 
jobs in rural areas had produced a steady internal migration to the 
cities. This urbanization of a traditionally agrarian society was com- 
monly mentioned as cause for increased crime rates. In particu- 
lar, police pointed to the rapid growth of urban slum and squatter 
areas; more than 25 percent of the population of Metro-Manila 
(see Glossary) were thought to be squatters in the late 1980s (see 
Migration, ch. 2). Widespread possession of firearms — including 
automatic rifles — was another factor contributing to crime. Un- 
disciplined private armies, usually maintained by local politicians 
and wealthy families, and numerous organized crime gangs were 
the biggest violators of firearms laws. The communist and Mus- 
lim insurgencies compounded the problem of proliferating guns 
and violence. Piracy and smuggling also were thriving criminal 
industries, especially in the southern portions of the archipelago. 

According to the police, the incidence of serious crime escalated 
through the early 1980s, from approximately 250 crimes per 100,000 



293 



Philippines: A Country Study 



population in 1979, to a sustained level of around 310 during 1984 
through 1987, then declined in 1988 and 1989. In 1988 the crime 
rate dipped below 300 crimes per 100,000 people, then fell dra- 
matically in 1989 to 251 crimes per 100,000 citizens. Because of 
differing reporting practices and degrees of coverage, it was difficult 
to compare Philippine crime rates to those of other countries. 

Government officials attributed the decrease in crime to improved 
police work, but economic conditions appeared to be as important. 
The deterioration in law and order during the early and mid-1980s 
accompanied a steadily worsening economy, whereas the improve- 
ment in the late 1980s paralleled renewed economic growth under 
Aquino. Not surprisingly, crime rates were highest in major ur- 
ban areas, where unemployment was the highest. Regionally, 
peninsular southern Luzon, the western Visayan islands, and por- 
tions of Mindanao — impoverished rural areas where insurgents 
were active — had the most criminal activity in the mid-1980s. 

Drug use and trafficking, particularly in marijuana, were growing 
problems during the 1980s. Cultivation was geographically wide- 
spread, but the mountainous portions of northern Luzon and the 
central Visayas were the major marijuana-growing centers. Dur- 
ing the late 1980s, another drug, methamphetamine, was fast be- 
coming a narcotics problem. Known locally as shabu, it had generally 
been smuggled into the country, but domestic production expanded 
sharply in 1989 to meet growing demand. Coca cultivation was 
not significant in 1989, and there was no evidence of opium pop- 
py cultivation or heroin manufacture. 

The Philippines remained a center of drug trafficking and trans- 
shipment. Cannabis growers exported their product to Hong Kong, 
Japan, Australia, and the United States, and Philippine waters were 
routinely used by other smugglers as a transshipment point for 
Southeast Asian marijuana bound for North America. Manila's 
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, too, was used for tranship- 
ment of heroin and marijuana destined for Guam, Australia, Eu- 
rope, and the United States. Production and trafficking of illegal 
drugs was accomplished by a variety of domestic and foreign crimi- 
nal groups, notably Australian, American, and ethnic Chinese 
Filipinos. Communist insurgents also were involved in marijuana 
cultivation. 

Corruption remained a serious problem in the early 1990s, and 
its elimination was one of the government's most vexing challenges. 
Despite persistent efforts, petty graft was commonplace, and high- 
level corruption scandals periodically rocked the government. As 
part of its continuing efforts to weed out official malfeasance, the 



294 



National Security 



government maintained a special anticorruption court, known as 
the Sandiganbayan. 

Other government initiatives targeted corruption, crime, and 
terrorism. Peace and Order Councils at the national, regional, and 
provincial level were rejuvenated under Aquino. By regularly bring- 
ing together responsible government, military, and community 
leaders, the government hoped to improve the effectiveness of its 
anticrime and counterinsurgency programs. AFP and police com- 
manders also attempted to address the problems of internal corrup- 
tion and abuse, which, they admitted, undermined public confidence 
in, and cooperation with, the security forces. Top military leaders 
routinely publicized retraining programs, the discharge and demo- 
tion of scalawags in the ranks, and other measures designed to 
improve discipline. The military also mounted a counternarcotics 
effort, spearheaded by the constabulary's Narcotics Command. 
Government agents more than doubled arrests during 1989 and 
eradicated millions of marijuana plants, but they still found it 
difficult to keep pace with the growing drug trade. 

Law Enforcement 

Until the mid-1970s, when a major restructuring of the nation's 
police system was undertaken, the Philippine Constabulary alone 
was responsible for law enforcement on a national level. Indepen- 
dent city and municipal police forces took charge of maintaining 
peace and order on a local level, calling on the constabulary for 
aid when the need arose. The National Police Commission, estab- 
lished in 1966 to improve the professionalism and training of local 
police, had loose supervisory authority over the police. It was widely 
accepted, however, that this system had several serious defects. Most 
noteworthy were jurisdictional limitations, lack of uniformity and 
coordination, disputes between police forces, and partisan politi- 
cal involvement in police employment, appointments, assignments, 
and promotions. Local political bosses routinely used police as pri- 
vate armies, protecting their personal interests and intimidating 
political opponents. 

In order to correct such deficiencies, the 1973 constitution provid- 
ed for the integration of public safety forces. Several presidential 
decrees were subsequently issued, integrating the police, fire, and 
jail services in the nation's more than 1,500 cities and municipali- 
ties. On August 8, 1975, Presidential Decree 765 officially estab- 
lished the joint command structure of the Philippine Constabulary 
and Integrated National Police. The constabulary, which had a 
well- developed nationwide command and staff structure, was given 
the task of organizing the integration. The chief of the Philippine 



295 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Constabulary served jointly as the director general of the Integrated 
National Police. As constabulary commander, he reported through 
the military chain of command, and as head of the Integrated Na- 
tional Police, he reported directiy to the minister (later secretary) 
of national defense. The National Police Commission was trans- 
ferred to the Ministry (later Department) of National Defense, re- 
taining its oversight responsibilities but turning over authority for 
training and other matters to the Philippine Constabulary and In- 
tegrated National Police. 

The Integrated National Police was assigned responsibility for 
public safety, protection of lives and property, enforcement of laws, 
and maintenance of peace and order throughout the nation. To 
carry out these responsibilities, it was given powers "to prevent 
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders and provide for their 
detention and rehabilitation, prevent and control fires, investigate 
the commission of all crimes and offenses, bring the offenders to 
justice, and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety." In 
practice, the Philippine Constabulary retained responsibility for 
dealing with serious crimes or cases involving jurisdictions far sepa- 
rated from one another, and the Integrated National Police took 
charge of less serious crimes and local traffic, crime prevention, 
and public safety. 

The Integrated National Police's organization paralleled that of 
the constabulary. The thirteen Philippine Constabulary regional 
command headquarters were the nuclei for the Integrated National 
Police's regional commands. Likewise, the constabulary's seventy- 
three provincial commanders, in their capacity as provincial police 
superintendents, had operational control of Integrated National 
Police forces in their respective provinces. Provinces were further 
subdivided into 147 police districts, stations, and substations. The 
constabulary was responsible for patrolling remote rural areas. In 
Metro Manila's four cities and thirteen municipalities, the Integrat- 
ed National Police's Metropolitan Police Force shared the head- 
quarters of the constabulary's Capital Command. The commanding 
general of the Capital Command was also the director of the In- 
tegrated National Police's Metropolitan Police Force and directed 
the operations of the capital's four police and fire districts. 

As of 1985, the Integrated National Police numbered some 60,000 
people, a marked increase over the 1980 figure of 51,000. Approx- 
imately 10 percent of these staff members were fire and prison offi- 
cials, and the remainder were police. The Philippine National Police 
Academy provided training for Integrated National Police officer 
cadets. Established under the Integrated National Police's Train- 
ing Command in 1978, the academy offered a bachelor of science 



296 



National Security 



degree in public safety following a two-year course of study. Ad- 
mission to the school was highly competitive. 

The Integrated National Police force was the subject of some crit- 
icism and the repeated object of reform. Police were accused of in- 
volvement in illegal activities, violent acts, and abuse. Charges of 
corruption were frequent. To correct the Integrated National Police's 
image problem, the government sponsored programs to identify 
and punish police offenders and introduced training designed to raise 
their standard of appearance, conduct, and performance. 

Dramatic changes were planned for the police in 1991 . The newly 
formed Philippine National Police was to be a strictly civilian or- 
ganization, removed from the armed forces and placed under a 
new civilian department known as the Department of the Interior 
and Local Government. 

Local police forces were supported at the national level by the 
National Bureau of Investigation. As an agency of the Department 
of Justice, the National Bureau of Investigation was authorized to 
"investigate, on its own initiative and in the public interest, crimes 
and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines; to help 
whenever officially requested, investigate or detect crimes or other 
offenses; [and] to act as a national clearing house of criminal records 
and other information. ' ' In addition, the bureau maintained a scien- 
tific crime laboratory and provided technical assistance on request 
to the police and constabulary. 

Local officials also played a role in law enforcement. By presiden- 
tial decree, the justice system in the barangays empowered village 
leaders to handle petty and less serious crimes. The intent of the 
program was to reinforce the authority of local officials and to reduce 
the workload on already overtaxed Philippine law enforcement 
agencies. 

Penal Law 

The Philippine legal system was a hybrid, reflecting the coun- 
try's cultural and colonial history. The system combined elements 
of Roman civil law from Spain, Anglo-American common law in- 
troduced by the United States, and the customary systems used 
by minorities. The influence of Spanish law was slowly fading but 
was clearly evident in private law, including family relations, 
property matters, and contracts. The influence of American law 
was most visible in constitutional and corporate law, and taxation 
and banking (see National Government, ch. 4). Evidentiary rules 
also were adopted from the American system. In the Muslim areas 
of the south, Islamic law was employed. 



297 



Philippines: A Country Study 

Philippine law dates to the nation's independence from Spain 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Statutes were enacted by the 
colonial Philippine legislature (1900-35), the commonwealth legis- 
lature (1935-46), and by the republic, beginning July 4, 1946. 
Many modern laws were patterned after the United States, and 
United States case law was cited and given persuasive effect in 
Philippine courts. As of the mid-1980s, twenty-six codes were in 
effect. These included the 1930 revised penal code, in effect since 
January 1, 1932, and the civil code, which replaced the Spanish 
civil code on July 1, 1950. In addition, numerous presidential 
decrees issued during and after the martial law period (1972-81) 
had the effect of law. During this era, President Marcos issued more 
than 2,000 decrees. Although some were rescinded by Aquino dur- 
ing her first year in office. Rule by presidential decree ended in 
February 1987 with the ratification of the constitution. 

Substantive criminal law was embodied in the revised penal code, 
as amended, and based chiefly on the Spanish penal code of 1870, 
which took effect in 1887. The penal code set forth the basic prin- 
ciples affecting criminal liability, established a system of penalties, 
and defined classes of crimes. It also provided for aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, stating, for instance, that age, physical 
defect, or acting under "powerful impulse causing passion or ob- 
fuscation" can affect criminal liability. Insanity or acting under 
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear were regarded by law as ex- 
empting circumstances. Under the code, penalties were classified 
as capital (requiring a death sentence), afflictive (six years to life 
imprisonment), correctional (one month to six years), and light 
(up to thirty days). These correspond to the classification of crimes 
as grave felonies, punishable by capital or afflictive penalties; less 
grave felonies, punishable by correctional penalties; and light felo- 
nies, punishable by light penalties. The 1987 constitution, however, 
outlaws the death penalty unless provided for by subsequent legis- 
lation. 

Criminal Procedure 

The sources of procedural criminal law were the constitution, 
the revised penal code of 1930, the New Rules of Court of 1964, 
special laws, and certain presidential orders and letters of instruc- 
tion. These governed the pleading, practice, and procedure of all 
courts as well as admission to the practice of law. All had the force 
and effect of law. 

The rights of the accused under Philippine law are guaranteed 
under Article $ of the 1987 constitution and include the right to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the right to enjoy due 



298 



National Security 



process under the law, and the right to a speedy, public trial. Those 
accused must be informed of the charges against them and must 
be given access to competent, independent counsel, and the op- 
portunity to post bail, except in instances where there is strong evi- 
dence that the crime could result in the maximum punishment of 
life imprisonment. Habeas corpus protection is extended to all ex- 
cept in cases of invasion or rebellion. During a trial, the accused 
are entitled to be present at every proceeding, to compel witness- 
es, to testify and cross-examine them and to testify or be exempt 
as a witness. Finally, all are guaranteed freedom from double 
jeopardy and, if convicted, the right to appeal. 

Criminal action can be initiated either by a complaint — a sworn 
statement by the offended party, a witness, or a police officer — or 
by "information." Information consists of a written accusation filed 
with the court by a prosecutor, known as a fiscal, at the provincial 
levels of government and below. No information can be filed unless 
investigation by a judge, fiscal, or state prosecutor establishes a prima 
facie case. Warrant for arrest is issued by a judge. Warrant-less 
arrests by a police officer can be made legally only under extraordi- 
nary circumstances. Aquino immediately discontinued Marcos-era 
practices of presidentially ordered searches and arrests without ju- 
dicial process and prolonged "preventative detention actions." 

Trial procedure consists of arraignment, trial, and the court's 
judgment and sentencing. The accused must be arraigned in the 
court where the complaint or information is filed. A defendant must 
be present to plead to the charge, except in certain minor cases 
where a lawyer can appear for him or her. All offenses are bail- 
able, save the most serious cases when strong evidence of guilt ex- 
ists. If a defendant has no lawyer, the court is required to supply 
one. Prosecution is carried out by the state prosecutor or provin- 
cial fiscal, who exercises broad discretion in screening cases and 
affixing charges. No jury is employed; the judge determines all ques- 
tions of law and fact and passes sentence. A written sentence must 
be read to the court. Afterward, either party may appeal. 

The Correctional System 

In the late 1980s, institutions for the confinement of convicts 
and the detention of those awaiting trial included a variety of na- 
tional prisons and penal farms as well as numerous small local jails 
and lockups. In general, the national prisons housed more serious 
offenders, and those serving short-term sentences were held in lo- 
cal facilities. The prison system at the national level was super- 
vised by the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice. The 
bureau was responsible for the safekeeping of prisoners and their 



299 



Philippines: A Country Study 

rehabilitation through general and moral education and technical 
training in industry and agriculture. The bureau also oversaw the 
operation of prison agro-industries and the production of food com- 
modities. In 1991 the newly formed Philippine National Police took 
over administration of local jails. 

The government maintained six correctional institutions and 
penal farms. The nation's largest prison was the National Peniten- 
tiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal Province, near Manila, which also oper- 
ated the Manila City Jail. The penitentiary served as the central 
facility for those sentenced to life imprisonment or long-term in- 
carceration. It was divided into two camps to separate those serv- 
ing maximum and minimum penalties. The Correctional Institution 
for Women was located in Metropolitan Manila. Combination 
prison and penal farms also were located in Zamboanga City; in 
Palawan, Mindoro Occidental; and in several Mindanao provinces. 
Prison conditions in the Philippines were generally poor, and pris- 
on life was harsh. 

Some prison inmates were eligible for parole and probation. Be- 
fore serving their sentence, felons who were not charged with sub- 
version or insurgency, or had not been on probation before, could 
apply for probation. Probationers were required to meet with their 
parole officers monthly, to avoid any further offense, and to com- 
ply with all other court-imposed conditions. After serving an es- 
tablished minimum sentence, certain prisoners could apply to their 
parole board for release. The board could also recommend pardon 
to the president for prisoners it believed to have reformed and who 
presented no menace to society. 

In 1991 crime still was a serious, if somewhat reduced, threat 
to the general peace and security of society and was aggravated 
by corruption in the police and court systems. The politicization 
of the military was seen as a long-term problem, and the threat 
of a military coup remained significant. The threat of a CPP-led 
takeover seemed to be receding as NPA guerrilla strength ebbed. 
The socioeconomic roots of the revolutionary movement remained 
and promised to make the insurgency a problem for some time to 
come, despite its slow decline. The government also recognized 
the continuing threat posed by well-armed Filipino Muslim rebels, 
although few feared a near-term resurgent Moro uprising. No ex- 
ternal security threats were perceived to exist. 

* * * 

A series of well-researched books published in the late 1980s have 
added immensely to the available body of work on the Philippine 



300 



National Security 



communist insurgency. William Chapman's Inside the Philippine 
Revolution offers unique insights on the revolutionary movement. 
Richard Kessler's Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines provides 
a thorough review of the insurgency, especially its social and cul- 
tural roots. Gregg Jones's Red Revolution combines discussions of 
the CPP's historical development with revealing interviews with 
communist leaders and first-hand reports on guerrilla commanders 
and political cadres in the field. Although predictably dogmatic, 
books by CPP founder Jose Maria Sison — Philippine Society and Revo- 
lution and The Philippine Revolution — present the theoretical under- 
pinnings of the insurgency (the former appears under his nom de 
guerre, Amado Guerrero). Annual updates on the progress of the 
communist movement can be found in the Yearbook on International 
Communist Affairs. 

Comprehensive studies of the Philippine military are few. 
Richard Kessler's Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines provides 
the most thorough examination of the Armed Forces of the Philip- 
pines and their strengths and weaknesses. The history of Philip- 
pine civil-military relations is explored by two doctoral dissertations: 
Donald L. Berlin's "Prelude to Martial Law" and Carolina Her- 
nandez's "The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the 
Philippines." More current information on the military's role in 
politics can be found in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian Defence 
Journal, and Pacific Defence Reporter. 

Standard references on military capabilities include annual edi- 
tions of The Military Balance, prepared by the International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, and the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency's World Military Expenditures and Arms Trans- 
fers. Jane's Infantry Weapons, Jane's Armour and Artillery, Jane's All the 
World's Aircraft, and Jane's Fighting Ships also are useful. The mili- 
tary's human rights performance is reviewed annually by the Am- 
nesty International Report and by the United States Department of 
State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



301 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Rate of Growth of Gross National Product (GNP) by Sector, 

1965-90 

3 Distribution of Employment by Sector, Selected Years, 

1956-88 

4 Government Expenditures, 1980, 1985, and 1989 

5 Government Revenues, 1980, 1985, and 1989 

6 Distribution of Government Expenditures, Selected Years, 

1965-89 

7 Annual Rate of Growth of Money Supply and Rate of Infla- 

tion, 1950-90 

8 Value Added in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing by Sec- 

tor, Selected Years, 1970-90 

9 Rates of Growth of Value Added in Agriculture, Forestry, and 

Fishing by Sector, 1970-90 

10 Structure of Manufacturing Sector, 1970, 1980, and 1987 

11 Production, Exports, and Reserves of Major Minerals, 1985, 

1987, and 1988 

12 Income Distribution by Decile, Selected Years, 1961-88 

13 Balance of Payments, 1985-89 

14 Foreign Investment by Industry, 1970-88 

15 Foreign Investment by Country, 1970-88 

16 External Debt, 1982-90 

17 Official Development Assistance by Source and Country, 

1952-72 and 1978-88 

18 Official Development Assistance by Source and Type, Selected 

Years, 1952-90 

19 Major Army Equipment, 1990 

20 Major Naval Equipment, 1990 

21 Major Air Force Equipment, 1990 



303 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Rate of Growth of Gross National Product (GNP) 
by Sector, 1965-90 * 
(in percentages) 



Sector 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1989-90 



Agriculture, forestry, 

and fishing 3.5 3.9 5.2 2.1 2.4 2.2 

Industry 4.9 7.5 7.5 -2.8 4.5 1.9 

Mining 15.3 5.2 8.4 -4.6 -2.0 2.5 

Manufacturing 6.1 6.0 6.0 -1.5 4.8 1.4 

Construction 3.1 14.8 12.5 -9.8 3.9 4.2 

Services 4.8 4.8 5.8 -0.4 4.9 3.3 

GNP 4.8 6.5 6.3 -1.0 4.6 3.1 



* Sectoral products from 1965 to 1975 are net domestic product. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1 989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Tables 3.9 and 3.10; 
Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority, 1981 Philippine Statisti- 
cal Yearbook, Manila, 1981, Tables 3.9 and 3.13; and Philippines, National Statistical 
Coordination Board, The National Accounts of the Philippines: CY1988 to CY1990, 
Manila, n.d., Tables 5-7. 



305 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 3. Distribution of Employment by Sector, Selected Years, 1956-88 

(in percentages) 

Sector 1956 1961 1968 1975 1980 1985 1988 
Agriculture, forestry, 

and fishing 59.0 60.6 53.8 53.8 51.4 49.0 46.1 

Industry 

Manufacturing 12.5 11.3 11.8 11.4 11.0 9.7 10.4 

Other 3J3 3J 4.0 3J* 4J) 4J5 5J! 

Total industry . . . 15.8 14.4 15.8 15.2 15.5 14.3 15.6 

Services 24.5 24.6 30.0 31.0 33.0 36.8 38.2 

TOTAL * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Tables 11.1 and 11.2; 
and Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority, 1981 Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1981, Table 11.8. 



Table 4. Government Expenditures, 1980, 1985, and 1989 
(in millions of pesos) * 





1980 


1985 


1989 


Economic services 










2,475 


4,606 


16,217 


Industry, trade, labor, and tourism 


. . . 1,424 


1,915 


1,343 




. . . 11,822 


13,378 


22,309 


Other 




11,474 


4,885 




. , 15,721 


31,373 


44,754 


Social services 










4,204 


10,976 


29,909 


Health 


. . . 1,333 


3,220 


7,353 




442 


1,875 


3,720 


Housing and community development . . . 


, , . 1,371 


5,505 


374 


Other 


267 


183 


2,632 


Total social services 


7,617 


21,759 


43,988 




4,760 


7,123 


20,770 


General public services 


6,528 


9,986 


18,989 




. . . 3,562 


22,269 


100,439 


TOTAL 


38,188 


92,510 


228,940 



— means negligible. 

* For value of the peso — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Developent Author- 
ity, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Table 15.3. 



306 



Appendix 



Table 5. Government Revenues, 1980, 1985, and 1989 
(in millions of pesos) * 





1980 


1985 


1989 


Tax revenue 










8,761 


18,655 


27,409 




196 


173 


384 




9,332 


22,677 


33,207 


Taxes on international trade and transactions 




1 7 AAA 




Other 


640 


1,304 


3,772 




28,833 


60,253 


90,352 


Nontax revenue 










5,020 


7,322 


20,723 




2 


3 


11 




222 


380 


1,775 




5,244 


7,705 


22,509 


TOTAL 


34,077 


67,958 


112,861 



* For value of the peso — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Table 15.2. 



Table 6. Distribution of Government Expenditures, Selected Years, 1965-89 

(in percentages) 

1965 1972 1980 1985 1989 



Economic services 16.7 33.8 41.2 33.9 19.5 

Social services 

Education 36.5 25.1 11.0 11.9 13.1 

Other 7J_ 6.5 8.9 11.6 6.1 

Total social services ... 44.2 31.6 19.9 23.5 19.2 

Defense 16.7 15.7 12.5 7.7 9.1 

General public services 22.2 18.8 17.1 10.8 8.3 

Debt-service fund n.a. n.a. 9.3 24.1 43.9 



TOTAL * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



n.a. — not applicable. 

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1 989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Table 15.3; and Philip- 
pines, National Economic and Development Authority, 1981 Philippine Statistical 
Yearbook, Manila, 1981, Table 16.5. 



307 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 7. Annual Rate of Growth of Money Supply 
and Rate of Inflation, 1950-90 
(in percentages) 

Money Supply Inflation 



Year Growth Rate Rate 



1950-60 4.4 0.8 

1960-70 9.9 5.4 

1970-75 16.8 16.1 

1975-80 17.0 11.7 

1981 4.4 13.1 

1982 -0.1 10.3 

1983 38.3 10.0 

1984 3.5 50.3 

1985 6.5 23.1 

1986 19.1 0.8 

1987 22.1 3.8 

1988 14.6 8.8 

1989 31.5 10.6 

1990 n.a. 12.7 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Tables 2.11 and 16.1; 
"Central Bank Chief Outlines Goals for 1991," Business World [Manila], Febru- 
ary 1, 1991, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, Febru- 
ary 8, 1991, 54; and Central Bank of the Philippines, 1989 Annual Report, Manila, 
1990, 34. 



Table 8. Value Added in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing by Sector, 
Selected Years, 1970-90 
(in percentages) 



Sector 1956 1961 1968 1975 1980 1985 1988 



Agricultural crops 55.1 62.5 58.8 60.8 56.2 57.3 56.2 

Livestock 

Poultry 3.8 3.9 5.9 9.1 10.0 9.9 10.6 

Other 11.3 8.2 6.2 6.2 7J3 7.7 8.4 

Total livestock ... 15.1 12.1 12.1 15.3 17.3 17.6 19.0 

Forestry 13.9 8.5 10.9 6.7 6.9 5.4 5.2 

Fishing 15.8 16.8 18.1 17.2 19.6 19.6 19.5 



TOTAL * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1981 Philippine Statistical Yearbook Manila, 1981, Table 3.16; Philippines, 
National Economic and Development Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
Manila, 1989, Table 3.13; and Philippines, National Statistical Coordination Board, 
The National Accounts of the Philippines: CY 1988 to CY1990, Manila, n.d., Table 26. 



308 



Appendix 



Table 9. Rates of Growth of Value Added in Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing by Sector, 1970-90 * 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1970-75 


1975-80 


1980-85 


1985-90 


Agricultural crops 












3 7 


A A 




u.o 




6.5 


3.3 


3.3 


4.5 




7.8 


2.9 


1.6 


2.0 




6.6 


-0.5 


-8.9 


0.3 


Bananas 


11.1 


15.6 


2.4 


-2.7 




7.7 


5.7 


1.9 


0.5 




-0.7 


1.6 


2.8 


8.5 


Poultry 


7.1 


13.6 


9.5 


7.3 




-8.6 


1.9 


-12.6 


-3.4 




4.3 


3.9 


2.7 


3.9 


Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 


4.5 


5.2 


2.1 


2.4 



* At 1972 prices. 



Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1981 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1981, Table 3.16; Philippines, 
National Economic and Development Authority, 1 989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
Manila, 1989, Table 3.13; and Philippines, National Statistical Coordination Board, 
The National Accounts of the Philippines: CY 1988 to CY1990, Manila, n.d., Table 26. 



309 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 10. Structure of Manufacturing Sector, 1970, 1980, and 1987 
(in percentages) 



Major Group 


1970 


1980 


1987 


Food products 


24.4 


22.3 


23.6 


Beverages 


5.3 


2.7 


6.7 


Tobacco 


5.6 


3.2 


5.3 




7.0 


7.2 


5.2 


Footwear and wearing apparel 


1.8 


2.9 


3.3 


Wood and cork 


4.2 


4.0 


2.6 




0.4 


1.0 


0.7 


Paper 


3.2 


2.9 


2.5 


Printing 


1.9 


1.5 


1.2 




0.2 


0.2 


0.1 


Kubber 


2.5 


1 .6 


1 .5 


Chemicals 


13 7 


11.5 


11.0 


Petroleum 


8.7 


15.9 


15.1 


Nonmetallic minerals 


2.9 


1.0 


2.7 


Basic metals 


5.7 


3.9 


7.7 




3.2 


2.5 


1.5 




0.7 


1.3 


0.8 


Electrical machinery 


3.3 


4.0 


6.4 




4.0 


4.6 


1.5 


Other 


1.6 


0.8 


0.5 


TOTAL 


100.0 1 


100.0 2 


100.0 1 



1 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

2 Sum of entries in source is 95 percent. 

Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Table 6.4. 



Table 11. Production, Exports, and Reserves of Major Minerals, 
1985, 1987, and 1988 " 
(in thousands of tons) 



Production Exports Reserves 

Mineral 1985 1988 (1987) (1987) 



Cement 3,080.0 4,300.0 38.6 6,507,569 

Clay 381.4 418.3 — 1,121,163 

Coal 1,257.9 1,330.0 — 369,000 

Chromium 272.0 190.0 105.7 56,848 

Copper 222.2 218.1 362.0 3,881,255 

Gold 0.033 0.033 0.004 101,557 

Nickel 28.2 10.8 483.4 1,566,101 

Pyrite 232.5 300.0 0.054 988,482 

Petroleum, crude * 3,285.0 2,170.0 — 16,300 



— means negligible. 

* In thousands of barrels. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Washington, 1990, 446-50; Philippines, National Eco- 
nomic and Development Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, 
Table 4.14; and Edith Hodgkinson, The Philippines to 1993, London, 1988, 74. 



310 



Appendix 



Table 12. Income Distribution by Decile, Selected Years, 1961-88 
(in percentages) 



Decile 


1961 


1971 


1985 


1988 




41.0 


37.1 


36.4 


35.7 




15.5 


16.9 


15.7 


16.1 


Third to sixth deciles 


31.4 


34.3 


33.6 


34.0 




12.1 


11.7 


14.3 


14.3 


TOTAL * 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Philippines, National Economic and Development 
Authority, 1989 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Manila, 1989, Table 2.8. 



Table 13. Balance of Payments, 1985-89 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 




4,629 


4,842 


5,720 


7,074 


7,821 


Imports 


. -5,111 


-5,044 


-6,737 


-8,159 


-10,419 


Trade balance 


-482 


-202 


-1,017 


-1,085 


-2,598 


Invisibles and private transfers . . 


447 


1,156 


573 


695 


1,133 


Current account balance .... 


-35 


954 


-444 


-390 


-1,465 


Direct investment and other long- 












term capital 


3,094 


1,249 


601 


605 


1,449 


Short-term capital 


. -2,741 


-1,069 


-246 


-34 


-72 


Capital account balance .... 


353 


180 


355 


571 


1,377 




659 


32 


-209 


480 


389 


Gold monetization, SDRs,* and 












valuation change 


160 


209 


202 


339 


161 




-1,100 














Changes in reserves 


-37 


-1,375 


96 


-1,000 


-462 



* SDRs — Special Drawing Rights, a monetary unit of the International Monetary Fund (see Glossary) 
based on a basket of the United States dollar, the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the 
British pound sterling, and the French franc. 

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, 
41, Pt. 1, Washington, 1990, 536. 



311 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 14. Foreign Investment by Industry, 1970-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Industry 


Value 


Percentage 


Financial institutions 










7.7 






4.6 




357 


12.3 


Manufacturing 






Chemicals and chemical products 


394 


13.6 




289 


10.1 


Basic metal products 


169 


5.8 






2.2 




108 


3.7 


Petroleum and coal 


82 


2.8 


Metal products except machinery 


34 


1.2 


Other 


262 


8.9 




1,401 


48.3 


Mining 








697 


24.0 


Other 


85 


3.0 


Total mining 


782 


27.0 




125 


4.3 




129 


4.5 


Other 


107 


3.6 


TOTAL 


2,901 


100.0 



Source: Based on information from Central Bank of the Philippines, unpublished data. 



Table 15. Foreign Investment by Country, 1970-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Country Value Percentage 

United States 1,649 56.9 

Japan 396 13.7 

Hong Kong 190 6.5 

Netherlands 131 4.5 

United Kingdom 103 3.5 

Other 432 14.9 

TOTAL 2,901 100.0 

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of the Philippines, unpublished data. 



312 



Appendix 



Table 16. External Debt, 1982-90 









Ratio of 






Outstanding 


Debt 


Debt to 


Ratio of Debt 


Year 


Debt 1 


Service 1 


GNP 2 


Service to Exports 3 


1982 


24.54 


3.50 


62.5 


42.5 






3.02 


71.5 


36.3 


1984 


24.38 


2.30 


77.2 


33.4 


1985 


26.92 


2.57 


83.5 


32.0 


1986 


28.37 


3.04 


94.1 


34.5 


1987 


30.03 


3.61 


87.8 


38.5 


1988 


29.16 


3.48 


74.8 


31.5 


1989 


28.92 


3.38 


65.2 


26.3 


1990 


26.97 4 


2.35 


57.9 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 In billions of United States dollars. 

2 In percentages; GNP — gross national product. 

3 In percentages. 

4 As of June. 



Table 17. Official Development Assistance by Source and 
Country, 1952-72 and 1978-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



T yp e 



Source and Country 


Grants 


Loans 


Total 


1952-72 








Bilateral 










541 


50 


591 




8 


78 


86 


Other 


14 


11 


25 




563 


139 


702 




59 


343 


402 


TOTAL 


622 


482 


1,104 


1978-88 








Bilateral 










1,439 


361 


1,800 


Japan 


449 


3,070 


3,519 


Other 


448 


590 


1,038 




2,336 


4,021 


6,357 




292 


6,497 


6,789 


TOTAL 


2,628 


10,518 


13,146 


* Includes US$48 million from the Asia, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations. 



Source: Based on information from Mila Bulan, "A Study of Official Development As- 
sistance to the Philippines FY 1952-72," Philippine Economic Journal [Manila], 8, 
No. 3, 1974, 267; Rigoberto Tiglao, "Manna for Manila," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 151, No. 10, March 7, 1991, 53; and Central Bank of the 
Philippines, unpublished data. 



313 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 18. Official Development Assistance by Source and 
Type, Selected Years, 1952-90 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Source Type 



Year Bilateral Multilateral Grants Loans Total 



1952-61 238 28 228 38 266 

1962-72 464 374 394 444 838 

1978-85 3,060 4,930 1,169 6,821 7,990 

1988 1,385 955 416 1,924 2,340 

1989 1,445 1,389 745 2,089 2,834 

1990 1,360 1,334 444 2,250 2,694 



Source: Based on information from Mila Bulan, "A Study of Official Development As- 
sistance to the Philippines FY 1952-72," Philippine Economic Journal [Manila], 8, 
No. 3, 1974, 267; Rigoberto Tiglao, "Manna for Manila," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], 151, No. 10, March 7, 1991, 53; and Central Bank of the 
Philippines, unpublished data. 



Table 19. Major Army Equipment, 1990 



In 

Type and Description Country of Origin Inventory 



Tank 



Scorpion (light) with 76mm gun 


Britain 


41 


Armored personnel carriers 






M-113 


United States 


100 




Portugal 


20 




United States 


165 


Armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) 


-do- 


85 


Howitzers 






105mm M-101 towed 


-do- 


n.a. 


105mm M-102 


-do- 


n.a. 


105mm M-26 


Spain 


n.a. 




Italy 


n.a. 


Total 105mm 




230 




Israel 


n.a. 


155mm M-114 


United States 


n.a. 






12 


Mortars 






81mm M-29 


-do- 


n.a. 


107mm M-30 


-do- 


40 


Recoilless launchers 






75mm M-20 


-do- 


n.a. 


90mm M-67 


-do- 


n.a. 


106mm M-40A1 


-do- 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, 1990, 174-75; 
Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1990-91, London, 1990; and Jane's Armour and Artillery, 
1990-91, London, 1990. 



314 



Appendix 



Table 20. Major Naval Equipment, 1990 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Navy 
Frigates 

Cannon class United States 1 

Casco class -do- 2 

Corvettes 

Auk class -do- 2 

PCE-827 class -do- 7 

Admirable class -do- 2 

Patrol craft 

PC-461 class -do- 2 

Kagitingan class Germany 4 

PGM-39/71 class United States 4 

Patrol craft-fast (PCF) Various 41 1 

Amphibious ships and craft 

Landing ship, tank (LST-511 class) United States 11 

Landing ship, medium (LSM) -do- 2 

Landing craft, utility (LCU) -do- 9 

Landing craft, medium (LCM) -do- 60 

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel 

(LCVP) -do- 6 

Naval Aviation 

Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2B Islander 

(patrol and search and rescue) Britain 12 

MBB BO-105C utility helicopters (search 

and rescue) 2 Philippines 10 

Marines 

Armored vehicles 

Armored personnel carrier, V-150 United States 18 

Armored personnel carrier, LAV-25 3 -do- 36 

Landing vehicle, LVTP-5 -do- 18 

Landing vehicle, LVTH-6 (105mm 

howitzer) -do- 20 

Landing vehicle, LVTP-7 -do- 55 

Artillery 

M-101 105mm, towed -do- 150 

Mortars 

M-30 107mm -do- n.a. 

M-29 81mm -do- n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

1 Thirty-five on order. 

2 Produced under license agreement with Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blom, Germany. 

3 The marines were scheduled to acquire thirty-six additional LAV-25s and as many as thirty LVTP-7s. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, 1990, 174-75; 

"The Modernisation of the Philippine Navy," International Defence Review, 23, Janu- 
ary 1990, 88; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1990-91, London, 1990. 



315 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Table 21. Major Air Force Equipment, 1990 



1 ypc and Description 


Country 01 Origin 


in 

Inventory 


rignter aircraft 








United States 


7 1 


Counterinsurgency aircraft 








-do- 


Q 

o 


Search and rescue/reconnaissance aircraft 








N etherlands 







United States 


Q 
J 




-ao- 


A 

'x 


Transport and utility aircraft 






T nrl/ViPP^ — 1 QATJ T-T<»rv-Mil#»c 


An 

Q0 


<2 
J 


T J T 1 An on U .-„l-c 


-do- 


Q 
J 




Netherlands 


Q 
O 




— oo— 


1 
1 


P\^v..^r-lr.cT O A7 


United States 


•J 
J 


N-99R NnmaH 


Australia 


q 




Britain 




r^^oo-.^. 1 on. 


United States 





P„„„„ „ O t A 


An 

-oo- 


o 




-do- 


i 
i 


ni-rr;-9 


Oanada 


5 


TT-1 7 A/R 


n.a. 




Trainer aircraft 








• 

United States 


o 




— oo— 


Q 
O 




An 

— oo— 


90 


<sT A.l-\Aarr-hf>tt\ <sF_9fiOA/T P/WP 


Italy 


93 


CT A T IV /f C Q1 1 


— do— 




Helicopters 






Bell UH-1H/M Iroquois (counterinsurgency) 


• 

United States 


3D 


T) „11 TTTJ 1 T_T T« ' 


-do- 


1 7 


Bell 205 


-do- 


15 


Sikorsky AUH-76 (S-76 attack version) 


-do- 


16 


McDonnell Douglas MD-520 (attack) 


-do- 


2 


Sikorsky S-70A 


-do- 


2 


Bell 212 


-do- 


1 


PADC MBB BO-105C (search and rescue) 2 . . 


Philippines 


10 


SA-330 Pumal 


France 3 


2 


Air-to-air missiles 






AIM-9B Sidewinder 


United States 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Assigned to presidential airlift wing. 

2 Produced under license from Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blom, Germany. 

3 Principally built in France, but also produced in Romania and Indonesia. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1990-1991, London, 174-75; and 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1989-90, London, 1989. 



316 



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353 



Philippines: A Country Study 



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359 



Glossary 



barangay — Malay term for boat; also came to be used for the com- 
munal settlements established by migrants who came from the 
Indonesian archipelago and elsewhere. The term replaces the 
word barrio, formerly used to identify the lowest political sub- 
division in the Philippines. 

Brady Plan — A plan proposed by United States Treasury secre- 
tary Nicholas Brady for lending by the International Mone- 
tary Fund (q. v.), World Bank (q. v.), and creditor governments 
to finance debtor country purchase of their foreign-currency 
debt at the discounted prices at which the debt instruments were 
trading in secondary markets. 

colorums — Folk Christian religious communities derived from the 
1839-41 Cofradfade San Jose movement, which spread through 
the islands thereafter and were the focus of resistance to Ameri- 
can rule in the early twentieth century. Term derived from the 
phrase per omnia saecula saeculorum (world without end), which 
Roman Catholic priests used to close their Latin prayers. 

Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) — An internation- 
al organization of communist parties, founded and controlled 
by the Soviet Union in 1947 and dissolved in 1956. The Comin- 
form published propaganda touting international communist 
solidarity but was primarily a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 

crony — A term used to describe an individual who was able to ex- 
ploit connections with former President Marcos to gain wealth 
and economic position. 

current account — Exports and imports of goods and services, net 
factor income from abroad, and unilateral transfers (gifts and 
foreign aid). 

EDSA Revolution — The February 1986 uprising, also called Peo- 
ple's Power (q.v.), that ousted President Ferdinard E. Mar- 
cos. EDSA stands for Epifanio de los Santos, a ring road around 
Manila that was the site of confrontation between pro- Marcos 
and anti-Marcos forces. 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) — A wide belt of sea and seabed ad- 
jacent to the national boundaries where the state claims preferen- 
tial fishing rights and control over the exploitation of mineral 
and other natural resources. Boundary disagreements with neigh- 
boring states sometimes prevent the extension of the EEZ to the 
full limits claimed. The Philippines claims a 200-nautical mile 
EEZ, now considered the international standard. 



361 



Philippines: A Country Study 



fiscal year (FY) — Calendar year. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and investment are included because the 
values of primary and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the 
result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deduc- 
tions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. 
See also gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (q. v. ) plus 
the net income or loss stemming from transactions with for- 
eign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the out- 
put of goods and services of an economy. It can be calculated 
at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. 
Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, 
GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes 
and subsidies. 

Huks, or Huk — Short form of Hukbalahap, itself the abbreviated 
form of the Tagalog name for the guerrilla force established 
in 1942, known as the People's Anti-Japanese Army (Hukbong 
Bayan Laban sa Hapon). In 1946 renamed the People's Liber- 
ation Army (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan). 

ilustrados — Literally, enlightened ones, the Philippine elite during 
the Spanish colonial period. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange loans to its members (including in- 
dustrialized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- 
ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

liberation theology — An activist movement led by Roman Catholic 
clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II 
(1963-65), where some church views were liberalized, and the 
Second Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellm, 
Colombia (1968), which endorsed greater direct efforts to im- 
prove the lot of the poor. Advocates of liberation theology have 
introduced a radical interpretation of the Bible, one that em- 
ploys Marxist terminology to analyze and condemn the wide 
disparities between the wealthy elite and the impoverished 



362 



Glossary 



masses in most underdeveloped countries. This reflection often 
leads advocates to organize to improve living standards through 
cooperatives and civic improvement projects. 

mestizos — The offspring of Filipino and non-Filipino marriages; 
includes those of Spanish-Filipino parentage (Spanish mesti- 
zos) and Chinese-Filipino parentage (Chinese mestizos). 

Metro Manila — Metropolitan Manila; also called the National Cap- 
ital Region. Includes the cities of Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, 
and Quezon City and several other major population centers. 

Moro — Spanish word for Moor; name given by Spanish to Mus- 
lim Filipinos and still used. Moros mosdy inhabit southern and 
eastern Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan and 
have not become assimilated into the mainstream of Philip- 
pine society. 

net domestic product/net national product (NDP/NNP) — Gross na- 
tional product (q. v.) or gross domestic product (q. v.) less capi- 
tal consumption allowance and indirect taxes or subsidies. 

People's Power — The popular uprising that ousted President Fer- 
dinard E. Marcos in February 1986. The movement was best 
known as People's Power in the United States, but in the Philip- 
pines it was also referred to as the EDS A Revolution (q.v.). 

peso (P) — Philippine currency, which is subdivided into 100 cen- 
tavos. In December 1991, the official exchange rate was US$1 
equals P26.70. 

structural adjustment loan — A program loan, often by the World 
Bank (q.v.), to effect a structural adjustment program to liber- 
alize an economy, involving maintaining a flexible exchange 
rate, lowering tariffs, removing quantitative restrictions on in- 
ternational trade, and relaxing price and other market controls. 

Sunni (from sunna, Arabic for orthodox A member of the larger 

of the two great divisions of Islam. 

Tagalog — Large ethnolinguistic group indigenous to central and 
southern Luzon, particularly around Manila. The Tagalog lan- 
guage is the basis for Pilipino, the national language of the 
Philippines. 

terms of trade — The average price of exports divided by the aver- 
age price of imports; the quantity of imports that can be pur- 
chased per unit of exports. 

value added — Price of output less purchased inputs; valuation of 
contribution by enterprise to the product; sum of wages, in- 
terest, rent, and profit. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 



363 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



364 



Index 



abaca, 9; export of, 10, 120 
abortion, 226 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 113, 114, 234 
AFP. See Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Aglipay, Gregorio, 37, 102 
Agrarian Commission, 46 
agrarian reform, 46, 149-51; in economic 

plans, 129; lack of, 231 
Agrava, Corazon, 57 
agribusiness, 178 

agricultural: geography, 135-36; markets, 
136-38 

agricultural production, xxxi, 136-39; fer- 
tilizer consumption for, 139; value add- 
ed in, 136, 139 

agricultural products, 54; abaca, 9, 10, 
120; bananas, 120, 136, 179; coconuts, 
120, 136, 140, 143; corn, 8, 120, 136; 
export of, 9, 10, 120, 139; indigo, 9; 
mulberry trees, 9; opium poppies, 9; 
peppers, 9; pineapples, 120, 136, 147, 
178, 179; rice, 84, 120, 136, 138, 
139-40, 147; silk, 9; sugar, 9, 10, 11, 
20, 54, 120, 136, 143-47; tea, 9; tobac- 
co, 10 

agriculture: under Aquino, 138; credit 
for, 138; employment in, 166-68; for- 
eign exchange from, 120; land used for, 
135; under Marcos, 138; under mar- 
tial law, 123, 146; multicropping, 136; 
as percentage of gross national product, 
119; slash-and-burn, 152; value added 
in, 139; work force in, 119, 136, 166 

Aguinaldo, Emilio, 21, 22, 102; allegiance 
of, to United States, 27; captured, 27; 
exiled, 22; inaugurated, 25; negotia- 
tions of, with United States, 22-23 

Aguinaldo administration: armed forces 
under, 245; accomplishments of, 25; 
exile of, 26; reaction of, to United 
States rule, 26 

Agusan River, 69 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force, 168-69; aircraft, 269; bases, 
268; chain of command, 268; materiel, 



269; mission of, 268; plans to moder- 
nize, 260; strength of, 256, 269 
Air Force Flying School, 268 
Air Force Security Command, 268 
Alejandrino, Casto, 45 
Alsa Masa (Masses Arise), 228, 229, 272 
Americans: as Filipinos, 76; as land- 
owners, 34; targeted by New People's 
Army, 288-89 
Amnesty International, 229 
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 204 
Apportionment Ordinance (1987), 208 
Aquino, Benigno, 51; arrested, 52; assas- 
sinated, xxviii, 3, 57-58, 124, 206, 214, 
247; background of, 56, 214; jail term 
of, 45-47; medical treatment of, xxvii, 
57; political activities of, 221; released 
from jail, xxvii, 56 
Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco, xxiii, 3, 56, 
61; American opinion of, 233; assump- 
tion of presidency by, xxiv, xxviii, 4, 
243; background of, 214; coalition of, 
225; election campaign of, 61, 124; eth- 
nicity of, 87; political affiliation of, 
221-22; religious faith of, 226; state 
visits of, 236, 237, 238 
Aquino administration, 124-28, 215; 
achievements of, 191; agriculture un- 
der, 138; armed forces under, 216-17; 
borrowing under, 130, 134; budget 
deficit under, 130; cabinet of, 125, 215; 
as coalition, 215-16; communist col- 
laboration with, 227, 283; and Con- 
gress, 127-28; construction under, 127; 
coup attempts against, xxix, 126, 134, 
192, 216, 217, 218, 230, 233, 244, 
250-52, 257; criticism of, 192, 216, 
283; debt under, 125, 129, 183-84; eco- 
nomic growth under, 119, 126; eco- 
nomic plan of, 127; foreign aid under, 
184; foreign policy under, 125, 129, 
236; goals of, xxiv, xxx; human rights 
under, 253-54; insurgency under, 254; 
investment under, 126, 127; labor un- 
der, 168, 170; land reform under, 
125-26, 129, 148-49, 217; local gov- 
ernment under, 207; military under, 
216-17, 244; reforestation under, 



365 



Philippines: A Country Study 



152-53; rural areas under, 138; tax re- 
form under, 131; trade policy under, 
176-77 

armed forces {see also military): and 
Corazon Aquino, 216-17; assassination 
of Benigno Aquino by, 3; attempts to 
reform, 60; auxiliaries, 271-72; 
benefits, 273; commands, 262-63; eth- 
nic groups in, 257; factions in, 227-28; 
improvements in, 47; inequity in, 258; 
insignia, 272; justice system, 205; lan- 
guages in, 257; mandatory service in, 
256; under Marcos, xxvii, 246-47; 
materiel shortages in, 260; mutinies by, 
247-48, 250; organization of, 261-72; 
origins of, 245; overseas deployment of, 
261; patron-client ties in, 258; personal 
loyalties in, 258; personnel, 256-58; 
Philippine Constabulary as part of, 47; 
political role of, 249-52; politicization 
of, 192, 246; ranks, 272; recruitment, 
256-58; reserves, 271-72; salaries, 
272-73; strength of, 256; structure of, 
260-77; as threat to communist insur- 
gency, 244-45; training of, 261-72; 
uniforms, 272 

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
{see also armed forces; military): an- 
tigovernment forces in, 257-58; bud- 
get, 247; civic- action operations, 247, 
252; counterinsurgency efforts of, 279; 
criminal justice activities of, 247; plans 
to modernize, 260; reorganization of, 
260-61; role of, in economy, 247; role 
of, in politics, 54-55, 244 

Arm-in- Arm. See Kabisig 

army, 265-66; artillery battalions, 266; 
construction battalion, 266; established, 
246; light armored brigade, 266; light 
infantry divisions, 265; materiel, 266; 
organization of, 265; strength of, 256, 
265; support units, 266; training, 266 

Arroyo, Joker, 217 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asi- 
an Nations 

Asian Development Bank, 232; aid from, 
184; loans from, 179, 182 

Asset Privatization Trust, 136, 155-56 

Association for an Offensive for Our Fu- 
ture Freedom. See Tangulang 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), 50, 232, 235, 260, 277 

Association of the Worthy Kabola, 37 



Ateneo de Manila University, 94 
attorneys, 204 

Augustinians {see also friars), 6, 99; pow- 
er of, 12 

Australia: exports to, 11; materiel from, 

269; military training in, 277 
Austria-Tiamzon, Wilma, 284 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Minda- 
nao, xxix, 84, 211, 231, 293; capital of, 
211 

Aviation Security Command, 268 



Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAY AN). 

See New Nationalist Alliance 
balance of payments: problems, 121, 154; 

targets, 180 
balance of trade, 175 
Balikatan, 273 
Balweg, Father Conrado, 59 
bananas: as foreign exchange earners, 

120, 136; production of, 179 
Bangsa Moro Army, 291 
Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, 

292 

banking system: crisis in, 160; failures in, 
160-61; regulation of, 160 

banks, commercial, 158; activities of, 133, 
160; concentration in, 161; earnings of, 
161; interest rates offered by, 134; loans 
by, 160, 181, 182; as oligopolies, 161 

banks: government, 158; offshore, 158, 
160; thrift and rural, 158 

banks, international, 158; loans from, 
123, 179 

Bantay Bayan (Nation Watch), 229, 272 

barangays: communist insurgency in, 93; 
structure of, 91, 207 

Barclays Bank of Britain, 181 

Barracudas, 83 

Basco y Vargas, Jose, 9 

Base Conversion Development Authori- 
ty, xxxii 

Basic Christian Communities, 287 
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, xxxi, 158, 
181 

Bataan Peninsula, 237 

Bates, John C, 27 

Battle of Mendiola, 51 

BAYAN. See New Nationalist Alliance 

Belgium: military training in, 277 

Bell Act. See Philippine Trade Act 



366 



Index 



Beltran, Crispin, 170 

Benedicto, Roberto, 54, 146 

B.F. Goodrich, 178 

Bicolano language, 77 

Bicolano people, 80 

Blackshirts, 83 

Blumentritt, Ferdinand, 18 

Board of Investments (BOI), 129, 154 

BOI. See Board of Investments 

Bonifacio, Andres, 20, 21; executed, 21 

borrowing: under Aquino, 130, 134; by 
Development Bank of the Philippines, 
133; for economic development, 179; 
under Marcos, 130, 133 

Brady Plan, 182 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 238 

Britain: materiel from, 269; military 
training in, 277; in Spanish-American 
War, 23; trade with, 10, 11 

British East India Company, 8 

British occupation, 8; Chinese support 
for, 9 

Brocka, Lino, 196 

budget deficit, xxxi, 126; under Aquino, 

130; under Marcos, 130 
bureaucracy. See civil service 
Bureau for Non-Christian Tribes, 83 
Bureau of Customs, 201 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 201 
Bureau of Land Transportation, 162 
Bureau of Prisons, 299-300 
Burgos, Jose, 16, 17 
Buscayno, Bernabe, 282 



cabinet, 201 

CAFGUs. See Citizens Armed Forces 

Geographic Units 
Cagayan de Oro port, 162 
Camp Aguinaldo, 262 
Campus Crusade for Christ, 104 
Capital Command, 270, 296 
capital flows, 59 

Catholic Church. See Roman Catholic 
Church 

Cagayan River, 69 

Carter, Jimmy, 56, 186 

Castle and Cooke, 178 

Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philip- 
pines, 226 

Cebuano language, 77 

Cebuano people, 80 



Cebu port, 10, 162 

censorship: abolished, 16 

Central Bank of the Philippines, 125, 158, 
166, 182; established, 132; loans from, 
124, 133; reserve requirements of, 134; 
role of, 132-33, 160 

Central Luzon: literacy rate in, 109 

Central Philippine University, 104 

Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 201 

Cheney, Richard, 233 

China, People's Republic of: aid by, to 
New People's Army, 237; Aquino's 
visit to, 238; relations with, 232, 
237-38; support by, for Communist 
Party of the Philippines, 290 

Chinese, 11-12, 86-87; expulsion orders 
against, 11; as Filipinos, 76; geographi- 
cal distribution of, 11; immigration of, 
11, 86; intermarriage by, 86-87; as per- 
centage of population, 86; population, 
35; respect for, 8, 11; under Spanish 
rule, 8; support by, for British, 9; sus- 
picion of, 8, 11; wealth of, 12 

Chinese mestizos, xxv, 11-12, 86-87; ex- 
pulsion edicts against, 12; geographi- 
cal distribution of, 12; as moneylenders, 
13; as percent of population, 11-12; 
schools of, 87; wealth of, 12 

Chop-Chop. See Tadtad 

Christianity (see also under individual sects): 
conversion to, 5-6 

Christian-Moro conflict, xxvi, 50, 136, 
291 

Christians for National Liberation, 226 

Christians: as threat to Moros, 34; as per- 
centage of population, 80 

Christians for National Liberation, 287 

church-state relations, 59, 100, 107-8, 
226-27; under Spanish rule, 6 

church-state separation, 197 

CIDF. See Coconut Industry Develop- 
ment Fund 

cities, 207 

Citizen Military Training, 257, 263 
Citizens Armed Forces Geographic Units 

(CAFGUs) {see also Civilian Home 

Defense Force), 255, 271 
Civilian Home Defense Force {see also 

Citizens Armed Forces Geographic 

Units), 255, 271; corruption in, 252; 

disbanded, 261 
civil-military relations, 227-29 
civil service: corruption in, 201; in 



367 



Philippines: A Country Study 



economic plans, 129; Filipinization of, 
32, 33; organized, 28; size of, 201 

Civil Service Commission, 201 

civil war, 21-22 

Clark Air Base, xxiii, xxix, 44, 48, 185, 
234, 276 

climate, 69-70, 136; drought, 70; mon- 
soons, 69; rainfall, 69; temperature, 69; 
typhoons, 69, 70 

Clomas, Tomas, 236 

Cluster for Political and Security Affairs 
(Cluster E), 262 

coast guard, 267-68 

Coates, Austin, 16 

Cocofed. See Coconut Producers Fed- 
eration 

coconut: farms, 147; industry, 140-43; 

mills, 140; products, 140 
Coconut Industry Development Fund 

(CIDF), 140 
Coconut Producers Federation (Cocofed), 

140-42 

coconuts, 120; area planted in, 136; ex- 
ports of, 140; prices for, 143 
cofradia. See Cofradia de San Jose 
Cofradia de San Jose, 36; banned, 14; 
characteristics of, 14; revolt (1839-41), 
14; started 14 
COIN. See counterinsurgency campaign 
Cojuangco, Eduardo, xxx, xxxi, 54, 143, 
220 

Cojuangco, Jose, 221, 231 

collaboration with Japanese: amnesty for, 
42-43; punishment of, 41-42 

color urns, 15, 36; revolts by, 37 

COMELEC. See Commission on Elec- 
tions 

Cominform, 46 

Command and General Staff College, 263 
Commander Dante. See Buscayno, Ber- 
nabe 

Commission for National Integration, 83 

Commission on Appointments, 199, 222 

Commission on Audit, 197 

Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 
61, 197; citizens' arm of, 223; duties 
of, 222-23; members of, 222 

Commission on Good Government, 197, 
230 

Commission on Human Rights, 197, 217, 
227, 253; established, 231; powers of, 
231-32 

Commonwealth Constitution (1935). See 



constitution of 1935 
Commonwealth of the Philippines, 194; 

established, 4, 33 
communication systems: as unifying 

force, 77, 94 
communist insurgency, 55, 193, 243, 278, 

279, 280-90; development of, 281-82; 

donations to, 244; influence of, 283; in 

rural areas, 92; setbacks for, 243-44, 

282; support for, 283; threats to, 

244-45 

Communist Party of the Philippines 
(PKP), 38, 231, 238, 243, 280-81; 
schism in, 280; support of, for Huk re- 
bellion, 46 

Communist Party of the Philippines- 
Marxist-Leninist (CPP), xxvi, 50, 279, 
280-81; Central Committee of, 283-84; 
Chinese support for, 290; drug traffick- 
ing by, 290; Executive Committee of, 
824; Finance Commission, 284; financ- 
ing, 289-90; foreign support, 289-90; 
front groups, 285-87; ideology of, 281; 
leadership of, 283-85; Manila-Rizal 
Commission, 285; Maoist program of, 
280-81; Middle Forces Department, 
284; Military Commission, 284; Na- 
tional Democratic Front, 285-87; Na- 
tional Organization Commission, 
284-85; National United Front Com- 
mission, 284, 285; National Urban 
Center Commission, 285; number 
of personnel, 281; opposition of, to 
constitution, 198; organization of, 
281, 283-85; outlawed, 280; Politi- 
cal Bureau of, 284; political organizing 
groups, 284-87; purges in, 283; revo- 
lutionary taxes, 289-90; strategies of, 
281 

communists: coercion by, 223-24; role of, 
in anti-Marcos demonstrations, 59-60; 
support for, 282; treaty of, with Aqui- 
no, 227 

compadrazgo, 88 

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 
(1988), 149-51, 231 

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Pro- 
gram (1987), 149-51, 231; cost of, 150; 
criticisms of, 149-50; implementation 
of, 150; outcomes of, 150-51; provi- 
sions of, 149 

Concepcion, Jose, 59, 223 

Congo, Republic of, 261 



368 



Index 



Congress (see also House of Represen- 
tatives; Senate): and Aquino adminis- 
tration, 127-28; closed by Marcos, 
xxvii 52; corruption in, 212; under 
Marcos, 194; members of, 202; pow- 
ers of, 202 

Congresswatch, 203 

conscription, 256 

Constabulary Security Group, 279 
Constitutional Commission: committees 

in, 196; delegates to, 193-96 
constitutional convention (1971), 51, 194 
constitutional framework, 193-98 
Constitutional Program for the Philippine 

Republic (Mabini), 24 
constitution of 1898-99, 24-25, 193-94 
constitution of 1935, xxvi, 39, 177, 194 
constitution of 1973, 194, 195, 295 
constitution of 1987, xxiv; abortion 
banned by, 226; Church influence on, 
197, 226; divorce in, 98; economic res- 
trictions in, 177; equal rights for wom- 
en in, 98; foreign relations under, 232; 
freedom of expression under, 229, 279; 
government under, 191, 197; human 
rights under, 231; independent com- 
missions in, 197; intelligence under, 
278; military bases under, 197, 276; 
military under, 250; progressive pro- 
visions in, 197; ratification of, 198; 
rights in, 197; voting under, 222-23 
construction, 127 
Consultative Group, 185 
contraception: government attempts to 
provide, 173, 227; opposition to, 173, 
227 

contract workers: characteristics of, 
167-68; number of, 119, 168; remit- 
tances from, 74, 132, 239 

Cordillera Autonomous Region, 211-12 

Cordillera Central, 69; cultural groups 
living in, 85 

Cordillera People's Liberation Army, 211 

Correctional Institution for Women, 300 

correctional system, 299-300 

Corregidor Incident, 50 

corruption, xxiv, 131, 173, 294-95; in 
armed forces, 260; attempts to elimi- 
nate, 213; in civil service, 201; in Con- 
gress, 212; under Marcos, 53, 122; in 
National Food Authority, 138; in 
police, 297 

counterinsurgency campaign (COIN), 



252-56; criticism of, 256; under Mar- 
cos, 252; revised, 254-56; special oper- 
ations, 255 

coup attempts, 192, 216, 230; Aquino's 
reaction to, 217; investigation of, 
251-52; in 1987, xxix, 244, 250-51; in 
1989, xxix, 126, 134, 244, 251, 257; 
reaction to, 192, 233; results of, 218 

courts: local, 204; military, 205; Muslim, 
204; national, 204; overbooked, 205; 
regional, 204; special, 204 

CPP. See Communist Party of the 
Philippines-Marxist-Leninist 

credit, 122 

creditors: commercial banks, 181; Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, 181; Paris 
Club, 181 

crime, 279, 293-95; causes of, 293; clas- 
sification of, 298; rate, 279-80, 293-94 

criminal procedure, 298-99; criminal ac- 
tion, 299; rights of accused, 298-99; tri- 
al procedure, 299 

cronies, xxvii, 53 

crony capitalism, 53-56, 122; mis- 
management under, 124; as tradition- 
al pattern, 127-28 

Cubi Point Naval Air Station, xxxii 

currency: devaluation of, 121, 122, 160, 
175; exchange rate of, 44; tied to the 
dollar, 43 

current account balance, 175, 180 

Custodio, Luther, 57 



Dansalan Junior College, 104 

datu, 85; power of, 82; role of, 83, 106 

Davao port, 162 

Davide Commission, 252, 258 

de Anda, Simon, 8, 9 

Death March, 40 

death penalty, 298 

debt, external, 179-84; amount of, 213; 
under Aquino, 125, 129, 183; creditors, 
123-24; in economic plans, 129; for- 
giveness for, 183; under martial law, 
123-24; in 1970, 119; in 1983, 119; in 
1986, 180-81; in 1990, 184; reduction 
of, 182, 183; renunciation of, 213; 
rescheduling of, 181, 182, 183-84; re- 
structuring of, 182 

debt burden, 179 

debt-equity conversion program, 183; 
criticism of, 183 



369 



Philippines: A Country Study 



debt service, 179; moratorium, 125; pay- 
ments, 126, 184; projected, 184; ratio 
of, to exports, 184; ratio of, to gross na- 
tional product, 184 

defense, external, 248-49 

defense spending, 258-60; in 1980s, 258; 
as percentage of budget, 130-31; as 
percentage of gross national product, 
258; as proportion of government 
spending, 259 

de Izquierdo, Rafael, 17 

de la Cruz, Apolinario, 14 

De La Salle University, 94 

de la Torre, Carlos Maria, 16 

Del Monte Corporation, 178 

del Pilar, Marcelo, 18-19, 20 

democracy, xxvi, 212-13; under Aquino, 
xxiv, xxx; under Marcos, 213; origins 
of, 212 

Democratic Alliance, 45 

de Morga, Antonio, 19 

Deng Xiaoping, 238 

Department of Agrarian Reform, 151 

Department of Education, Culture, and 
Sports, 111 

Department of Interior and Local 
Government, 261, 297 

Department of Justice, 278, 297 

Department of National Defense, 229; in- 
telligence gathering by, 278; roles of, 
262 

Department of Social Welfare and De- 
velopment, 70 

Department of Tourism, 166 

de Tavera, Trinidad H. Pardo, 29; in- 
fluence of, 29 

development, economic, 291; assistance, 
184-85; borrowing for, 179; role of for- 
eign investment in, 177; under Taft 
Commission, 34 

development, industrial, 138; under Mar- 
cos, 154; under Spanish rule, 9 

Development Bank of the Philippines, 
159; bad loans made by, 135; borrow- 
ing by, 133; difficulties in, 160; re- 
habilitation of, 161 

development planning, 128-30 

development plans (see also Medium-Term 
Development Plan): for 1974-77, 128; 
for 1978-82, 128; for 1983-88, 128; for 
1987-92, 128 

de Venecia, Jose, xxxi 

Dewey, George, 22; agreement of, with 



Jaudenes, 23-24; as member of First 

Philippine Commission, 27 
distribution of wealth, xxiv, 36, 172-73 
Division of Investigation, 278 
divorce, 98 
Dole Philippines, 179 
Dominicans (see also friars), 6, 99; power 

of, 12 
drought, 70, 126, 139 
drug abuse, 113, 294 
drug trafficking, 280, 294; by Communist 

Party of the Philippines, 290 



earthquakes, xxiii, 69, 70, 126, 155 
Economic and Social Commission for 

Asia and the Pacific, 232 
economic crisis of 1983, 134 
Economic Development Corps, 48 
economic growth, 96; under Aquino, 119, 

126 

economic plan: of Aquino administration, 
127 

Economic Society of Friends of the Coun- 
try: established, 9; problems in, 9; role 
of, 9 

economic welfare, 171-73 

economy, xxxi; dependence of, on Unit- 
ed States, 43; informal sector of, 91 ; un- 
der Marcos, xxvii, 3, 213; problems in, 
xxiii, 119, 294; reaction of, to coup at- 
tempts, 218 

ecosystem: damage to, 68 

Eder, James, 86 

EDS A Revolution, 58, 212; role of 
churches in, 107 

education, xxiii, xxvi, 108-112; enroll- 
ment, 108, 109; government spending 
on, 130; higher, 108; historical back- 
ground of, 109; languages used in, 111, 
112; in the modern period, 109-112; 
monopoly on, by friars, 13; percentage 
of budget spent on, 109; policies, 112; 
primary, 13-14; by Protestant mis- 
sionaries, 104; quality of, 108, 109; 
regard for, 108; religious, 107, 226- 
27; under Spanish rule, 13-14; sys- 
tem, 111; tuition for, 109; as unifying 
force, 94; vocational, 110; of women, 
96 

elections, xxvi, 32-33, 202, 222-24; coer- 
cion used in, 225-26; under constitution 



370 



Index 



of 1987, 222-23; killings related to, 
xxx, 223, 224; of 1907, 28; of 1916, 33; 
of 1935, 39; of 1949, 46; of 1961, 48; 
of 1981, xxvii; of 1986, 60-61; of 1987, 
202; of 1988, 224; of 1992, xxx; per- 
sonal alliance systems in, 224; problems 
in, 222; snap, xxviii, 60-61, 215, 222; 
suspended, 225; system of, 222 

electoral tribunals, 223 

El Filibusterismo (The Reign of Greed), 18 

elite, business, 59, 173 

elite class, 4, 45; Chinese members of, 12; 
collaboration by, with Japanese, 42; 
composition of, 90-91; lifestyles of, 
90-91; role of, in political system, 53 

elite families: in early twentieth century, 
67; under Marcos, 67; as newspaper 
owners, 230 

elite, political, xxv, 191; landowners as, 
121 

employment (see also work force), 166-68; 

in agriculture, 166; of squatters, 95 
energy programs: under martial law, 53 
energy resources: coal, 157; geothermal, 

157; hydroelectric, 157; nuclear, 158; 

oil, 157; solar, 157 
English language: broadcasts in, 165; 

competence in, 80; in education, 80, 

111, 112; government emphasis on, 

75-76; as lingua franca, 77, 81; role of, 

77-80 

Enrile, Juan Ponce, xxvii, 51, 60, 62, 
143, 198, 206; under Aquino, 249; dis- 
missed, 250; as leader of military rebel- 
lion, xxviii, 244, 247; opposition of, to 
Aquino, 202-3, 216; opposition of, to 
Marcos, 220; reform of armed forces 
by, 250 

Entrencherado, Florencio, 37 

entrepot trade, 8 

Estanislao, Jesus, 127, 177, 186-87 

Estrada, Joseph, 219 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 68; cleavages among, 76-77; in 
early history, 4; geographical distribu- 
tion of, 79-80, 83, 84, 85; in military, 
257 

exchange rate: overvaluation of, 175; tied 

to dollar, 121, 174 
exclusive economic zone, 153 
Executive Order 413 (1990), 177 
export: growth, xxxi; taxes, 138; process- 
ing zones, 176 



Export Incentives Act (1970), 129 
exports: agricultural, 9, 10, 120, 139, 140, 
143-44; to Australia, 11; of fish, 176; 
to Hong Kong, 151; to Japan, 152, 
174, 179; livestock, 151; log, 152; un- 
der martial law, 123; mineral, 120; 
nontraditional, 176; as percentage of 
gross national product, 174; ratio of, to 
debt service, 184; seafood, 176; sugar, 
11, 144; tourism as, 166; to United 
States, 34-35, 144-46, 173-74; value 
added to, 176; volume of, 10 



family planning. See population growth 
famine, 172 

farmers, 94; living in poverty, 171 
farming: of corn, 8; of rice, 8; subsistence, 
93 

farms: number of, 36; size of, 147 
Federalista Party, 29 
Federation of Free Workers, 170 
Feleo, Juan, 45 
Fernandez, Jose, 134 
Ferrer, Jaime, 229 
fiesta, 101 
Filipino Party, 220 

Filipinos: assimilation among, 76; reac- 
tion of, to Treaty of Paris, 25 

financial scandal of 1981, 124, 134 

financial system, 158 

fiscal policy, 130-32; under Marcos, 130 

fish: as diet staple, 120; export of, 176 

fishing, 153-54; aquaculture, 153; com- 
mercial, 153; environmental damage 
from, 154; municipal, 153; production, 
153; subsistence, 153; workers living in 
poverty, 171; work force in, 136 

flora, 69 

foreign affairs, 232-39 

foreign aid: increase in, under Aquino, 
184; from Japan, 184; from United 
States, 121, 184 

foreign exchange: from agriculture, 120; 
from contract worker remittances, 74, 
168; controls, 121, 154, 174; reaction 
of, to coup attempts, 218 

foreign military relations, 273-77 

foreign ownership, 177-78 

foreign policy, 232-39; under Aquino, 
125, 129; in economic plans, 129; un- 
der Macapagal, 49 



371 



Philippines: A Country Study 



foreign relations, 193 

forest reserves, 120; deforestation, 152, 

153; reforestation, 152-53 
forestry, 151-53; land area devoted to, 

151; workers living in poverty, 171; 

work force in, 136 
France: in Spanish- American War, 23 
Franciscans (see also friars), 6, 99; power 

of, 12 

Fray Botod (Brother Fatso), 18 
Freedom Constitution. See constitution of 
1987 

Freedom from Debt Coalition, 180, 
213-14 

frialocracia. See friarocracy 

friarocracy, xxiv-xxv, 12-15; power of, 
12; racism by, 14; role of, 12-13 

friars (see also under individual orders), xxiv- 
xxv, 6, 16, 99; extravagant lifestyles of, 
13; as landholders, 13, 29; monopoly 
of, on education, 13; under United 
States rule, 29 



Galman, Rolando, 57 
gangs, 293 

Garcia, Carlos P., 48, 246 

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), 55, 232 

General Banking Act (1948), 159, 177 

General Headquarters, 262 

Germany: military training in, 277; in 
Spanish-American War, 23 

GNP. See gross national product 

Gomez, Mariano, 17 

Gonzales, Neptali, xxxi, 195, 221 

Goodyear Tire Corporation, 178 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 238 

government, local, 206-12; under Aqui- 
no, 207; autonomy of, 208-12; under 
Marcos, 206-7; organization of, 207-8; 
powers of, 206; reorganization of, 207; 
revenue sources for, 208 

government, national, 198-206; executive 
department, 199-201; factions in, 216; 
judicial department, 203-6; legislative 
department, 201-3; negotiations of, 
with Moro insurgents, 291, 292; sepa- 
ration of powers in, 198 



government budget: defense as percent- 
age of, 130-31; education as percentage 
of, 107-8 

government spending: apportionment of, 
130-31; defense spending as proportion 
of, 259; on education, 130; on land re- 
form, 150; as percentage of gross na- 
tional product, 130 

government structure, 193 

governors, 207 

Grand Alliance for Democracy, 219 
gross national product (GNP), xxvii; 
agriculture as percentage of, 119; bud- 
get deficit as percentage of, 131 ; defense 
spending as percentage of, 258; domes- 
tic savings as percentage of, 132; ex- 
ports as percentage of, 174; government 
spending as percentage of, 130; growth 
rate of, xxiii, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 
126, 129; imports as percentage of, 174; 
industry as percentage of, 119; land re- 
form as percentage of, 150; manufac- 
turing as percentage of, 1 19-20; mining 
as percentage of, 155; per capita, 119, 
171; produced in Metro Manila, 94; ra- 
tio of debt service to, 184; ratio of 
money supply to, 133; rice as percent- 
age of, 139; service sector as percent- 
age of, 120; tax revenue as percentage 
of, 130 

Guerrero, Amado. See Sison, Jose Maria 
Guerrero of Jesus, 228 



Hacienda Luisita, 150 
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Independence Bill, 
38-39 

Harrison, Francis Burton, 32 

health care, xxiv, xxvi; facilities, condi- 
tions in, 112-13; immunizations, 113; 
modern, 114; by Protestant mission- 
aries, 104; psychic surgery, 114-15; 
traditional, 114 

health problems, 114, 115 

Hiligaynon language, 77 

Hirohito (emperor), 237 

Home Defense Program, 252 

Honasan, Gregorio, 218, 227, 249; coup 
attempt led by, 250-52 

Hong Kong: exports to, 151; investment 
by, 178; migration to, 74 

Hoover, Herbert, 38 



372 



Index 



House of Representatives, 201; members 

of, 202 
Hukbalahap. See Huks 
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan. See 

Huks 

Huk rebellion, 45-47, 246, 280; com- 
munist support for, 46; decline of, 47, 
48 

Huks (see also Huk rebellion), 41 ; MacAr- 
thur's reaction to, 45; outlawed, 46; 
resistance by, to Japanese, 41; Roxas's 
policy toward, 46 

human rights, xxiv, 56; groups, 229 

hydroelectric power, 69 

Ickes, Harold, 41 

Iglesia Filipina Independiente (Indepen- 
dent Philippine Church), 37, 102; ori- 
gins of, 100, 102; schism in, 102 

Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ), 
102-3; authoritarianism of, 103; origins 
of, 102-3 

Ilagas (Rats), 83 

Ileto, Rafael, 216 

Ilocano language, 77 

Ilocano people, 80; in armed forces, 257; 
migration of, 80 

Iloilo port, 10, 11, 162 

Ilongo people, 80 

ilustrados, xxv, 12, 29 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

imports, xxxi; composition of, 175; con- 
trols on, 121, 154, 174, 176-77; from 
Japan, 162; of materiel, 260, 266, 269; 
of oil, 120, 239; as percentage of gross 
national product, 174; quotas, 34; of 
rice, 126, 139-40; volume of, 10; from 
United States, 121 

independence: achievement of, 4; call for, 
30; declared (1898), 24; under Jones 
Act, 32; Moro view of, 33; negotiations 
with United States for, 23; transition 
to, 41 

industry, 154-58; capacity of, 126, 154; 
energy, 157-58; growth in, 127; oligop- 
oly in, 155; manufacturing, 154-55; 
mining, 155-57; as percentage of gross 
national product, 119; policies of, 
175-76; work force in, 119 
inflation, xxiii, xxvii, xxxi, 3, 59 
informal sector: characteristics of, 167; 
workers living in poverty, 171; work 



force in, 166-67 

infrastructure: damage to, xxiii, declin- 
ing, 127; in economic plans, 129; im- 
provements in, 47-48, 50, 96 

Inquirer, 230 

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 204 
Integrated National Police, 261, 270-71, 
280, 295-96; criticism of, 297; mission 
of, 296; organization of, 296; person- 
nel of, 296; training, 296-97 
intelligence: activities, 277; agencies, 
277-79 

Intelligence and Security Group, 279 

Intelligence Service, 278-79 

interest rates, 180; attempts to lower, 
183-84; deregulation of, 133, 160; var- 
iation in, 134 

Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 

intermediation margins, 133-34 

international economic relations, 173-87 

International Military Education and 
Training Program, 259 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 59, 
232; conditions imposed by, xxxi, 180, 
182; contravention of agreement with, 
180; emergency loans from, 179; loans 
from, 181; loan disbursements frozen 
by, 131-32; standby credit arrange- 
ment with, 122, 127, 130, 132, 176-77, 
180, 181, 182 

International Rice Research Institute, 139 

Intramuros, 166 

investment: under Aquino, xxiii, 126, 
127; incentive system, 130; under Mar- 
cos, 59, 122-23; projects, 154-55 

investment, foreign, 122-23, 130, 
177-79; by agribusiness, 178; by Hong 
Kong, 178; inflows, 178; by Japan, 
178; by the Netherlands, 178; by Tai- 
wan, 178; by the United States, 178 

Investment Code (1983), 130 

Investment Code (1987), 130 

Investment Incentives Act (1967), 129-30 

irrigation: of rice, 8, 139 

Isabella II (queen), 16 

Islam, 6, 76, 105-6; indigenous elements 
in, 106; introduction of, 5; rituals of, 
105; young reformers in, 106 

Italy: materiel from, 269 



Jalandoni, Luis, 290 
Jamal-ul Kiram II, 27 



373 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Jamiatul Philippine al-Islamia, 106 
Japan: aid from, 235, 237; Aquino's visits 
to, 237; attack by, on Philippines, 

39- 40; exports to, 152, 174, 179; im- 
ports from, 162; investment by, 178, 
237; loan disbursements frozen by, 
131-32; relations with, 232, 237; in 
Spanish- American War, 23; surrender 
to, 40; tourists from, 237; trade with, 
237 

Japanese occupation, 40-41; collabora- 
tion under, 40; deaths under, 41; de- 
struction under, 41; opposition to, 

40- 41; tenant farmers under, 42 
Japanese people, 35 

Jaudenes, Fermfn, 23; agreement of, with 
Dewey, 23-24 

Jesuits, 6, 99; education by, 14 

Jobo bills, 134 

John Hay Air Station, 276 

Johnson, Lyndon, 50 

Joint United States Military Advisory 
Group, 44 

Jones Act (1916), 32-34 

Judicial Bar council, 204 

Judicial Reorganization Act (1981), 204 

judicial system {see also courts): estab- 
lished, 28; influences on, 203 

Juventud Escolar Liberal. See Liberal 
Young Students 

Kabisig (Arm-in-Arm), 221 

Kabola, Pedro, 37 

Kalayaan Islands, 235-36, 248 

Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag. See As- 
sociation of the Worthy Kabola 

Kapatiran Tangulang Malayang Mama- 
mayang. See Tangulang 

kasama system, 35 

kasamas, 35-36 

Katipunan, 20, 39 

Kerkvliet, Benedict, 46 

Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. See New So- 
ciety Movement 

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), 169, 170, 
287; opposition of, to constitution, 198 

Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas. See 
Peasant Movement of the Philippines 

kinship ties, 92 

Kintanar, Romulo, 283, 284, 288 
KMP. See Peasant Movement of the 
Philippines 



Korean war: Philippine troops in, 45, 261 
LABAN, 57, 221 

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino. See 
Struggle of Filipino Democrats 

labor: actions, 170; activists, 170; under 
Aquino, 170; government approach to, 
168; under Marcos, 170 

Labor Advisory and Consultative Coun- 
cil (LACC), 169-70; membership in, 
170 

labor force. See work force 

labor-law reforms, 170 

labor relations, 168-71; under Aquino, 
168; under Marcos, 168; under mar- 
tial law, 168 

labor unions, 168-71; membership of, 
168; number of, 169 

LACC. See Labor Advisory and Consul- 
tative Council 

Laguna de Bay, 69 

La Independencia (Independence), 25 

Lakas Ng Bayan. See LABAN 

Lakas ng Edsa-National Union of Chris- 
tian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD), xxxi 

Lakas Ng Manggagawa Labor Center, 
170 

land: under cultivation, 135; leased or 

sold to Americans, 34 
Land Bank of the Philippines, 159-60 
Lande, Carl, 30 

landowners, 256; absentee, xxvi, 93; as 
oligarchs, 121 

land ownership: concentration of, 147 

land reform, 94, 147-51, 256; under 
Aquino, 125-26, 129, 148-49, 217; 
limited impact of, 147, 217; under 
Marcos, 147; under martial law, 53-54, 
147-48; outcomes of, 148; and popu- 
lation, 73-74 

land tenancy, 35-36, 147-51; homestead- 
ing in, 35; increase in, 36; rebellions 
against, 280, 282; sharecropping in, 35 

language (see also under individual languages:) 
diversity, 77; in military, 257; nation- 
al, 77 

La Solidaridad (Solidarity), 18, 20 

Laurel, Jose P., 40, 41, 42 

Laurel, Salvador H., 58, 61, 215, 219; 
criticism of Aquino by, 192, 216; in 
1986 election, xxviii, 61; opposition of, 
to Marcos, 220 



374 



Index 



Laurel- Langley Agreement, 44; expira- 
tion of, 55 

law enforcement, 295-98 

Laxalt, Paul, 62 

Lee Kwan Yew, 236 

left-wing groups, 59-60 

legal system: codes in, 298; influences on, 
297; penalties in, 298 

Legarda, Benito, 29; influence of, 29 

Legaspi port, 10 

Liberal Party, xxxi, 30, 220; organization 

of, 30-31, 42 
liberal period, 16-17 
Liberal Young Students Quventud Esco- 

lar Liberal), 16 
liberation theology, 287 
Libya: support by, for Moro insurgency, 

291 

Liga Filipina (Philippine League): dis- 
solved, 20; established, 19 
Light Rail Transit system, 165 
Li Peng, 238 

literacy rate, xxiii, 108; in Central Luzon, 
110; in Metro Manila, 109-10; in 
Western Mindanao Region, 108-9; of 
women, 96 

Literary University of the Philippines, 25 

livestock, 151 

loans, concessionary, 184 

Locsin, Teodoro, 217 

logging: exports, 152; illegal, 152; 
licensed, 151-52 

Logistics Command, 263 

Loney, Nicholas, 11, 54 

Lopez, Fernando, 53 

Lopez family, 54 

Lopez de Legazpi, Miguel, xxiv, 5, 99 
Lopez Jaena, Graciano, 18, 20 
lowland Christians, 80-81, 86-87; enslaved 
by Moros, 9; social organization of, 88 
Lugar, Richard, 61 
Luna, Antonio, 25; assassinated, 26 
Lupao Massacre (1987), 232 
Luzon: land area of, 68 
Lynch, Frank, 74 

Mabini, Apolinario, 26; background of, 
24; ideas of, 24 

Macapagal, Diosdado: foreign policy un- 
der, 49; as president, 48, 246 

MacArthur, Douglas, 40, 42 

McKinley, William, 25, 27, 28 

McNutt, Paul, 43 



Mactan International Airport, 162 

Magellan, Ferdinand, 5 

Magsaysay, Ramon: death of, 48; elec- 
tion of, 223; as president, 47-48, 246; 
as secretary of defense, 47 

Maharlika Highway. See Pan-Philippine 
Highway 

Mahathir bin Mohamad, 237 

Makati, 93, 218; seized by mutineers, 251 

Makati Business Club, 203 

Malays: as Filipinos, 76 

Malaysia: dispute with, over Sabah, 50, 
236-37, 248-49; military training in, 
277; relations with 236-37, 248; sup- 
port by, for Moro insurgency, 291 

malnutrition, 114, 171 

Malolos Constitution. See constitution of 
1898-99 

Mamamayan, 254 

Manglapus, Raul, 186, 238 

Manifesto to the Noble Spanish Nation (Bur- 
gos), 16 

Manila {see also Metro Manila): arch- 
bishop of, 16, 59, 226; Chinese popu- 
lation of, 11; as colonial capital, 5; 
growth, 73; population, 73 

Manila Bay, 69 

Manila Bulletin, 230 

Manila City Jail, 300 

Manila International Container Termi- 
nal, 162 

Manila port, 162 

Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 181 

manufacturing, 154-55; branches of, 154; 
geographic distribution of, 155; growth, 
154; under martial law, 123; output, 
154-55; as percentage of gross nation- 
al product, 119-20; work force in, 
119-20, 154, 166 

Mao Zedong, 281 

MAPHILINDO, 49 

Marcos, Ferdinand, xxvi, 3; background 
of, 49; exiled, xxviii; and political par- 
ties, 219; ruling style of, 214-15; wealth 
of, 213 

Marcos, Imelda Romualdez, 3, 49-50, 
51; charges against, 206; as governor 
of Metro Manila, 53; as minister of hu- 
man settlements, 53; as presidential 
candidate, xxiii, xxx 

Marcos administration (1965-86): Con- 
gress closed by, 52, 194; church in- 
volvement in, 226; cronies under, 53; 



375 



Philippines: A Country Study 



democracy damaged by, 213; economy 
under, 3; fiscal policy under, 130, 135; 
industrial development under, 154; 
labor under, 168; land reform under, 
147-48; martial law under, 3, 122; 
military under, 246; New Society of, 
52-53; overthrow of, 62, 282; political 
unrest under, xxvii, 51; powers of, 
194-95; problems under, 3; profligate 
spending by, 122, 181; public works 
projects under, 50; reforestation under, 
152-53; United States support for, 60 
marine corps, 268 

martial law, 4, 52-56; agriculture under, 
123, 146; declared, xxvii, 3, 52, 122; 
economy under, 53, 122; elections sus- 
pended under, 225; ended, 56; energy 
programs under, 53; exports under, 
123; labor under, 168; land reform un- 
der, 53-54, 147-48; manufacturing un- 
der, 123; Moro insurgency under, 291; 
role of public sector under, 123; Roman 
Catholic Church under, 58-59 

materiel: domestically manufactured, 
259, 266; imported, 260, 266, 269; 
shortages of, 260 

Masagana 99 program, 138 

Masses Arise. See Alsa Masa 

May First Movement. See Kilusang Mayo 
Uno 

mayors, 207 

media, xxiv, 229-30 

Medium-Term Development Plan, 
1987-92, 138-39; goals of, 128-29; 
tourism under, 166; transportation un- 
der, 162 

Meliton Martinez, Gregorio, 16, 17 
Mendiola Massacre (1987), 217 
Metro Manila: economic production in, 
94; government of, 207-8; literacy rate 
in, 110; as "primate city," 94; squat- 
ters in, 95; tradition in, 95 
Metropolitan Police Force, 270, 296 
middle class, 91 

Middle East: migrants to, 67, 74, 167-68, 
239; relations with, 232, 239 

migration, 70-74; to Hong Kong, 74; of 
Ilocano people, 80; of Ilongo people, 
80; to Middle East, 74; to Moro areas, 
50-51, 68, 73, 83, 291; to Singapore, 
74; to United States, 74 

migration, urban, 73, 81, 92, 279, 293; 
by health care workers, 112; to Mid- 



dle East, 67; to United States, 67 
military: aid, 259, 260, 276; dissidents, 

279; rebellions, 244; unrest, 251 
Military Assistance Agreement (1947), 44 
Military Assistance Program, 259 
Military Bases Agreement (1945), 44, 
234, 259, 273-76; amendments to, 
xxix, 55, 234, 276; controversy over, 
273-76; reviews of, 276-77 
military training: institutions, 263; pro- 
grams to upgrade, 265; for reserves, 
271; in the United States, 44 
Mindanao: cultural groups on, 85; land 
area of, 68; migration to, 73, 83, 291; 
sultanates on, 76 
Mindanao River, 69 
Mindanao Sea, 69 
Mindoro: cultural groups on, 85 
mineral: deposits, 120, 155; exports, 155; 
fuels, 155 

"mini Marshall Plan." See Multilateral 

Aid Initiative 
mining, 155-57; as percentage of gross 

national product, 155; problems in, 155 
Ministry of Labor and Employment, 168, 

170 

Ministry of Local Government, 206 
Ministry of National Defense, 249 
missionaries, 6 
Misuari, Nur, 239, 291 
Mitra, Ramon, 221 

MNLF. See Moro National Liberation 
Front 

Monetary Board: members of, 132 

monetary policy, 132-35 

money supply: growth of, xxxi, 134-35; 
ratio of, to gross national product, 133 

monopolies, 173; coconut, 54, 143; un- 
der Marcos, xxvii, 122; sugar, 54 

Moro insurgency, 243, 279, 290-93; 
armed forces counterinsurgency, 245; 
casualties in, 291; under martial law, 
291 

Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 292, 293 

Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), xxvi, xxix, 211, 231, 239, 
291; organized, 51; schism in, 292; sup- 
port for, 51 ; treaty of, with Aquino, 227 

Moro National Liberation Front- 
Reformist Movement, 292, 293 

Moros (Muslims) {see also Christian-Moro 
violence), 8, 27, 81-84; in armed for- 
ces, 257; autonomy for, 208; Christians 



376 



Index 



as threat to, 34; conflict among, 82, 
293; geographic distribution of, 82; 
government accommodation to, 84; 
government neglect of, 82; grievances 
of, 208-11; independence as threat to, 
33; independence movement among, 
55, 193, 239; negotiations of, with 
government, 291, 292; as percentage of 
population, 81, 99; prejudice against, 
82; raids by, 9; society of, 82-83; un- 
der Spanish rule, 290; subgroups of, 82; 
subjugation of, 27; under United States 
rule, 28, 290 

motor vehicles: number of, 162 

Mount Apo, 69 

Mount Banahao, 15 

Mount Mayon, 69 

Mount Pinatubo: eruption of, xxiii, xxix 

Mount San Cristobal, 15 

Multilateral Aid Initiative, 126, 184-85, 

235; aid commitments under, 185 
multilateral organizations: loans from, 

123 

municipalities, 91-92, 207 
Muslims. See Moros 
mutiny of 1872, 17 

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the 
United States of America, 45, 236, 245, 
273 



Nacionalista Party, 30; in 1916 elections, 
33; reestablished, 219 

NAMFREL. See National Movement for 
Free Elections 

Narcotics Command, 295 

Nasutra. See National Sugar Trading Cor- 
poration 

National Alliance for Democracy, 229 
National Assembly, 202 
National Bureau of Investigation, 278, 
297 

National Capital Region Command, 263 
National Council of Churches in the 

Philippines (NCCP), 103 
National Defense Act (1935), 260 
National Defense College, 263-65 
National Democratic Front, 60, 226, 254 
National Development Corporation, 178 
National Economic and Development Au- 
thority (NEDA) (see also National Eco- 
nomic Council), 125; created, 128; 



responsibilities of, 128 

National Economic Council (see also Na- 
tional Economic and Development 
Authority), 128 

National Food Authority, 36-38; corrup- 
tion in, 138 

National Housing Authority, 73 

national identity, 76, 193 

National Intelligence and Security Au- 
thority, 249, 277; purged, 278 

National Intelligence Coordinating Agen- 
cy, 278 

National Livelihood Program, 252 

National Movement for Free Elections 
(NAMFREL), 59, 203, 223; in 1986 
elections, 61 

National Peasant Union (PKM), 45 

National Penitentiary, 300 

National Police Commission, 295, 296 

National Power Corporation, 157 

National Progressive Party, 30; in 1916 
elections, 33 

National Reconciliation and Development 
Program, 254 

National Security Council, 261-62; mem- 
bers of, 261 

National Security Council Secretariat, 
261 

National Service Law (1980), 256 

National Sugar Trading Corporation 
(Nasutra), 147 

nationalism, 15-17, 228, 232-33, 234 

Nationalist Party of the Philippines (Par- 
tido Nacionalista ng Pilipinas), 219 

Nationalist People's Party, xxxi 

Nation Watch, 229, 272 

navy, 266-68; chain of command in, 267; 
coast guard, 267; headquarters, 266; 
mission of, 266-67; plans to modernize, 
260; ships, 267; strength of, 256, 266 

NCCP. See National Council of Churches 
in the Philippines 

NDP. See net domestic product 

NEDA. See National Economic and De- 
velopment Authority 

Negritos, 76 

Negros: development of, 11 
net domestic product: growth of, 121 
Netherlands: investment by, 178; materiel 
from, 269 

New Armed Forces of the Philippines, 250 
New Nationalist Alliance (BAYAN), 60, 
287 



377 



Philippines: A Country Study 



New People's Army (NPA), xxvi, 50, 93, 
193, 211, 238, 243, 279; assassinations 
by, 288; atrocities committed by, 227; 
Chinese aid to, 237; church activists in, 
287; founded, 280; guerrilla units in, 
288; living conditions in, 289; opera- 
tions of, 288-89; organization of, 284; 
personnel in, xxix, 252, 282, 283; 
problems in, 230-31; role of, in anti- 
Marcos demonstrations, 59; Roman 
Catholic cooperation with, 192; support 
for, 283; tactics of, 288-89; targets of, 
288; weapons in, 289; women in, 289 
New Republic, 56 
New Rules of Court (1964), 198 
New Society, 52-53, 56, 122, 213 
New Society Movement (Kilusang Ba- 

gong Lipunan), 219 
newspapers, xxvii, 230 
New Tribes Mission, 104 
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, 162 
Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not), 18, 19 
Nonoc Mining and Industrial Corpora- 
tion, 155-57 
Northern Luzon Command, 262 
NPA. See New People's Army 
nuclear: power, 158; weapons, 234-35 



Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural 
Communities, 83-84; reservations for 
tribal groups, 85-86 

Officer Candidate School, 257, 258, 263 

officers: commissions of, 257; on compa- 
ny boards, 249; factions among, 257; 
in government positions, 249; mutiny 
by, 244; noncommissioned, 257 

official development assistance (ODA), 
184-85 

Offshore Patrol, 260 

oil {see also petroleum): exploration, 157; 
import of, 120, 239; production, 157 

Oil Price Stabilization Fund, 132 

Ongpin, Jaime, 217 

Operation Quick Count, 48 

Ople, Bias, 196, 219 

Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
291, 292 

Osmena, Sergio, 30, 32, 45; as president 
of the Commonwealth, 41; as speaker 
of the House, 33, 38 

Otis, Ewell S., 26; as member of First 



Philippine Commission, 27 
Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Mag- 
bubukid (PKM). See National Peasant 
Union 

Pampangan language, 77 

Pampangan people, 81 

Pangasinan language, 77 

Pan-Philippine Highway, 161 

Paris Club, 181, 182 

Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). 
See Communist Party of the Philippines 

Partido Nacionalista ng Pilipinas. See Na- 
tionalist Party of the Philippines 

Partido Nacional Progresista. See National 
Progressive Party 

Partido ng Bayan (Party of the Nation), 
220 

Partido Pilipino. See Filipino Party 
Party of the Nation. See Partido ng Bayan 
Paterno, Pedro, 26 

patron-client relationships, 90, 98; erosion 
of, xxvi, 36, 92; in Metro Manila, 95; 
in political parties, 31; in rural areas, 
92 

Payne Aldrich Tariff Act (1909), 34 
PCA. See Philippine Coconut Authority 
PDP. See Pilipino Democratic Party 
PDP— LABAN: created, 221; problems 
in, 221 

Peace and Order Councils, 255, 295 

Peace Corps volunteers, 234 

Peasant Movement of the Philippines 

(KMP), 170, 287 
peasant unrest, xxv, xxvi, 280, 282 
penal law, 297-98 

People's Anti-Japanese Army. See Huks 
People's Liberation Army. See Huks 
People's Power movement, xxiv, xxviii, 
58, 212, 229, 249; issues addressed by, 
171; role of churches in, 107; support- 
ers of, 58, 62 
Persian Gulf crisis, 132 
personal alliance systems, 88-91, 92; in 
armed forces, 258; Catholic Church 
as extension of, 101; compadrazgo, 89; 
in elections, 224; friendship, 90; kin- 
ship, 88, 90, 98, 224; patron-client sys- 
tem, 90, 95; suki, 89, 90; utang na bob, 
89, 90 
peso. See currency 

petroleum (see also oil): exploration, 120 
Philippine Air Lines, xxxi, 162 
Philippine Amanah Bank, 159, 160 



378 



Index 



Philippine archipelago: islands of, 68; 

land area of, 68; locations of, 68 
Philippine Assembly, 28 
Philippine Assistance Plan. See Multilater- 
al Aid Initiative 
Philippine Christian College, 104 
Philippine Civic Action Group, 261 
Philippine Coconut Authority (PC A), 140 
Philippine Commission, First (Schurman 
Commission), 27; recommendations of, 
27-28 

Philippine Commission, Second (Taft 
Commission), 28; economic develop- 
ment under, 34; Filipinos on, 32; pow- 
ers of, 28 

Philippine Constabulary, 269-71, 
295-96; abolished, 260, 269; assign- 
ments to, 263; corruption in, 252; 
as counterrevolutionary force, 36; 
equipped, 270; established, 269; func- 
tion of, 269-70; incorporated into 
armed forces, 47; intelligence gather- 
ing, 278; mission of, 296; as national 
police, 261, 270-71; organization of, 
296; organized, 28, 270; reorganized, 
44-45; role of, 246; specialized units of, 
270; strength of, 256 
Philippine Constabulary Special Action 

Force, 270 
Philippine Economic Journal, 167 
Philippine League. See Liga Filipina 
Philippine Military Academy, 157, 263 
Philippine National Bank, 135, 159, 160; 
difficulties in, 160; rehabilitation of, 
161 

Philippine National Police, 261, 270-71, 
300; training, 296-97 

Philippine National Railroad, 165 

Philippine Naval Patrol, 266 

Philippine Organic Act (1902), 28; Ro- 
man Catholic Church under, 29 

Philippine Overseas Employment Ad- 
ministration, 168 

Philippine Rehabilitation Act (1946), 43 

Philippine Scouts, 245 

Philippine Senate, 32-33; elections to, 
32-33 

Philippine Society and Revolution, 281 
Philippine Sugar Commission (Philsu- 

com), 146-47 
Philippine Trade Act (1946), 43; parity 

clause in, 43-44 
Philippine Trough, 69 



Philsucom. See Philippine Sugar Com- 
mission 
physicians, 111 

Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP), 221 

Pilipino language, 67; broadcasts in, 165; 
in education, 80, 111, 112, government 
emphasis on, 75-76; as lingua franca, 
81; in media, 80 

Pimentel, Aquilino, 207, 221 

pineapples: as foreign exchange earners, 
120, 136; plantations, 147, 178, 179 

PISTON, 170 

Plaza Miranda, 51, 220 

PKP. See Communist Party of the 
Philippines 

Policy Agenda for People-Powered De- 
velopment, 171 

political: demonstrations, 59-60; organi- 
zation, 5; prisoners, 227; problems, 
xxiii, xxiv, 230-32; unrest, xxvi, 51 

political parties, 212, 218-22; function of, 

218- 19; number of, 223; opposition, 

219- 20; organized, 28; patron-client 
relationships in, 31, 219; progovern- 
ment, 221-22; proliferation of, 191-92; 
system of, 30-32 

politicians, 212 
politics, 224-26 
polygamy, 83 

Popcorn. See Population Control Com- 
mission 

population, 280; age distribution in, xxiii, 
166; Catholics as percentage of, 98; of 
Chinese, 1 1 ; Chinese as percentage of, 
86; Chinese mestizos as percentage of, 
11-12; Christians as percentage of, 80; 
control, 74-75; density, xxiii, 70; dis- 
tribution, 70; and land reform, 73-74; 
of Metro Manila, 73; Moros as percen- 
tage of, 80, 98; in 1980, 70, 93; in 1985, 
93; in 1990, 70; percentage of, in 
poverty, 171; projected, 227; Protes- 
tants as percentage of, 104; in rural 
areas, 94, 136; upland tribal groups as 
percentage of, 83 

Population Control Commission (Pop- 
corn), 68, 74; and clergy, 74-75 

population growth, 36, 68, 70, 166; at- 
tempts to reduce, 74; of Caloocan, 73; 
impacts of, 135, 293; of Metro Ma- 
nila, 73; as cause of poverty, xxvi, 173; 
by province, 73; of Quezon City, 73; 
rate, 119 



379 



Philippines: A Country Study 



population statistics: birthrate, 70; death 
rate, 70; infant mortality, 70, 112; life 
expectancy, 112 

ports, 162; under Spanish rule, 10 

postal services, 165 

poverty, 4, 279; attempts to alleviate, 171; 

causes of, 172-73; extent of, 171-72; 

line, 1 7 1 ; population living in, 171; in 

rural areas, 171; workers living in, 171 
power, 157-58; generation, 126-27, 157, 

158; in rural areas, 158; shortages, 

xxxi, 155 

president: as commander in chief, 261; 
constraints on, 199; powers of, 199; 
qualifications of, 199; succession for, 
203; term of, 199 

Presidential Decree No. 27, 148 

Presidential Decree No. 765, 295 

Presidential Economic Staff, 128 

Presidential Proclamation No. 34, 195 

principales, xxv; characteristics of, 6 

prisons, 299-300 

private armies, 293 

private sector: in economic plans, 128 

privatization, 135 

Proclamation 1081, 52 

Proclamation 2045, 56 

propaganda movement, 17-20; or- 
ganized, 17 

Propagandists, 17-18; goals of, 18 

Protestants, 103-5; community welfare 
efforts by, 107; missionaries, 104; as 
percentage of population, 104; schools 
sponsored by, 110; views by, of social 
action, 107-8 

provinces, 207 

public order, 279-300 

public safety forces, 295-96 

public sector: deficit, 131; under martial 
law, 123 

Pulangi River (Rio Grande), 69 

Quezon, Aurora, 47 

Quezon, Manuel, 32; background of, 30; 

collaboration by, with Japanese, 42; 

death of, 41; as Senate president, 33 
Quezon administration, 38 
Quirino, Elpidio, 46 

radios, 165 

radio stations, 165, 230 



Radio Veritas, xxviii, 62 
railroad lines, 165 
rain forests, 69 

RAM. See Reform the Armed Forces 

Movement 
Ramos, Benigno, 37; exiled, 38 
Ramos, Fidel, 62, 214, 229, 249; as leader 

of military rebellion, xxviii, 244, 247; 

as president, xxx; reform of armed 

forces by, 250 
Reagan, Ronald, 60-61 
rebellions, 280; against Spanish rule, 8-9 
Recto, Claro, 228; collaboration by, with 

Japanese, 41 
Reform the Armed Forces Movement 

(RAM), 60, 227-28, 247, 257; formed, 

227; goals of, 228, 249; grievances of, 

251; role of, in People's Power, 249 
refugee camps, 237 
regional cooperation, 235 
religion (see also under individual sects), 

98- 108; ecumenical, 106-7; in educa- 
tion, 226-27; historical background, 

99- 100; indigenous, 102-3; role of, un- 
der Spanish rule, 6; syncretic, 99-100; 
traditional, 99 

religious: associations, 98; revivalist 

movements, 98-99 
Remnants of God, 228 
remontados, 15 

Reserve Officers Training Corps 
(ROTC) (see also Citizen Military 
Training), 257, 263 

resistance movements, 26-27, 36-38; 
deaths in, 26; against Spanish rule, 16; 
against United States rule, 16 

Retail Nationalization Act (1954), 177 

Revolutionary Government of the 
Visayas: proclaimed, 25 

Reyes, Ricardo, 284 

rice: area planted in, 120, 136; exports 
of, 139; farming, 85; farms, 147; im- 
ports of, 126, 139-40; as percentage of 
gross national product, 139; as percent- 
age of value added, 139; pricing poli- 
cy for, 138; production of, 139 

Rice Share Tenancy Act (1933), 38 

Rio Grande. See Pulangi River 

river systems, 69 

Rizal, Jose, 17-20, 21; background of, 
18; ethnicity of, 87; executed, 21; ex- 
iled, 20 

roads, 161 



380 



Index 



Rock Christ, 228 

Roman Catholic Church, 3, 100-101; 
Christmas celebration in, 101; commu- 
nity welfare efforts by, 107; conversions 
to, 100; critical collaboration by, xxvii, 
226; as extension of personal alliance 
system, 101; fiesta celebration in, 101; 
importance of, 100-101; influence of, 
xxvi, 197, 226; Lent in, 101; under 
martial law, 58-59; opposition of, to 
contraception, 173; political involve- 
ment of, xxviii, 192, 226, 287; schools 
sponsored by, 110; secularization un- 
der, 13; under United States rule, 29; 
visitation under, 13 

Roman Catholics: as percentage of popu- 
lation, 99; views by, of social action, 
107-8 

Romualdez, Benjamin, 54 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 194 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 22 

Rowe, James N., 289 

Roxas, Manuel, 38, 45; ambitions of, for 
presidency, 42; collaboration by, with 
Japanese, 41, 42; death of, 46; as presi- 
dent, 42 

Roxas administration, 42-43; policy of, 

toward Huks, 46 
Royal Company of the Philippines, 9,10 
rural areas: under Aquino, 138; com- 
munist insurgency in, 93; and econom- 
ic plans, 128; electricity in, 158; 
housing in, 70; improvement of infra- 
structure in, 47-48; living areas, 94; 
under Marcos, 138; military brutality 
in, 55; old-style politics in, 224-26; 
poor in, 4; population in, 94, 136; 
poverty in, 171; social patterns in, 
91-94; social values in, 92 

Sabah: claim to, 49, 50, 196, 236-37, 

248-49 
Sakdalistas, 37 

Sakdal Party: platform of, 37; rebellion 
by, 37-38 

Salamat, Hashim, 292 

Salas, Rodolfo, 255, 282, 283 

Salonga, Jovito, 220 

Sanchez, Agusto, 170 

Sandiganbayan, 57, 204, 295 

San Miguel Naval Communications Sta- 
tion, 276 



Santiago, Miriam Defensor, xxx 

savings, domestic, 132 

schools: Chinese, 86, 110; elementary, 
108; international, 110; private, 110; 
public, 77, 107; secondary, 108 

Schultz, George, 186 

Schurman, Jacob, 27 

Schurman Commission. See Philippine 
Commission, First 

Second Indochina War: Philippine in- 
volvement in, 50 

secularization, 13 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 

158, 177 
security agencies, 277-79 
security, internal, 278, 279-300 
Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) pro- 
gram, 259 
Senate, 201; members of, 202 
service sector, 158-66; finance, 158-61; 
as percentage of gross national product, 
120; work force in, 120, 166 
Seven Years' War, 8 
shantytowns, 73 
sharia, 83 

shipping industry, 162-65 
ships, 162, 267 
Sierra Madre, 69 

Silang, Diego: assassination of, 9; rebel- 
lion under, 8-9 

Silliman University, 104 

Sin, Jaime (cardinal), 59, 61, 61, 213; 
ethnicity of, 87; political role of, 192, 
226; role of, in People's Power, xxviii, 
107, 192 

Singapore: migration to, 74; military 

training in, 277 
Sin, Salvation, Life, and Property, 228 
Sison, Jose Maria, 254, 280, 284, 290; 

arrested, 282; writings of, 281 
sitios, 91 

snap election, xxviii, 60-61, 215, 222 

Socialist Party, 38 

Social Justice program, 38 

social organization, 88-91; in early his- 
tory, 5; in rural areas, 91-94; in urban 
areas, 94-96 

social security system, 115 

social values, 4, 88-91; litigiousness, 205; 
religious faith, 88, 98; respect for 
authority, 88; self-esteem, 88 

Soeharto, 236 

Southern Command, 262 



381 



Philippines: A Country Study 



Southern Luzon Command, 262 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 235 
Soviet Communist Party, 238 
Soviet Union: relations with, 238 
Spain: payment to, by United States, 25 
Spaniards: as Filipinos, 76 
Spanish language: education in, 111 
Spanish- American War: declared, 22; in- 
ternational involvement in, 23; Span- 
ish surrender in, 23-24 
Spanish rule, xxiv, 3; agricultural exports 
under, 9; Chinese under, 8; church- 
state relations under, 6; conversion to 
Christianity under, 5-6; cultural in- 
fluence of, 76; education under, 13-14; 
entrepot trade under, 8; indirect rule 
under, 6; industrial development un- 
der, 9; Moros under, 290; national 
resistance against, 16; objectives in, 5; 
ports under, 10; rebellions against, xxv, 
8-9; role of religion under, 6; trade 
volume under, 10 
Spratly Islands, 235-36, 248 
squatters, 73, 95-96, 172, 293; employ- 
ment of, 95; eviction of, 96; support of, 
96 

SRDP. See Self-Reliant Defense Posture 
statehood movement, 29-30 
Steinberg, David J., 101 
Strength of the People. See LAB AN 
strikes, 170, 171 

Struggle of Filipino Democrats (Laban ng 
Demokratikong Pilipino), xxxi, 221 

Sturtevant, David R., 35 

Subic Bay Naval Base, xxiii, xxix, xxxi, 
xxxii, 44, 185, 234, 276 

suffrage: age for, 222; men's, 31-32; 
universal, 222; women's, 32 

sugar, 143-47; barons, 11, 144; export of, 
10, 11, 120, 143-44; industry, 146; mo- 
nopoly, 54; prices, 144; production of, 

sugarcane: farms, 147; as foreign ex- 
change earner, 120, 136; growing 
region, 144 

Sugar Regulatory Authority, 147 

suki, 88 

sultans, 82, 106 

Sulu Archipelago: sultanates on, 76, 236, 
248 

Supreme Court, 204; established, 28; 
justices, 33, 204, 205; role of, 204 



Taal Volcano, 69 

Tadeo, Jaime, 171 

Tadtad (Chop-Chop), 228 

Taft, William Howard, 28; as governor 
of the Philippines, 29 

Taft Commission. See Philippine Com- 
mission, Second 

Tagalog language, 67, 77 

Tagalog people, 80 

Taiwan, 238; investment by, 178 

Tanada, Lorenzo, 221 

Tangulang, 37 

tariffs, 34, 121, 138; controls on, 174; 

protection, 176; revision of, 177 
Taruc, Luis, 41; jailed, 45; surrender of, 

48 

Task force Detainees, 229 
Tatad, Francisco, 219 
tax: evasion, 131; reform, 129, 131; sys- 
tem, 131 

taxes: export, 138; under International 
Monetary Fund plan, 127; local, 208; 
as percentage of gross national product, 
130 

telecommunications, 165 

telephones, 165 

televisions, 165 

television stations, 165, 230 

tenant movement, 38 

terrorism, 280 

terrorist organizations, 82 

Thailand: military training in, 277 

Tiamzon, Benito, 284 

Tiananmen Square massacre, 238 

tobacco, 10 

Tolentino, Arturo, 216, 250 
torture, 229 

tourism, 165-66; number of visitors, 165; 

reaction of, to coup attempts, 218; 

revenue from, 166 
trade (see also exports; imports): deficit, 

126; international, 173-77; policies, 

175-76; terms of, 175 
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines 

(TUCP), 169, 170 
Training Command, 263; mission of, 

263; organization of, 263 
transportation, 67, 161-65; lack of, 127, 

162; as unifying force, 77 
Treaty of Paris, 8, 25-26; Philippine reac- 
tion to, 25; terms of, 25 
True Decalogue, The, 24 



382 



Index 



TUCP. See Trade Union Congress of the 

Philippines 
Tydings-McDuffie Act, 39, 194; terms of, 

39 

typhoons, xxiii, 69, 70, 126, 139, 155 



underemployment, 167, 173; rate of, 

xxiii, 119 
Underwood Tariff Act, 34-35 
unemployment, 173; characteristics, 167; 
under Marcos, xxvii, 3, 59; rate of, 
xxiii, 119, 167; in urban areas, 95 
UNIDO. See United Nationalist Demo- 
cratic Organization 
Union for National Action. See United 

Nationalist Alliance 
United Brands, 179 
United Church of Christ in the Philip- 
pines, 103 
United Coconut Oil Mills, 143 
United Coconut Planters Bank, 143 
United Nationalist Alliance, 220 
United Nationalist Democratic Organi- 
zation (UNIDO), 58, 220 
United Nations, 232; refugee camps, 237 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, 

and Cultural Organization, 232 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization, 232 
United States, 22; aid from, 121, 235, 
259, 260; dependence on, 121, 173-74, 
232; economic relations with, 43-44, 
173-74; exports to, 34-35, 144-46, 
173-74; influences of, 212; investment 
by, 178, 235; loans from, 123, 183; 
materiel from, 266, 269, 277; migrants 
to, 67, 74, 167; military phaseout, 277; 
military training in, 277; missionaries 
from, 104; Moros under, 290-91; 
negotiations of, with Aguinaldo, 22-23; 
payment to Spain by, 25; personnel, as- 
sassinations of, 233-34; security agree- 
ments with, 44-45; support of, for 
Marcos, 60; trade quotas with, 146; 
trade with, 10 
United States Immigration and Nation- 
ality Act, 167 
United States Air Force Academy, 277 
United States Coast Guard Academy, 277 
United States Military Academy, 277 
United States military bases, 48-49, 245; 



conflict over, 186, 234, 238; in consti- 
tution, 197; conversion of, xxxi-xxxii, 
277; economic considerations of, 
186-87; negotiations on, 185; person- 
nel assigned to, 234; political economy 
of, 185-87; question of, 48-49; status 
of, 55; United States access to, 234; va- 
cated, xxx, xxxi 
United States Naval Academy, 277 
United States-Philippine relations, 24, 55, 
232, 233-35; cooperation in, 235; mili- 
tary, 273; problems in, 233 
United States-Philippine Trade Agree- 
ment (1955), 44 
United States rule, xxiv, 3; initiated, 25; 
military under, 245; Moros under, 27, 
28; national resistance against, xxv, 16, 
26-27, 245; Roman Catholic Church 
under, 29 
University of Santo Tomas, 14, 16 
University of the Philippines, 94, 109 
upland tribal groups: autonomy for, 208; 
culture of, 86; folk art of, 84; as per- 
cent of population, 84; reservations for, 
85-86 

uprising of 1896, 21-22 

urban areas: buildings in, 70; household 
size in, 95; poverty in, 4, 172, 173; so- 
cial patterns in, 94-96; squatters in, 95, 
172; traditional patterns of behavior in, 
95; unemployment in, 95 

utang na bob, 61, 201 



value added: in agriculture, 139; to 
livestock, 151 

Vargas, Jose: collaboration by, with 
Japanese, 42 

Ver, Fabian, 3, 54, 206, 214, 249, 278; 
involvement of, in Aquino assassina- 
tion, 247 

vice president, 199 

Vickberg, Edgar, 12 

Vietnam, 2337 

Vietnam War, 237, 261 

vigilante groups, 93, 228-29, 272; exe- 
cutions by, 229; guidelines for, 229; 
rituals of, 228, 229 

Visayan Islands, 68 

Visayas Command, 262 

visitation, 13 

volcanoes, 69 



383 



Philippines: A Country Study 



voting, 222-24; obstacles to, 222; rates, 
xxx, 222 



Wallace Air Station, 276 

Waray-Waray language, 77 

Waray-Waray people, 80-81 

Welga ng Bayan, 170 

Western Command, 262 

Western Mindanao Region: literacy rate 

in, 109-110 
Westinghouse Corporation, xxxi, 181 
wildlife, 69 
Wilson, Woodrow, 32 
Wolff, Leon, 25 

women: in armed forces, 258, 263; and 
divorce, 98; education levels of, 97; 
equal rights of, 97, 98; as family trea- 
surers, 98; household responsibilities 
of, 98; life expectancy for, 112; litera- 
cy levels of, 96; in Moro society, 84; 
in New People's Army, 289; profes- 
sions of, 97; role of, 96-98; and sexual 
double standard, 98; in work force, 166 

Women's Auxiliary Corps, 258, 263 

Wood, Leonard, 33 

work force, 166-68; in agriculture, 119, 



136, 166; in fishing, 136; in forestry, 
136; in industry, 119; in informal sec- 
tor, 166-67; in manufacturing, 119-20, 
154, 166; poverty among, 172; partic- 
ipation rate, 166; in service sector, 120, 
166-67; women in, 166 

World Bank, 185, 232; aid from, 184; 
loan disbursements frozen by, 131-32; 
loans from, 123, 179, 182; reaction of, 
to land reform program, 149-50; trade 
recommendations by, 176 

World Development Report, 1990, 172 

World Health Organization, 232 

World Vision, 104 

World War II, 39-41, 246 



Young Officers' Union (YOU), 228, 257; 

coup attempt by, 251 
Yniguez, Nicanor, 219 
Ysagun, Felix Manalo, 102 

Zaide, Gregorio, 26 
Zamboanga port, 10, 162 
Zamora, Jacinto, 17 



384 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



DjO-OD 


Afghanistan 


DDU-o/ 


Lrreece 


550-98 


Albania 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-59 


Angola 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-151 


Honduras 


ODU-loy 


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OOU-lOD 


Hungary 


550-176 


Austria 


550-21 


India 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-68 


Iran 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-31 


Iraq 


ccn ICQ 


Bulgaria 


c crv etc 


Israel 


550-61 


Burma 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


<^n 77 


^>nne 


^^n fti 


Korea, North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


on 


Costa Rica 


DDK)— oj 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic and 


550-76 


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Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



385 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


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550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


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550-72 


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550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







386 



\ 





PIN: 004244^000 



